unsigned char *out, int olen)
{
int chunk;
- unsigned int j;
- HMAC_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
+ size_t j;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int A1_len;
+ size_t A1_len;
int ret = 0;
chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+ if (!mac_key)
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
- if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
- if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
goto err;
- if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
goto err;
- if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
goto err;
- if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+ /* Reinit mac contexts */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
goto err;
- if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
goto err;
- if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
goto err;
- if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
goto err;
- if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
goto err;
- if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
goto err;
if (olen > chunk)
{
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
goto err;
out+=j;
olen-=j;
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */
+ /* calc the next A1 value */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
}
else /* last one */
{
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
memcpy(out,A1,olen);
break;
}
ret = 1;
err:
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
return ret;
}
if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
}
len=slen/count;
+ if (count == 1)
+ slen = 0;
S1=sec;
memset(out1,0,olen);
for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
unsigned char *tmp, int num)
{
int ret;
- ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
- else
+ else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
}
memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
- mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
- EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ {
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+ mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
+ EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
* same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
*/
- if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
exp_label,exp_label_len,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
if (k > 0)
{
- if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+ /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ *mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
unsigned long l;
- int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+ int bs,i,ii,j,k,pad=0;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
if (send)
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
{
- n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
}
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
if (ivlen > 1)
{
if ( rec->data != rec->input)
- /* we can't write into the input stream:
- * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
- */
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ /* we can't write into the input stream:
+ * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__);
else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
return -1;
}
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
{
- n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
}
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
l=rec->length;
bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
- if ((bs != 1) && send)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+ {
+ unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
+
+ seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
+ memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
+ memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(buf,seq,8);
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0) break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf[8]=rec->type;
+ buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+ buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
+ buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
+ buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
+ pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
+ if (send)
+ {
+ l+=pad;
+ rec->length+=pad;
+ }
+ }
+ else if ((bs != 1) && send)
{
i=bs-((int)l%bs);
{
if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
{
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ return -1;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
return 0;
}
}
- EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ if (!EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l))
+ return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
rec->length -= bs;
}
}
+ if (pad && !send)
+ rec->length -= pad;
}
return(1);
}
for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
{
- if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)
+ if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
{
int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
}
}
- if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
int col = 0, sol = 0;
+
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
}
#endif
- tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
co, col,
so, sol,
p,len,
s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ case SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME:return(TLS1_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME);
+#endif
#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
(DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
if (!tmp)
return 0;
- rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
label, label_len,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,