/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
- const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
- const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
- const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
- const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
- const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
- const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
- unsigned char *out, int olen)
+ const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
int ret = 0;
- size_t outlen = olen;
if (md == NULL) {
/* Should never happen */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, slen) <= 0)
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, (int)slen) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, seed1_len) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, (int)seed1_len) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, seed2_len) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, (int)seed2_len) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, seed3_len) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, (int)seed3_len) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, seed4_len) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, (int)seed4_len) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, seed5_len) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, (int)seed5_len) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &olen) <= 0)
goto err;
ret = 1;
return ret;
}
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)
{
int ret;
ret = tls1_PRF(s,
#endif
const EVP_MD *m;
int mac_type;
- int *mac_secret_size;
+ size_t *mac_secret_size;
EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- int n, i, j, k, cl;
+ size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
int reuse_dd = 0;
c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
#endif
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+ else
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
else
mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
} else {
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+ else
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
else
p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+ /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
j = cl;
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
- mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
+ mac_secret, (int)*mac_secret_size);
if (mac_key == NULL
|| EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
{
- int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
+ iv)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err2;
}
int taglen;
if (s->s3->tmp.
new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
- taglen = 8;
+ taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
- taglen = 16;
+ taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv)
|| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err2;
/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
&& !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+ (int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err2;
}
}
printf("\niv=");
{
- int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
unsigned char *p;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
- int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
- int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
+ int mac_type = NID_undef;
+ size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return (1);
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
- (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp,
- SSL_USE_ETM(s))) {
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size,
+ &comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return (0);
}
}
printf("master key\n");
{
- int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("\nkey block\n");
{
- int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
return (ret);
}
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
+size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
+ unsigned char *out)
{
- int hashlen;
+ size_t hashlen;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
return 0;
- hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
-
- if (hashlen == 0)
+ if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen))
return 0;
if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
}
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
- int len)
+ size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
{
- if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): We haven't implemented TLS1.3 key derivation yet. For now
+ * we will just force no use of EMS (which adds complications around the
+ * handshake hash). This will need to be removed later
+ */
+ if ((s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)
+ && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
- int hashlen;
+ size_t hashlen;
/*
* Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
* affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
* point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
- return -1;
- hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
+ return 0;
+ if(!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen))
+ return 0;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
}
#endif
- return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+ *secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
+ return 1;
}
int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff