Set security level to zero is ssltest
[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
index 151e7b8..26fc45c 100644 (file)
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#endif
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@@ -218,33 +222,46 @@ void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 
-static int nid_list[] =
+typedef struct
+       {
+       int nid;                /* Curve NID */
+       int secbits;            /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
+       unsigned int flags;     /* Flags: currently just field type */
+       } tls_curve_info;
+
+#define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2                0x1
+#define TLS_CURVE_PRIME                0x0
+
+static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
        {
-               NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
-               NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
-               NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
-               NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
-               NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
-               NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
-               NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
-               NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
-               NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
-               NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
-               NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
-               NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
-               NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
-               NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
-               NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
-               NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
-               NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
-               NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
-               NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
-               NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
-               NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
-               NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
-               NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
-               NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
-               NID_secp521r1  /* secp521r1 (25) */     
+               {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
+               {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
+               {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
+               {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */ 
+               {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */ 
+               {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
+               {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */ 
+               {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */ 
+               {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
+               {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+               {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */ 
+               {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
+               {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */ 
+               {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */ 
+               {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
+               {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */ 
+               {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */ 
+               {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
+               {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */ 
+               {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */ 
+               {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
+               {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */ 
+               {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+               {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
+               {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */      
+               {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 
+               {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 
+               {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */   
        };
 
 
@@ -260,11 +277,14 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
                0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
                0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
                0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */      
+               0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 
                0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
                0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+               0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */        
                0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
                0,9,  /* sect283k1 (9) */
                0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+               0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */        
                0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
                0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
                0,8,  /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
@@ -296,7 +316,7 @@ int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
        if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
                                sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
                return 0;
-       return nid_list[curve_id-1];
+       return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
        }
 
 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
@@ -354,6 +374,12 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
                return 24;
        case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */       
                return 25;
+       case NID_brainpoolP256r1:  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+               return 26;
+       case NID_brainpoolP384r1:  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+               return 27;
+       case NID_brainpoolP512r1:  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+               return 28;
        default:
                return 0;
                }
@@ -398,6 +424,20 @@ static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
                *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
                }
        }
+
+/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
+static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
+       {
+       tls_curve_info *cinfo;
+       if (curve[0])
+               return 1;
+       if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
+                               sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
+               return 0;
+       cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
+       return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
+       }
+
 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
        {
@@ -429,7 +469,7 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
        for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
                {
                if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
-                       return 1;
+                       return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
                }
        return 0;
        }
@@ -480,6 +520,8 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
                        {
                        if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
                                {
+                               if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
+                                       continue;
                                if (nmatch == k)
                                        {
                                        int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
@@ -527,7 +569,7 @@ int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
        return 1;
        }
 
-#define MAX_CURVELIST  25
+#define MAX_CURVELIST  28
 
 typedef struct
        {
@@ -578,14 +620,12 @@ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
        {
        int is_prime, id;
        const EC_GROUP *grp;
-       const EC_POINT *pt;
        const EC_METHOD *meth;
        if (!ec)
                return 0;
        /* Determine if it is a prime field */
        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
-        pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
-       if (!grp || !pt)
+       if (!grp)
                return 0;
         meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
        if (!meth)
@@ -613,6 +653,8 @@ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
                }
        if (comp_id)
                {
+               if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
+                       return 0;
                if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
                        {
                        if (is_prime)
@@ -662,7 +704,7 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
                        return 0;
                /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
                if (!s->server)
-                       return 1;
+                       break;
                }
        return 1;
        }
@@ -864,9 +906,6 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
        tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-       tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
-#endif
 };
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
@@ -909,13 +948,7 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
        else
                {
                *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-               /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
-               if (FIPS_mode())
-                       return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
-               else
-#endif
-                       return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+               return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
                }
        }
 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
@@ -998,6 +1031,14 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
                return 0;
                }
+       /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
+       if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
+                               EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
+                                                               (void *)sig))
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+               return 0;
+               }
        /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
         * wish.
         */
@@ -1005,6 +1046,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
                s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
        return 1;
        }
+
 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
  * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
  * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
@@ -1014,9 +1056,6 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
        {
        CERT *c = s->cert;
-       const unsigned char *sigalgs;
-       size_t i, sigalgslen;
-       int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
        c->mask_a = 0;
        c->mask_k = 0;
        /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
@@ -1024,50 +1063,16 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
                c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
        else
                c->mask_ssl = 0;
-       /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
-        * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
-        * TLS 1.2.
-        */
-       sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
-       for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
-               {
-               switch(sigalgs[1])
-                       {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-               case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
-                       have_rsa = 1;
-                       break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-               case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
-                       have_dsa = 1;
-                       break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-               case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
-                       have_ecdsa = 1;
-                       break;
-#endif
-                       }
-               }
-       /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
+       ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
+       /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
         * signature algorithms.
         */
-       if (!have_rsa)
-               {
-               c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+       if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
                c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
-               }
-       if (!have_dsa)
-               {
-               c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+       if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
                c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
-               }
-       if (!have_ecdsa)
-               {
-               c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+       if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
                c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
-               }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
        if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
                {
@@ -1086,20 +1091,22 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
        c->valid = 1;
        }
 
-/* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
-static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
+int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
        {
-       unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
-       unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
-
-       if (a > b)
+       CERT *ct = s->cert;
+       if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
                return 1;
-       else if (a < b)
-               return -1;
-       return 0;
-}
+       return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
+       }
+
+static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
+       {
+       if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+               return 0;
+       return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
+       }
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
        {
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
@@ -1118,7 +1125,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
                        alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
                        alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-                       if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
+                       if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
                                || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
                                {
                                using_ecc = 1;
@@ -1229,6 +1236,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                long lenmax; 
                const unsigned char *plist;
                size_t plistlen;
+               size_t i;
+               unsigned char *etmp;
 
                tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
 
@@ -1257,22 +1266,34 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return NULL;
                        }
+
                
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
-               s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
+               etmp = ret + 4;
+               /* Copy curve ID if supported */
+               for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
+                       {
+                       if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
+                               {
+                               *etmp++ = plist[0];
+                               *etmp++ = plist[1];
+                               }
+                       }
+
+               plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
 
                /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
                 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
                 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
                 * resolves this to two bytes.
                 */
+               s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
                s2n(plistlen, ret);
-               memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
                ret+=plistlen;
                }
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
-       if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
+       if (tls_use_ticket(s))
                {
                int ticklen;
                if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
@@ -1312,13 +1333,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                {
                size_t salglen;
                const unsigned char *salg;
+               unsigned char *etmp;
                salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
                if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
                        return NULL; 
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
-               s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
-               s2n(salglen, ret);
-               memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
+               etmp = ret;
+               /* Skip over lengths for now */
+               ret += 4;
+               salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, etmp, salg, salglen);
+               /* Fill in lengths */
+               s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
+               s2n(salglen, etmp);
                ret += salglen;
                }
 
@@ -1445,26 +1471,6 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                 ret += el;
                 }
 
-       /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
-       /* 2 bytes for extension type */
-       /* 2 bytes for extension length */
-       /* 1 byte for the list length */
-       /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
-       if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
-               {
-                const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
-                const unsigned char list_len = 1;
-
-               if (limit < ret + 6)
-                       return NULL;
-
-               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
-                /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
-               s2n(ext_len, ret);
-               *(ret++) = list_len;
-               *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
-               }
-
        /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
        if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
                {
@@ -1483,7 +1489,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                                {
                                int cb_retval = 0;
                                cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
-                                                       &out, &outlen,
+                                                       &out, &outlen, al,
                                                        record->arg);
                                if (cb_retval == 0)
                                        return NULL; /* error */
@@ -1498,6 +1504,39 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                        ret += outlen;
                        }
                }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+       s2n(0,ret);
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
+       /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+        * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
+        *
+        * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
+        * extensions it MUST always appear last.
+        */
+       {
+       int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+       /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+        * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
+        * not. */
+       if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+               hlen -= 5;
+       if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+               {
+               hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+               if (hlen >= 4)
+                       hlen -= 4;
+               else
+                       hlen = 0;
+
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+               s2n(hlen, ret);
+               memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+               ret += hlen;
+               }
+       }
+#endif
 
        if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
                return p;
@@ -1506,17 +1545,19 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        return ret;
        }
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
        {
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
+       size_t i;
+       custom_srv_ext_record *record;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
        int next_proto_neg_seen;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
        unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
        unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-       int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+       int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
        using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
 #endif
        /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
@@ -1586,8 +1627,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
-       if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
-               && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 
+       if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
                { 
                if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
@@ -1693,119 +1733,46 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
-       /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
-        * to it. */
-       if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
+       for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
                {
-               size_t authz_length;
-               /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
-                * to see whether the cert we are going to send
-                * has any authz data attached to it. */
-               const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
-               const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
-               size_t i;
-               unsigned authz_count = 0;
-
-               /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
-                *      uint8_t authz_type
-                *      uint16_t length
-                *      uint8_t data[length]
-                *
-                * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
-               for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
-                       {
-                       unsigned short length;
-                       unsigned char type;
-
-                       type = *(authz++);
-                       if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                  type,
-                                  s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
-                               authz_count++;
-
-                       n2s(authz, length);
-                       /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
-                       i += 2;
-                       authz += length;
-                       i += length;
-                       }
+               const unsigned char *out = NULL;
+               unsigned short outlen = 0;
+               int cb_retval = 0;
 
-               if (authz_count)
-                       {
-                       /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
-                        * 2 bytes for extension type
-                        * 2 bytes for extension length
-                        * 1 byte for the list length
-                        * n bytes for the list */
-                       const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
-
-                       if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
-                       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
-                       s2n(ext_len, ret);
-                       *(ret++) = authz_count;
-                       s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
-                       }
+               record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
 
-               authz = orig_authz;
-               for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
-                       {
-                       unsigned short length;
-                       unsigned char type;
-
-                       authz_count++;
-                       type = *(authz++);
-                       if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                  type,
-                                  s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
-                               *(ret++) = type;
-                       n2s(authz, length);
-                       /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
-                       i += 2;
-                       authz += length;
-                       i += length;
-                       }
+               /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
+               if (!record->fn2)
+                       continue;
+               cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
+                                                               &out, &outlen, al,
+                                                               record->arg);
+               if (cb_retval == 0)
+                       return NULL; /* error */
+               if (cb_retval == -1)
+                       continue; /* skip this extension */
+               if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+               s2n(outlen, ret);
+               memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+               ret += outlen;
                }
-
-       /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
-       if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
                {
-               size_t i;
-
-               for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
+               /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
+                * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
+                */
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+                       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+               else
                        {
-                       size_t j;
-                       custom_srv_ext_record *record;
-
-                       for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
-                               {
-                               record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
-                               if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
-                                       {
-                                       const unsigned char *out = NULL;
-                                       unsigned short outlen = 0;
-                                       int cb_retval = 0;
-
-                                       /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
-                                       if (!record->fn2)
-                                               break;
-                                       cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
-                                                               &out, &outlen,
-                                                               record->arg);
-                                       if (cb_retval == 0)
-                                               return NULL; /* error */
-                                       if (cb_retval == -1)
-                                               break; /* skip this extension */
-                                       if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
-                                               return NULL;
-                                       s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
-                                       s2n(outlen, ret);
-                                       memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
-                                       ret += outlen;
-                                       break;
-                                       }
-                               }
+                       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+                       s2n(0,ret);
                        }
                }
+#endif
 
        if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
                {
@@ -1899,6 +1866,89 @@ parse_error:
        return -1;
        }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+       unsigned short type, size;
+       static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+               0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
+               0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
+               0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+               0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
+               0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
+               0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */
+
+               0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
+               0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
+               0x01,        /* 1 point format */
+               0x00,        /* uncompressed */
+       };
+
+       /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+       static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+               0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
+               0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
+               0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
+               0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
+               0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
+               0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
+               0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+               0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+       };
+
+       if (data >= (d+n-2))
+               return;
+       data += 2;
+
+       if (data > (d+n-4))
+               return;
+       n2s(data,type);
+       n2s(data,size);
+
+       if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+               return;
+
+       if (data+size > d+n)
+               return;
+       data += size;
+
+       if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               {
+               const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+               const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+               if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+                       return;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+               if (data + len != d+n)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+                       return;
+               }
+
+       s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 
        {       
        unsigned short type;
@@ -1921,17 +1971,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                }
 
        /* Clear observed custom extensions */
-       s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
-       if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
+       s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
+       if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
                {
-               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
-               s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
-               }               
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
+               s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
+               }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
        s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
                               SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+               ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
        /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
        if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
                {
@@ -1951,6 +2007,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
                }
 
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
                goto ri_check;
        n2s(data,len);
@@ -2252,8 +2312,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                return 0;
                                }
                        }
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
-                        && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
                        {
                
                        if (size < 5) 
@@ -2411,8 +2470,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        {
                        if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
                                return 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
                        /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
                        s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
                        }
 
                /* session ticket processed earlier */
@@ -2422,66 +2483,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                                              al))
                                return 0;
                         }
-
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
-                       {
-                       unsigned char *sdata = data;
-                       unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-
-                       if (size == 0)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
-                        * information as the original session so we ignore this
-                        * in the case of a session resumption. */
-                       if (!s->hit)
-                               {
-                               if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
-                                       OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
-                               s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
-                                       OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
-                               if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
-                                       {
-                                       *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                                       return 0;
-                                       }
-
-                               s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
-                                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-                               memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                      sdata,
-                                      server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
-
-                               /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
-                               qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                     server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
-                                     1 /* element size */,
-                                     byte_compare);
-
-                               for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
-                                       {
-                                       if (i > 0 &&
-                                           s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
-                                             s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
-                                               {
-                                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                                               return 0;
-                                               }
-                                       }
-                               }
-                       }
-
                /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is 
                 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a 
                 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
@@ -2497,38 +2498,15 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
                                if (type == record->ext_type)
                                        {
-                                       size_t j;
-
-                                       /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
-                                       for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
-                                               {
-                                               if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
-                                                       {
-                                                       *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                                                       return 0;
-                                                       }
-                                               }
-
-                                       /* NULL callback still notes the extension */ 
                                        if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
                                                return 0;
-                                               
-                                       /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
-                                       s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
-                                       s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
-                                                       s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
-                                                       s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
-                                       if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
-                                               {
-                                               s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
-                                               *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                                               return 0;
-                                               }
-                                       s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
-                                                       s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
                                        }                                               
                                }
                        }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+                       s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
 
                data+=size;
                }
@@ -2615,6 +2593,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                               SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
                goto ri_check;
 
@@ -2685,8 +2667,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                                return 0;
                                }
-                       if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-                               || (size > 0))
+                       if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
                                return 0;
@@ -2847,46 +2828,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                                              al))
                                 return 0;
                         }
-
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
-                       {
-                       /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
-                        * an authz hello extension if the client
-                        * didn't request a proof. */
-                       unsigned char *sdata = data;
-                       unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-
-                       if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       if (!size)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
-                        * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
-                               sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
-                       }
-
                /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but 
                 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
                 * callback */
@@ -2906,6 +2847,14 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                        }
                                }                       
                        }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+                       {
+                       /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
+                       if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
+                               s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+                       }
+#endif
  
                data += size;
                }
@@ -3181,7 +3130,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
        if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
            (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
-           ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+           ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
                {
                /* we are using an ECC cipher */
                size_t i;
@@ -3344,7 +3293,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
        /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
         * to permit stateful resumption.
         */
-       if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+       if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
                return 0;
        if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
                return 0;
@@ -3598,40 +3547,60 @@ int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
                                sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
        }
 
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+typedef struct 
        {
-       switch(hash_alg)
-               {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-               case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-               if (FIPS_mode())
-                       return NULL;
+       int nid;
+       int secbits;
+       const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
+       } tls12_hash_info;
+
+static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+       {NID_md5, 64, 0},
+#else
+       {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
 #endif
-               return EVP_md5();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+       {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
+#else
+       {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
-               return EVP_sha1();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+       {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
+       {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
+#else
+       {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
+       {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
-               return EVP_sha224();
-
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
-               return EVP_sha256();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+       {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
+       {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
+#else
+       {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
+       {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
-               return EVP_sha384();
+};
 
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
-               return EVP_sha512();
-#endif
-               default:
+static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
+       {
+       if (hash_alg == 0)
+               return NULL;
+       if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
                return NULL;
+       return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
+       }
 
-               }
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+       {
+       const tls12_hash_info *inf;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+       if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
+               return NULL;
+#endif
+       inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
+       if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
+               return NULL; 
+       return inf->mfunc();
        }
 
 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
@@ -3684,8 +3653,86 @@ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
                        *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
                }
        }
+/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
+       {
+       /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
+       const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
+       if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
+               return 0;
+       /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
+       if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+               return 0;
+       /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
+       return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
+       }
+
+/* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
+ * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
+ * then RSA is disabled.
+ */
+
+void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+       size_t i, sigalgslen;
+       int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+       /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
+        * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
+        * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
+        * if we have to.
+        */
+       sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+       for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
+               {
+               switch(sigalgs[1])
+                       {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+                       if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                               have_rsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+                       if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                               have_dsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+                       if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                               have_ecdsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+                       }
+               }
+       if (!have_rsa)
+               *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+       if (!have_dsa)
+               *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+       if (!have_ecdsa)
+               *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+       }
+
+size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
+       {
+       unsigned char *tmpout = out;
+       size_t i;
+       for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
+               {
+               if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
+                       {
+                       *tmpout++ = psig[0];
+                       *tmpout++ = psig[1];
+                       }
+               }
+       return tmpout - out;
+       }
+
 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
-static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
                                const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
                                const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
        {
@@ -3694,9 +3741,7 @@ static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
        for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
                {
                /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
-               if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
-                       continue;
-               if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+               if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
                        continue;
                for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
                        {
@@ -3729,6 +3774,11 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
        TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
        CERT *c = s->cert;
        unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+       if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+               c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+               }
        /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
        if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
                {
@@ -3756,13 +3806,13 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
                pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
                preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
                }
-       nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+       nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
        if (!nmatch)
                return 1;
        salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
        if (!salgs)
                return 0;
-       nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+       nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
        c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
        c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
        return 1;
@@ -3785,6 +3835,8 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
        if (!c)
                return 0;
 
+       if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+               OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
        c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
        if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
                return 0;
@@ -4517,3 +4569,131 @@ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
        }
 
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
+       {
+       int dh_secbits = 80;
+       if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
+               return DH_get_1024_160();
+       if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+               {
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
+                       dh_secbits = 128;
+               else
+                       dh_secbits = 80;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+               dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
+               }
+
+       if (dh_secbits >= 128)
+               {
+               DH *dhp = DH_new();
+               if (!dhp)
+                       return NULL;
+               dhp->g = BN_new();
+               if (dhp->g)
+                       BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
+               if (dh_secbits >= 192)
+                       dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
+               else
+                       dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
+               if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
+                       {
+                       DH_free(dhp);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+               return dhp;
+               }
+       if (dh_secbits >= 112)
+               return DH_get_2048_224();
+       return DH_get_1024_160();
+       }
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+       {
+       int secbits;
+       EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+       if (pkey)
+               {
+               secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
+               EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+               }
+       else
+               secbits = -1;
+       if (s)
+               return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
+       else
+               return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
+       }
+
+static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+       {
+       /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
+       int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
+       sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+       if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
+               {
+               const EVP_MD *md;
+               if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
+                               secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+               }
+       if (s)
+               return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
+       else
+               return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
+       }
+
+int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
+       {
+       if (vfy)
+               vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
+       if (is_ee)
+               {
+               if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
+                       return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
+                       return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
+               }
+       if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
+               return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
+       return 1;
+       }
+
+/* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
+ * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
+ * not sending one to the peer.
+ * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
+ */
+
+int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
+       {
+       int rv, start_idx, i;
+       if (x == NULL)
+               {
+               x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+               start_idx = 1;
+               }
+       else
+               start_idx = 0;
+
+       rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
+       if (rv != 1)
+               return rv;
+
+       for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
+               {
+               x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+               rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
+               if (rv != 1)
+                       return rv;
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }