-/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
# include <openssl/bn.h>
#endif
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+# include <openssl/ct.h>
+#endif
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
SSL_SESSION **psess);
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
{
ssl3_clear(s);
- s->version = s->method->version;
+ if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
+ s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
+ else
+ s->version = s->method->version;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
} tls_curve_info;
-# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
+/* Mask for curve type */
+# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
+# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
+# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
+/*
+ * Table of curve information.
+ * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
+ * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
+ */
static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
{NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
{NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
{NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+ /* X25519 (29) */
+ {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
};
static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
};
-/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
-static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
- /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
+/* The default curves */
+static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
+ 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
- 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
};
static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
- /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
+ 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+ 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+
+ /*
+ * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
+ * via an explicit callback or parameters.
+ */
0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- /*
- * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
- * via an explicit callback or parameters.
- */
0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
- /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
- switch (nid) {
- case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
- return 1;
- case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
- return 2;
- case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
- return 3;
- case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
- return 4;
- case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
- return 5;
- case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
- return 6;
- case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
- return 7;
- case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
- return 8;
- case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
- return 9;
- case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
- return 10;
- case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
- return 11;
- case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
- return 12;
- case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
- return 13;
- case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
- return 14;
- case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
- return 15;
- case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
- return 16;
- case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
- return 17;
- case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
- return 18;
- case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
- return 19;
- case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
- return 20;
- case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
- return 21;
- case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
- return 22;
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
- return 23;
- case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
- return 24;
- case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
- return 25;
- case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- return 26;
- case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- return 27;
- case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- return 28;
- default:
- return 0;
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
+ if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
+ return i + 1;
}
+ return 0;
}
/*
pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
- if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
- *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
- pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
- } else {
- *pcurves = eccurves_all;
- pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
- }
+ *pcurves = eccurves_default;
+ pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
}
}
}
/*-
- * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
- * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
+ * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
+ * if there is no match.
+ * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
* For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
* an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
*/
*/
unsigned long dup_list = 0;
clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
- if (!clist)
+ if (clist == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
EC_KEY *ec)
{
- int is_prime, id;
+ int id;
const EC_GROUP *grp;
- const EC_METHOD *meth;
if (!ec)
return 0;
/* Determine if it is a prime field */
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
if (!grp)
return 0;
- meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
- if (!meth)
- return 0;
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
- is_prime = 1;
- else
- is_prime = 0;
/* Determine curve ID */
id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
- /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
- if (id) {
- curve_id[0] = 0;
- curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
- } else {
- curve_id[0] = 0xff;
- if (is_prime)
- curve_id[1] = 0x01;
- else
- curve_id[1] = 0x02;
- }
+ /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
+ if (id == 0)
+ return 0;
+ curve_id[0] = 0;
+ curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
if (comp_id) {
if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
return 0;
- if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
- if (is_prime)
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ } else {
+ if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
else
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
- } else
- *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ }
}
return 1;
}
unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int rv;
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (!pkey)
return 0;
/* If not EC nothing to do */
- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
return 1;
- }
- rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
if (!rv)
return 0;
/*
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
+/*
+ * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
+ * @s: SSL connection
+ * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
+ *
+ * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
+ * is compatible with the client extensions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
+ */
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
{
- unsigned char curve_id[2];
- EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
- return 1;
-# endif
/*
* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
* curves permitted.
*/
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ unsigned char curve_id[2];
/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
/* Check this curve is acceptable */
if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
return 0;
- /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
- return 1;
- /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
- else {
- unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
- if (!ec)
- return 0;
- if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
- return 0;
- if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
- }
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
- /* Need a shared curve */
- if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- if (!ec) {
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
- if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
- return 0;
-/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
-# if 0
- return 1;
-# else
- return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
-# endif
+ /* Need a shared curve */
+ if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
+#endif
};
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
- if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
+ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
return 0;
if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
+ /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
+ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
- /*
- * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
- * algorithms.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
- if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
- if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
}
+static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
+ unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
+ unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
+ if (u1 < u2)
+ return -1;
+ else if (u1 > u2)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
+ * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
+ * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
+ * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
+ * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
+ * occurred.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
+ PACKET extensions = *packet;
+ size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
+ unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* First pass: count the extensions. */
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
+ unsigned int type;
+ PACKET extension;
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
+ !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ num_extensions++;
+ }
+
+ if (num_extensions <= 1)
+ return 1;
+
+ extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
+ if (extension_types == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
+ extensions = *packet;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+ PACKET extension;
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
+ !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ /* This should not happen. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
+ qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
+ for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+ if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ done:
+ OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
+ return ret;
+}
+
unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
- SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
using_ecc = 1;
break;
}
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
return NULL;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* Add Heartbeat extension */
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
- s2n(1, ret);
- /*-
- * Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* Add Heartbeat extension */
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
+ s2n(1, ret);
+ /*-
+ * Set mode:
+ * 1: peer may send requests
+ * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+ *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ else
+ *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
}
#endif
+ /*
+ * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
+ * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
+ * (see longer comment below)
+ */
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
return NULL;
s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
#endif
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+ int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+ *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
}
#endif
* for other cases too.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
+ || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
+ || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
else {
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
}
}
#endif
- if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
- unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+ unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
return NULL;
}
/*
- * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
- * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
- * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
- * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
- * success.
+ * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
+ * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
+ * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
+ * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
- unsigned int data_len;
- unsigned int proto_len;
- const unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char *data;
- unsigned char selected_len;
- int r;
-
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
- return 0;
+ PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
- /*
- * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
- * length-prefixed strings.
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
- || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
- goto parse_error;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
do {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
- || proto_len == 0
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
- goto parse_error;
- } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
-
- r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return -1;
+ /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
+ return 0;
}
- memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
+
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
+ &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
+ &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
}
- return 0;
- parse_error:
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return -1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
+ * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
+ * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
+ * returns 1 on success, 0
+ */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
+{
+ const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
+ unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+
+ if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+ int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed,
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
+ s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ } else {
+ *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
+ *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*-
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
{
- unsigned int type, size;
- unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
+ unsigned int type;
+ PACKET sni, tmppkt;
+ size_t ext_len;
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
- };
-
- /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
- static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
- if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, size))
+ /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
+ static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
+
+ tmppkt = *pkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
return;
+ }
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock1, len1)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock2, len2)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt))
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
- return;
- } else {
- const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock1, len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt))
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
- return;
- }
+ ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
+ sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
+ ext_len);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+/*
+ * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
+ * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
+ *
+ * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
+ * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
+ */
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int type;
- unsigned int size;
- unsigned int len;
- unsigned char *data;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+ PACKET extensions;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+ SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
goto ri_check;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
- goto err;
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
+ return 0;
- while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
- PACKET subpkt;
+ if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
+ return 0;
- if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
- goto err;
+ /*
+ * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
+ * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
+ * resumption.
+ */
+ while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
+ PACKET extension;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
+ return 0;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
- goto err;
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
+ PACKET_remaining(&extension),
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
*/
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- unsigned char *sdata;
unsigned int servname_type;
- unsigned int dsize;
- PACKET ssubpkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
- goto err;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
- goto err;
-
- if (s->servername_done == 0)
- switch (servname_type) {
- case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- goto err;
-
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
- OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
- (unsigned char *)s->session
- ->tlsext_hostname,
- len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
- if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- s->servername_done = 1;
-
- } else {
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
- && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
- && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
- (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
- }
-
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
+ PACKET sni, hostname;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
+ /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
+ || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
+ return 0;
}
- /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
- goto err;
+ /*
+ * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
+ * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
+ * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
+ * such.
+ * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
+ * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
+ * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
+ *
+ * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
+ * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
+ || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
+ || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->servername_done = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
+ * fall back to a full handshake.
+ */
+ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+ && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
+ strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
+ }
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
- || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
- len))
- goto err;
- s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
-
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
- goto err;
+ PACKET srp_I;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
+ * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
+ PACKET ec_point_format_list;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
- || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
- goto err;
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
+ &ec_point_format_list)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
if (!s->hit) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
+ &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
- ecpointformatlist_length;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- ecpointformatlist_length))
- goto err;
- } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- goto err;
- }
- /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
- unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
- /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
- || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
- || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
- goto err;
+ /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
+ &elliptic_curve_list)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
+ || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
- goto err;
-
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
+ &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
- ellipticcurvelist_length;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
- ellipticcurvelist_length))
- goto err;
- } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
- goto err;
- }
- /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- goto err;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
- || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
+ PACKET_remaining(&extension),
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
- unsigned int dsize;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || (dsize & 1) != 0
- || (dsize == 0)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
- || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
- goto err;
+ PACKET supported_sig_algs;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
+ || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
+ || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
+ PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- PACKET ssubpkt;
+ const unsigned char *ext_data;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
- (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
- goto err;
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
+ (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- const unsigned char *sdata;
- unsigned int dsize;
- /* Read in responder_id_list */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
- goto err;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
+ PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
+ return 0;
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
- unsigned int idsize;
+ PACKET responder_id;
+ const unsigned char *id_data;
- if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
- goto err;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
+ &responder_id)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
+ return 0;
}
- sdata = data;
- data += idsize;
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
- if (!id)
- goto err;
- if (data != sdata) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- goto err;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
+ && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
}
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
+
+ id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
+ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
+ PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
+ if (id == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
+
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- goto err;
- }
- sdata = data;
- if (dsize > 0) {
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
+ ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
- goto err;
+ d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
+ PACKET_remaining(&exts));
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
+ || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
}
- }
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
*/
- else
+ } else {
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ }
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
switch (hbtype) {
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
+ if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
- if (!s->hit)
- s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
- }
+ /*
+ * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
+ * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
+ */
+
/*
* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
* nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
* ServerHello may be later returned.
*/
else if (!s->hit) {
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+ if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
+ PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
}
- /* Spurious data on the end */
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
- goto err;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
ri_check:
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
+ * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
+ * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
+ * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
+ */
return 1;
-err:
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
}
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
-
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
return 0;
* elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
* fill the length of the block.
*/
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
{
- unsigned int off = 0;
+ unsigned int len;
- while (off < len) {
- if (d[off] == 0)
+ while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
+ || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
return 0;
- off += d[off];
- off++;
}
- return off == len;
+ return 1;
}
#endif
-static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
- unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
- unsigned short length;
- unsigned short type;
- unsigned short size;
- unsigned char *data = *p;
+ unsigned int length, type, size;
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+ SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif
- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
goto ri_check;
- n2s(data, length);
- if (data + length != d + n) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
+ if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
+ const unsigned char *data;
+ PACKET spkt;
- if (data + size > (d + n))
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
+ || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
+ unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
+ || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
- ecpointformatlist_length);
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ ecpointformatlist_length)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ /*
+ * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
+ * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
+ * need to let control continue to flow to that.
+ */
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
+ s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
+ if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
+ s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
+ if (size > 0) {
+ s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+ if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
-
/* We must have requested it. */
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* The data must be valid */
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
unsigned len;
-
/* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+ if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
- if (size < 4) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
/*-
* The extension data consists of:
* uint16 list_length
* uint8 proto_length;
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
- len = data[0];
- len <<= 8;
- len |= data[1];
- if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- len = data[2];
- if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
+ || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
- switch (data[0]) {
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+ unsigned int hbtype;
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ switch (hbtype) {
case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
}
*/
else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
-
- data += size;
}
- if (data != d + n) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
}
- *p = data;
-
ri_check:
/*
return 0;
}
+ if (s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
+ * original session.
+ */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
+ !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
return 1;
}
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
-
+ s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
return 1;
}
}
}
/* Initialise digests to default values */
-static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
+void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
{
const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+ else
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
#endif
}
} else
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
err:
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
&& (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
size_t i;
unsigned char *list;
initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
/*
- * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
- * callback
+ * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
+ * that we don't receive a status message
*/
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
- && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int r;
- /*
- * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
- * response.
- */
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- if (r == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- }
- if (r < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- }
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
}
}
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
- int n)
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al = -1;
if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
return 1;
- if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
+ if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
/*-
* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
- * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
+ * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
+ * need to be handled at the same time.
+ *
+ * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
+ * secret.
*
- * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
- * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
- * extension, if any.
- * len: the length of the session ID.
- * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
+ * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*
* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
* s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
* Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
+ *
+ * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
+ *
*/
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned char *session_id,
- int len, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
+ const PACKET *session_id,
+ SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
unsigned int i;
- size_t bookmark = 0;
+ PACKET local_ext = *ext;
int retv = -1;
+ int have_ticket = 0;
+ int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
+
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
- if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
- return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
return 0;
- if (!PACKET_get_bookmark(pkt, &bookmark)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)) {
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- }
- /* Skip past cipher list and compression algorithm list */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)
- || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)) {
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* Now at start of extensions */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
retv = 0;
goto end;
}
- while (PACKET_remaining (pkt) >= 4) {
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
unsigned int type, size;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < size) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
retv = 0;
goto end;
}
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
int r;
- unsigned char *etick;
+ const unsigned char *etick;
+
+ /* Duplicate extension */
+ if (have_ticket != 0) {
+ retv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ have_ticket = 1;
if (size == 0) {
/*
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
retv = 1;
- goto end;
+ continue;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
retv = 2;
- goto end;
+ continue;
}
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &etick, size)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, session_id, len, ret);
+ r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
+ PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
switch (r) {
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
retv = -1;
break;
}
- goto end;
+ continue;
} else {
- if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, size)) {
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
}
}
- retv = 0;
+ if (have_ticket == 0)
+ retv = 0;
end:
- if (!PACKET_goto_bookmark(pkt, bookmark))
- return -1;
return retv;
}
* point to the resulting session.
*
* Returns:
+ * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
* 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
+ int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
if (eticklen < 48)
return 2;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if (hctx == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ret = -2;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
- &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+ ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rv == 0)
- return 2;
+ goto err;
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ ret = 2;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
- return 2;
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- EVP_sha256(), NULL);
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
+ ret = 2;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+ etick + 16) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
if (mlen < 0) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return 2;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ if (sdec == NULL
+ || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return -1;
}
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
}
slen += mlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ return ret;
}
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
+ {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
};
static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
+ {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
+ {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
+ {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
+ {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
};
static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
{
- return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
+ return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
}
typedef struct {
int nid;
int secbits;
- const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
+ int md_idx;
+ unsigned char tlsext_hash;
} tls12_hash_info;
static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- {NID_md5, 64, 0},
-#else
- {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
-#endif
- {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
+ {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+ {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+ {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+ {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+ {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+ {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
};
static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
{
+ unsigned int i;
if (hash_alg == 0)
return NULL;
- if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
- return NULL;
- return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
+
+ for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
+ {
+ if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
+ return tls12_md_info + i;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
}
const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
return NULL;
inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
- if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
+ if (!inf)
return NULL;
- return inf->mfunc();
+ return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
}
static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
+ return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+
+ case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
+ return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
+
+ case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
+ return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
+# endif
}
return -1;
}
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
{
- int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+ int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
return;
if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
*psign_nid = sign_nid;
}
if (psignhash_nid) {
- if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
- OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
- else
+ if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
+ || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
+ sign_nid) <= 0)
*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
}
}
{
/* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
- if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
+ if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
return 0;
/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
* disabled.
*/
-void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
+void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
{
const unsigned char *sigalgs;
size_t i, sigalgslen;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (nmatch) {
salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
- if (!salgs)
+ if (salgs == NULL)
return 0;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
} else {
if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
return 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
- /*
- * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
- * ignoring any peer preferences.
- */
- const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
- if (s->server)
- sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
- else
- sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
- if (sigs) {
- idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
- md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
- pmd[idx] = md;
- pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
- pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
+ if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
+ if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
+# endif
}
return 1;
}
return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
-{
- unsigned char *pl;
- unsigned short hbtype;
- unsigned int payload;
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- p, length,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
- return 0; /* silently discard */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
- pl = p;
-
- if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
- unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
- int r;
-
- /*
- * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
- * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
- */
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- bp = buffer;
-
- /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
- *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
- s2n(payload, bp);
- memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
- bp += payload;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- return -1;
- }
-
- r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
- 3 + payload + padding);
-
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
-
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
- unsigned int seq;
-
- /*
- * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
- * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
- */
- n2s(pl, seq);
-
- if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int ret = -1;
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
- * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
-
- /*-
- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
- * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
- * some random stuff.
- * - Message Type, 1 byte
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
- * - Padding
- */
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- if (buf == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- p = buf;
- /* Message Type */
- *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
- /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
- s2n(payload, p);
- /* Sequence number */
- s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
- /* 16 random bytes */
- if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- p += 16;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
- if (ret >= 0) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buf, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
- }
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
typedef struct {
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
if (!x || !pk)
goto end;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
- rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
- CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
- *pvalid = rv;
- return rv;
- }
-#endif
} else {
if (!x || !pk)
return 0;
idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
if (idx == -1)
return 0;
- cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
switch (idx) {
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
break;
default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
break;
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
+ default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
+ default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
+ default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
+ break;
+
default:
default_nid = -1;
break;
if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
int check_type = 0;
- switch (pk->type) {
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
break;
- case EVP_PKEY_DH:
- case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
- {
- int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
- if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
- check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
- if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
- check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
- }
}
if (check_type) {
const unsigned char *ctypes;
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
- tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
- tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
}
/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
DH *dhp = DH_new();
- if (!dhp)
+ if (dhp == NULL)
return NULL;
dhp->g = BN_new();
- if (dhp->g)
+ if (dhp->g != NULL)
BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
if (dh_secbits >= 192)
dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
else
dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
- if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
+ if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
DH_free(dhp);
return NULL;
}
static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
{
- int secbits;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ int secbits = -1;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey) {
+ /*
+ * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
+ * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
+ * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
+ * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
+ */
secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- } else
- secbits = -1;
+ }
if (s)
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
else
{
/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
+ /* Don't check signature if self signed */
+ if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
+ return 1;
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
const EVP_MD *md;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff