-/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-# include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-# include <openssl/des.h>
-#endif
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
- int sec_len,
- const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
- const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
- const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
- const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
- const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
- unsigned char *out, int olen)
-{
- int chunk;
- size_t j;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t A1_len;
- int ret = 0;
-
- chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
- OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
- if (!mac_key)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
- goto err;
- if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- /* Reinit mac contexts */
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
- goto err;
- if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx))
- goto err;
- if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
- goto err;
-
- if (olen > chunk) {
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
- goto err;
- out += j;
- olen -= j;
- /* calc the next A1 value */
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
- } else { /* last one */
-
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
- memcpy(out, A1, olen);
- break;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
- return ret;
-}
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
- const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
- const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
- const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
- const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
- const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
- const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
- unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
+ const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal)
{
- int len, i, idx, count;
- const unsigned char *S1;
- long m;
- const EVP_MD *md;
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
int ret = 0;
- /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
- count = 0;
- for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
- if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
- count++;
- }
- if(!count) {
+ if (md == NULL) {
/* Should never happen */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (fatal)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- len = slen / count;
- if (count == 1)
- slen = 0;
- S1 = sec;
- memset(out1, 0, olen);
- for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
- if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
- if (!md) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1),
- seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
- seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len,
- out2, olen))
- goto err;
- S1 += len;
- for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
- out1[i] ^= out2[i];
- }
- }
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, (int)slen) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, (int)seed1_len) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, (int)seed2_len) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, (int)seed3_len) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, (int)seed4_len) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, (int)seed5_len) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &olen) <= 0) {
+ if (fatal)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
+
ret = 1;
+
err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ret;
}
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
- unsigned char *tmp, int num)
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)
{
int ret;
- ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+ ret = tls1_PRF(s,
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
- s->session->master_key_length);
- {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1);
+
return ret;
}
int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
- static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
- unsigned char *exp_label;
- unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
- unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
- int client_write;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
#endif
const EVP_MD *m;
int mac_type;
- int *mac_secret_size;
+ size_t *mac_secret_size;
EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl;
+ size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
int reuse_dd = 0;
- is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
#endif
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
- fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp);
- fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
- fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
- c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len);
- fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ",
- s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
- {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+ else
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ } else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
- else
+ } else {
/*
- * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
*/
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->expand != NULL) {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand = NULL;
- }
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand = NULL;
if (comp != NULL) {
s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
if (s->expand == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
goto err;
+ }
}
#endif
/*
* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
} else {
+ s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+ else
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ } else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
+ }
dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (!mac_ctx)
+ mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
+ }
s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
- } else
+ } else {
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->compress != NULL) {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress = NULL;
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress = NULL;
if (comp != NULL) {
s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
if (s->compress == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
}
#endif
* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
}
if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+ /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
- cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ j = cl;
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+ /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+ k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
else
k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
n += j + j;
iv = &(p[n]);
n += k + k;
- exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write = 1;
} else {
n = i;
ms = &(p[n]);
n += j + k;
iv = &(p[n]);
n += k;
- exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write = 0;
}
if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
- mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
- EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key);
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
+ (int)*mac_secret_size);
+ if (mac_key == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
}
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
{
- int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
- if (is_export) {
- /*
- * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
- * since only the correct one will be used :-).
- */
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- exp_label, exp_label_len,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
- key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- goto err2;
- key = tmp1;
-
- if (k > 0) {
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2))
- goto err2;
- if (client_write)
- iv = iv1;
- else
- iv = &(iv1[k]);
- }
- }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int i;
- fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= ");
- for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
- for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
+ iv)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ int taglen;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.
+ new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
+ taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ else
+ taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv)
+ || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
} else {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
}
/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
&& !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
- if (*mac_secret_size)
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
- mac_secret, *mac_secret_size,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (c->key_len)
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
- key, c->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (k) {
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV;
- else
- wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
+ (int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
-#endif
+ s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
{
int z;
}
printf("\niv=");
{
- int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("\n");
#endif
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
- return (1);
+ return 1;
err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err2:
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL;
+ unsigned char *p;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
- int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
- int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
+ int mac_type = NID_undef;
+ size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
- return (1);
+ return 1;
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
- (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp,
- SSL_USE_ETM(s))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
- return (0);
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size,
+ &comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
+ SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
- num =
- EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num *= 2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
- if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
- s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1;
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
- if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- OPENSSL_free(p1);
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("client random\n");
{
int z;
}
printf("master key\n");
{
- int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
- if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num))
+ if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("\nkey block\n");
{
- int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
ret = 1;
err:
- if (p2) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num);
- OPENSSL_free(p2);
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*-
- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- * short etc).
- * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- * an internal error occurred.
- */
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- unsigned long l;
- int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
- if (send) {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
- int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
- }
- ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else {
- int ivlen;
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
- if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
- && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
- else
- ivlen = 0;
- if (ivlen > 1) {
- if (rec->data != rec->input)
- /*
- * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
- * happen?? (steve)
- */
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__);
- else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
- return -1;
- }
- }
- } else {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
- int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
- }
- ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
- rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
- memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
- rec->input = rec->data;
- ret = 1;
- } else {
- l = rec->length;
- bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
- unsigned char buf[13], *seq;
-
- seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
- memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
- memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
- } else {
- memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
- }
-
- buf[8] = rec->type;
- buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
- buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
- buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
- buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
- pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
- if (send) {
- l += pad;
- rec->length += pad;
- }
- } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
- i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
-
- /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
- /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
- j = i - 1;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- j++;
- }
- for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
- rec->input[k] = j;
- l += i;
- rec->length += i;
- }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned long ui;
- fprintf(stderr,
- "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
- ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
- fprintf(stderr,
- "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ,
- DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len);
- fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: ");
- for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input=");
- for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++)
- fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (!send) {
- if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
- return 0;
- }
-
- i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
- ? (i < 0)
- : (i == 0))
- return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
- rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned long i;
- fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data=");
- for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- ret = 1;
- if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
- if (pad && !send)
- rec->length -= pad;
- }
return ret;
}
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
+size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
+ unsigned char *out)
{
- unsigned int ret;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
- int i;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return 0;
+ size_t hashlen;
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
- && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
- d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!d) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return ((int)ret);
-}
-
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen,
- unsigned char *out)
-{
- int hashlen;
- unsigned char hash[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char buf2[12];
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return 0;
-
- hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
-
- if (hashlen == 0)
+ if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
+ }
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
- out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
+ out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
- return sizeof buf2;
-}
-
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- unsigned char *seq;
- EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- size_t md_size;
- int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
- unsigned char header[13];
- int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
- : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
- int t;
-
- if (send) {
- rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
- seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
- hash = ssl->write_hash;
- } else {
- rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
- seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
- hash = ssl->read_hash;
- }
-
- t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
- md_size = t;
-
- /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
- if (stream_mac) {
- mac_ctx = hash;
- } else {
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
- return -1;
- mac_ctx = &hmac;
- }
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
- unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
- memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-
- memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
- } else
- memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
- header[8] = rec->type;
- header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
- header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
- header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
- header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
-
- if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
- /*
- * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
- * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
- * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
- */
- /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
- ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
- md, &md_size,
- header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
- ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
- ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0);
- } else {
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
- t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
- if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
- tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
- mac_ctx, rec->input,
- rec->length, rec->orig_len);
- }
-
- if (!stream_mac)
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
- fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
- {
- unsigned int z;
- for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
- }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned int z;
- for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif
- return (md_size);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+ return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
}
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
- int len)
+ size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
{
- unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p,
- len);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
- int hashlen;
- /* If we don't have any digests cache records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- /*
- * keep record buffer: this wont affect client auth because we're
- * freezing the buffer at the same point (after client key
- * exchange and before certificate verify)
- */
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- if(!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return -1;
+ size_t hashlen;
+ /*
+ * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
+ * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
+ * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
+ || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
}
- hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
#endif
- tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
- hash, hashlen,
- NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ hash, hashlen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0, p, len, out,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
} else {
- tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL, 0,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, p, len, out,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
}
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
- p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
- s->session->master_key,
- SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+ *secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
+ return 1;
}
int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const unsigned char *context,
size_t contextlen, int use_context)
{
- unsigned char *buff;
unsigned char *val = NULL;
- size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+ size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
int rv;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n",
- s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
- if (buff == NULL)
- goto err2;
-
/*
* construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
* than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
goto err1;
- rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ rv = tls1_PRF(s,
val, vallen,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
- out, buff, olen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
+ out, olen, 0);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
goto ret;
err1:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL,
- SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
rv = 0;
goto ret;
err2:
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
rv = 0;
ret:
- if (buff != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(buff);
- if (val != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(val);
- return (rv);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
+ return rv;
}
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
{
switch (code) {
case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
- return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
- return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
- return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
- return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+ return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
- return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
- return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+ return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+ return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+ return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
- return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
+ return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
- return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
- return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
- return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
- return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
+ return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
- return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
- return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+ return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
- return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
- return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
+ return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
- return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
- return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
+ return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
+ return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
- return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
- return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
- return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+ case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
+ return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
+ return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
default:
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff