int *al);
/*
- * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
- * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
- * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
- * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
+ * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
+ * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ * 1: Success (transition allowed)
+ * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
+ */
+static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
+ * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
+ * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
+ */
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* No valid transition found */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
+ * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
+ * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ if (s->method->version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt);
+
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
break;
}
/*
- * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
- * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
+ * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
+ * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
+ * client.
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ * WRITE_TRAN_ERROR - an error occurred
+ * WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE - Successful transition, more writing to be done
+ * WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED - Successful transition, no more writing to be done
+ */
+static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ /*
+ * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
+ * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
+ */
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+ if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
+ * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ * WRITE_TRAN_ERROR - an error occurred
+ * WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE - Successful transition, more writing to be done
+ * WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED - Successful transition, no more writing to be done
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ /*
+ * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
+ * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
+ */
+
+ if (s->method->version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
+
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
#endif
int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
- unsigned char cookie_len)
+ size_t cookie_len)
{
/* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
+ unsigned int cookie_leni;
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
- &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
- s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
+ &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
+ cookie_leni > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
+ s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len)) {
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- unsigned int j, complen = 0;
+ unsigned int j;
+ size_t loop;
unsigned long id;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
int protverr;
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
- PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
- int is_v2_record;
+ PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
+ CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
- is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
-
+ /*
+ * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
+ */
+ memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
+ clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
- /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
- if (is_v2_record) {
- unsigned int version;
+
+ if (clienthello.isv2) {
unsigned int mt;
+
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
- /* No protocol version supplied! */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
- if (version == 0x0002) {
- /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
- /* SSLv3/TLS */
- s->client_version = version;
- } else {
- /* No idea what protocol this is */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
- * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
}
- /*
- * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
- * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
- */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
- } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
- DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
- protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
- } else {
- protverr = 0;
- }
-
- if (protverr) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
- if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
- /*
- * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
- * number
- */
- s->version = s->client_version;
- }
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto err;
}
/* Parse the message and load client random. */
- if (is_v2_record) {
+ if (clienthello.isv2) {
/*
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
- * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
+ * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
*/
- unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
+ unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
PACKET challenge;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
goto f_err;
}
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
+ ciphersuite_len)
+ || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
/* No extensions. */
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
+ clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
- /* Load the client random and compression list. */
- challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
- challenge_len;
- memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
+ * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
+ * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
+ */
+ challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
+ memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
- s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+ clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
challenge_len, challenge_len)
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
goto f_err;
}
- PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
+ PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
} else {
/* Regular ClientHello. */
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
+ || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
+ SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
+ &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
+ if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
+ DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
+ &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
* just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
* So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
+ if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
return 1;
}
}
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* Could be empty. */
- extensions = *pkt;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
+ PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
+ MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
+ &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
+ extensions = clienthello.extensions;
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(&extensions, &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
+ &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
+ /* SSLerr already been called */
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
+
+ /* Set up the client_random */
+ memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+ /* Choose the version */
+
+ if (clienthello.isv2) {
+ if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
+ || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
+ != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
+ /*
+ * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
+ * support it.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* SSLv3/TLS */
+ s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
+ * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
+ } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+ DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
+ protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
+ } else {
+ protverr = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (protverr) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+ if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
+ /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+ s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
- PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
- 0) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
+ clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
- } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+ } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
+ || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
}
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
+ protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
if (protverr != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
s->version = s->client_version;
s->hit = 0;
+ /* We need to do this before getting the session */
+ if (!tls_check_client_ems_support(s, &clienthello)) {
+ /* Only fails if the extension is malformed */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/*
* We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
* TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
* ignored.
*/
- if (is_v2_record ||
+ if (clienthello.isv2 ||
(s->new_session &&
(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
/*
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
* version.
}
}
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
- is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
+ clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
goto f_err;
}
}
}
- complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
- for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
- if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
+ for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
+ if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
break;
}
- if (j >= complen) {
+ if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
}
/* TLS extensions */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
+ if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
+ /* No suitable share */
+ /* TODO(1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ goto f_err;
}
/*
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
- if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
+ for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
+ if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
break;
}
- if (k >= complen) {
+ if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
- for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
- if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
+ for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
+ if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto f_err;
}
}
{
int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t sl, len;
+ int version;
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
+ version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
/*
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
* tls_process_client_hello()
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encodedlen = 0;
+ size_t encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
}
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
- nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
+ nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
if (curve_id == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- int i, nl;
+ int i;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const unsigned char *psigs;
- nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
+ size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
* the timing-sensitive code below.
*/
- decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
- PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
- rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
+ decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
+ PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+ rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (decrypt_len < 0)
goto err;
goto err;
}
- if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
+ if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
- if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
+ if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
unsigned long alg_a;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
- long sess_key_len;
+ size_t sess_key_len;
const unsigned char *data;
int ret = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
- &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|| Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
+
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- s->session->master_key_length,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+
+ /*
+ * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
+ * message
+ */
+ if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff