/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
-static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
/*
* ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
break;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
- if (s->hello_retry_request) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
return 1;
*/
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
break;
+
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
+ && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
return 1;
err:
/* No valid transition found */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ BIO *rbio;
+
+ /*
+ * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
+ * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
+ */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
+ return 0;
+ }
SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
-static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
if (
/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
+ /*
+ * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
+ * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
+ */
+ && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
+ || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
/*
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
- * during re-negotiation:
+ * a second time:
*/
- && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
+ && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
/* Try to read from the client instead */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (s->hello_retry_request)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+ && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+ else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+ }
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
/*
* Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
- * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
+ * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
* immediately.
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
- * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
- * session ticket?
*/
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
+ } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
+ /*
+ * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
+ * handshake at this point.
+ */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
+ * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
+ * been configured for.
+ */
+ if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
+ /* We've written enough tickets out. */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ }
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
+ && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- else
+ } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+ }
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
* Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
* straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
* the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
- *
+ *
* Calls SSLfatal as required.
*/
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
} if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ break;
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
- if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
+ && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* No post work to be done */
break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- break;
-
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
+ && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
}
#endif
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
+ || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+ && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
break;
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ if (!statem_flush(s))
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+ }
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
* whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
}
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
*mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
- break;
-
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
*confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
*mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
}
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
- CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
+ CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
- clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
- if (clienthello == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
/* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
+ || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
+ && (s->options
+ & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
}
+ clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
+ if (clienthello == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
*/
if (clienthello->isv2) {
unsigned int mt;
- if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
+ || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
- if (s->hello_retry_request
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
/*
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
if (!s->hit) {
- /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
+ /*
+ * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
+ * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
+ * selected ALPN.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
selected_len);
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
size_t sl, len;
int version;
unsigned char *session_id;
+ int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
- version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
+ version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
/*
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
* tls_process_client_hello()
*/
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
+ s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+ ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
&& !s->hit))
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (usetls13) {
sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
} else {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
compm = 0;
#else
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
compm = 0;
else
compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
- if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
|| !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
|| !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
+ s->hello_retry_request
+ == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+ : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
- if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
- && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
+ * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
+ */
+ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+ && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
return 0;
}
}
dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
pkdh = NULL;
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
- * points to the space at the end.
- */
-
/* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
+ s->pha_context_len = 32;
+ if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
+ || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
+ if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
}
done:
+ s->certreqs_sent++;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
return 1;
}
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
- if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret,
+ if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
const unsigned char *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
- int Ttag, Tclass;
- long Tlen;
- size_t sess_key_len;
- const unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
int ret = 0;
+ PACKET encdata;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
- sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
+ || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
+ || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
- &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
- || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
+ if (asn1len == 0x81) {
+ /*
+ * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
+ * isn't supported.
+ * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
+ /*
+ * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
+ * support it
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ } /* else short form length */
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- start = data;
- inlen = Tlen;
+ inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
+ start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
+
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
inlen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
int i;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long l, llen;
+ unsigned long l;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
PACKET spkt, context;
size_t chainidx;
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
goto err;
}
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
- if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
- || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
+ || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
+ || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
+ !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
+ SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
}
+ /*
+ * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
+ * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
+ * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
+ * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
+ * session may have already gone into the session cache.
+ */
+
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ int m = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (m & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) {
+ /*
+ * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
} age_add_u;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when
+ * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info
+ * callback.
+ */
+ if (s->sent_tickets != 0) {
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+ }
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket then we need to take a copy
+ * of it and create a new session from it.
+ */
+ if (s->sent_tickets != 0) {
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
+
+ if (new_sess == NULL) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
}
+ if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
+ tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/*
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
- if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
- tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)
- || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
+ tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
+ || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- NULL, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->sent_tickets++;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return 1;
}
-static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
-{
- size_t len = 0;
-
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
- * (should be s->version)
- */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
- || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
- &len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- NULL, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = NULL;
- s->hit = 0;
-
- /*
- * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
- * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
- */
- if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff