-/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "record/record_local.h"
+#include "internal/ktls.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/comp.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
-static void tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
- int sec_len, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
- unsigned char *out, int olen)
- {
- int chunk,n;
- unsigned int j;
- HMAC_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
- unsigned char A1[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
- unsigned int A1_len;
-
- chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
-
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
-
- n=0;
- for (;;)
- {
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
-
- if (olen > chunk)
- {
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j);
- out+=j;
- olen-=j;
- HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len); /* calc the next A1 value */
- }
- else /* last one */
- {
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
- memcpy(out,A1,olen);
- break;
- }
- }
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
- memset(A1,0,sizeof(A1));
- }
-
-static void tls1_PRF(const EVP_MD *md5, const EVP_MD *sha1,
- unsigned char *label, int label_len,
- const unsigned char *sec, int slen, unsigned char *out1,
- unsigned char *out2, int olen)
- {
- int len,i;
- const unsigned char *S1,*S2;
-
- len=slen/2;
- S1=sec;
- S2= &(sec[len]);
- len+=(slen&1); /* add for odd, make longer */
-
-
- tls1_P_hash(md5 ,S1,len,label,label_len,out1,olen);
- tls1_P_hash(sha1,S2,len,label,label_len,out2,olen);
-
- for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
- out1[i]^=out2[i];
- }
-
-static void tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
- unsigned char *tmp, int num)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+
- TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE];
- p=buf;
-
- memcpy(p,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE);
- p+=TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),
- s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
- km,tmp,num);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
- s->session->master_key_length);
- {
- int i;
- for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
- {
- printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
- }
- printf("\n"); }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- }
-
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
- {
- static const unsigned char empty[]="";
- unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret;
- unsigned char *exp_label,buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2];
- unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
- int client_write;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
- const SSL_COMP *comp;
- const EVP_MD *m;
- int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
- int reuse_dd = 0;
-
- is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
- m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
- comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
- key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
- printf("\talg= %ld, comp= %p\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms,
- comp);
- printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
- printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
- c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
- printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
- {
- int i;
- for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
- {
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
- s->read_hash=m;
- if (s->expand != NULL)
- {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand=NULL;
- }
- if (comp != NULL)
- {
- s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->expand == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
- memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
- mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) &&
- ((s->enc_write_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
- goto err;
- dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash=m;
- if (s->compress != NULL)
- {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress=NULL;
- }
- if (comp != NULL)
- {
- s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->compress == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- }
- memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
- mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
- }
-
- if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(dd);
-
- p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
- i=EVP_MD_size(m);
- cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
- cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
- /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
- er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
- if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
- (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
- {
- ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
- key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
- iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
- exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write=1;
- }
- else
- {
- n=i;
- ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
- key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
- iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
- exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write=0;
- }
-
- if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
- if (is_export)
- {
- /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
- * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
- */
- p=buf;
- memcpy(p,exp_label,exp_label_len);
- p+=exp_label_len;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),key,j,
- tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c));
- key=tmp1;
-
- if (k > 0)
- {
- p=buf;
- memcpy(p,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE);
- p+=TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,p-buf,empty,0,
- iv1,iv2,k*2);
- if (client_write)
- iv=iv1;
- else
- iv= &(iv1[k]);
- }
- }
-
- s->session->key_arg_length=0;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int i;
- printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
- printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
- printf("\n");
- printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
- printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\niv=");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
-#endif
-
- memset(tmp1,0,sizeof(tmp1));
- memset(tmp2,0,sizeof(tmp1));
- memset(iv1,0,sizeof(iv1));
- memset(iv2,0,sizeof(iv2));
- return(1);
-err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
- return(0);
- }
-
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p1,*p2;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
- int num;
- SSL_COMP *comp;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
- return(1);
-
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&comp))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
- return(0);
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
- s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
-
- num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+EVP_MD_size(hash)+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- num*=2;
-
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
- s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
-
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("client random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("server random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("pre-master\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
- tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num);
- memset(p2,0,num);
- OPENSSL_free(p2);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("\nkey block\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
+ EVP_KDF *kdf;
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[8], *p = params;
+ const char *mdname;
+
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (fatal)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ else
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
+ OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->propq);
+ if (kdf == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+ if (kctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ (char *)mdname, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET,
+ (unsigned char *)sec,
+ (size_t)slen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+ (void *)seed1, (size_t)seed1_len);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+ (void *)seed2, (size_t)seed2_len);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+ (void *)seed3, (size_t)seed3_len);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+ (void *)seed4, (size_t)seed4_len);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+ (void *)seed5, (size_t)seed5_len);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, olen, params)) {
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ if (fatal)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ else
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *km,
+ size_t num)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+ ret = tls1_PRF(s,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3.server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_iv_length_within_key_block(const EVP_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ return EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+ return EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ return EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c);
+}
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
+ unsigned char *key, *iv;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *m;
+ int mac_type;
+ size_t mac_secret_size;
+ size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
+ int iivlen;
+ /*
+ * Taglen is only relevant for CCM ciphersuites. Other ciphersuites
+ * ignore this value so we can default it to 0.
+ */
+ size_t taglen = 0;
+ int direction;
+
+ c = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ m = s->s3.tmp.new_hash;
+ mac_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ comp = s->s3.tmp.new_compression;
#endif
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
- {
- /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
- * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
-#ifndef NO_RC4
- if ((s->session->cipher != NULL) && ((s->session->cipher->algorithms & SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_RC4))
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-#endif
- }
-
- return(1);
-err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
-
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
- {
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- unsigned long l;
- int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
- if (send)
- {
- if (s->write_hash != NULL)
- n=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
- ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
- rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
- enc=NULL;
- else
- enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->read_hash != NULL)
- n=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
- ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
- rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
- enc=NULL;
- else
- enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
- (enc == NULL))
- {
- memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
- rec->input=rec->data;
- }
- else
- {
- l=rec->length;
- bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
- if ((bs != 1) && send)
- {
- i=bs-((int)l%bs);
-
- /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
- /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
- j=i-1;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
- {
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- j++;
- }
- for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
- rec->input[k]=j;
- l+=i;
- rec->length+=i;
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned long ui;
- printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
- ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
- printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
- DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
- ds->cipher->iv_len);
- printf("\t\tIV: ");
- for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
- printf("\n");
- printf("\trec->input=");
- for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
- printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (!send)
- {
- if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned long i;
- printf("\trec->data=");
- for (i=0; i<l; i++)
- printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- {
- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
- i++;
- if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
- {
- /* First packet is even in size, so check */
- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- i--;
- }
- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
- if (i > (int)rec->length)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
- return -1;
- }
- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
- {
- if (rec->data[j] != ii)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- rec->length-=i;
- }
- }
- return(1);
- }
-
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx, unsigned char *out)
- {
- unsigned int ret;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in_ctx);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return((int)ret);
- }
-
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in1_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *in2_ctx,
- const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
- {
- unsigned int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
-
- q=buf;
- memcpy(q,str,slen);
- q+=slen;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in1_ctx);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
- q+=i;
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in2_ctx);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
- q+=i;
-
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(q-buf),
- s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
- out,buf2,12);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- return((int)12);
- }
-
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
- {
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
- unsigned int md_size;
- int i;
- HMAC_CTX hmac;
- unsigned char buf[5];
-
- if (send)
- {
- rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
- mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
- seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
- hash=ssl->write_hash;
- }
- else
- {
- rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
- mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
- seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
- hash=ssl->read_hash;
- }
-
- md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash);
-
- buf[0]=rec->type;
- buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
- buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
- buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
- buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
-
- /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash,NULL);
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8);
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5);
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length);
- HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("sec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("seq=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("buf=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
-#endif
-
- for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
- {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0) break;
- }
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
-#endif
- return(md_size);
- }
-
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
- int len)
- {
- unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE];
- unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- /* Setup the stuff to munge */
- memcpy(buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE);
- memcpy(&(buf[TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- memcpy(&(buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,
- buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE+SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2,p,len,
- s->session->master_key,buff,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
- }
+ p = s->s3.tmp.key_block;
+ i = mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
+ cl = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c);
+ j = cl;
+ iivlen = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c);
+ if (iivlen < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ k = iivlen;
+ if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+ (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ mac_secret = &(p[0]);
+ n = i + i;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + j;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k + k;
+ } else {
+ n = i;
+ mac_secret = &(p[n]);
+ n += i + j;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + k;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k;
+ }
+
+ if (n > s->s3.tmp.key_block_length) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c)) {
+ case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+ taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+ if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc
+ & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) != 0)
+ taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ else
+ taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "CHACHA20-POLY1305")) {
+ taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ /* MAC secret size corresponds to the MAC output size */
+ taglen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+ else
+ s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
+
+ direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ;
+ } else {
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+ else
+ s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;
+
+ direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
+ dtls1_increment_epoch(s, which);
+
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, direction,
+ OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
+ NULL, 0, key, cl, iv, (size_t)k, mac_secret,
+ mac_secret_size, c, taglen, mac_type,
+ m, comp, NULL)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, key:\n", which);
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c), 4);
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "iv:\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, iv, k, 4);
+ } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+ int mac_type = NID_undef;
+ size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int ivlen;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash,
+ &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp,
+ s->ext.use_etm)) {
+ /* Error is already recorded */
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
+ s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+ ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
+ s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+ ivlen = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c);
+ if (ivlen < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ num = mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c) + ivlen;
+ num *= 2;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3.tmp.key_block_length = num;
+ s->s3.tmp.key_block = p;
+
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block length: %zu\n", num);
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "client random\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "server random\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "master key\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length, 4);
+ } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+ if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, num, 4);
+ } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str,
+ size_t slen, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ size_t hashlen;
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t finished_size = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST18)
+ finished_size = 32;
+
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+ out, finished_size, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+ return finished_size;
+}
+
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned char *p, size_t len,
+ size_t *secret_size)
+{
+ if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ size_t hashlen;
+ /*
+ * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this won't
+ * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
+ * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
+ || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "Handshake hashes:\n");
+ BIO_dump(trc_out, (char *)hash, hashlen);
+ } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ hash, hashlen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0, p, len, out,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+ } else {
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0,
+ s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, p, len, out,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, len, 4);
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "Client Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "Server Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "Master Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 4);
+ } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+ *secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+{
+ unsigned char *val = NULL;
+ size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5705 embeds context length as uint16; reject longer context
+ * before proceeding.
+ */
+ if (contextlen > 0xffff) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
+ * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
+ * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
+ */
+ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+ if (use_context) {
+ vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+ }
+
+ val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+ if (val == NULL)
+ goto ret;
+ currentvalpos = 0;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
+ currentvalpos += llen;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ if (use_context) {
+ val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
+ * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
+ * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+ */
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+
+ rv = tls1_PRF(s,
+ val, vallen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+ out, olen, 0);
+
+ goto ret;
+ err1:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+ ret:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
+ return rv;
+}
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
- {
- switch (code)
- {
- case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
- case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
- case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
- case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
- case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
- case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
- case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
- case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
- case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
- case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- default: return(-1);
- }
- }
-
+{
+ switch (code) {
+ case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
+ case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+ return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+ return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+ return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+ return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+ return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+ return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+ return -1;
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+ return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+ return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+ return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+ return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+ case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+ return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+ return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+ return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+ return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+ return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+ return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+ return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+ return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+ case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+ return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
+ case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+ return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+ return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+ return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+ return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+ return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+ return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+ return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+ return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+ case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
+ return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
+ return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ case TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION:
+ return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff