Fix memory leak with client auth.
[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
index 43ca29a..31fc70e 100644 (file)
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@@ -122,6 +123,8 @@ const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
                                const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
                                SSL_SESSION **psess);
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 #endif
 
 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
@@ -136,6 +139,50 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
        TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
        TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
        tls1_alert_code,
+       tls1_export_keying_material,
+       0,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
+       };
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
+       tls1_enc,
+       tls1_mac,
+       tls1_setup_key_block,
+       tls1_generate_master_secret,
+       tls1_change_cipher_state,
+       tls1_final_finish_mac,
+       TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+       tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+       TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       tls1_alert_code,
+       tls1_export_keying_material,
+       SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
+       };
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
+       tls1_enc,
+       tls1_mac,
+       tls1_setup_key_block,
+       tls1_generate_master_secret,
+       tls1_change_cipher_state,
+       tls1_final_finish_mac,
+       TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+       tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+       TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       tls1_alert_code,
+       tls1_export_keying_material,
+       SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+               |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
        };
 
 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
@@ -170,6 +217,7 @@ void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
        }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
 static int nid_list[] =
        {
                NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
@@ -196,9 +244,58 @@ static int nid_list[] =
                NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
                NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
                NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
-               NID_secp521r1  /* secp521r1 (25) */     
+               NID_secp521r1,  /* secp521r1 (25) */    
+               NID_brainpoolP256r1,  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */        
+               NID_brainpoolP384r1,  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */        
+               NID_brainpoolP512r1  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */  
        };
-       
+
+
+static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = 
+       {
+       TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
+       TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
+       TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
+       };
+
+static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
+       {
+               0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
+               0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
+               0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */      
+               0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 
+               0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
+               0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+               0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */        
+               0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+               0,9,  /* sect283k1 (9) */
+               0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+               0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */        
+               0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
+               0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+               0,8,  /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
+               0,6,  /* sect233k1 (6) */
+               0,7,  /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
+               0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
+               0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+               0,4,  /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
+               0,5,  /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
+               0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+               0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
+               0,1,  /* sect163k1 (1) */
+               0,2,  /* sect163r1 (2) */
+               0,3,  /* sect163r2 (3) */
+               0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+               0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
+               0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
+       };
+
+static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
+       {
+               0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+               0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+       };
+
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
        {
        /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
@@ -263,10 +360,479 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
                return 24;
        case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */       
                return 25;
+       case NID_brainpoolP256r1:  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+               return 26;
+       case NID_brainpoolP384r1:  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+               return 27;
+       case NID_brainpoolP512r1:  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+               return 28;
+       default:
+               return 0;
+               }
+       }
+/* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
+ * preferred list
+ */
+static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
+                                       const unsigned char **pcurves,
+                                       size_t *pcurveslen)
+       {
+       if (sess)
+               {
+               *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+               *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+               return;
+               }
+       /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+       switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
+               {
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+               *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+               *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+               break;
+
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+               *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+               *pcurveslen = 2;
+               break;
+
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+               *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
+               *pcurveslen = 2;
+               break;
        default:
+               *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+               *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+               }
+       if (!*pcurves)
+               {
+               *pcurves = eccurves_default;
+               *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
+               }
+       }
+/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
+int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *curves;
+       size_t curveslen, i;
+       unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+       if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
+               return 0;
+       /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
+       if (suiteb_flags)
+               {
+               unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+               if (p[1])
+                       return 0;
+               if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+                       {
+                       if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+                               return 0;
+                       }
+               else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+                       {
+                       if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+                               return 0;
+                       }
+               else    /* Should never happen */
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
+       for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
+               {
+               if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
+                       return 1;
+               }
+       return 0;
+       }
+
+/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
+ * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * an EC tmp key.
+ */
+
+int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
+       size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
+       int k;
+       /* Can't do anything on client side */
+       if (s->server == 0)
+               return -1;
+       if (nmatch == -2)
+               {
+               if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+                       {
+                       /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we 
+                        * already know these are acceptable due to previous
+                        * checks.
+                        */
+                       unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+                       if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+                               return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
+                       if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+                               return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
+                       /* Should never happen */
+                       return NID_undef;
+                       }
+               /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+               nmatch = 0;
+               }
+       tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
+                               &supp, &supplen);
+       tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
+                               &pref, &preflen);
+       preflen /= 2;
+       supplen /= 2;
+       k = 0;
+       for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
+               {
+               const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
+               for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
+                       {
+                       if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
+                               {
+                               if (nmatch == k)
+                                       {
+                                       int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
+                                       return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
+                                       }
+                               k++;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+       if (nmatch == -1)
+               return k;
+       return 0;
+       }
+
+int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+                       int *curves, size_t ncurves)
+       {
+       unsigned char *clist, *p;
+       size_t i;
+       /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
+        * while curve ids < 32 
+        */
+       unsigned long dup_list = 0;
+       clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
+       if (!clist)
+               return 0;
+       for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
+               {
+               unsigned long idmask;
+               int id;
+               id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
+               idmask = 1L << id;
+               if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
+                       {
+                       OPENSSL_free(clist);
+                       return 0;
+                       }
+               dup_list |= idmask;
+               s2n(id, p);
+               }
+       if (*pext)
+               OPENSSL_free(*pext);
+       *pext = clist;
+       *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
+       return 1;
+       }
+
+#define MAX_CURVELIST  28
+
+typedef struct
+       {
+       size_t nidcnt;
+       int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
+       } nid_cb_st;
+
+static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+       {
+       nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
+       size_t i;
+       int nid;
+       char etmp[20];
+       if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
+               return 0;
+       if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+               return 0;
+       memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+       etmp[len] = 0;
+       nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
+       if (nid == NID_undef)
+               nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
+       if (nid == NID_undef)
+               nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
+       if (nid == NID_undef)
+               return 0;
+       for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
+               if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
+                       return 0;
+       narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
+       return 1;
+       }
+/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
+int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 
+                               const char *str)
+       {
+       nid_cb_st ncb;
+       ncb.nidcnt = 0;
+       if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
+               return 0;
+       if (pext == NULL)
+               return 1;
+       return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
+       }
+/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
+static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
+                               EC_KEY *ec)
+       {
+       int is_prime, id;
+       const EC_GROUP *grp;
+       const EC_METHOD *meth;
+       if (!ec)
+               return 0;
+       /* Determine if it is a prime field */
+       grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+       if (!grp)
+               return 0;
+        meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
+       if (!meth)
+               return 0;
+        if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+               is_prime = 1;
+       else
+               is_prime = 0;
+       /* Determine curve ID */
+       id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+       id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
+       /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
+       if (id)
+               {
+               curve_id[0] = 0;
+               curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               curve_id[0] = 0xff;
+               if (is_prime)
+                       curve_id[1] = 0x01;
+               else
+                       curve_id[1] = 0x02;
+               }
+       if (comp_id)
+               {
+               if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
+                       return 0;
+               if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
+                       {
+                       if (is_prime)
+                               *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+                       else
+                               *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+                       }
+               else
+                       *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }
+/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
+static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
+                       unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *p;
+       size_t plen, i;
+       int j;
+       /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
+        * is supported (see RFC4492).
+        */
+       if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+               {
+               p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+               plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+               for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
+                       {
+                       if (*comp_id == *p)
+                               break;
+                       }
+               if (i == plen)
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       if (!curve_id)
+               return 1;
+       /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
+       for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
+               {
+               tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
+               for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
+                       {
+                       if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
+                               break;
+                       }
+               if (i == plen)
+                       return 0;
+               /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
+               if (!s->server)
+                       return 1;
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }
+
+static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+                                       size_t *pformatslen)
+       {
+       /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
+        * use default */
+       if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+               {
+               *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+               *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               *pformats = ecformats_default;
+               /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
+               if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+                       *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
+               else
+                       *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
+               }
+       }
+
+/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
+ * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+       {
+       unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
+       EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+       int rv;
+       pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+       if (!pkey)
+               return 0;
+       /* If not EC nothing to do */
+       if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+               {
+               EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+               return 1;
+               }
+       rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
+       EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+       if (!rv)
+               return 0;
+       /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
+        * supported curves extension.
+        */
+       rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+       if (!rv)
                return 0;
+       /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+        * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+        */
+       if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
+               {
+               int check_md;
+               size_t i;
+               CERT *c = s->cert;
+               if (curve_id[0])
+                       return 0;
+               /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+               if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+                       check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+               else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+                       check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+               else
+                       return 0; /* Should never happen */
+               for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+                       if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+                               break;
+               if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
+                       return 0;
+               if (set_ee_md == 2)
+                       {
+                       if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
+                       else
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
+                       }
+               }
+       return rv;
+       }
+/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
+       {
+       unsigned char curve_id[2];
+       EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+       /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
+       if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+               return 1;
+#endif
+       /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
+        * no other curves permitted.
+        */
+       if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+               {
+               /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
+               if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+                       curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+               else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+                       curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+               else
+                       return 0;
+               curve_id[0] = 0;
+               /* Check this curve is acceptable */
+               if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
+                       return 0;
+               /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
+               if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+                       return 1;
+               /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
+               else 
+                       {
+                       unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
+                       if (!ec)
+                               return 0;
+                       if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
+                               return 0;
+                       if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
+                               return 1;
+                       return 0;
+                       }
+                       
+               }
+       if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
+               {
+               /* Need a shared curve */
+               if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
+                       return 1;
+               else return 0;
+               }
+       if (!ec)
+               {
+               if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+                       return 1;
+               else
+                       return 0;
                }
+       if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
+               return 0;
+/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
+#if 0
+       return 1;
+#else
+       return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
+#endif
+       }
+
+#else
+
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+       {
+       return 1;
        }
+
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
@@ -290,7 +856,7 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
 #else
-#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
+#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
 #endif
 
 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
@@ -310,47 +876,266 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
        tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-       tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
-#endif
 };
-
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
-       {
-       size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-       /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
-       if (FIPS_mode())
-               slen -= 2;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+       tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+       tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+};
 #endif
-       if (p)
-               memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
-       return (int)slen;
-       }
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
        {
-       int extdatalen=0;
-       unsigned char *ret = p;
-
-       /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
-       if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
-                                       && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-               return p;
-
-       ret+=2;
-
-       if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+       /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+        * preferences.
+        */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
+               {
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+               *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+               return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
 
-       if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
-               { 
-               /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
-               unsigned long size_str;
-               long lenmax; 
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+               *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+               return 2;
 
-               /* check for enough space.
-                  4 for the servername type and entension length
-                  2 for servernamelist length
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+               *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
+               return 2;
+               }
+#endif
+       /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
+       if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
+               {
+               *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+               return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+               }
+       else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
+               {
+               *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+               return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+               return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+               }
+       }
+/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
+ * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+                               const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+       size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+       int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+       /* Should never happen */
+       if (sigalg == -1)
+               return -1;
+       /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+       if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+               return 0;
+               }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+               {
+               unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+               /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+               if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
+                       return 0;
+               if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+                       return 0;
+                       }
+               /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
+               if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+                       {
+                       if (curve_id[0])
+                               return 0;
+                       if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+                               {
+                               if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+                                       {
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+                                               SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+                                       return 0;
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+                               {
+                               if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+                                       {
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+                                               SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+                                       return 0;
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       else
+                               return 0;
+                       }
+               }
+       else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+               return 0;
+#endif
+
+       /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+       sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
+       for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
+               {
+               if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+                       break;
+               }
+       /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
+       if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+               return 0;
+               }
+       *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
+       if (*pmd == NULL)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+               return 0;
+               }
+       /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
+        * wish.
+        */
+       if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
+               s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
+       return 1;
+       }
+/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
+ * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
+ * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
+ * session and not global settings.
+ * 
+ */
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
+       {
+       CERT *c = s->cert;
+       const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+       size_t i, sigalgslen;
+       int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+       c->mask_a = 0;
+       c->mask_k = 0;
+       /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
+       if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
+               c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+       else
+               c->mask_ssl = 0;
+       /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
+        * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
+        * TLS 1.2.
+        */
+       sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+       for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
+               {
+               switch(sigalgs[1])
+                       {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+                       have_rsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+                       have_dsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+                       have_ecdsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+                       }
+               }
+       /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
+        * signature algorithms.
+        */
+       if (!have_rsa)
+               {
+               c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
+               }
+       if (!have_dsa)
+               {
+               c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+               }
+       if (!have_ecdsa)
+               {
+               c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+               }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+       if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
+               {
+               c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+               }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+       /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+       if (!s->psk_client_callback)
+               {
+               c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+               }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+       c->valid = 1;
+       }
+
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+       {
+       int extdatalen=0;
+       unsigned char *ret = p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
+       int using_ecc = 0;
+       if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+               {
+               int i;
+               unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+               STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+
+               for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
+                       {
+                       SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+
+                       alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+                       alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+                       if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
+                               || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+                               {
+                               using_ecc = 1;
+                               break;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+#endif
+
+       /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+       if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
+                                       && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+               return p;
+
+       ret+=2;
+
+       if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+       if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+               { 
+               /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+               unsigned long size_str;
+               long lenmax; 
+
+               /* check for enough space.
+                  4 for the servername type and entension length
+                  2 for servernamelist length
                   1 for the hostname type
                   2 for hostname length
                   + hostname length 
@@ -400,75 +1185,80 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-#define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
-       /* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
+       /* Add SRP username if there is one */
        if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
-               {/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
-               int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
-               long lenmax; 
+               { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
 
-               if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
-               if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
-               if (login_len > 255)
+               int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);       
+               if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return NULL;
-                       }
+                       } 
+
+               /* check for enough space.
+                  4 for the srp type type and entension length
+                  1 for the srp user identity
+                  + srp user identity length 
+               */
+               if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 
+
+               /* fill in the extension */
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
                s2n(login_len+1,ret);
-
-               (*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
-               memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
+               (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
+               memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
                ret+=login_len;
                }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-       if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (using_ecc)
                {
                /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
                long lenmax; 
+               const unsigned char *plist;
+               size_t plistlen;
+
+               tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
 
                if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+               if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
+               if (plistlen > 255)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return NULL;
                        }
                
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
-               s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
-               *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-               memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-               ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-               }
-       if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-               {
+               s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
+               *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
+               memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+               ret+=plistlen;
+
                /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
-               long lenmax; 
+               plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+               tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
 
                if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 
-               if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-               if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
+               if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
+               if (plistlen > 65532)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return NULL;
                        }
                
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
-               s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
+               s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
 
                /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
                 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
                 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
                 * resolves this to two bytes.
                 */
-               s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
-               memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
-               ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+               s2n(plistlen, ret);
+               memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+               ret+=plistlen;
                }
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
@@ -508,20 +1298,22 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
                skip_ext:
 
-       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                {
-               if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
+               size_t salglen;
+               const unsigned char *salg;
+               salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
+               if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
                        return NULL; 
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
-               s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
-               s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
-               memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
-               ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+               s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
+               s2n(salglen, ret);
+               memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
+               ret += salglen;
                }
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-       if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
                {
                size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
                
@@ -538,8 +1330,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
-       if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
                {
                int i;
                long extlen, idlen, itmp;
@@ -587,6 +1378,20 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                        i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
                }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+       /* Add Heartbeat extension */
+       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
+       s2n(1,ret);
+       /* Set mode:
+        * 1: peer may send requests
+        * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+        */
+       if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+               *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+       else
+               *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
        if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
                {
@@ -599,21 +1404,126 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
-       if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
+       if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
+               {
+               if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+               s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+               s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+               memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
+                      s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+               ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+               }
+
+        if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+                {
+                int el;
+
+                ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+                
+                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
+                s2n(el,ret);
+
+                if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+                ret += el;
+                }
+
+       /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
+       if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
+               {
+               size_t i;
+               custom_cli_ext_record* record;
+
+               for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
+                       {
+                       const unsigned char* out = NULL;
+                       unsigned short outlen = 0;
+
+                       record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
+                       /* NULL callback sends empty extension */ 
+                       /* -1 from callback omits extension */
+                       if (record->fn1)
+                               {
+                               int cb_retval = 0;
+                               cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
+                                                       &out, &outlen, al,
+                                                       record->arg);
+                               if (cb_retval == 0)
+                                       return NULL; /* error */
+                               if (cb_retval == -1)
+                                       continue; /* skip this extension */
+                               }
+                       if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+                               return NULL;
+                       s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+                       s2n(outlen, ret);
+                       memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+                       ret += outlen;
+                       }
+               }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+       s2n(0,ret);
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
+       /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+        * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
+        *
+        * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
+        * extensions it MUST always appear last.
+        */
+       {
+       int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+       /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+        * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
+        * not. */
+       if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+               hlen -= 5;
+       if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+               {
+               hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+               if (hlen >= 4)
+                       hlen -= 4;
+               else
+                       hlen = 0;
+
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+               s2n(hlen, ret);
+               memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+               ret += hlen;
+               }
+       }
+#endif
+
+       if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
                return p;
 
        s2n(extdatalen,p);
        return ret;
        }
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
        {
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
+       size_t i;
+       custom_srv_ext_record *record;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
        int next_proto_neg_seen;
 #endif
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+       unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+       int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+       using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+#endif
        /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
                return p;
@@ -654,25 +1564,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-       if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (using_ecc)
                {
+               const unsigned char *plist;
+               size_t plistlen;
                /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
                long lenmax; 
 
+               tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+
                if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+               if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
+               if (plistlen > 255)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return NULL;
                        }
                
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
-               s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
-               *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-               memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-               ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+               s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
+               *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
+               memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+               ret+=plistlen;
 
                }
        /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
@@ -694,8 +1607,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-       if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
                {
                size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
                
@@ -711,6 +1623,26 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                ret += sol;
                }
 #endif
+
+        if(s->srtp_profile)
+                {
+                int el;
+
+                ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+                
+                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
+                s2n(el,ret);
+
+                if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+                ret+=el;
+                }
+
        if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 
                && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
                { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
@@ -726,6 +1658,24 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
                }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+       /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
+       if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
+               {
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
+               s2n(1,ret);
+               /* Set mode:
+                * 1: peer may send requests
+                * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+                */
+               if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+                       *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+               else
+                       *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+
+               }
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
        next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
        s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
@@ -748,6 +1698,62 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
+       for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
+               {
+               const unsigned char *out = NULL;
+               unsigned short outlen = 0;
+               int cb_retval = 0;
+
+               record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
+
+               /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
+               if (!record->fn2)
+                       continue;
+               cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
+                                                               &out, &outlen, al,
+                                                               record->arg);
+               if (cb_retval == 0)
+                       return NULL; /* error */
+               if (cb_retval == -1)
+                       continue; /* skip this extension */
+               if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+               s2n(outlen, ret);
+               memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+               ret += outlen;
+               }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+               {
+               /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
+                * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
+                */
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+                       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+               else
+                       {
+                       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+                       s2n(0,ret);
+                       }
+               }
+#endif
+
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
+               unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+
+               if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+               s2n(3 + len,ret);
+               s2n(1 + len,ret);
+               *ret++ = len;
+               memcpy(ret, selected, len);
+               ret += len;
+               }
+
        if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
                return p;
 
@@ -755,50 +1761,253 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        return ret;
        }
 
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
+ * ClientHello.
+ *   data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
+ *   data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
+ *   al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
+ *       return.
+ *
+ *   returns: 0 on success. */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+                                        unsigned data_len, int *al)
        {
-       unsigned short type;
-       unsigned short size;
-       unsigned short len;
-       unsigned char *data = *p;
-       int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-       int sigalg_seen = 0;
+       unsigned i;
+       unsigned proto_len;
+       const unsigned char *selected;
+       unsigned char selected_len;
+       int r;
 
-       s->servername_done = 0;
-       s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+       if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
+               return 0;
 
-       if (data >= (d+n-2))
-               goto ri_check;
-       n2s(data,len);
+       if (data_len < 2)
+               goto parse_error;
 
-       if (data > (d+n-len)) 
-               goto ri_check;
+       /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
+        * length-prefixed strings. */
+       i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
+           ((unsigned) data[1]);
+       data_len -= 2;
+       data += 2;
+       if (data_len != i)
+               goto parse_error;
 
-       while (data <= (d+n-4))
+       if (data_len < 2)
+               goto parse_error;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
                {
-               n2s(data,type);
-               n2s(data,size);
+               proto_len = data[i];
+               i++;
 
-               if (data+size > (d+n))
-                       goto ri_check;
-#if 0
-               fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
-#endif
-               if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
-                       s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
-                                               s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
+               if (proto_len == 0)
+                       goto parse_error;
 
-   - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
-   - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
-     in which case an fatal alert is generated.
-   - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
-   - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
-     to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 
-   - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 
-     it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 
-     Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
-     set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+               if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
+                       goto parse_error;
+
+               i += proto_len;
+               }
+
+       r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
+                                  s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+       if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+               if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                       OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+               if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                       {
+                       *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                       return -1;
+                       }
+               memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+       }
+       return 0;
+
+parse_error:
+       *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+       return -1;
+       }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+       unsigned short type, size;
+       static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+               0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
+               0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
+               0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+               0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
+               0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
+               0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */
+
+               0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
+               0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
+               0x01,        /* 1 point format */
+               0x00,        /* uncompressed */
+       };
+
+       /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+       static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+               0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
+               0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
+               0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
+               0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
+               0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
+               0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
+               0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+               0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+       };
+
+       if (data >= (d+n-2))
+               return;
+       data += 2;
+
+       if (data > (d+n-4))
+               return;
+       n2s(data,type);
+       n2s(data,size);
+
+       if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+               return;
+
+       if (data+size > d+n)
+               return;
+       data += size;
+
+       if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               {
+               const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+               const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+               if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+                       return;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+               if (data + len != d+n)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+                       return;
+               }
+
+       s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 
+       {       
+       unsigned short type;
+       unsigned short size;
+       unsigned short len;
+       unsigned char *data = *p;
+       int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+       size_t i;
+
+       s->servername_done = 0;
+       s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+       s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+               }
+
+       /* Clear observed custom extensions */
+       s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
+       if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
+               s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
+               }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+       s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+               ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+       /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+       if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
+               s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+               }
+       /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
+       if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+               s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+               }
+       /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+       for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+               {
+               s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
+               s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
+               }
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
+       if (data >= (d+n-2))
+               goto ri_check;
+       n2s(data,len);
+
+       if (data > (d+n-len)) 
+               goto ri_check;
+
+       while (data <= (d+n-4))
+               {
+               n2s(data,type);
+               n2s(data,size);
+
+               if (data+size > (d+n))
+                       goto ri_check;
+#if 0
+               fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
+#endif
+               if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+                       s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
+                                               s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
+
+   - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+   - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
+     in which case an fatal alert is generated.
+   - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+   - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
+     to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 
+   - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 
+     it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 
+     Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
+     set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
      case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
      a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
      presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
@@ -896,25 +2105,37 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
                        {
-                       if (size > 0)
+                       if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
                                {
-                               len = data[0];
-                               if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
-                                       return -1;
-                               memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
-                               s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';  
+                               *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+                               {
+                               *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+                               return -1;
+                       memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
+                       s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
+  
+                       if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 
+                               {
+                               *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
                                }
                        }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
 
-                       if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+                       if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
+                               ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                                return 0;
@@ -943,14 +2164,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                        fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
                        }
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
                        ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
 
-                       if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+                       if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+                               ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                                return 0;
@@ -981,8 +2202,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                        }
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -1029,15 +2249,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
                        {
                        int dsize;
-                       if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 
+                       if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 
                                {
                                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                                return 0;
                                }
-                       sigalg_seen = 1;
                        n2s(data,dsize);
                        size -= 2;
-                       if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 
+                       if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize
                                {
                                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                                return 0;
@@ -1047,9 +2266,18 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                                return 0;
                                }
+                       /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
+                        * error.
+                        */
+                       if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                                       SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+                               *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
                        }
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-                        s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
                        {
                
                        if (size < 5) 
@@ -1137,6 +2365,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                sdata = data;
                                if (dsize > 0)
                                        {
+                                       if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+                                               {
+                                               sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+                                                                          X509_EXTENSION_free);
+                                               }
+
                                        s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
                                                d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
                                                        &sdata, dsize);
@@ -1154,9 +2388,27 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                else
                                        s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
                        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
+                       {
+                       switch(data[0])
+                               {
+                               case 0x01:      /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
+                                                       s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+                                                       break;
+                               case 0x02:      /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
+                                                       s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+                                                       s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+                                                       break;
+                               default:        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                                                       return 0;
+                               }
+                       }
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-                         s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
+                        s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
                        {
                        /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
                         * renegotiation.
@@ -1177,10 +2429,53 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                        }
 #endif
 
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
+                        s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+                       {
+                       if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
+                               return 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+                       /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+                       s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+                       }
+
                /* session ticket processed earlier */
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+                        {
+                       if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+                                                             al))
+                               return 0;
+                        }
+               /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is 
+                * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a 
+                * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
+                * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
+                * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
+                */
+               else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
+                       {
+                       custom_srv_ext_record *record;
+
+                       for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
+                               {
+                               record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
+                               if (type == record->ext_type)
+                                       {
+                                       if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
+                                               return 0;
+                                       }                                               
+                               }
+                       }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+                       s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
                data+=size;
                }
-                               
+
        *p = data;
 
        ri_check:
@@ -1191,19 +2486,39 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
                {
                *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
                                SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
                return 0;
                }
+       /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
+       if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
+               ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
 
        return 1;
        }
 
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
+       {
+       int al = -1;
+       if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
+               {
+               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+               return 0;
+               }
+
+       if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) 
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+               return 0;
+               }
+       return 1;
+}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
  * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
  * the length of the block. */
-static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
        {
        unsigned int off = 0;
 
@@ -1219,7 +2534,7 @@ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
        }
 #endif
 
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
        {
        unsigned short length;
        unsigned short type;
@@ -1228,6 +2543,25 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
        int tlsext_servername = 0;
        int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+       s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+               }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+       s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
                goto ri_check;
 
@@ -1261,8 +2595,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                        }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1308,8 +2641,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                        s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
                        }
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -1339,8 +2671,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                }
                        }
 #endif
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-                        s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
                        {
                        /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
                         * a status request message.
@@ -1354,13 +2685,14 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                        s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
                        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
                        {
                        unsigned char *selected;
                        unsigned char selected_len;
 
                        /* We must have requested it. */
-                       if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+                       if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
                                return 0;
@@ -1384,15 +2716,113 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                }
                        memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
                        s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+                       s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
                        }
 #endif
+
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
+                       {
+                       unsigned len;
+
+                       /* We must have requested it. */
+                       if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       if (size < 4)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       /* The extension data consists of:
+                        *   uint16 list_length
+                        *   uint8 proto_length;
+                        *   uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
+                       len = data[0];
+                       len <<= 8;
+                       len |= data[1];
+                       if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       len = data[2];
+                       if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+                       s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+                       if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
+                       s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+                       }
+
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
                        {
                        if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
                                return 0;
                        renegotiate_seen = 1;
                        }
-               data+=size;             
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
+                       {
+                       switch(data[0])
+                               {
+                               case 0x01:      /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
+                                                       s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+                                                       break;
+                               case 0x02:      /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
+                                                       s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+                                                       s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+                                                       break;
+                               default:        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                                                       return 0;
+                               }
+                       }
+#endif
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+                        {
+                        if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+                                                             al))
+                                return 0;
+                        }
+               /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but 
+                * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
+                * callback */
+               else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
+                       {
+                       size_t i;
+                       custom_cli_ext_record* record;
+
+                       for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
+                               {
+                               record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
+                               if (record->ext_type == type)
+                                       {
+                                       if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
+                                               return 0;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               }                       
+                       }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+                       {
+                       /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
+                       if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
+                               s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+                       }
+#endif
+               data += size;
                }
 
        if (data != d+n)
@@ -1438,7 +2868,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
                {
                *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
                                SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
                return 0;
                }
@@ -1449,56 +2879,6 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 
 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-       /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 
-        * and elliptic curves we support.
-        */
-       int using_ecc = 0;
-       int i;
-       unsigned char *j;
-       unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
-       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
-       for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
-               {
-               SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
-               alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
-               alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-               if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
-                       {
-                       using_ecc = 1;
-                       break;
-                       }
-               }
-       using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
-       if (using_ecc)
-               {
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-               if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
-                       {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                       return -1;
-                       }
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-
-               /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
-               if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-               s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
-               if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
-                       {
-                       s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                       return -1;
-                       }
-               for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
-                               sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
-                       s2n(i,j);
-               }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
        {
@@ -1539,36 +2919,10 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 
 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-       /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 
-        * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension.  Note that the server is not
-        * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
-        */
-
-       unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-       unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-       int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
-       using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-       
-       if (using_ecc)
-               {
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-               if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
-                       {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                       return -1;
-                       }
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-               }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
        return 1;
        }
 
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
        {
        int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
        int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -1587,42 +2941,12 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)             
                ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 
-       /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
-        * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
-        * the certificate has changed.
-        */
-       if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-               {
-               int r;
-               r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-               switch (r)
-                       {
-                       /* We don't want to send a status request response */
-                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-                               s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-                               break;
-                       /* status request response should be sent */
-                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
-                               if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-                                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
-                               else
-                                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-                               break;
-                       /* something bad happened */
-                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-                               ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-                               al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                               goto err;
-                       }
-               }
-       else
-               s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
        {
                /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
                 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
-                * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+                * so this has to happen here in
+                * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
 
                int r = 1;
        
@@ -1674,8 +2998,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
                        }
        }
 
-#endif
  err:
+#endif
        switch (ret)
                {
                case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -1693,6 +3017,71 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
                }
        }
 
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+       {
+       int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+       int al;
+
+       /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+        * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
+        * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+        * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
+        */
+       if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+               {
+               int r;
+               CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+               certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+               /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+               if (certpkey == NULL)
+                       {
+                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+                       return 1;
+                       }
+               /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+                * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+                */
+               s->cert->key = certpkey;
+               r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+               switch (r)
+                       {
+                       /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+                               s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+                               break;
+                       /* status request response should be sent */
+                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+                               if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+                                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+                               else
+                                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+                               break;
+                       /* something bad happened */
+                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+                               ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+                               al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                               goto err;
+                       }
+               }
+       else
+               s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+ err:
+       switch (ret)
+               {
+               case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+                       ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+                       return -1;
+
+               case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+                       ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+                       return 1; 
+
+               default:
+                       return 1;
+               }
+       }
+
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        {
        int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
@@ -1707,7 +3096,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
        if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
            (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
-           ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+           ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
                {
                /* we are using an ECC cipher */
                size_t i;
@@ -1805,30 +3194,79 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
                }
        }
 
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
- * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
- * session ticket extension at the same time.
- */
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
+       {
+       int al = -1;
+       if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
+               return 1;
+       if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
+               {
+               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+               return 0;
+               }
 
+       if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+               return 0;
+               }
+       return 1;
+}
+
+/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
+ * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
+ * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
+ *
+ *   session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
+ *       read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
+ *       extension, if any.
+ *   len: the length of the session ID.
+ *   limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ *   ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ *       point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
+ * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
+ * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ *    0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
+ *    1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
+ *       session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
+ *    2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
+ *       couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
+ *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ *   Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ *   a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ *   (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ *   a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ *   s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ *   Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
+ */
 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-                               const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+                       const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
        {
        /* Point after session ID in client hello */
        const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
        unsigned short i;
 
+       *ret = NULL;
+       s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
        /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
-        * to permit stateful resumption.
-        */
+        * to permit stateful resumption.
+        */
        if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-               return 1;
-
+               return 0;
        if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
-               return 1;
+               return 0;
        if (p >= limit)
                return -1;
        /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
-       if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+       if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
                {
                i = *(p++);
                p+= i;
@@ -1847,7 +3285,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
                return -1;
        /* Now at start of extensions */
        if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-               return 1;
+               return 0;
        n2s(p, i);
        while ((p + 4) <= limit)
                {
@@ -1855,39 +3293,61 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
                n2s(p, type);
                n2s(p, size);
                if (p + size > limit)
-                       return 1;
+                       return 0;
                if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
                        {
-                       /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
-                        * trigger a full handshake
-                        */
-                       if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-                               return 1;
-                       /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
-                        * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
-                        */
+                       int r;
                        if (size == 0)
                                {
+                               /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
+                                * currently have one. */
                                s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-                               return 0;       /* Cache miss */
+                               return 1;
                                }
                        if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
                                {
-                               /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
-                                * generating the session from ticket now,
-                                * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
-                                * external mechanism to calculate the master
-                                * secret later. */
-                               return 0;
+                               /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
+                                * decrypted rather than generating the session
+                                * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
+                                * handshake based on external mechanism to
+                                * calculate the master secret later. */
+                               return 2;
+                               }
+                       r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
+                       switch (r)
+                               {
+                               case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+                                       s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+                                       return 2;
+                               case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+                                       return r;
+                               case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+                                       s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+                                       return 3;
+                               default: /* fatal error */
+                                       return -1;
                                }
-                       return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
-                                                                       ret);
                        }
                p += size;
                }
-       return 1;
+       return 0;
        }
 
+/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
+ *
+ *   etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
+ *   eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ *   sess_id: points at the session ID.
+ *   sesslen: the length of the session ID.
+ *   psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ *       point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ *    2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
+ *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
+ *    4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
+ */
 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
                                const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
                                SSL_SESSION **psess)
@@ -1902,7 +3362,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
        SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
        /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
        if (eticklen < 48)
-               goto tickerr;
+               return 2;
        /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
        HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
@@ -1914,7 +3374,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
                if (rv < 0)
                        return -1;
                if (rv == 0)
-                       goto tickerr;
+                       return 2;
                if (rv == 2)
                        renew_ticket = 1;
                }
@@ -1922,15 +3382,15 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
                {
                /* Check key name matches */
                if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
-                       goto tickerr;
+                       return 2;
                HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
                                        tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
                EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
                                tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
                }
        /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
-        * integrity checks on ticket.
-        */
+        * integrity checks on ticket.
+        */
        mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
        if (mlen < 0)
                {
@@ -1942,8 +3402,8 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
        HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
        HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-       if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
-               goto tickerr;
+       if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+               return 2;
        /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
        /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
        p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
@@ -1956,33 +3416,33 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
                }
        EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
        if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
-               goto tickerr;
+               return 2;
        slen += mlen;
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
        p = sdec;
-               
+
        sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
        OPENSSL_free(sdec);
        if (sess)
                {
-               /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
-                * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
-                * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
-                * as required by standard.
-                */
+               /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
+                * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
+                * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
+                * as required by standard.
+                */
                if (sesslen)
                        memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
                sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
                *psess = sess;
-               s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
-               return 1;
+               if (renew_ticket)
+                       return 4;
+               else
+                       return 3;
                }
-       /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
-        * send a new ticket
-        */
-       tickerr:        
-       s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-       return 0;
+        ERR_clear_error();
+       /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
+        * ticket. */
+       return 2;
        }
 
 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
@@ -1994,32 +3454,18 @@ typedef struct
        } tls12_lookup;
 
 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
        {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
        {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
        {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
        {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
        {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
        {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
-#endif
 };
 
 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
        {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
        {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
        {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
-#endif
 };
 
 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
@@ -2032,22 +3478,23 @@ static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
                }
        return -1;
        }
-#if 0
+
 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
        {
        size_t i;
        for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
                {
-               if (table[i].id == id)
+               if ((table[i].id) == id)
                        return table[i].nid;
                }
-       return -1;
+       return NID_undef;
        }
-#endif
 
 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
        {
        int sig_id, md_id;
+       if (!md)
+               return 0;
        md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
                                sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
        if (md_id == -1)
@@ -2102,83 +3549,893 @@ const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
                }
        }
 
+static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
+       {
+       switch(sig_alg)
+               {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+       case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+               return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+       case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+               return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+       case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+               return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+#endif
+               }
+       return -1;
+       }
+
+/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
+static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
+                       int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
+       {
+       int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+       if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
+               return;
+       if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
+               {
+               hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
+                                       sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+               if (phash_nid)
+                       *phash_nid = hash_nid;
+               }
+       if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
+               {
+               sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
+                                       sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+               if (psign_nid)
+                       *psign_nid = sign_nid;
+               }
+       if (psignhash_nid)
+               {
+               if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
+                       OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
+                                                       hash_nid, sign_nid);
+               else
+                       *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
+               }
+       }
+/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
+static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+                               const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
+                               const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
+       size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
+       for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
+               {
+               /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
+               if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
+                       continue;
+               if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+                       continue;
+               for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
+                       {
+                       if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
+                               {
+                               nmatch++;
+                               if (shsig)
+                                       {
+                                       shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
+                                       shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
+                                       tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
+                                               &shsig->sign_nid,
+                                               &shsig->signandhash_nid,
+                                               ptmp);
+                                       shsig++;
+                                       }
+                               break;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+       return nmatch;
+       }
+
+/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
+static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
+       size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
+       size_t nmatch;
+       TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
+       CERT *c = s->cert;
+       unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+       if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+               c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+               }
+       /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+       if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
+               {
+               conf = c->client_sigalgs;
+               conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
+               }
+       else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
+               {
+               conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
+               conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+               }
+       else
+               conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+       if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
+               {
+               pref = conf;
+               preflen = conflen;
+               allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
+               allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               allow = conf;
+               allowlen = conflen;
+               pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
+               preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+               }
+       nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+       if (!nmatch)
+               return 1;
+       salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+       if (!salgs)
+               return 0;
+       nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+       c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+       c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+       return 1;
+       }
+               
+
 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
 
 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
        {
-       int i, idx;
+       int idx;
+       size_t i;
        const EVP_MD *md;
        CERT *c = s->cert;
-       /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
-       if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
+       /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+       if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                return 1;
        /* Should never happen */
        if (!c)
                return 0;
 
-       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
-       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
-       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
-       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
+       if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+               OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+       c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
+       if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
+               return 0;
+       c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
+       memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
 
-       for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
-               {
-               unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
+       tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
 
-               switch(sig_alg)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+       if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+               {
+               /* Use first set signature preference to force message
+                * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
+                */
+               const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
+               if (s->server)
+                       sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
+               else
+                       sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
+               if (sigs)
                        {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-                       case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
-                       idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
-                       break;
+                       idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
+                       md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
+                       c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+                       c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                       if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+                               {
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
 #endif
+
+       for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
+                       i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
+               {
+               idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
+               if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
+                       {
+                       md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
+                       c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+                       c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                       if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+                               {
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+                               }
+                       }
+
+               }
+       /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
+        * use the certificate for signing.
+        */
+       if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
+               {
+               /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
+                * not supported it stays as NULL.
+                */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-                       case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
-                       idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-                       break;
+               if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
+                       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+               if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
+                       {
+                       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+                       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+                       }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-                       case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
-                       idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-                       break;
+               if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
+                       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
-                       default:
-                       continue;
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }
+
+
+int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                       int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+                       unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
+       if (psig == NULL)
+               return 0;
+       if (idx >= 0)
+               {
+               idx <<= 1;
+               if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
+                       return 0;
+               psig += idx;
+               if (rhash)
+                       *rhash = psig[0];
+               if (rsig)
+                       *rsig = psig[1];
+               tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
+               }
+       return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+       }
+
+int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                       int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+                       unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+       {
+       TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
+       if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
+               return 0;
+       shsigalgs += idx;
+       if (phash)
+               *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
+       if (psign)
+               *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
+       if (psignhash)
+               *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
+       if (rsig)
+               *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
+       if (rhash)
+               *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
+       return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+       }
+       
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int
+tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+       {
+       unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
+       unsigned short hbtype;
+       unsigned int payload;
+       unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+       /* Read type and payload length first */
+       hbtype = *p++;
+       n2s(p, payload);
+       pl = p;
+
+       if (s->msg_callback)
+               s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                       &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+                       s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+       if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+               {
+               unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+               int r;
+
+               /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
+                * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+                * payload, plus padding
+                */
+               buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+               bp = buffer;
+               
+               /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+               *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+               s2n(payload, bp);
+               memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+               bp += payload;
+               /* Random padding */
+               RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+
+               r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+
+               if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+                       s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                               buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+               OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+               if (r < 0)
+                       return r;
+               }
+       else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
+               {
+               unsigned int seq;
+               
+               /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
+                * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
+                * sequence number */
+               n2s(pl, seq);
+               
+               if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
+                       {
+                       s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+                       s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+                       }
+               }
+
+       return 0;
+       }
+
+int
+tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+       {
+       unsigned char *buf, *p;
+       int ret;
+       unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+       unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+       /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+       if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+           s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+               return -1;
+               }
+
+       /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+       if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+               return -1;
+               }
+               
+       /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+       if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+               return -1;
+               }
+               
+       /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
+        * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
+        */
+       OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
+
+       /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+        * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+        * some random stuff.
+        *  - Message Type, 1 byte
+        *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+        *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+        *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+        *  - Padding
+        */
+       buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+       p = buf;
+       /* Message Type */
+       *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+       /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+       s2n(payload, p);
+       /* Sequence number */
+       s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+       /* 16 random bytes */
+       RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+       p += 16;
+       /* Random padding */
+       RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+
+       ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+       if (ret >= 0)
+               {
+               if (s->msg_callback)
+                       s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                               buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+               s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+               }
+               
+       OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+       return ret;
+       }
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_SIGALGLEN  (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
+
+typedef struct
+       {
+       size_t sigalgcnt;
+       int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
+       } sig_cb_st;
+
+static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+       {
+       sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
+       size_t i;
+       char etmp[20], *p;
+       int sig_alg, hash_alg;
+       if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
+               return 0;
+       if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+               return 0;
+       memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+       etmp[len] = 0;
+       p = strchr(etmp, '+');
+       if (!p)
+               return 0;
+       *p = 0;
+       p++;
+       if (!*p)
+               return 0;
+
+       if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
+               sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+       else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
+               sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+       else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
+               sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+       else return 0;
+
+       hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
+       if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+               hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
+       if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+               return 0;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
+               {
+               if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
+                       && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
+       sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
+       return 1;
+       }
+
+/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
+ * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+       {
+       sig_cb_st sig;
+       sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+       if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
+               return 0;
+       if (c == NULL)
+               return 1;
+       return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
+       }
+
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
+       {
+       unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
+       int rhash, rsign;
+       size_t i;
+       if (salglen & 1)
+               return 0;
+       sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
+       if (sigalgs == NULL)
+               return 0;
+       for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
+               {
+               rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
+                                       sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+               rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
+                               sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+
+               if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
+                       goto err;
+               *sptr++ = rhash;
+               *sptr++ = rsign;
+               }
+
+       if (client)
+               {
+               if (c->client_sigalgs)
+                       OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+               c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+               c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+                       OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+               c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+               c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+               }
+
+       return 1;
+
+       err:
+       OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
+       return 0;
+       }
+
+static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+       {
+       int sig_nid;
+       size_t i;
+       if (default_nid == -1)
+               return 1;
+       sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+       if (default_nid)
+               return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
+       for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+               if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+                       return 1;
+       return 0;
+       }
+/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
+static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
+       {
+       X509_NAME *nm;
+       int i;
+       nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+       for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
+               {
+               if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
+                       return 1;
+               }
+       return 0;
+       }
+
+/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
+ * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to 
+ * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
+ * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
+ */
+
+/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
+
+#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
+       (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
+/* Strict mode flags */
+#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
+        (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
+        | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
+
+int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                                                       int idx)
+       {
+       int i;
+       int rv = 0;
+       int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
+       CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
+       CERT *c = s->cert;
+       unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+       /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
+       if (idx != -1)
+               {
+               /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+               if (idx == -2)
+                       {
+                       cpk = c->key;
+                       idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
                        }
+               else
+                       cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+               x = cpk->x509;
+               pk = cpk->privatekey;
+               chain = cpk->chain;
+               strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
+               /* If no cert or key, forget it */
+               if (!x || !pk)
+                       goto end;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+               /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
+               if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+                       {
+                       rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+                       cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+                       return rv;
+                       }
+#endif
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               if (!x || !pk)
+                       goto end;
+               idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
+               if (idx == -1)
+                       goto end;
+               cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+               if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+                       check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
+               else
+                       check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
+               strict_mode = 1;
+               }
+
+       if (suiteb_flags)
+               {
+               int ok;
+               if (check_flags)
+                       check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+               ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+               if (ok != X509_V_OK)
+                       {
+                       if (check_flags)
+                               rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+                       else
+                               goto end;
+                       }
+               }
+
+       /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
+        * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
+        * and strict mode.
+        */
+       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
+               {
+               int default_nid;
+               unsigned char rsign = 0;
+               if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+                       default_nid = 0;
+               /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
+               else
+                       {
+                       switch(idx)
+                               {       
+                       case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+                       case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+                       case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+                               rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+                               default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
+                               break;
+
+                       case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+                       case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+                               rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
+                               default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
+                               break;
+
+                       case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+                               rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+                               default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
+                               break;
 
-               if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
+                       default:
+                               default_nid = -1;
+                               break;
+                               }
+                       }
+               /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
+                * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
+                * sha1.
+                */
+               if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
+                       {
+                       size_t j;
+                       const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
+                       for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
+                               {
+                               if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
+                                       break;
+                               }
+                       if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
+                               {
+                               if (check_flags)
+                                       goto skip_sigs;
+                               else
+                                       goto end;
+                               }
+                       }
+               /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
+               if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
+                       {
+                       if (!check_flags) goto end;
+                       }
+               else
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+               for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+                       {
+                       if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
+                                                       default_nid))
+                               {
+                               if (check_flags)
+                                       {
+                                       rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               else
+                                       goto end;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+       /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
+       else if(check_flags)
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+       skip_sigs:
+       /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
+       if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
+       else if (!check_flags)
+               goto end;
+       if (!s->server)
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+       /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
+       else if (strict_mode)
+               {
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+               for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+                       {
+                       X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+                       if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
+                               {
+                               if (check_flags)
+                                       {
+                                       rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               else
+                                       goto end;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+       if (!s->server && strict_mode)
+               {
+               STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
+               int check_type = 0;
+               switch (pk->type)
                        {
-                       md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
-                       if (md)
+               case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+                       check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+                       break;
+               case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+                       check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+                       break;
+               case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+                       check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+                       break;
+               case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+               case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
                                {
-                               c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
-                               if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
-                                       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+                               int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
+                               if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
+                                       check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
+                               if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
+                                       check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
                                }
                        }
+               if (check_type)
+                       {
+                       const unsigned char *ctypes;
+                       int ctypelen;
+                       if (c->ctypes)
+                               {
+                               ctypes = c->ctypes;
+                               ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
+                               }
+                       else
+                               {
+                               ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+                               ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
+                               }
+                       for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
+                               {
+                               if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
+                                       {
+                                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
+                               goto end;
+                       }
+               else
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+
+               ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
+
+               if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
 
+               if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+                       {
+                       if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
+                               rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+                       }
+               if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+                       {
+                       for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+                               {
+                               X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+                               if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
+                                       {
+                                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       }
+               if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+                       goto end;
                }
+       else
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+       if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
 
+       end:
 
-       /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
-        * supported it stays as NULL.
+       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               {
+               if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+               else if (cpk->digest)
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+               }
+       else
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+
+       /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
+        * if the chain is invalid.
         */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-       if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
-               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-       if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
+       if (!check_flags)
                {
-               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+               if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+                       cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+               else
+                       {
+                       /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+                       cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                       return 0;
+                       }
                }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-       if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
-               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
-#endif
-       return 1;
+       return rv;
+       }
+
+/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
+void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
+       {
+       tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
+       tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
+       tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
+       tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
+       tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
+       tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
+       }
+/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
+int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+       {
+       return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
        }
 
 #endif