Option to set current cert to server certificate.
[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_enc.c
index fb1ea50..28471c2 100644 (file)
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  *
  */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#endif
 
-static void tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
-                       int sec_len, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
+                       int sec_len,
+                       const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+                       const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+                       const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+                       const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+                       const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
                        unsigned char *out, int olen)
        {
-       int chunk,n;
-       unsigned int j;
-       HMAC_CTX ctx;
-       HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
+       int chunk;
+       size_t j;
+       EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
+       EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
        unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-       unsigned int A1_len;
+       size_t A1_len;
+       int ret = 0;
        
        chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
+       OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
 
-       HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
-       HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-       HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL);
-       HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL);
-       HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
-       HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
+       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
+       EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+       mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+       if (!mac_key)
+               goto err;
+       if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+               goto err;
+       if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,&ctx_init))
+               goto err;
+       if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+               goto err;
+       if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+               goto err;
+       if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+               goto err;
+       if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+               goto err;
+       if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+               goto err;
+       if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+               goto err;
 
-       n=0;
        for (;;)
                {
-               HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */
-               HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */
-               HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len);
-               HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len);
-               HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
+               /* Reinit mac contexts */
+               if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,&ctx_init))
+                       goto err;
+               if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+                       goto err;
+               if (olen>chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp,&ctx))
+                       goto err;
+               if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+                       goto err;
+               if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+                       goto err;
+               if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+                       goto err;
+               if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+                       goto err;
+               if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+                       goto err;
 
                if (olen > chunk)
                        {
-                       HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j);
+                       if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
+                               goto err;
                        out+=j;
                        olen-=j;
-                       HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len); /* calc the next A1 value */
+                       /* calc the next A1 value */
+                       if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
+                               goto err;
                        }
                else    /* last one */
                        {
-                       HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
+                       if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+                               goto err;
                        memcpy(out,A1,olen);
                        break;
                        }
                }
-       HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-       HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+       ret = 1;
+err:
+       EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
        OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
+       return ret;
        }
 
-static void tls1_PRF(const EVP_MD *md5, const EVP_MD *sha1,
-                    unsigned char *label, int label_len,
-                    const unsigned char *sec, int slen, unsigned char *out1,
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
+                    const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+                    const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+                    const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+                    const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+                    const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+                    const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
+                    unsigned char *out1,
                     unsigned char *out2, int olen)
        {
-       int len,i;
-       const unsigned char *S1,*S2;
-
-       len=slen/2;
+       int len,i,idx,count;
+       const unsigned char *S1;
+       long m;
+       const EVP_MD *md;
+       int ret = 0;
+
+       /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
+       count=0;
+       for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
+               if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
+       }       
+       len=slen/count;
+       if (count == 1)
+               slen = 0;
        S1=sec;
-       S2= &(sec[len]);
-       len+=(slen&1); /* add for odd, make longer */
-
-       
-       tls1_P_hash(md5 ,S1,len,label,label_len,out1,olen);
-       tls1_P_hash(sha1,S2,len,label,label_len,out2,olen);
-
-       for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
-               out1[i]^=out2[i];
+       memset(out1,0,olen);
+       for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
+               if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
+                       if (!md) {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+                               SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
+                               goto err;                               
+                       }
+                       if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
+                                       seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
+                                       out2,olen))
+                               goto err;
+                       S1+=len;
+                       for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
+                       {
+                               out1[i]^=out2[i];
+                       }
+               }
        }
-
-static void tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
+       ret = 1;
+err:
+       return ret;
+}
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
             unsigned char *tmp, int num)
        {
-       unsigned char *p;
-       unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+
-               TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE];
-       p=buf;
-
-       memcpy(p,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-               TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE);
-       p+=TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE;
-       memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-       p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-       memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-       p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-       tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),
+       int ret;
+       ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+                TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+                s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                NULL,0,NULL,0,
                 s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
                 km,tmp,num);
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@@ -215,19 +312,19 @@ static void tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
                 }
         printf("\n");  }
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+       return ret;
        }
 
 int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
        {
        static const unsigned char empty[]="";
-       unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret;
-       unsigned char *exp_label,buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+
-               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2];
+       unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
+       unsigned char *exp_label;
        unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
        unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
        unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
        unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
-       unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
+       unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
        int client_write;
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
        const EVP_CIPHER *c;
@@ -235,21 +332,27 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
        const SSL_COMP *comp;
 #endif
        const EVP_MD *m;
+       int mac_type;
+       int *mac_secret_size;
+       EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+       EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
        int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
        int reuse_dd = 0;
 
        is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
        c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
        m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+       mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
        comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
 #endif
-       key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
        printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
-       printf("\talg= %ld, comp= %p\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms,
-                comp);
+       printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
+              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+              s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
+              comp);
        printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
        printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
                 c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
@@ -257,18 +360,26 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
        {
         int i;
         for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-               printf("%02x", key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
+               printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
         }
 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
        if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
                {
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+                       s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+               else
+                       s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
                if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
                        reuse_dd = 1;
                else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
                        goto err;
+               else
+                       /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+                       EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
                dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
-               s->read_hash=m;
+               mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
                if (s->expand != NULL)
                        {
@@ -294,19 +405,28 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
                if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
                        memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
                mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+               mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
                }
        else
                {
-               if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+                       s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+                       else
+                       s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+               if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
                        reuse_dd = 1;
-               else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
-                       goto err;
-               if ((s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) &&
-                       ((s->enc_write_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
-                       OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
+               else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
                        goto err;
                dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
-               s->write_hash=m;
+               if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+                       {
+                       mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+                       if (!mac_ctx)
+                               goto err;
+                       s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
+                       }
+               else
+                       mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
                if (s->compress != NULL)
                        {
@@ -327,21 +447,24 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
                if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
                        memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
                mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+               mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
                }
 
        if (reuse_dd)
                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
-       EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(dd);
 
        p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-       i=EVP_MD_size(m);
+       i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
        cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
        j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
                       cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
        /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-       k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-       er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
-       er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+       /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+       if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+               k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+       else
+               k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
        if (    (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
                (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
                {
@@ -370,6 +493,14 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
                }
 
        memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
+
+       if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+               {
+               mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+                               mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
+               EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
+               EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+               }
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -379,29 +510,24 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
                /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
                 * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
                 */
-               p=buf;
-               memcpy(p,exp_label,exp_label_len);
-               p+=exp_label_len;
-               memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-               p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-               memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-               p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-               tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),key,j,
-                        tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c));
+               if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+                               exp_label,exp_label_len,
+                               s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                               s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                               NULL,0,NULL,0,
+                               key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+                       goto err2;
                key=tmp1;
 
                if (k > 0)
                        {
-                       p=buf;
-                       memcpy(p,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,
-                               TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE);
-                       p+=TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE;
-                       memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                       p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-                       memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                       p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-                       tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,p-buf,empty,0,
-                                iv1,iv2,k*2);
+                       if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+                                       TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+                                       s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                                       s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                                       NULL,0,NULL,0,
+                                       empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
+                               goto err2;
                        if (client_write)
                                iv=iv1;
                        else
@@ -421,7 +547,43 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
        }
 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-       EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+       if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+               {
+               EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
+               }
+       else    
+               EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+       /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+       if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+                               *mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+       if (s->msg_callback)
+               {
+               int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
+               if (*mac_secret_size)
+                       s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
+                                               mac_secret, *mac_secret_size,
+                                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+               if (c->key_len)
+                       s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
+                                               key, c->key_len,
+                                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+               if (k)
+                       {
+                       if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+                               wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV;
+                       else
+                               wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
+                       s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k,
+                                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+                       }
+               }
+#endif
+
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -443,11 +605,13 @@ err2:
 
 int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
        {
-       unsigned char *p1,*p2;
+       unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
        const EVP_CIPHER *c;
        const EVP_MD *hash;
        int num;
        SSL_COMP *comp;
+       int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
+       int ret=0;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
        printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
@@ -456,7 +620,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
        if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
                return(1);
 
-       if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&comp))
+       if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp, SSL_USE_ETM(s)))
                {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
                return(0);
@@ -464,20 +628,27 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
 
        s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
        s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
-
-       num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+EVP_MD_size(hash)+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+       s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+       s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+       num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
        num*=2;
 
        ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
 
        if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
-       if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-               goto err;
+               }
 
        s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
        s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
 
+       if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+               goto err;
+               }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("client random\n");
@@ -487,15 +658,15 @@ printf("server random\n");
 printf("pre-master\n");
 { int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 #endif
-       tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num);
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
-       OPENSSL_free(p2);
+       if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
+               goto err;
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("\nkey block\n");
 { int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 #endif
 
-       if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+       if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
+               && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION)
                {
                /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
                 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
@@ -504,45 +675,85 @@ printf("\nkey block\n");
 
                if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
                        {
-                       if ((s->session->cipher->algorithms & SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_eNULL)
+                       if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
                                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
                        
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-                       if ((s->session->cipher->algorithms & SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_RC4)
+                       if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
                                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
 #endif
                        }
                }
                
-       return(1);
+       ret = 1;
 err:
-       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-       return(0);
+       if (p2)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
+               OPENSSL_free(p2);
+               }
+       return(ret);
        }
 
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occurred.
+ */
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
        {
        SSL3_RECORD *rec;
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
        unsigned long l;
-       int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+       int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
        const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
        if (send)
                {
-               if (s->write_hash != NULL)
-                       n=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+               if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
+                       {
+                       int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+                       OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+                       }
                ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
                rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
                if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
                        enc=NULL;
                else
+                       {
+                       int ivlen;
                        enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+                       /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+                       if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+                               && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                               ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+                       else
+                               ivlen = 0;
+                       if (ivlen > 1)
+                               {
+                               if ( rec->data != rec->input)
+                                       /* we can't write into the input stream:
+                                        * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
+                                        */
+                                       fprintf(stderr,
+                                               "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+                                               __FILE__, __LINE__);
+                               else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
+                                       return -1;
+                               }
+                       }
                }
        else
                {
-               if (s->read_hash != NULL)
-                       n=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+               if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
+                       {
+                       int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+                       OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+                       }
                ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
                rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
                if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
@@ -555,18 +766,54 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
        printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-       if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-               (enc == NULL))
+       if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
                {
                memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
                rec->input=rec->data;
+               ret = 1;
                }
        else
                {
                l=rec->length;
                bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
 
-               if ((bs != 1) && send)
+               if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+                       {
+                       unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
+
+                       seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+                       if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+                               {
+                               unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+                               s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
+                               memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
+                               memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
+                               }
+                       else
+                               {
+                               memcpy(buf,seq,8);
+                               for (i=7; i>=0; i--)    /* increment */
+                                       {
+                                       ++seq[i];
+                                       if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
+                                       }
+                               }
+
+                       buf[8]=rec->type;
+                       buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+                       buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
+                       buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
+                       buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
+                       pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
+                       if (send)
+                               {
+                               l+=pad;
+                               rec->length+=pad;
+                               }
+                       }
+               else if ((bs != 1) && send)
                        {
                        i=bs-((int)l%bs);
 
@@ -587,13 +834,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                {
-                unsigned long ui;
+               unsigned long ui;
                printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+                       ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
                printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
+                       ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+                       DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+                       ds->cipher->iv_len);
                printf("\t\tIV: ");
                for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
                printf("\n");
@@ -606,143 +853,218 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                if (!send)
                        {
                        if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                               {
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-                               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                                return 0;
-                               }
                        }
                
-               EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+               i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+               if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+                                               ?(i<0)
+                                               :(i==0))
+                       return -1;      /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+               if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
+                       {
+                       rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                       rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                       rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                       }
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                {
-                unsigned long i;
-                printf("\trec->data=");
+               unsigned long i;
+               printf("\trec->data=");
                for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-                }
+                       printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+               }
 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
+               ret = 1;
+               if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+                       mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
                if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-                       {
-                       ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-                       i++;
-                       if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-                               {
-                               /* First packet is even in size, so check */
-                               if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-                                       "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-                                       s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-                               if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-                                       i--;
-                               }
-                       /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-                        * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-                       if (i > (int)rec->length)
-                               {
-                               /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-                                * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-                                * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-                                * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-                               return -1;
-                               }
-                       for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-                               {
-                               if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-                                       {
-                                       /* Incorrect padding */
-                                       return -1;
-                                       }
-                               }
-                       rec->length-=i;
-                       }
+                       ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+               if (pad && !send)
+                       rec->length -= pad;
                }
-       return(1);
+       return ret;
        }
 
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx, unsigned char *out)
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
        {
        unsigned int ret;
-       EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+       EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
+       int i;
+
+       if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
+               if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                       return 0;
+
+       for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
+               {
+                 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) 
+                       {
+                       d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+                       break;
+                       }
+               }
+       if (!d) {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+               return 0;
+       }       
 
        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in_ctx);
+       EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
        return((int)ret);
        }
 
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in1_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *in2_ctx,
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
             const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
        {
        unsigned int i;
        EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-       unsigned char buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+       unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
+       int idx;
+       long mask;
+       int err=0;
+       const EVP_MD *md; 
 
        q=buf;
-       memcpy(q,str,slen);
-       q+=slen;
+
+       if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
+               if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                       return 0;
 
        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-       EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in1_ctx);
-       EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
-       q+=i;
-       EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in2_ctx);
-       EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
-       q+=i;
-
-       tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(q-buf),
-               s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-               out,buf2,sizeof buf2);
+
+       for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
+               {
+               if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
+                       {
+                       int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+                       EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
+                       if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+                               {
+                               /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
+                               err = 1;
+                               }
+                       else
+                               {
+                               if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
+                                       !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
+                                       (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
+                                       err = 1;
+                               q+=hashsize;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+               
+       if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+                       str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
+                       s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+                       out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
+               err = 1;
        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
-       return sizeof buf2;
+       if (err)
+               return 0;
+       else
+               return sizeof buf2;
        }
 
 int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
        {
        SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-       unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
-       const EVP_MD *hash;
-       unsigned int md_size;
+       unsigned char *seq;
+       EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+       size_t md_size;
        int i;
-       HMAC_CTX hmac;
-       unsigned char buf[5]; 
+       EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
+       unsigned char header[13];
+       int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+       int t;
 
        if (send)
                {
                rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-               mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
                seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
                hash=ssl->write_hash;
                }
        else
                {
                rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
-               mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
                seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
                hash=ssl->read_hash;
                }
 
-       md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash);
-
-       buf[0]=rec->type;
-       buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
-       buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-       buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
-       buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
+       t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+       OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+       md_size=t;
 
        /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
-       HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
-       HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash,NULL);
-       HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8);
-       HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5);
-       HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length);
-       HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size);
-       HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+       if (stream_mac) 
+               {
+                       mac_ctx = hash;
+               }
+               else
+               {
+                       EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash);
+                       mac_ctx = &hmac;
+               }
 
+       if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
+               {
+               unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+               s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
+               memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
+
+               memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
+               }
+       else
+               memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+       header[8]=rec->type;
+       header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+       header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+       header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+       header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+       if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
+           EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+           ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+               {
+               /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+                * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+                * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+                * timing-oracle. */
+               ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+                       mac_ctx,
+                       md, &md_size,
+                       header, rec->input,
+                       rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+                       ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+                       ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+                       0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+               EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+               t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+               OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+               if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
+                       tls_fips_digest_extra(
+                                       ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+                                       mac_ctx, rec->input,
+                                       rec->length, rec->orig_len);
+#endif
+               }
+               
+       if (!stream_mac)
+               EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("sec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
@@ -754,8 +1076,8 @@ printf("rec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
 #endif
 
-    if ( SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_VERSION)
-           {
+       if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
+               {
                for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
                        {
                        ++seq[i];
@@ -772,29 +1094,159 @@ printf("rec=");
 int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
             int len)
        {
-       unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE];
        unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+       const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
+       int col = 0, sol = 0;
+
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
        printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-       /* Setup the stuff to munge */
-       memcpy(buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-               TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE);
-       memcpy(&(buf[TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
-               s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-       memcpy(&(buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
-               s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-       tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,
-               buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE+SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2,p,len,
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+       if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+           s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
+           s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
+               {
+               co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
+               col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+               so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
+               sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
+               }
+#endif
+
+       tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+               TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+               s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+               co, col,
+               s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+               so, sol,
+               p,len,
                s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+       fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+       BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+       fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+       BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+       fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+       BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+       fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+       BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+       if (s->msg_callback)
+               {
+               s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
+                                               p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+               s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
+                                       s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+               s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
+                                       s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                                       s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+               s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
+                                       s->session->master_key,
+                                       SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE,
+                                       s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+               }
+#endif
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
        printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
        return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
        }
 
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+        const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
+        size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+       {
+       unsigned char *buff;
+       unsigned char *val = NULL;
+       size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+       int rv;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+       printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+       buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+       if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
+
+       /* construct PRF arguments
+        * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
+        * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
+        * does not create a prohibited label.
+        */
+       vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+       if (use_context)
+               {
+               vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+               }
+
+       val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+       if (val == NULL) goto err2;
+       currentvalpos = 0;
+       memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
+       currentvalpos += llen;
+       memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+       currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+       memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+       currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+       if (use_context)
+               {
+               val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+               currentvalpos++;
+               val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+               currentvalpos++;
+               if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
+                       {
+                       memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+                       }
+               }
+
+       /* disallow prohibited labels
+        * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
+        * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
+        * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+        */
+       if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+                TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+       if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+                TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+       if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+       if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+                TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+
+       rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+                     val, vallen,
+                     NULL, 0,
+                     NULL, 0,
+                     NULL, 0,
+                     NULL, 0,
+                     s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+                     out,buff,olen);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+       printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+       goto ret;
+err1:
+       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+       rv = 0;
+       goto ret;
+err2:
+       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+       rv = 0;
+ret:
+       if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
+       if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
+       return(rv);
+       }
+
 int tls1_alert_code(int code)
        {
        switch (code)
@@ -828,9 +1280,11 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
        case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:  return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
        case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
        case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+       case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
        case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 
                                          (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
        default:                        return(-1);
                }
        }
-