st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
+ if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
/* Try to read from the client instead */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
* Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
* been configured for.
*/
- if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
/* We've written enough tickets out. */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
+ && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
/*
* Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
* straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
goto err;
}
- /*
- * TODO(3.0) Remove this when EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint()
- * knows how to get a key from an encoded point with the help of
- * a OSSL_SERIALIZER deserializer. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0()
- * downgrades an EVP_PKEY to contain a legacy key.
- *
- * THIS IS TEMPORARY
- */
- EVP_PKEY_get0(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(s->s3.tmp.pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
/* Encode the public key. */
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
&encodedPoint);
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * TODO(3.0) Remove this when EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint()
- * knows how to get a key from an encoded point with the help of
- * a OSSL_SERIALIZER deserializer. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0()
- * downgrades an EVP_PKEY to contain a legacy key.
- *
- * THIS IS TEMPORARY
- */
- EVP_PKEY_get0(ckey);
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(ckey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
goto err;
}
#endif
}
+static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
+ const unsigned char *start = NULL;
+ size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
+
+ if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get our certificate private key */
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
+ s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
+ s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
+ SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+ start = PACKET_data(pkt);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Generate master secret */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ /* Should never happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
+ if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
/*
* Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
* gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
- * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
+ * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
+ * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
*/
s->sent_tickets++;
s->next_ticket_nonce++;
+ if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
+ s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff