#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess);
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
-static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_mac,
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
+ tls13_enc,
tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ tls13_setup_key_block,
+ tls13_generate_master_secret,
+ tls13_change_cipher_state,
+ tls13_final_finish_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
+ tls13_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
- | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
void tls1_free(SSL *s)
{
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
ssl3_free(s);
}
0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
};
-static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
- 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
- 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
-
- /*
- * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
- * via an explicit callback or parameters.
- */
- 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
-};
-
static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
* parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
* so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
*/
-static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
- const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
+int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
+ size_t *num_curves)
{
size_t pcurveslen = 0;
+
if (sess) {
- *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
- pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
+ *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
+ pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
} else {
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
default:
- *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
- pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
+ *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
+ pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*num_curves = 0;
return 0;
- } else {
- *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
- return 1;
}
+ *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
+ return 1;
}
/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
-static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
+int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
if (curve[0])
const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
int k;
+
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
return -1;
* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
*/
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
* Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
* but s->options is a long...
*/
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist
- (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
- &num_supp))
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
+ &supp, &num_supp))
/* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist
- (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
+ &pref, &num_pref))
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
- /*
- * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
- * are allowed.
- */
- if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
- supp = eccurves_all;
- num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
- } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
- (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
- pref = eccurves_all;
- num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
- }
-
- k = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
+ for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
+
for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
if (nmatch == k) {
int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
+
return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
}
k++;
* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
* supported (see RFC4492).
*/
- if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
- pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
+ pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
+ num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
if (*comp_id == *pformats)
break;
return 1;
}
-static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
- size_t *num_formats)
+void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+ size_t *num_formats)
{
/*
* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
*/
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
- *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
+ *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
+ *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
} else {
*pformats = ecformats_default;
/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-/*
- * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
- */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
-#else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+/* Default sigalg schemes */
+static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
-#else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
-#endif
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
-#else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
#endif
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
-#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
-
-static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
#endif
};
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
};
#endif
-size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
+
+typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st {
+ uint16_t sigalg;
+ int hash;
+ int sig;
+} SIGALG_LOOKUP;
+
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_EC},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_EC},
+#endif
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512},
+ {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001}
+#endif
+};
+
+static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(uint16_t sigalg)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
+
+ for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i++, curr++) {
+ if (curr->sigalg == sigalg)
+ return curr->hash;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(uint16_t sigalg)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
+
+ for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i++, curr++) {
+ if (curr->sigalg == sigalg)
+ return curr->sig;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
{
/*
* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
- return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+ return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
- return 2;
+ return 1;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
- *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
- return 2;
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
+ return 1;
}
#endif
- /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
- if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
+ /*
+ * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
+ * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
+ * determining which shared algorithm to use.
+ */
+ if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
} else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else {
*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+ return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
}
}
/*
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
- * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
+ * s.
*/
-int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
- const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, unsigned int sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+ const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ char sigalgstr[2];
size_t sent_sigslen, i;
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ int peer_sigtype;
/* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1)
+ if (pkeyid == -1)
return -1;
/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
- if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
+ peer_sigtype = tls_sigalg_get_sig(sig);
+ /* RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS */
+ if (pkeyid != peer_sigtype
+ && (peer_sigtype != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
if (curve_id[0])
return 0;
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
- if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
+ if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha256) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
} else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
- if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
+ if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha384) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
return 0;
#endif
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
- sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
- for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
- if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
+ if (sig == *sent_sigs)
break;
}
/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
if (i == sent_sigslen
- && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
+ && (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha1
|| s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
- if (*pmd == NULL) {
+ md = tls12_get_hash(tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig));
+ if (md == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
+ /*
+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
+ * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
+ */
+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
- EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
+ EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
+ (void *)sigalgstr)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
*/
- s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_md = md;
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigtype = peer_sigtype;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
+{
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigtype == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+ *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigtype;
return 1;
}
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
-static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
+int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
{
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
return 0;
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
}
-static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
+/* Initialise digests to default values */
+void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
- unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
- if (u1 < u2)
- return -1;
- else if (u1 > u2)
- return 1;
+ const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
else
- return 0;
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
+#endif
}
-/*
- * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
- * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
- * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
- * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
- * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
- * occurred.
- */
-static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
+int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
- PACKET extensions = *packet;
- size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
- unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* First pass: count the extensions. */
- while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
- unsigned int type;
- PACKET extension;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
- !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
- goto done;
- }
- num_extensions++;
- }
-
- if (num_extensions <= 1)
- return 1;
+ int al;
+ size_t i;
- extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
- if (extension_types == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
+ /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+ s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+ /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
}
- /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
- extensions = *packet;
- for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
- PACKET extension;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
- !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
- /* This should not happen. */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto done;
+ /* If sigalgs received process it. */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
}
+ /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
+ if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
+ SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssl_set_default_md(s);
}
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto done;
- }
- /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
- qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
- for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
- if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
- goto done;
- }
- ret = 1;
- done:
- OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
- return ret;
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
}
-int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+/*-
+ * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
+ *
+ * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
+ * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ * point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
+ * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
+ * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
+ * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
+ * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
+ * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
+ * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
+ * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
+ */
+TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
+ SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
- size_t num_curves = 0;
- int using_ecc = 0;
-
- /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
- if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- int i;
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
- using_ecc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- } else if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
- * change if we implement DH key shares
- */
- using_ecc = 1;
- }
-#else
- if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- /* Shouldn't happen! */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
-
- /* Add RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
- goto done;
-
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
- strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Add SRP username if there is one */
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
- /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
- /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
- || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
- strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
+ int retv;
+ size_t size;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (using_ecc) {
- /*
- * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
- */
- const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
- size_t num_formats;
- size_t i;
+ *ret = NULL;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
+ /*
+ * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
+ * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
+ * resumption.
+ */
+ if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
+ return TICKET_NONE;
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
- /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
+ ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
+ if (!ticketext->present)
+ return TICKET_NONE;
+ size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
+ if (size == 0) {
/*
- * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
+ * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
+ * one.
*/
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
- pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- pcurvestmp = pcurves;
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
- /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Copy curve ID if supported */
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
- if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- size_t ticklen;
- if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
- ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
- else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
- ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
- s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
- if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
- } else
- ticklen = 0;
- if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
- goto skip_ext;
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
- ticklen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+ return TICKET_EMPTY;
}
- skip_ext:
-
- if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- size_t salglen;
- const unsigned char *salg;
-
- salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
- /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- int i;
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
- /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
- /* Sub-packet for the ids */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
- unsigned char *idbytes;
- int idlen;
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
-
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
- if (idlen <= 0
- /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
- || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
- unsigned char *extbytes;
- int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
-
- if (extlen < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
- || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
- != extlen) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
/*
- * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
- * for Next Protocol Negotiation
+ * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
+ * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
+ * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
+ * calculate the master secret later.
*/
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
-#endif
- /*
- * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
- * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
- * (see longer comment below)
- */
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
- /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
- s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
- int i, ct;
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
- for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
- prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
- if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
- /* Add an empty use_mki value */
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
- custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
- /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
- if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
- if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
- size_t i, sharessent = 0;
-
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
- /* supported_versions extension */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
- if (reason != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
- * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
- * reviewed later.
- */
- for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
- if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
-
- /* key_share extension */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
- /* Extension data sub-packet */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
- * now, just send one
- */
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
- if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- unsigned int curve_id = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
- size_t encodedlen;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- /* Shouldn't happen! */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Generate a key for this key_share */
- curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
- key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
- if (key_share_key == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Encode the public key. */
- encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
- &encodedPoint);
- if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Create KeyShareEntry */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint,
- encodedlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share
- * we're going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY
- * For now we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
- */
- s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
- sharessent++;
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- }
- }
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
- * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
- * appear last.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
- unsigned char *padbytes;
- size_t hlen;
-
- if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
- hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
- if (hlen >= 4)
- hlen -= 4;
- else
- hlen = 0;
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
- }
- }
-
- done:
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-#endif
-
- if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- goto done;
-
- if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
- && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (using_ecc) {
- const unsigned char *plist;
- size_t plistlen;
- /*
- * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
- */
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
- * extension
- */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
- * later
- */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
- const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
- 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
- 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
- 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
- 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
- 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
- 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
- };
- if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
- const unsigned char *npa;
- unsigned int npalen;
- int r;
-
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
- s->
- ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
- unsigned char *encodedPoint;
- size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
-
- ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
- if (ckey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
-
- /* Generate encoding of server key */
- encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
- if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- return 0;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
-
- if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
- /*
- * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
- * for other cases too.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- else {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- done:
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
- * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
- * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
- * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
- */
-static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
- PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
- || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
- do {
- /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
- || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
-
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
- &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
- * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
- * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
- */
-static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
-{
- const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
- unsigned char selected_len = 0;
-
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
- int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
-
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
- } else {
- *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/*-
- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
- * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
- * SNI,
- * elliptic_curves
- * ec_point_formats
- *
- * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
- * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
- * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
- * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
- */
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
-{
- unsigned int type;
- PACKET sni, tmppkt;
- size_t ext_len;
-
- static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
- 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
- 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
- 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
- 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
-
- 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
- 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
- 0x01, /* 1 point format */
- 0x00, /* uncompressed */
- /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
- 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
- 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
- 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
- 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
-
- /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
- static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
-
- tmppkt = hello->extensions;
-
- if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
- return;
- }
-
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
-
- ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
- sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
-
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
- ext_len);
-}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-
-/*
- * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
- * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
- *
- * Returns
- * 1 on success
- * 0 on failure
- */
-static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- PACKET supported_groups_list;
- RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
- hello->num_extensions,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
-
- if (suppgroups == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
- &supported_groups_list)
- || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
- || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit
- && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
- &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
- * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
- * used.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is 1)
- * 0 otherwise
- */
-static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
- const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
- int checkallow)
-{
- size_t i;
-
- if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
- return 0;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
- unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
- if (group_id == share_id
- && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
- SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (i == num_groups) {
- /* Not in list */
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
- * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
- * object as required.
- *
- * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
- * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
- * ignored.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
- * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
- */
-static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
-{
- size_t loop;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- s->servername_done = 0;
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
- s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
- s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-#endif
-
- s->srtp_profile = NULL;
-
- /*
- * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
- * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
- */
- if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
- * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
- * resumption.
- */
- for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
- RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
- s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
- &currext->data, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- }
-/*-
- * The servername extension is treated as follows:
- *
- * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- * the value of the Host: field.
- * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
- * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
- * extension.
- * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
- *
- */
-
- else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- unsigned int servname_type;
- PACKET sni, hostname;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
- /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
- || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
- * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
- * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
- * such.
- * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
- * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
- * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
- *
- * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
- * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
- || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
- || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->servername_done = 1;
- } else {
- /*
- * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
- * fall back to a full handshake.
- */
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
- && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
- strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- PACKET srp_I;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
- return 0;
-
- if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
- * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
- */
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- PACKET ec_point_format_list;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
- &ec_point_format_list)
- || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->
- session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
- PACKET supported_sig_algs;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
- &supported_sig_algs)
- || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
- || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
- PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
- (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
- return 0;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- const unsigned char *ext_data;
- PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
- (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
- * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
- */
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
- OCSP_RESPID_free);
- if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
- }
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
- PACKET responder_id;
- const unsigned char *id_data;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
- &responder_id)
- || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
- (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
- if (id == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Read in request_extensions */
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
- &currext->data, &exts))
- return 0;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
- ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
- X509_EXTENSION_free);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
- (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
- || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- } else
-#endif
- {
- /*
- * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
- */
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
- && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- /*-
- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
- * renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
- *
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.)
- */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-#endif
-
- else if (currext->type
- == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
- && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
- &currext->data, al))
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
- && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
- &currext->data, al))
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
- else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
- && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
- unsigned int group_id;
- PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
- const unsigned char *curves;
- size_t num_curves;
- int group_nid, found = 0;
- unsigned int curve_flags;
-
- /* Sanity check */
- if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
- &encoded_pt)
- || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
- * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
- */
- if (found)
- continue;
-
- /* Check this share is in supported_groups */
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &num_curves)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 0)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Find a share that we can use */
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 1)) {
- /* Share not suitable */
- continue;
- }
-
- group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
-
- if (group_nid == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
- /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
- EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
-
- if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- EVP_PKEY_free(key);
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
- } else {
- /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
- if (pctx == NULL
- || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
- group_nid) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- pctx = NULL;
- }
- s->s3->group_id = group_id;
-
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
- PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
- PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- found = 1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
- * tls_check_client_ems_support()
- */
-
- /*
- * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
- * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
- * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
- * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
- * ServerHello may be later returned.
- */
- else if (!s->hit) {
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
-
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
- * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
- * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
- * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
- */
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
-{
- int al = -1;
- custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/*
- * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
- * fill the length of the block.
- */
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
-{
- PACKET tmp_protocol;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
- || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
- unsigned int length, type, size;
- int tlsext_servername = 0;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
- const unsigned char *data;
- PACKET spkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
- || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- tlsext_servername = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
- || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->hit) {
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
- ecpointformatlist_length;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- /*
- * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
- * request message.
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
- /*
- * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
- * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
- * need to let control continue to flow to that.
- */
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
- s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
- /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
- if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
- s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
- }
- s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
- if (size > 0) {
- s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
- if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* The data must be valid */
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
- size,
- s->
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
- SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
- * a single Serverhello
- */
- OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-#endif
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
- unsigned len;
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /*-
- * The extension data consists of:
- * uint16 list_length
- * uint8 proto_length;
- * uint8 proto[proto_length];
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
- /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
- && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
- (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
- if (!s->hit)
- s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
- && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- unsigned int group_id;
- PACKET encoded_pt;
- EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
-
- /* Sanity check */
- if (ckey == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
- /*
- * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
- * key_share!
- */
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
- PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- /*
- * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
- * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
- */
- } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname =
- OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ri_check:
-
- /*
- * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
- * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
- * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
- * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
- * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
- */
- if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
- * original session.
- */
- if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
- !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
- * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
- /*
- * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
- * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
-#endif
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-/* Initialise digests to default values */
-void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
-{
- const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
- else
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
-#endif
-}
-
-int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
-{
- int al;
- size_t i;
-
- /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
- s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
- /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
- }
-
- /* If sigalgs received process it. */
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
- if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- ssl_set_default_md(s);
- }
- return 1;
- err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Upon success, returns 1.
- * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
- */
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
-{
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
- /*
- * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
- * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
- * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
- * influence which certificate is sent
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int ret;
- CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
- certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (certpkey != NULL) {
- /*
- * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
- * et al can pick it up.
- */
- s->cert->key = certpkey;
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- switch (ret) {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- default:
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
- * must contain uncompressed.
- */
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
- /* we are using an ECC cipher */
- size_t i;
- unsigned char *list;
- int found_uncompressed = 0;
- list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
- if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
- found_uncompressed = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found_uncompressed) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- /*
- * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
- * that we don't receive a status message
- */
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- int al = -1;
- if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
- return 1;
- if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
- * type and return it.
- *
- * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
- * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
- * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
- *
- * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
- */
-RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
- unsigned int type)
-{
- size_t loop;
-
- for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
- if (exts[loop].type == type)
- return &exts[loop];
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
- *
- * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
- * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- * point to the resulting session.
- *
- * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
- * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
- * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
- * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
- * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
- * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
- * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
- *
- * Side effects:
- * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
- * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
- * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
- * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
- * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
- * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- */
-int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
- SSL_SESSION **ret)
-{
- int retv;
- const unsigned char *etick;
- size_t size;
- RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
-
- *ret = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-
- /*
- * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
- * resumption.
- */
- if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
- return 0;
-
- ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
- hello->num_extensions,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
- if (ticketext == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
- if (size == 0) {
- /*
- * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
- * one.
- */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 1;
- }
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
- /*
- * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
- * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
- * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
- * calculate the master secret later.
- */
- return 2;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- return -1;
- }
- retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
- hello->session_id_len, ret);
+ retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
+ hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
switch (retv) {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 2;
+ case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- return 3;
+ case TICKET_SUCCESS:
+ return TICKET_SUCCESS;
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 3;
+ case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+ return TICKET_SUCCESS;
- default: /* fatal error */
- return -1;
+ default:
+ return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
}
}
-/*
- * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
- * ClientHello and we can support it
- * Returns:
- * 1 on success
- * 0 on error
- */
-int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
-{
- RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
-
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
-
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
- || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
- return 1;
-
- emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
- hello->num_extensions,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
-
- /*
- * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
- * client doesn't support EMS.
- */
- if (emsext == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- /* The extensions must always be empty */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
- return 0;
-
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
/*-
* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
- * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
*/
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
- size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
- size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
+TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
+ size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+ size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
+ int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
+ TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
- return -2;
+ return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
- ret = -2;
+ ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto err;
}
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
+ int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
if (rv == 0) {
- ret = 2;
+ ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
- sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
- ret = 2;
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
+ ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
- if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
- etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
- 0) {
+ tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
+ etick
+ + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
}
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
if (eticklen <=
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
- ret = 2;
+ ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- return 2;
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
(int)eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- return -1;
+ return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- return 2;
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
slen += declen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
- return 4;
+ return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
else
- return 3;
+ return TICKET_SUCCESS;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
- return 2;
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return ret;
}
-/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
-
-typedef struct {
- int nid;
- int id;
-} tls12_lookup;
-
-static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
- {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
- {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
-};
-
-static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
- {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
- {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
- {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
- {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
-};
-
-static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
-{
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- if (table[i].nid == nid)
- return table[i].id;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
+ const EVP_MD *md, int *ispss)
{
+ int md_id, sig_id;
size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- if ((table[i].id) == id)
- return table[i].nid;
- }
- return NID_undef;
-}
-
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- int sig_id, md_id;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
- if (md_id == -1)
- return 0;
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
- if (sig_id == -1)
- return 0;
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
+ md_id = EVP_MD_type(md);
+ sig_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pk);
+ if (md_id == NID_undef)
return 0;
+ /* For TLS 1.3 only allow RSA-PSS */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ sig_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
- return 1;
-}
+ for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i++, curr++) {
+ /* If key type is RSA also match PSS signature type */
+ if (curr->hash == md_id && (curr->sig == sig_id
+ || (sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA && curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS))) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
+ return 0;
+ *ispss = curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
-{
- return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
+ return 0;
}
typedef struct {
int nid;
int secbits;
int md_idx;
- unsigned char tlsext_hash;
} tls12_hash_info;
static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
- {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
- {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
+ {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX},
+ {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX},
+ {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX},
+ {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX},
+ {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX},
+ {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX},
};
-static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
+static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(int hash_nid)
{
unsigned int i;
- if (hash_alg == 0)
+ if (hash_nid == NID_undef)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
- if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
+ if (tls12_md_info[i].nid == hash_nid)
return tls12_md_info + i;
}
return NULL;
}
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid)
{
const tls12_hash_info *inf;
- if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
+ if (hash_nid == NID_md5 && FIPS_mode())
return NULL;
- inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
+ inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_nid);
if (!inf)
return NULL;
return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
}
-static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
+static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
{
- switch (sig_alg) {
+ switch (sig_nid) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ /*
+ * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
+ * this will need to be updated.
+ */
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
- case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
- case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
#endif
}
/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
- int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
+ int *psignhash_nid, uint16_t data)
{
int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
return;
if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
- hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
+ hash_nid = tls_sigalg_get_hash(data);
if (phash_nid)
*phash_nid = hash_nid;
}
if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
- sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
+ sign_nid = tls_sigalg_get_sig(data);
if (psign_nid)
*psign_nid = sign_nid;
}
}
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
-static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, unsigned int ptmp)
{
/* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
- const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
+ const tls12_hash_info *hinf
+ = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp));
+ unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
+
if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
return 0;
/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
- if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+ if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp)) == -1)
return 0;
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
- return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
+ sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
+ return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)sigalgstr);
}
/*
void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
{
- const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+ const uint16_t *sigalgs;
size_t i, sigalgslen;
int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
/*
* RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
* down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
*/
- sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
- switch (sigalgs[1]) {
+ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
+ switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+ /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
have_rsa = 1;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
- if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
have_dsa = 1;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
have_ecdsa = 1;
break;
#endif
}
int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
+ const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
{
size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
- if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
+ for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
+ if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
return 0;
}
}
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
- const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
- const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
+ const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
+ const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
{
- const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
+ const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
- for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
+ for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
- if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
continue;
- for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
- if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
+ for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
+ if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
nmatch++;
if (shsig) {
- shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
- shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
+ shsig->rsigalg = *ptmp;
tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
&shsig->sign_nid,
- &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
+ &shsig->signandhash_nid, *ptmp);
shsig++;
}
break;
/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
- const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
+ const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
size_t nmatch;
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
} else
- conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+ conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
+ unsigned int stmp;
+ size_t size, i;
+
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
return 1;
if (!c)
return 0;
+ size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+
+ /* Invalid data length */
+ if ((size & 1) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ size >>= 1;
+
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
+ * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
return 0;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
- memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
+ for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
+
+ if (i != size)
+ return 0;
+
return 1;
}
for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
- idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
+ /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ continue;
+ idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sign_nid);
if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
- md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
+ md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->hash_nid);
pmd[idx] = md;
pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
}
/*
- * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
- * the certificate for signing.
+ * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
+ * use the certificate for signing.
*/
- if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
+ if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+ && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
* supported it stays as NULL.
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
- const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
- size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+ uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
return 0;
if (idx >= 0) {
- idx <<= 1;
- if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
+ if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
return 0;
psig += idx;
if (rhash)
- *rhash = psig[0];
+ *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
if (rsig)
- *rsig = psig[1];
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
+ *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
+ tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, *psig);
}
return (int)numsigalgs;
}
if (psignhash)
*psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
if (rsig)
- *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
+ *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->rsigalg & 0xff);
if (rhash)
- *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
+ *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->rsigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
}
{
if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
+ *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
} else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
*psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
} else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
{
- unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
- int rhash, rsign;
+ uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
size_t i;
+
if (salglen & 1)
return 0;
- sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
+ sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
if (sigalgs == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
- rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
- rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
+ size_t j;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
+ int md_id = *psig_nids++;
+ int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
+
+ for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ j++, curr++) {
+ if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
+ *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
- if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
+ if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
goto err;
- *sptr++ = rhash;
- *sptr++ = rsign;
}
if (client) {
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
} else {
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
}
return 1;
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
int default_nid;
- unsigned char rsign = 0;
+ int rsign = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
default_nid = 0;
/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
switch (idx) {
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
break;
*/
if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
size_t j;
- const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
- for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
- if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
+ const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
+ for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
+ if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p) == NID_sha1
+ && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p) == rsign)
break;
}
if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
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