Fix memory leak with client auth.
[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
index 1d336c2..31fc70e 100644 (file)
@@ -140,6 +140,49 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
        TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
        tls1_alert_code,
        tls1_export_keying_material,
+       0,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
+       };
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
+       tls1_enc,
+       tls1_mac,
+       tls1_setup_key_block,
+       tls1_generate_master_secret,
+       tls1_change_cipher_state,
+       tls1_final_finish_mac,
+       TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+       tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+       TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       tls1_alert_code,
+       tls1_export_keying_material,
+       SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
+       };
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
+       tls1_enc,
+       tls1_mac,
+       tls1_setup_key_block,
+       tls1_generate_master_secret,
+       tls1_change_cipher_state,
+       tls1_final_finish_mac,
+       TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+       tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+       TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       tls1_alert_code,
+       tls1_export_keying_material,
+       SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+               |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
        };
 
 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
@@ -201,7 +244,10 @@ static int nid_list[] =
                NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
                NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
                NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
-               NID_secp521r1  /* secp521r1 (25) */     
+               NID_secp521r1,  /* secp521r1 (25) */    
+               NID_brainpoolP256r1,  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */        
+               NID_brainpoolP384r1,  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */        
+               NID_brainpoolP512r1  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */  
        };
 
 
@@ -217,11 +263,14 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
                0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
                0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
                0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */      
+               0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 
                0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
                0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+               0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */        
                0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
                0,9,  /* sect283k1 (9) */
                0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+               0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */        
                0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
                0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
                0,8,  /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
@@ -311,6 +360,12 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
                return 24;
        case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */       
                return 25;
+       case NID_brainpoolP256r1:  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+               return 26;
+       case NID_brainpoolP384r1:  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+               return 27;
+       case NID_brainpoolP512r1:  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+               return 28;
        default:
                return 0;
                }
@@ -484,7 +539,7 @@ int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
        return 1;
        }
 
-#define MAX_CURVELIST  25
+#define MAX_CURVELIST  28
 
 typedef struct
        {
@@ -535,14 +590,12 @@ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
        {
        int is_prime, id;
        const EC_GROUP *grp;
-       const EC_POINT *pt;
        const EC_METHOD *meth;
        if (!ec)
                return 0;
        /* Determine if it is a prime field */
        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
-        pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
-       if (!grp || !pt)
+       if (!grp)
                return 0;
         meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
        if (!meth)
@@ -570,6 +623,8 @@ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
                }
        if (comp_id)
                {
+               if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
+                       return 0;
                if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
                        {
                        if (is_prime)
@@ -771,6 +826,13 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
 #endif
        }
 
+#else
+
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+       {
+       return 1;
+       }
+
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
@@ -814,21 +876,19 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
        tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-       tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
-#endif
 };
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
        tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
        tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
 };
-
+#endif
 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
        {
        /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
         * preferences.
         */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
        switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
                {
        case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
@@ -843,7 +903,7 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
                *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
                return 2;
                }
-
+#endif
        /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
        if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
                {
@@ -858,13 +918,7 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
        else
                {
                *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-               /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
-               if (FIPS_mode())
-                       return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
-               else
-#endif
-                       return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+               return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
                }
        }
 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
@@ -885,6 +939,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
                return 0;
                }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
                {
                unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
@@ -925,6 +980,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
                }
        else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
                return 0;
+#endif
 
        /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
        sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
@@ -966,8 +1022,8 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
        int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
        c->mask_a = 0;
        c->mask_k = 0;
-       /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
-       if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
+       if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
                c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
        else
                c->mask_ssl = 0;
@@ -1033,27 +1089,14 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
        c->valid = 1;
        }
 
-/* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
-static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
-       {
-       unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
-       unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
-
-       if (a > b)
-               return 1;
-       else if (a < b)
-               return -1;
-       return 0;
-}
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
        {
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
        /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
        int using_ecc = 0;
-       if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
                {
                int i;
                unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
@@ -1065,7 +1108,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
                        alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
                        alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-                       if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
+                       if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
                                || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
                                {
                                using_ecc = 1;
@@ -1255,7 +1298,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
                skip_ext:
 
-       if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                {
                size_t salglen;
                const unsigned char *salg;
@@ -1270,8 +1313,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-       if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
                {
                size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
                
@@ -1288,8 +1330,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
-       if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
                {
                int i;
                long extlen, idlen, itmp;
@@ -1363,6 +1404,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
+       if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
+               {
+               if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+               s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+               s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+               memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
+                      s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+               ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+               }
+
         if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                 {
                 int el;
@@ -1382,25 +1435,72 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                 ret += el;
                 }
 
-       /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
-       /* 2 bytes for extension type */
-       /* 2 bytes for extension length */
-       /* 1 byte for the list length */
-       /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
-       if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
+       /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
+       if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
                {
-               size_t lenmax;
-                const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
-                const unsigned char list_len = 1;
+               size_t i;
+               custom_cli_ext_record* record;
 
-               if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
+               for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
+                       {
+                       const unsigned char* out = NULL;
+                       unsigned short outlen = 0;
+
+                       record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
+                       /* NULL callback sends empty extension */ 
+                       /* -1 from callback omits extension */
+                       if (record->fn1)
+                               {
+                               int cb_retval = 0;
+                               cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
+                                                       &out, &outlen, al,
+                                                       record->arg);
+                               if (cb_retval == 0)
+                                       return NULL; /* error */
+                               if (cb_retval == -1)
+                                       continue; /* skip this extension */
+                               }
+                       if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+                               return NULL;
+                       s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+                       s2n(outlen, ret);
+                       memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+                       ret += outlen;
+                       }
+               }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+       s2n(0,ret);
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
+       /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+        * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
+        *
+        * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
+        * extensions it MUST always appear last.
+        */
+       {
+       int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+       /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+        * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
+        * not. */
+       if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+               hlen -= 5;
+       if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+               {
+               hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+               if (hlen >= 4)
+                       hlen -= 4;
+               else
+                       hlen = 0;
 
-               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
-                /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
-               s2n(ext_len, ret);
-               *(ret++) = list_len;
-               *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+               s2n(hlen, ret);
+               memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+               ret += hlen;
                }
+       }
+#endif
 
        if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
                return p;
@@ -1409,18 +1509,21 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        return ret;
        }
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
        {
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
+       size_t i;
+       custom_srv_ext_record *record;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
        int next_proto_neg_seen;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
        unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
        unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-       int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+       int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
        using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-
+#endif
        /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
                return p;
@@ -1461,7 +1564,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-       if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (using_ecc)
                {
                const unsigned char *plist;
                size_t plistlen;
@@ -1504,8 +1607,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-       if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
                {
                size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
                
@@ -1596,78 +1698,61 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
-       /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
-        * to it. */
-       if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
+       for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
                {
-               size_t authz_length;
-               /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
-                * to see whether the cert we are going to send
-                * has any authz data attached to it. */
-               const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
-               const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
-               size_t i;
-               unsigned authz_count = 0;
-
-               /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
-                *      uint8_t authz_type
-                *      uint16_t length
-                *      uint8_t data[length]
-                *
-                * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
-               for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
-                       {
-                       unsigned short length;
-                       unsigned char type;
-
-                       type = *(authz++);
-                       if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                  type,
-                                  s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
-                               authz_count++;
-
-                       n2s(authz, length);
-                       /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
-                       i += 2;
-                       authz += length;
-                       i += length;
-                       }
+               const unsigned char *out = NULL;
+               unsigned short outlen = 0;
+               int cb_retval = 0;
 
-               if (authz_count)
-                       {
-                       /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
-                        * 2 bytes for extension type
-                        * 2 bytes for extension length
-                        * 1 byte for the list length
-                        * n bytes for the list */
-                       const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
-
-                       if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
-                       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
-                       s2n(ext_len, ret);
-                       *(ret++) = authz_count;
-                       s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
-                       }
+               record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
 
-               authz = orig_authz;
-               for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
+               /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
+               if (!record->fn2)
+                       continue;
+               cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
+                                                               &out, &outlen, al,
+                                                               record->arg);
+               if (cb_retval == 0)
+                       return NULL; /* error */
+               if (cb_retval == -1)
+                       continue; /* skip this extension */
+               if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+               s2n(outlen, ret);
+               memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+               ret += outlen;
+               }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+               {
+               /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
+                * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
+                */
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+                       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+               else
                        {
-                       unsigned short length;
-                       unsigned char type;
-
-                       authz_count++;
-                       type = *(authz++);
-                       if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                  type,
-                                  s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
-                               *(ret++) = type;
-                       n2s(authz, length);
-                       /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
-                       i += 2;
-                       authz += length;
-                       i += length;
+                       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+                       s2n(0,ret);
                        }
                }
+#endif
+
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
+               unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+
+               if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+               s2n(3 + len,ret);
+               s2n(1 + len,ret);
+               *ret++ = len;
+               memcpy(ret, selected, len);
+               ret += len;
+               }
 
        if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
                return p;
@@ -1676,6 +1761,159 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        return ret;
        }
 
+/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
+ * ClientHello.
+ *   data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
+ *   data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
+ *   al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
+ *       return.
+ *
+ *   returns: 0 on success. */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+                                        unsigned data_len, int *al)
+       {
+       unsigned i;
+       unsigned proto_len;
+       const unsigned char *selected;
+       unsigned char selected_len;
+       int r;
+
+       if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
+               return 0;
+
+       if (data_len < 2)
+               goto parse_error;
+
+       /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
+        * length-prefixed strings. */
+       i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
+           ((unsigned) data[1]);
+       data_len -= 2;
+       data += 2;
+       if (data_len != i)
+               goto parse_error;
+
+       if (data_len < 2)
+               goto parse_error;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
+               {
+               proto_len = data[i];
+               i++;
+
+               if (proto_len == 0)
+                       goto parse_error;
+
+               if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
+                       goto parse_error;
+
+               i += proto_len;
+               }
+
+       r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
+                                  s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+       if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+               if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                       OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+               if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                       {
+                       *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                       return -1;
+                       }
+               memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+       }
+       return 0;
+
+parse_error:
+       *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+       return -1;
+       }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+       unsigned short type, size;
+       static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+               0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
+               0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
+               0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+               0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
+               0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
+               0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */
+
+               0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
+               0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
+               0x01,        /* 1 point format */
+               0x00,        /* uncompressed */
+       };
+
+       /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+       static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+               0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
+               0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
+               0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
+               0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
+               0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
+               0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
+               0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+               0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+       };
+
+       if (data >= (d+n-2))
+               return;
+       data += 2;
+
+       if (data > (d+n-4))
+               return;
+       n2s(data,type);
+       n2s(data,size);
+
+       if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+               return;
+
+       if (data+size > d+n)
+               return;
+       data += size;
+
+       if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               {
+               const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+               const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+               if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+                       return;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+               if (data + len != d+n)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+                       return;
+               }
+
+       s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 
        {       
        unsigned short type;
@@ -1691,10 +1929,30 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
        s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
 #endif
 
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+               }
+
+       /* Clear observed custom extensions */
+       s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
+       if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
+               s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
+               }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
        s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
                               SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+               ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
        /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
        if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
                {
@@ -1714,6 +1972,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
                }
 
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
                goto ri_check;
        n2s(data,len);
@@ -1867,8 +2129,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1903,8 +2164,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
                        }
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
@@ -1942,8 +2202,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        }
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -2018,8 +2277,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                return 0;
                                }
                        }
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-                        s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
                        {
                
                        if (size < 5) 
@@ -2149,7 +2407,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
+                        s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
                        {
                        /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
                         * renegotiation.
@@ -2170,6 +2429,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        }
 #endif
 
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
+                        s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+                       {
+                       if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
+                               return 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+                       /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+                       s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+                       }
+
                /* session ticket processed earlier */
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
                         {
@@ -2177,65 +2448,30 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                                              al))
                                return 0;
                         }
-
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
+               /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is 
+                * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a 
+                * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
+                * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
+                * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
+                */
+               else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
                        {
-                       unsigned char *sdata = data;
-                       unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-
-                       if (size == 0)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
+                       custom_srv_ext_record *record;
 
-                       /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
-                        * information as the original session so we ignore this
-                        * in the case of a session resumption. */
-                       if (!s->hit)
+                       for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
                                {
-                               if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
-                                       OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
-                               s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
-                                       OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
-                               if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
+                               record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
+                               if (type == record->ext_type)
                                        {
-                                       *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                                       return 0;
-                                       }
-
-                               s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
-                                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-                               memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                      sdata,
-                                      server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
-
-                               /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
-                               qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                     server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
-                                     1 /* element size */,
-                                     byte_compare);
-
-                               for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
-                                       {
-                                       if (i > 0 &&
-                                           s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
-                                             s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
-                                               {
-                                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                                       if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
                                                return 0;
-                                               }
-                                       }
+                                       }                                               
                                }
                        }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+                       s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
 
                data+=size;
                }
@@ -2311,11 +2547,21 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
        s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
 #endif
 
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+               }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
        s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
                               SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
                goto ri_check;
 
@@ -2349,8 +2595,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -2396,8 +2641,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
                        }
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -2427,8 +2671,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                }
                        }
 #endif
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-                        s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
                        {
                        /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
                         * a status request message.
@@ -2449,7 +2692,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        unsigned char selected_len;
 
                        /* We must have requested it. */
-                       if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+                       if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
                                return 0;
@@ -2476,6 +2719,52 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
                        }
 #endif
+
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
+                       {
+                       unsigned len;
+
+                       /* We must have requested it. */
+                       if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       if (size < 4)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       /* The extension data consists of:
+                        *   uint16 list_length
+                        *   uint8 proto_length;
+                        *   uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
+                       len = data[0];
+                       len <<= 8;
+                       len |= data[1];
+                       if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       len = data[2];
+                       if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+                       s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+                       if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
+                       s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+                       }
+
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
                        {
                        if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
@@ -2505,45 +2794,33 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                                              al))
                                 return 0;
                         }
-
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
+               /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but 
+                * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
+                * callback */
+               else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
                        {
-                       /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
-                        * an authz hello extension if the client
-                        * didn't request a proof. */
-                       unsigned char *sdata = data;
-                       unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-
-                       if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       if (!size)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
+                       size_t i;
+                       custom_cli_ext_record* record;
 
-                       /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
-                        * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
-                               sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
+                       for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
                                {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
+                               record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
+                               if (record->ext_type == type)
+                                       {
+                                       if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
+                                               return 0;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               }                       
+                       }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+                       {
+                       /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
+                       if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
+                               s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
                        }
+#endif
  
                data += size;
                }
@@ -2819,7 +3096,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
        if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
            (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
-           ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+           ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
                {
                /* we are using an ECC cipher */
                size_t i;
@@ -2989,7 +3266,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
        if (p >= limit)
                return -1;
        /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
-       if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+       if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
                {
                i = *(p++);
                p+= i;
@@ -3125,7 +3402,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
        HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
        HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-       if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+       if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
                return 2;
        /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
        /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
@@ -3367,6 +3644,11 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
        TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
        CERT *c = s->cert;
        unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+       if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+               c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+               }
        /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
        if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
                {
@@ -3416,13 +3698,15 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
        const EVP_MD *md;
        CERT *c = s->cert;
        TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
-       /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
-       if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+       if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                return 1;
        /* Should never happen */
        if (!c)
                return 0;
 
+       if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+               OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
        c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
        if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
                return 0;