Enable runtime testing of no-deprecated builds in Travis
[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_enc.c
index 70ea6c0..64806a3 100644 (file)
-/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
  *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-# include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "record/record_local.h"
+#include "internal/ktls.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-# include <openssl/des.h>
-#endif
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
-                       int sec_len,
-                       const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-                       const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-                       const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-                       const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-                       const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-                       unsigned char *out, int olen)
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
+                    const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+                    const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
+                    const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
+                    const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,
+                    const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,
+                    const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
+                    unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal)
 {
-    int chunk;
-    size_t j;
-    EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
-    EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-    unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    size_t A1_len;
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
-    OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
+    const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
+    EVP_KDF *kdf;
+    EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL;
+    OSSL_PARAM params[8], *p = params;
+    const char *mdname;
 
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-    mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
-    if (!mac_key)
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
-        goto err;
-    if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
-        goto err;
-    if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
-        goto err;
-    if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
-        goto err;
-    if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
-        goto err;
-    if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
+    if (md == NULL) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        if (fatal)
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        else
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
+    if (kdf == NULL)
         goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+    kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+    EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+    if (kctx == NULL)
         goto err;
-
-    for (;;) {
-        /* Reinit mac contexts */
-        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init))
-            goto err;
-        if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
-            goto err;
-        if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx))
-            goto err;
-        if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
-            goto err;
-        if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
-            goto err;
-        if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
-            goto err;
-        if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
-            goto err;
-        if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
-            goto err;
-
-        if (olen > chunk) {
-            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
-                goto err;
-            out += j;
-            olen -= j;
-            /* calc the next A1 value */
-            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
-                goto err;
-        } else {                /* last one */
-
-            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
-                goto err;
-            memcpy(out, A1, olen);
-            break;
-        }
+    mdname = EVP_MD_name(md);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+                                            (char *)mdname, strlen(mdname) + 1);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET,
+                                             (unsigned char *)sec,
+                                             (size_t)slen);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed1, (size_t)seed1_len);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed2, (size_t)seed2_len);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed3, (size_t)seed3_len);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed4, (size_t)seed4_len);
+    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
+                                             (void *)seed5, (size_t)seed5_len);
+    *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+    if (EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params)
+            && EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, olen)) {
+        EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+        return 1;
     }
-    ret = 1;
+
  err:
-    EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
-    return ret;
+    if (fatal)
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    else
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+    return 0;
 }
 
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
-                    const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-                    const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-                    const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-                    const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-                    const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-                    const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
-                    unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)
 {
-    int len, i, idx, count;
-    const unsigned char *S1;
-    long m;
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-    int ret = 0;
+    int ret;
+
+    /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+    ret = tls1_PRF(s,
+                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3.server_random,
+                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                   NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
+                   s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1);
 
-    /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
-    count = 0;
-    for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
-        if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
-            count++;
-    }
-    if(!count) {
-        /* Should never happen */
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    len = slen / count;
-    if (count == 1)
-        slen = 0;
-    S1 = sec;
-    memset(out1, 0, olen);
-    for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
-        if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
-            if (!md) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
-                goto err;
-            }
-            if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1),
-                             seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
-                             seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len,
-                             out2, olen))
-                goto err;
-            S1 += len;
-            for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
-                out1[i] ^= out2[i];
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    ret = 1;
- err:
     return ret;
 }
 
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
-                                   unsigned char *tmp, int num)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+ /*
+  * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
+  *
+  * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
+  * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
+  * function will fail.
+  */
+static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s)
 {
-    int ret;
-    ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
-                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                   NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
-                   s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
-            s->session->master_key_length);
-    {
-        int i;
-        for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
-        }
-        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+    PACKET pkt, subpkt;
+    int count = 0;
+
+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
+        return -1;
+
+    while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
+        /* Skip record type and version */
+        if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
+            return -1;
+
+        /* Read until next record */
+        if (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
+            return -1;
+
+        count += 1;
     }
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-    return ret;
+
+    return count;
 }
+#endif
 
 int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 {
-    static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
     unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
-    unsigned char *exp_label;
-    unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-    unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-    unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
-    unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
     unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
-    int client_write;
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
     const EVP_CIPHER *c;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@@ -334,108 +145,123 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 #endif
     const EVP_MD *m;
     int mac_type;
-    int *mac_secret_size;
+    size_t *mac_secret_size;
     EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
     EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-    int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl;
+    size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
     int reuse_dd = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+    struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 crypto_info;
+    BIO *bio;
+    unsigned char geniv[12];
+    int count_unprocessed;
+    int bit;
+#endif
 
-    is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-    c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-    m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
-    mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
+    c = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
+    m = s->s3.tmp.new_hash;
+    mac_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-    comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+    comp = s->s3.tmp.new_compression;
 #endif
 
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
-    fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
-            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
-            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp);
-    fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
-    fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
-            c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len);
-    fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ",
-            s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
-    {
-        int i;
-        for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-            fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);
-        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-    }
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
     if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
-        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+        if (s->ext.use_etm)
+            s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+        else
+            s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+
+        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
             s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
         else
             s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
 
-        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
             reuse_dd = 1;
-        else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
-                  OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+        } else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto err;
-        else
+        } else {
             /*
-             * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+             * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
              */
-            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
+        }
         dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
         mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-        if (s->expand != NULL) {
-            COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
-            s->expand = NULL;
+        if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
         }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+        s->expand = NULL;
         if (comp != NULL) {
             s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
             if (s->expand == NULL) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
-                       SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-                goto err2;
-            }
-            if (SSL3_RECORD_setup(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer),
-                SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH))
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                         SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
                 goto err;
+            }
         }
 #endif
         /*
          * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
          */
         if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-            memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
-        mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
-        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        mac_secret = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);
+        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret_size);
     } else {
-        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+        s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
+        if (s->ext.use_etm)
+            s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+        else
+            s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+
+        if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
             s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
         else
             s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
             reuse_dd = 1;
-        else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        } else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto err;
+        }
         dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
         if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-            mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-            if (!mac_ctx)
+            mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+            if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                 goto err;
+            }
             s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
-        } else
+        } else {
             mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-        if (s->compress != NULL) {
-            COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
-            s->compress = NULL;
+            if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
         }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+        s->compress = NULL;
         if (comp != NULL) {
             s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
             if (s->compress == NULL) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
-                       SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-                goto err2;
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                        SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+                goto err;
             }
         }
 #endif
@@ -443,24 +269,26 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
          * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
          */
         if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-            memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
-        mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
-        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+        mac_secret = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
+        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret_size);
     }
 
     if (reuse_dd)
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
 
-    p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-    i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+    p = s->s3.tmp.key_block;
+    i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
 
+    /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
     cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-    j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
-                     cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+    j = cl;
     /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-    /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+    /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
     if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
         k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+    else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+        k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
     else
         k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
     if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
@@ -471,9 +299,6 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
         n += j + j;
         iv = &(p[n]);
         n += k + k;
-        exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-        exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-        client_write = 1;
     } else {
         n = i;
         ms = &(p[n]);
@@ -482,220 +307,236 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
         n += j + k;
         iv = &(p[n]);
         n += k;
-        exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-        exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-        client_write = 0;
     }
 
-    if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err2;
+    if (n > s->s3.tmp.key_block_length) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
     }
 
     memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
 
     if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
-        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-                                       mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
-        EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key);
-        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-    }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-    printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
-    {
-        int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
-            printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
-    }
-#endif
-    if (is_export) {
-        /*
-         * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
-         * since only the correct one will be used :-).
-         */
-        if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                      exp_label, exp_label_len,
-                      s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                      s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                      NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-                      key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-            goto err2;
-        key = tmp1;
-
-        if (k > 0) {
-            if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                          TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
-                          s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                          s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                          NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2))
-                goto err2;
-            if (client_write)
-                iv = iv1;
-            else
-                iv = &(iv1[k]);
+        /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
+        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
+                                               (int)*mac_secret_size);
+        if (mac_key == NULL
+            || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
         }
+        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
     }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    {
-        int i;
-        fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= ");
-        for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++)
-            fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]);
-        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
-        for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++)
-            fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]);
-        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-    }
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, mac key:\n", which);
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, ms, i, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
 
     if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
         if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
-            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            goto err2;
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
+                                    iv)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+        int taglen;
+        if (s->s3.tmp.
+            new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
+            taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+        else
+            taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv)
+            || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
         }
     } else {
         if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            goto err2;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
         }
     }
     /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
     if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
         && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-                                *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err2;
+                                (int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
     }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
-    if (s->msg_callback) {
-        int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
-        if (*mac_secret_size)
-            s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
-                            mac_secret, *mac_secret_size,
-                            s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-        if (c->key_len)
-            s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
-                            key, c->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-        if (k) {
-            if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-                wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV;
-            else
-                wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
-            s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+    if (s->compress)
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    if (((which & SSL3_CC_READ) && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_RX))
+        || ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX)))
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
+    if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    /* check that cipher is AES_GCM_128 */
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_nid(c) != NID_aes_128_gcm
+        || EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) != EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
+        || EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) != TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE)
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    /* check version is 1.2 */
+    if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION)
+        goto skip_ktls;
+
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+        bio = s->wbio;
+    else
+        bio = s->rbio;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
     }
-#endif
 
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-    printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
-    {
-        int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
-            printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+    /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {
+       if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
+           goto skip_ktls;
     }
-    printf("\niv=");
-    {
-        int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
-            printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+
+    /* ktls doesn't support renegotiation */
+    if ((BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) ||
+        (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    memset(&crypto_info, 0, sizeof(crypto_info));
+    crypto_info.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128;
+    crypto_info.info.version = s->version;
+
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GET_IV,
+                        EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN,
+                        geniv);
+    memcpy(crypto_info.iv, geniv + EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN,
+           TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE);
+    memcpy(crypto_info.salt, geniv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
+    memcpy(crypto_info.key, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c));
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+        memcpy(crypto_info.rec_seq, &s->rlayer.write_sequence,
+                TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+    else
+        memcpy(crypto_info.rec_seq, &s->rlayer.read_sequence,
+                TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+
+    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+        count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
+        if (count_unprocessed < 0)
+            goto skip_ktls;
+
+        /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
+        while (count_unprocessed) {
+            for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
+                ++crypto_info.rec_seq[bit];
+                if (crypto_info.rec_seq[bit] != 0)
+                    break;
+            }
+            count_unprocessed--;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
+    if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
+        if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+            ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+        SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
     }
-    printf("\n");
-#endif
 
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
-    return (1);
+ skip_ktls:
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KTLS */
+    s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, key:\n", which);
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c), 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "iv:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, iv, k, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+    return 1;
  err:
-    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err2:
-    return (0);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
 {
-    unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL;
+    unsigned char *p;
     const EVP_CIPHER *c;
     const EVP_MD *hash;
-    int num;
     SSL_COMP *comp;
-    int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
+    int mac_type = NID_undef;
+    size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
     int ret = 0;
 
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-    if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
-        return (1);
+    if (s->s3.tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+        return 1;
 
-    if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
-        (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp,
-         SSL_USE_ETM(s))) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
-        return (0);
+    if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size,
+                            &comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
+                 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+        return 0;
     }
 
-    s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
-    s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
-    s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
-    s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
-    num =
-        EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+    s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+    s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
+    s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+    s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+    num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
     num *= 2;
 
     ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
 
-    if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;
     }
 
-    s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
-    s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1;
+    s->s3.tmp.key_block_length = num;
+    s->s3.tmp.key_block = p;
 
-    if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        OPENSSL_free(p1);
-        goto err;
-    }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-    printf("client random\n");
-    {
-        int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
-            printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
-                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
-    }
-    printf("server random\n");
-    {
-        int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
-            printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
-                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
-    }
-    printf("master key\n");
-    {
-        int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
-            printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
-                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
-    }
-#endif
-    if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num))
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "client random\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "server random\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "master key\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out,
+                        s->session->master_key,
+                        s->session->master_key_length, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+    if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         goto err;
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-    printf("\nkey block\n");
-    {
-        int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
-            printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
     }
-#endif
+
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, num, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
 
     if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
         && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
@@ -703,454 +544,111 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
          * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
          * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
          */
-        s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+        s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 1;
 
         if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
             if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+                s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
             if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+                s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;
 #endif
         }
     }
 
     ret = 1;
  err:
-    if (p2) {
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num);
-        OPENSSL_free(p2);
-    }
-    return (ret);
-}
-
-/*-
- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- *       short etc).
- *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- *       an internal error occurred.
- */
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-{
-    SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-    unsigned long l;
-    int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
-    const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
-    if (send) {
-        if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
-            int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-            OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-        }
-        ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
-        rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
-        if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-            enc = NULL;
-        else {
-            int ivlen;
-            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-            /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
-            if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
-                && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-                ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
-            else
-                ivlen = 0;
-            if (ivlen > 1) {
-                if (rec->data != rec->input)
-                    /*
-                     * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
-                     * happen?? (steve)
-                     */
-                    fprintf(stderr,
-                            "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
-                            __FILE__, __LINE__);
-                else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
-                    return -1;
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
-            int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-            OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-        }
-        ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
-        if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-            enc = NULL;
-        else
-            enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
-    }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-    if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
-        memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
-        rec->input = rec->data;
-        ret = 1;
-    } else {
-        l = rec->length;
-        bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
-            unsigned char buf[13], *seq;
-
-            seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
-
-            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-                unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
-
-                s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
-                memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-                memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
-            } else {
-                memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
-                for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
-                    ++seq[i];
-                    if (seq[i] != 0)
-                        break;
-                }
-            }
-
-            buf[8] = rec->type;
-            buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
-            buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
-            buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
-            buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
-            pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
-            if (send) {
-                l += pad;
-                rec->length += pad;
-            }
-        } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
-            i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
-
-            /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
-            /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
-            j = i - 1;
-            if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
-                if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-                    j++;
-            }
-            for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
-                rec->input[k] = j;
-            l += i;
-            rec->length += i;
-        }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-        {
-            unsigned long ui;
-            fprintf(stderr,
-                    "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                    ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
-            fprintf(stderr,
-                    "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
-                    ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ,
-                    DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len);
-            fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: ");
-            for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++)
-                fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]);
-            fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-            fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input=");
-            for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++)
-                fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]);
-            fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-        }
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-        if (!send) {
-            if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
-                return 0;
-        }
-
-        i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
-        if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
-            ? (i < 0)
-            : (i == 0))
-            return -1;          /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
-            rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-            rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-            rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-        }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-        {
-            unsigned long i;
-            fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data=");
-            for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
-                fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]);
-            fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-        }
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-        ret = 1;
-        if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
-            mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-        if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-            ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
-        if (pad && !send)
-            rec->length -= pad;
-    }
     return ret;
 }
 
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
+size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
+                             unsigned char *out)
 {
-    unsigned int ret;
-    EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
-    int i;
-
-    if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-            return 0;
+    size_t hashlen;
+    unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 
-    for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
-        if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
-            && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
-            d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    if (!d) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return 0;
     }
 
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
-    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    return ((int)ret);
-}
-
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen,
-                          unsigned char *out)
-{
-    int hashlen;
-    unsigned char hash[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    unsigned char buf2[12];
-
-    if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-            return 0;
-
-    hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
-
-    if (hashlen == 0)
+    if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return 0;
+    }
 
-    if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                  str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+    if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
                   s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
-                  out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
+                  out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 1)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return 0;
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
-    return sizeof buf2;
-}
-
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-{
-    SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-    unsigned char *seq;
-    EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-    size_t md_size;
-    int i;
-    EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-    unsigned char header[13];
-    int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
-                      : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
-    int t;
-
-    if (send) {
-        rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-        seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
-        hash = ssl->write_hash;
-    } else {
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
-        seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
-        hash = ssl->read_hash;
-    }
-
-    t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
-    OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-    md_size = t;
-
-    /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
-    if (stream_mac) {
-        mac_ctx = hash;
-    } else {
-        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
-            return -1;
-        mac_ctx = &hmac;
-    }
-
-    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
-        unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
-
-        s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
-        memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-
-        memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
-    } else
-        memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
-    header[8] = rec->type;
-    header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
-    header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-    header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
-    header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
-
-    if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-        ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
-        /*
-         * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
-         * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
-         * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
-         */
-        /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
-        ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
-                               md, &md_size,
-                               header, rec->input,
-                               rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
-                               ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
-                               ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0);
-    } else {
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
-        t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
-        OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
-        if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
-            tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
-                                  mac_ctx, rec->input,
-                                  rec->length, rec->orig_len);
-    }
-
-    if (!stream_mac)
-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
-    {
-        int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
-            fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
-        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-    }
-    fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
-    {
-        unsigned int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
-            fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
-        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-    }
-#endif
-
-    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
-        for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
-            ++seq[i];
-            if (seq[i] != 0)
-                break;
-        }
-    }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-    {
-        unsigned int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
-            fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
-        fprintf(stderr, "\n");
     }
-#endif
-    return (md_size);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
+    return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
 }
 
 int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
-                                int len)
+                                size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
 {
-    unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p,
-            len);
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
     if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
         unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
-        int hashlen;
-        /* If we don't have any digests cache records */
-        if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
-            /*
-             * keep record buffer: this wont affect client auth because we're
-             * freezing the buffer at the same point (after client key
-             * exchange and before certificate verify)
-             */
-            s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
-            if(!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-                return -1;
+        size_t hashlen;
+        /*
+         * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
+         * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
+         * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
+         */
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
+                || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+            BIO_printf(trc_out, "Handshake hashes:\n");
+            BIO_dump(trc_out, (char *)hash, hashlen);
+        } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+        if (!tls1_PRF(s,
+                      TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                      TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+                      hash, hashlen,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      NULL, 0, p, len, out,
+                      SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
         }
-        hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-        fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
-        BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
-#endif
-        tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                 TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-                 TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
-                 hash, hashlen,
-                 NULL, 0,
-                 NULL, 0,
-                 NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
         OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
     } else {
-        tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-                 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-                 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
-                 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                 NULL, 0,
-                 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                 NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+        if (!tls1_PRF(s,
+                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+                      s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                      NULL, 0, p, len, out,
+                      SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
+           /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
     }
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
-    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
-    fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
-    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-    fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
-    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-    fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
-    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
-                SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-#endif
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
-    if (s->msg_callback) {
-        s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
-                        p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-        s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
-                        s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                        s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-        s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
-                        s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-                        s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-        s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
+    OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, len, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Client Random:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Server Random:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
+        BIO_printf(trc_out, "Master Secret:\n");
+        BIO_dump_indent(trc_out,
                         s->session->master_key,
-                        SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-    }
-#endif
+                        SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 4);
+    } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
 
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-    return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+    *secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
+    return 1;
 }
 
 int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
@@ -1158,20 +656,10 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
                                 const unsigned char *context,
                                 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
 {
-    unsigned char *buff;
     unsigned char *val = NULL;
-    size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+    size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
     int rv;
 
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n",
-            s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-    buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-    if (buff == NULL)
-        goto err2;
-
     /*
      * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
      * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
@@ -1188,9 +676,9 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
     currentvalpos = 0;
     memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
     currentvalpos += llen;
-    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
     currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
     currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 
     if (use_context) {
@@ -1224,103 +712,98 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
                TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
         goto err1;
 
-    rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+    rv = tls1_PRF(s,
                   val, vallen,
                   NULL, 0,
                   NULL, 0,
                   NULL, 0,
                   NULL, 0,
                   s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
-                  out, buff, olen);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
+                  out, olen, 0);
 
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
-#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
     goto ret;
  err1:
-    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL,
-           SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
     rv = 0;
     goto ret;
  err2:
     SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     rv = 0;
  ret:
-    if (buff != NULL)
-        OPENSSL_free(buff);
-    if (val != NULL)
-        OPENSSL_free(val);
-    return (rv);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
+    return rv;
 }
 
 int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 {
     switch (code) {
     case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
-        return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+        return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
     case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
-        return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
     case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
-        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+        return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
     case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
-        return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+        return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
     case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
-        return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+        return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
     case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
-        return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+        return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
     case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
-        return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
     case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
-        return (-1);
+        return -1;
     case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
-        return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+        return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
     case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
-        return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+        return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
     case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
-        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
     case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
-        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
     case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
-        return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
     case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
-        return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
     case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
-        return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
+        return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
     case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
-        return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
+        return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
     case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
-        return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
     case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
-        return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+        return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
     case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
-        return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
+        return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
     case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
-        return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+        return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
     case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
-        return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+        return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
     case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
-        return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
-        return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
+        return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
     case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
-        return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
     case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
-        return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+        return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
     case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
-        return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
+        return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
     case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
-        return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
+        return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
     case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
-        return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+        return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
     case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
-        return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+        return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
     case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
-        return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+        return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
     case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
-        return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+        return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+    case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
+        return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
+        return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
     default:
-        return (-1);
+        return -1;
     }
 }