#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
int sslv2format, int *al);
+/*
+ * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
+ * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
+ * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
+ * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ * 1: Success (transition allowed)
+ * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
+ */
+int server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch(st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+ case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+ /*
+ * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
+ * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
+ * OR
+ * 2) If we did request one then
+ * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
+ * AND
+ * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
+ * list if we requested a certificate)
+ */
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
+ && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
+ || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+ && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+ /*
+ * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
+ * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
+ * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
+ * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
+ * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
+ * set.
+ */
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ /*
+ * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
+ * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
+ * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
+ * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
+ */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+#endif
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ }
+#endif
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* No valid transition found */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ * 1: Yes
+ * 0: No
+ */
+static inline int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /*
+ * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH, fortezza or RSA but we have a
+ * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
+ * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
+ * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
+ * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
+ * key exchange.
+ */
+ if ( (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
+ [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
+ 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ /*
+ * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
+ * provided
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
+ || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
+ && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
+ /* For other PSK always send SKE */
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+#endif
+ ) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ * 1: Yes
+ * 0: No
+ */
+static inline int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (
+ /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
+ /*
+ * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
+ * during re-negotiation:
+ */
+ && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
+ /*
+ * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
+ * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
+ * RFC 2246):
+ */
+ && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ /*
+ * ... except when the application insists on
+ * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
+ * this for SSL 3)
+ */
+ || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+ /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
+ /*
+ * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
+ * are omitted
+ */
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
+ * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
+ */
+enum WRITE_TRAN server_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch(st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+ /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
+ && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
+ st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+ } else {
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+ /* normal PSK or SRP */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+ (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+ } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
+ } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
+ }
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+ if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
+ if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
+ * the server to the client.
+ */
+enum WORK_STATE server_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch(st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
+ /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
+ st->use_timer = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /*
+ * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
+ * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
+ */
+ st->use_timer = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+ return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
+#endif
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
+ * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
+ */
+ st->use_timer = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
+ * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
+ * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
+ * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
+ */
+ st->use_timer = 0;
+ }
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+
+ default:
+ /* No pre work to be done */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
+ * server to the client.
+ */
+enum WORK_STATE server_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ switch(st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ /*
+ * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
+ * treat like it was the first packet
+ */
+ s->first_packet = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+ char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
+ * SCTP used.
+ */
+ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+ DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+ }
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* No post work to be done */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ * 1: Success
+ * 0: Error
+ */
+int server_construct_message(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch(st->hand_state) {
+ case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+ return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+ return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+ return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
+ return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+ return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+ return tls_construct_server_done(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+ return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
+ else
+ return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ return tls_construct_finished(s,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
+#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
+
+/*
+ * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
+ * reading. Excludes the message header.
+ */
+unsigned long server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch(st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+ return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
+#endif
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+ return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+ return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
+ */
+enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch(st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+ return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+ return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+ return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+ return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
+#endif
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+ return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+ return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
+ * from the client
+ */
+enum WORK_STATE server_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch(st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+ return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
+ BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
+ /* Are we renegotiating? */
+ && s->renegotiate
+ && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ } else {
+ ossl_ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
+ }
+#endif
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit)
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+ else
+ return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
{
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
*(p++) = sl;
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
if ((p =
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
l = (p - d);
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
{
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
}
}
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
return 1;
err:
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
goto f_err;
}
if (dh_clnt) {
- s->no_cert_verify = 1;
+ s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
} else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- s->no_cert_verify = 1;
+ s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
} else {
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
- s->no_cert_verify = 1;
+ s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;;
}
/* Are we renegotiating? */
&& s->renegotiate
/* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
- && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->no_cert_verify)
+ && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
return WORK_MORE_B;
} else {
- statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
+ ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
}
#endif
- if (s->no_cert_verify) {
+ if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) {
/* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
} else {
* step
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) {
dgst_size =
EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0) {
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
offset += dgst_size;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
}
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
if (cpk == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (!senc) {
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
* + (ocsp response)
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
- statem_set_error(s);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff