Correctly handle SSL3 Master Secret when calling providers
[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_enc.c
index dd29306..64806a3 100644 (file)
-/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
  *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "record/record_local.h"
+#include "internal/ktls.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-#include <openssl/des.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
+                    const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+                    const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
+                    const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
+                    const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,
+                    const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,
+                    const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+                    unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal)
+{
+    const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
+    EVP_KDF *kdf;
+    EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL;
+    OSSL_PARAM params[8], *p = params;
+    const char *mdname;
+
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        if (fatal)
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        else
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
+    if (kdf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+    EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+    if (kctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    mdname = EVP_MD_name(md);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+                                            (char *)mdname, strlen(mdname) + 1);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET,
+                                             (unsigned char *)sec,
+                                             (size_t)slen);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed1, (size_t)seed1_len);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed2, (size_t)seed2_len);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed3, (size_t)seed3_len);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed4, (size_t)seed4_len);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed5, (size_t)seed5_len);
+    *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+    if (EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params)
+            && EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, olen)) {
+        EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    if (fatal)
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    else
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)
+{
+    int ret;
 
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
-                       int sec_len,
-                       const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-                       const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-                       const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-                       const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-                       const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-                       unsigned char *out, int olen)
-       {
-       int chunk;
-       size_t j;
-       EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
-       EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-       unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-       size_t A1_len;
-       int ret = 0;
-       
-       chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
-       OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
-       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-       mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
-       if (!mac_key)
-               goto err;
-       if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-               goto err;
-       if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,&ctx_init))
-               goto err;
-       if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
-               goto err;
-       if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
-               goto err;
-       if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
-               goto err;
-       if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
-               goto err;
-       if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
-               goto err;
-       if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
-               goto err;
-
-       for (;;)
-               {
-               /* Reinit mac contexts */
-               if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,&ctx_init))
-                       goto err;
-               if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
-                       goto err;
-               if (olen>chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp,&ctx))
-                       goto err;
-               if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
-                       goto err;
-               if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
-                       goto err;
-               if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
-                       goto err;
-               if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
-                       goto err;
-               if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
-                       goto err;
-
-               if (olen > chunk)
-                       {
-                       if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
-                               goto err;
-                       out+=j;
-                       olen-=j;
-                       /* calc the next A1 value */
-                       if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
-                               goto err;
-                       }
-               else    /* last one */
-                       {
-                       if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
-                               goto err;
-                       memcpy(out,A1,olen);
-                       break;
-                       }
-               }
-       ret = 1;
-err:
-       EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
-       return ret;
-       }
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
-                    const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-                    const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-                    const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-                    const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-                    const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-                    const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
-                    unsigned char *out1,
-                    unsigned char *out2, int olen)
-       {
-       int len,i,idx,count;
-       const unsigned char *S1;
-       long m;
-       const EVP_MD *md;
-       int ret = 0;
-
-       /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
-       count=0;
-       for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
-               if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
-       }       
-       len=slen/count;
-       if (count == 1)
-               slen = 0;
-       S1=sec;
-       memset(out1,0,olen);
-       for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
-               if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
-                       if (!md) {
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
-                               SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
-                               goto err;                               
-                       }
-                       if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
-                                       seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
-                                       out2,olen))
-                               goto err;
-                       S1+=len;
-                       for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
-                       {
-                               out1[i]^=out2[i];
-                       }
-               }
-       }
-       ret = 1;
-err:
-       return ret;
+    /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+    ret = tls1_PRF(s,
+                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3.server_random,
+                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                   NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
+                   s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+ /*
+  * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
+  *
+  * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
+  * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
+  * function will fail.
+  */
+static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s)
+{
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+    PACKET pkt, subpkt;
+    int count = 0;
+
+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
+        return -1;
+
+    while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
+        /* Skip record type and version */
+        if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
+            return -1;
+
+        /* Read until next record */
+        if (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
+            return -1;
+
+        count += 1;
+    }
+
+    return count;
 }
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
-            unsigned char *tmp, int num)
-       {
-       int ret;
-       ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
-                s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                NULL,0,NULL,0,
-                s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-                km,tmp,num);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
-                s->session->master_key_length);
-       {
-        int i;
-        for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
-                {
-                fprintf(stderr,"%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
-                }
-        fprintf(stderr,"\n");  }
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-       return ret;
-       }
+#endif
 
 int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
-       {
-       static const unsigned char empty[]="";
-       unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
-       unsigned char *exp_label;
-       unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-       unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-       unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
-       unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
-       unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
-       int client_write;
-       EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
-       const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
+    unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-       const SSL_COMP *comp;
+    const SSL_COMP *comp;
 #endif
-       const EVP_MD *m;
-       int mac_type;
-       int *mac_secret_size;
-       EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
-       EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-       int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
-       int reuse_dd = 0;
-
-       is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-       c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-       m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
-       mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
+    const EVP_MD *m;
+    int mac_type;
+    size_t *mac_secret_size;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+    EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+    size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
+    int reuse_dd = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+    struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 crypto_info;
+    BIO *bio;
+    unsigned char geniv[12];
+    int count_unprocessed;
+    int bit;
+#endif
+
+    c = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
+    m = s->s3.tmp.new_hash;
+    mac_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-       comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+    comp = s->s3.tmp.new_compression;
 #endif
 
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr,"tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
-       fprintf(stderr,"\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
-              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
-              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
-              comp);
-       fprintf(stderr,"\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
-       fprintf(stderr,"\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
-                c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
-       fprintf(stderr,"\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
-       {
-        int i;
-        for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-               fprintf(stderr,"%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+        if (s->ext.use_etm)
+            s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+        else
+            s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+
+        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+        else
+            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
+            reuse_dd = 1;
+        } else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
+             */
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
+        }
+        dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
+        mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
+        if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
         }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-       if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
-               {
-               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-                       s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-               else
-                       s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
-               if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
-                       reuse_dd = 1;
-               else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
-                       goto err;
-               else
-                       /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-                       EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
-               dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
-               mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-               if (s->expand != NULL)
-                       {
-                       COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
-                       s->expand=NULL;
-                       }
-               if (comp != NULL)
-                       {
-                       s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-                       if (s->expand == NULL)
-                               {
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-                               goto err2;
-                               }
-                       if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-                               s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
-                                       OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
-                       if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-                               goto err;
-                       }
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+        s->expand = NULL;
+        if (comp != NULL) {
+            s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+            if (s->expand == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                         SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
 #endif
-               /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
-               if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-                       memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
-               mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
-               mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-                       s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-                       else
-                       s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-               if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-                       reuse_dd = 1;
-               else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-                       goto err;
-               dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
-               if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-                       {
-                       mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-                       if (!mac_ctx)
-                               goto err;
-                       s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
-                       }
-               else
-                       mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+        /*
+         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
+         */
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        mac_secret = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);
+        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret_size);
+    } else {
+        s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
+        if (s->ext.use_etm)
+            s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+        else
+            s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+
+        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+        else
+            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            reuse_dd = 1;
+        } else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+            if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
+        } else {
+            mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
+            if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-               if (s->compress != NULL)
-                       {
-                       COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
-                       s->compress=NULL;
-                       }
-               if (comp != NULL)
-                       {
-                       s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-                       if (s->compress == NULL)
-                               {
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-                               goto err2;
-                               }
-                       }
-#endif
-               /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
-               if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-                       memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
-               mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
-               mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
-               }
-
-       if (reuse_dd)
-               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
-
-       p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-       i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
-
-       cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-       j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
-                      cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
-       /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-       /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
-       if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-               k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
-       else
-               k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-       if (    (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
-               (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
-               {
-               ms=  &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
-               key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
-               iv=  &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
-               exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-               exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-               client_write=1;
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               n=i;
-               ms=  &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
-               key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
-               iv=  &(p[ n]); n+=k;
-               exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-               exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-               client_write=0;
-               }
-
-       if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-               goto err2;
-               }
-
-       memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
-
-       if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
-               {
-               mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-                               mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
-               EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
-               EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-               }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
-       if (is_export)
-               {
-               /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
-                * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
-                */
-               if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                               exp_label,exp_label_len,
-                               s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                               s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                               NULL,0,NULL,0,
-                               key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-                       goto err2;
-               key=tmp1;
-
-               if (k > 0)
-                       {
-                       if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                                       TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
-                                       s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                                       s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                                       NULL,0,NULL,0,
-                                       empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
-                               goto err2;
-                       if (client_write)
-                               iv=iv1;
-                       else
-                               iv= &(iv1[k]);
-                       }
-               }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       {
-        int i;
-       fprintf(stderr,"EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
-       fprintf(stderr,"\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x", key[i]);
-       fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-       fprintf(stderr,"\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x", iv[i]);
-       fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-       }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-       if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-               {
-               EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
-               }
-       else    
-               EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-
-       /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
-       if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
-               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-                               *mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
-       if (s->msg_callback)
-               {
-               int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
-               if (*mac_secret_size)
-                       s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
-                                               mac_secret, *mac_secret_size,
-                                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-               if (c->key_len)
-                       s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
-                                               key, c->key_len,
-                                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-               if (k)
-                       {
-                       if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-                               wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV;
-                       else
-                               wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
-                       s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k,
-                                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-                       }
-               }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\niv=");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+        s->compress = NULL;
+        if (comp != NULL) {
+            s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+            if (s->compress == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                        SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
 #endif
-
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
-       return(1);
-err:
-       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
-       return(0);
-       }
+        /*
+         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
+         */
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        mac_secret = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
+        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret_size);
+    }
+
+    if (reuse_dd)
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
+
+    p = s->s3.tmp.key_block;
+    i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
+    /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
+    cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+    j = cl;
+    /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+    /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+        k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+    else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+        k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+    else
+        k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+    if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+        (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+        ms = &(p[0]);
+        n = i + i;
+        key = &(p[n]);
+        n += j + j;
+        iv = &(p[n]);
+        n += k + k;
+    } else {
+        n = i;
+        ms = &(p[n]);
+        n += i + j;
+        key = &(p[n]);
+        n += j + k;
+        iv = &(p[n]);
+        n += k;
+    }
+
+    if (n > s->s3.tmp.key_block_length) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
+
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
+        /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
+        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
+                                               (int)*mac_secret_size);
+        if (mac_key == NULL
+            || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+    }
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, mac key:\n", which);
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, ms, i, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
+                                    iv)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+        int taglen;
+        if (s->s3.tmp.
+            new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
+            taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+        else
+            taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv)
+            || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+    if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
+        && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+                                (int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+    if (s->compress)
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    if (((which & SSL3_CC_READ) && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_RX))
+        || ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX)))
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
+    if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    /* check that cipher is AES_GCM_128 */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_nid(c) != NID_aes_128_gcm
+        || EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) != EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
+        || EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) != TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE)
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    /* check version is 1.2 */
+    if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION)
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+        bio = s->wbio;
+    else
+        bio = s->rbio;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {
+       if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
+           goto skip_ktls;
+    }
+
+    /* ktls doesn't support renegotiation */
+    if ((BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) ||
+        (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    memset(&crypto_info, 0, sizeof(crypto_info));
+    crypto_info.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128;
+    crypto_info.info.version = s->version;
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GET_IV,
+                        EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN,
+                        geniv);
+    memcpy(crypto_info.iv, geniv + EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN,
+           TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE);
+    memcpy(crypto_info.salt, geniv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
+    memcpy(crypto_info.key, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c));
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+        memcpy(crypto_info.rec_seq, &s->rlayer.write_sequence,
+                TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+    else
+        memcpy(crypto_info.rec_seq, &s->rlayer.read_sequence,
+                TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+        count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
+        if (count_unprocessed < 0)
+            goto skip_ktls;
+
+        /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
+        while (count_unprocessed) {
+            for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
+                ++crypto_info.rec_seq[bit];
+                if (crypto_info.rec_seq[bit] != 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+            count_unprocessed--;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
+    if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
+        if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+            ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+        SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+    }
+
+ skip_ktls:
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KTLS */
+    s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, key:\n", which);
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c), 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "iv:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, iv, k, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
 
 int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
-       {
-       unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
-       const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-       const EVP_MD *hash;
-       int num;
-       SSL_COMP *comp;
-       int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
-       int ret=0;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr,"tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-       if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
-               return(1);
-
-       if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp, SSL_USE_ETM(s)))
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
-               return(0);
-               }
-
-       s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
-       s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
-       s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
-       s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
-       num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-       num*=2;
-
-       ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-       if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-               goto err;
-               }
-
-       s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
-       s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
-
-       if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-               goto err;
-               }
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("client random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("server random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("master key\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
-       if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
-               goto err;
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("\nkey block\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+    const EVP_MD *hash;
+    SSL_COMP *comp;
+    int mac_type = NID_undef;
+    size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3.tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size,
+                            &comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
+                 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+    s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
+    s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+    s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+    num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+    num *= 2;
+
+    ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+    if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    s->s3.tmp.key_block_length = num;
+    s->s3.tmp.key_block = p;
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "client random\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "server random\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "master key\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out,
+                        s->session->master_key,
+                        s->session->master_key_length, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+    if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, num, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
+        && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
+        /*
+         * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
+         * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+         */
+        s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+        if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+                s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;
 
-       if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
-               && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION)
-               {
-               /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
-                * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
-                */
-               s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
-               if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
-                       {
-                       if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-                               s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-                       
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-                       if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-                               s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-#endif
-                       }
-               }
-               
-       ret = 1;
-err:
-       if (p2)
-               {
-               OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
-               OPENSSL_free(p2);
-               }
-       return(ret);
-       }
-
-/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- *       short etc).
- *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- *       an internal error occurred.
- */
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-       {
-       SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-       EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-       unsigned long l;
-       int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
-       const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
-       if (send)
-               {
-               if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
-                       {
-                       int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-                       OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-                       }
-               ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
-               rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
-               if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-                       enc=NULL;
-               else
-                       {
-                       int ivlen;
-                       enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-                       /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
-                       if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
-                               && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-                               ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
-                       else
-                               ivlen = 0;
-                       if (ivlen > 1)
-                               {
-                               if ( rec->data != rec->input)
-                                       /* we can't write into the input stream:
-                                        * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
-                                        */
-                                       fprintf(stderr,
-                                               "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
-                                               __FILE__, __LINE__);
-                               else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
-                                       return -1;
-                               }
-                       }
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
-                       {
-                       int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-                       OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-                       }
-               ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
-               rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
-               if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-                       enc=NULL;
-               else
-                       enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
-               }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr,"tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-       if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
-               {
-               memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
-               rec->input=rec->data;
-               ret = 1;
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               l=rec->length;
-               bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
-               if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
-                       {
-                       unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
-
-                       seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
-
-                       if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-                               {
-                               unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
-
-                               s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
-                               memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
-                               memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
-                               }
-                       else
-                               {
-                               memcpy(buf,seq,8);
-                               for (i=7; i>=0; i--)    /* increment */
-                                       {
-                                       ++seq[i];
-                                       if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-                                       }
-                               }
-
-                       buf[8]=rec->type;
-                       buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
-                       buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
-                       buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
-                       buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
-                       pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
-                       if (send)
-                               {
-                               l+=pad;
-                               rec->length+=pad;
-                               }
-                       }
-               else if ((bs != 1) && send)
-                       {
-                       i=bs-((int)l%bs);
-
-                       /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
-                       /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
-                       j=i-1;
-                       if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-                               {
-                               if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-                                       j++;
-                               }
-                       for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
-                               rec->input[k]=j;
-                       l+=i;
-                       rec->length+=i;
-                       }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-               {
-               unsigned long ui;
-               fprintf(stderr,"EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                       ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-               fprintf(stderr,"\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
-                       ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                       DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                       ds->cipher->iv_len);
-               fprintf(stderr,"\t\tIV: ");
-               for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X", ds->iv[i]);
-               fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-               fprintf(stderr,"\trec->input=");
-               for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) fprintf(stderr," %02x", rec->input[ui]);
-               fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-               }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-               if (!send)
-                       {
-                       if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                               return 0;
-                       }
-               
-               i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-               if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
-                                               ?(i<0)
-                                               :(i==0))
-                       return -1;      /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-               if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
-                       {
-                       rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                       rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                       rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                       }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-               {
-               unsigned long i;
-               fprintf(stderr,"\trec->data=");
-               for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                       fprintf(stderr," %02x", rec->data[i]);  fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-               }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-               ret = 1;
-               if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
-                       mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-               if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-                       ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
-               if (pad && !send)
-                       rec->length -= pad;
-               }
-       return ret;
-       }
-
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
-       {
-       unsigned int ret;
-       EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
-       int i;
-
-       if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
-               if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-                       return 0;
-
-       for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
-               {
-                 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) 
-                       {
-                       d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-                       break;
-                       }
-               }
-       if (!d) {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
-               return 0;
-       }       
-
-       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
-       EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-       return((int)ret);
-       }
-
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
-            const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
-       {
-       unsigned int i;
-       EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-       unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-       unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
-       int idx;
-       long mask;
-       int err=0;
-       const EVP_MD *md; 
-
-       q=buf;
-
-       if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
-               if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-                       return 0;
-
-       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-       for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
-               {
-               if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
-                       {
-                       int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
-                       EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
-                       if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
-                               {
-                               /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
-                               err = 1;
-                               }
-                       else
-                               {
-                               if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
-                                       !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
-                                       (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
-                                       err = 1;
-                               q+=hashsize;
-                               }
-                       }
-               }
-               
-       if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                       str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
-                       s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-                       out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
-               err = 1;
-       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-       if (err)
-               return 0;
-       else
-               return sizeof buf2;
-       }
-
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-       {
-       SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-       unsigned char *seq;
-       EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-       size_t md_size;
-       int i;
-       EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-       unsigned char header[13];
-       int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
-       int t;
-
-       if (send)
-               {
-               rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-               seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
-               hash=ssl->write_hash;
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
-               seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
-               hash=ssl->read_hash;
-               }
-
-       t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
-       OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-       md_size=t;
-
-       /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
-       if (stream_mac) 
-               {
-                       mac_ctx = hash;
-               }
-               else
-               {
-                       if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
-                               return -1;
-                       mac_ctx = &hmac;
-               }
-
-       if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
-               {
-               unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
-
-               s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
-               memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
-
-               memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
-               }
-       else
-               memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
-       header[8]=rec->type;
-       header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-       header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-       header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
-       header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
-
-       if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
-           EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-           ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
-               {
-               /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
-                * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
-                * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
-                * timing-oracle. */
-               ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
-                       mac_ctx,
-                       md, &md_size,
-                       header, rec->input,
-                       rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
-                       ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
-                       ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
-                       0 /* not SSLv3 */);
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
-               EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-               t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-               OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
-               if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
-                       tls_fips_digest_extra(
-                                       ssl->enc_read_ctx,
-                                       mac_ctx, rec->input,
-                                       rec->length, rec->orig_len);
-               }
-               
-       if (!stream_mac)
-               EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-fprintf(stderr,"seq=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",seq[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
-fprintf(stderr,"rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",rec->data[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
-#endif
-
-       if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
-               {
-               for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
-                       {
-                       ++seq[i];
-                       if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-                       }
-               }
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",md[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
-#endif
-       return(md_size);
-       }
-
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
-            int len)
-       {
-       unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-       const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
-       int col = 0, sol = 0;
-
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-       if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-           s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
-           s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
-               {
-               co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
-               col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-               so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
-               sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
-               }
+            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+                s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;
 #endif
+        }
+    }
 
-       tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-               TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
-               s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-               co, col,
-               s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-               so, sol,
-               p,len,
-               s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
-       BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
-       fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
-       BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-       fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
-       BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-       fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
-       BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-#endif
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return ret;
+}
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
-       if (s->msg_callback)
-               {
-               s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
-                                               p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-               s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
-                                       s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-               s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
-                                       s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                                       s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-               s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
-                                       s->session->master_key,
-                                       SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE,
-                                       s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-               }
-#endif
+size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
+                             unsigned char *out)
+{
+    size_t hashlen;
+    unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+                  s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+                  out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 1)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+    return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
+}
 
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-       return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-       }
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+                                size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
+{
+    if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+        unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+        size_t hashlen;
+        /*
+         * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
+         * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
+         * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
+         */
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
+                || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+            BIO_printf(trc_out, "Handshake hashes:\n");
+            BIO_dump(trc_out, (char *)hash, hashlen);
+        } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+        if (!tls1_PRF(s,
+                      TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                      TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+                      hash, hashlen,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      NULL, 0, p, len, out,
+                      SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+    } else {
+        if (!tls1_PRF(s,
+                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+                      s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                      NULL, 0, p, len, out,
+                      SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
+           /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, len, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Client Random:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Server Random:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Master Secret:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out,
+                        s->session->master_key,
+                        SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+    *secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
+    return 1;
+}
 
 int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-        const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
-        size_t contextlen, int use_context)
-       {
-       unsigned char *buff;
-       unsigned char *val = NULL;
-       size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
-       int rv;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr,"tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-       buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-       if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
-
-       /* construct PRF arguments
-        * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
-        * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
-        * does not create a prohibited label.
-        */
-       vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
-       if (use_context)
-               {
-               vallen += 2 + contextlen;
-               }
-
-       val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
-       if (val == NULL) goto err2;
-       currentvalpos = 0;
-       memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
-       currentvalpos += llen;
-       memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-       currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-       memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-       currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-       if (use_context)
-               {
-               val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
-               currentvalpos++;
-               val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
-               currentvalpos++;
-               if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
-                       {
-                       memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
-                       }
-               }
-
-       /* disallow prohibited labels
-        * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
-        * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
-        * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
-        */
-       if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
-                TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-       if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
-                TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-       if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-                TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-       if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-                TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-
-       rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                     val, vallen,
-                     NULL, 0,
-                     NULL, 0,
-                     NULL, 0,
-                     NULL, 0,
-                     s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-                     out,buff,olen);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-       fprintf(stderr,"tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-       goto ret;
-err1:
-       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
-       rv = 0;
-       goto ret;
-err2:
-       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-       rv = 0;
-ret:
-       if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
-       if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
-       return(rv);
-       }
+                                const char *label, size_t llen,
+                                const unsigned char *context,
+                                size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+{
+    unsigned char *val = NULL;
+    size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
+    int rv;
+
+    /*
+     * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
+     * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
+     * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
+     */
+    vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+    if (use_context) {
+        vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+    }
+
+    val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+    if (val == NULL)
+        goto err2;
+    currentvalpos = 0;
+    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
+    currentvalpos += llen;
+    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+    if (use_context) {
+        val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+        currentvalpos++;
+        val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+        currentvalpos++;
+        if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
+            memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
+     * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
+     * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+     */
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+               TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+        goto err1;
+
+    rv = tls1_PRF(s,
+                  val, vallen,
+                  NULL, 0,
+                  NULL, 0,
+                  NULL, 0,
+                  NULL, 0,
+                  s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+                  out, olen, 0);
+
+    goto ret;
+ err1:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+    rv = 0;
+    goto ret;
+ err2:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    rv = 0;
+ ret:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
+    return rv;
+}
 
 int tls1_alert_code(int code)
-       {
-       switch (code)
-               {
-       case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:       return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-       case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-       case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:     return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-       case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:  return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-       case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:    return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
-       case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
-       case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:  return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-       case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:     return(-1);
-       case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:    return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-       case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-       case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-       case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
-       case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
-       case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:  return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-       case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:         return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
-       case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:      return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
-       case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:       return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-       case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:      return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-       case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
-       case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:   return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-       case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
-       case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:     return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-       case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:     return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
-       case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:   return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-       case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
-       case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
-       case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:  return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
-       case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
-       case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
-       case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
-       case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
-       case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 
-                                         (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
-#endif
-       default:                        return(-1);
-               }
-       }
+{
+    switch (code) {
+    case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+        return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
+    case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+        return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+        return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+    case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+        return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+    case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+        return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+    case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+        return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+    case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+        return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+        return -1;
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+        return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+        return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+    case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+        return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+        return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+    case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+        return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+    case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+        return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+        return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+    case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+        return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+    case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+        return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+        return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+    case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+        return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+        return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
+    case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+        return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+        return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+        return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
+    case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+        return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+        return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+        return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
+    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+        return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+    case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+        return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+    case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
+        return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
+        return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    default:
+        return -1;
+    }
+}