if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
count++;
}
+ if(!count) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
len = slen / count;
if (count == 1)
slen = 0;
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
- } else
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- *mac_secret_size, mac_secret);
-
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
+ && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
if (s->msg_callback) {
int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(p1);
goto err;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
return ((int)ret);
}
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
- const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen,
+ unsigned char *out)
{
- unsigned int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *q, buf2[12];
- int idx;
- long mask;
- int err = 0;
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- q = buf;
+ int hashlen;
+ unsigned char hash[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char buf2[12];
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return 0;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
- for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) {
- if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
- int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
- EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
- if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0
- || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
- /*
- * internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite!
- */
- err = 1;
- } else {
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
- !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) ||
- (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
- err = 1;
- q += hashsize;
- }
- }
- }
+ if (hashlen == 0)
+ return 0;
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
- err = 1;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- if (err)
return 0;
- else
- return sizeof buf2;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
+ return sizeof buf2;
}
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
int len)
{
unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
- int col = 0, sol = 0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p,
len);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- co, col,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+ if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ int hashlen;
+ /* If we don't have any digests cache records */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ /*
+ * keep record buffer: this wont affect client auth because we're
+ * freezing the buffer at the same point (after client key
+ * exchange and before certificate verify)
+ */
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ if(!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
+#endif
+ tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ hash, hashlen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+ } else {
+ tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
goto err1;
NULL, 0,
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
out, buff, olen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-#if 0
- /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
- case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE:
- return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
-#endif
default:
return (-1);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff