#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
+ const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
SSL_SESSION **psess);
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
0,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+ | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
- return i + 1;
+ return (int)(i + 1);
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- int ticklen;
+ size_t ticklen;
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
int i, ct;
return 0;
}
}
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ /* Add an empty use_mki value */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
+ unsigned int mode;
/*-
* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
+ (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*-
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
unsigned int type;
PACKET sni, tmppkt;
/* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
- tmppkt = *pkt;
+ tmppkt = hello->extensions;
if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/*
- * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
- * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
+ * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
+ * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
+ * object as required.
*
* Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
* effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
* ignored.
*
- * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
* Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
*/
-static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
{
- unsigned int type;
+ size_t loop;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- PACKET extensions;
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
s->servername_done = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
- return 0;
-
- if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
- return 0;
-
/*
* We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
* unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
* resumption.
*/
- while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
- PACKET extension;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
- return 0;
+ for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
+ RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
- PACKET_remaining(&extension),
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
+ PACKET_data(&currext->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
+ if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
+ &currext->data, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
*
*/
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+ else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
+ else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
PACKET srp_I;
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
return 0;
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+ else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
+ &ec_point_format_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
}
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
+ } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
+ &elliptic_curve_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
|| (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
- PACKET_remaining(&extension),
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
+ PACKET_data(&currext->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
+ } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
+ &supported_sig_algs)
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
return 0;
return 0;
}
}
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
+ } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
(unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
return 0;
}
const unsigned char *ext_data;
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
- (&extension, &responder_id_list))
+ (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
return 0;
/*
}
id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
- PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
if (id == NULL)
return 0;
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
+ &currext->data, &exts))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
- PACKET_remaining(&exts));
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
|| ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
- || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data, &hbtype)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&currext->data)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
+ && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
}
#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
+ else if (currext->type
+ == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
+ && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
+ &currext->data, al))
return 0;
}
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
- && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
+ && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+ if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
+ &currext->data, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+ else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
/*
* Note: extended master secret extension handled in
- * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
+ * tls_check_client_ems_support()
*/
/*
* ServerHello may be later returned.
*/
else if (!s->hit) {
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
- PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
+ if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
+ PACKET_data(&currext->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
}
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- /*
- * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
- */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- ri_check:
-
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
return 1;
}
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
int al = -1;
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
+ if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
*/
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
return 1;
}
-/*-
- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
- * need to be handled at the same time.
+/*
+ * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
+ * type and return it.
*
- * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
- * secret.
+ * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
+ * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
+ * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
+ */
+static RAW_EXTENSION *get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
+ unsigned int type)
+{
+ size_t loop;
+
+ for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
+ if (exts[loop].type == type)
+ return &exts[loop];
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
*
- * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
- * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
+ * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*
* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
* s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
* Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- *
- * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
- *
*/
-int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
- const PACKET *session_id,
- SSL_SESSION **ret)
+int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
+ SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
- unsigned int i;
- PACKET local_ext = *ext;
- int retv = -1;
-
- int have_ticket = 0;
- int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
+ int retv;
+ const unsigned char *etick;
+ size_t size;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
- if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
+ if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
return 0;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
- retv = 0;
- goto end;
+ ticketext = get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
+ hello->num_extensions,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
+ if (ticketext == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
+ if (size == 0) {
+ /*
+ * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
+ * one.
+ */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 1;
}
- while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
- unsigned int type, size;
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ /*
+ * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
+ * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
+ * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
+ * calculate the master secret later.
+ */
+ return 2;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
+ /* Shouldn't ever happen */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
+ hello->session_id_len, ret);
+ switch (retv) {
+ case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 2;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
- retv = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
- int r;
- const unsigned char *etick;
+ case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+ return 3;
- /* Duplicate extension */
- if (have_ticket != 0) {
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- have_ticket = 1;
+ case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 3;
- if (size == 0) {
- /*
- * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
- * one.
- */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 1;
- continue;
- }
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
- /*
- * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
- * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
- * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
- * calculate the master secret later.
- */
- retv = 2;
- continue;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
- PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
- switch (r) {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 2;
- break;
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- retv = r;
- break;
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 3;
- break;
- default: /* fatal error */
- retv = -1;
- break;
- }
- continue;
- } else {
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
- if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- }
+ default: /* fatal error */
+ return -1;
}
- if (have_ticket == 0)
- retv = 0;
- end:
- return retv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
+ * ClientHello
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 on success
+ * 0 on error
+ */
+int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
+{
+ RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
+
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+
+ if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)
+ return 1;
+
+ emsext = get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts, hello->num_extensions,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
+
+ /*
+ * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
+ * client doesn't support EMS.
+ */
+ if (emsext == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* The extensions must always be empty */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+
+ return 1;
}
/*-
* 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
*/
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
- int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
- int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
+ size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+ size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
+ int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
+ size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
* checks on ticket.
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
- if (mlen < 0) {
+ if (mlen == 0) {
goto err;
}
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
+ if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
+ (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
}
- slen += mlen;
+ slen += declen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
return 1;
}
-/*
- * Old version of the tls12_get_sigandhash function used by code that has not
- * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
- * is complete.
- * TODO - DELETE ME
- */
-int tls12_get_sigandhash_old(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
- const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- int sig_id, md_id;
- if (!md)
- return 0;
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
- if (md_id == -1)
- return 0;
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
- if (sig_id == -1)
- return 0;
- p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
- p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
- return 1;
-}
-
int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
{
return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
*pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
}
-/*
- * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
- * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
- * is complete.
- * TODO - DELETE ME
- */
-size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
-{
- unsigned char *tmpout = out;
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
- if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
- *tmpout++ = psig[0];
- *tmpout++ = psig[1];
- }
- }
- return tmpout - out;
-}
-
int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
{
}
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
-static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
- const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
- const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
+static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+ const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
+ const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
{
const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
- if (psig == NULL)
+ size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+ if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
return 0;
if (idx >= 0) {
idx <<= 1;
*rsig = psig[1];
tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
}
- return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+ return (int)numsigalgs;
}
int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
- if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
+ if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
+ || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
return 0;
shsigalgs += idx;
if (phash)
*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
if (rhash)
*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
- return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+ return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
}
#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
if (idx == -2) {
cpk = c->key;
- idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+ idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
} else
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff