Restore historical SSL_get_servername() behavior
[openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
index 01b07a934627d02b50634f982ba7999429232750..346b1e3989164c27f047a035b459708857534761 100644 (file)
@@ -764,6 +764,22 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
     return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
 }
 
+static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
+{
+    switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
+#if defined(EPIPE)
+    case EPIPE:
+        return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(ECONNRESET)
+    case ECONNRESET:
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
  * server to the client.
@@ -848,12 +864,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
                 return WORK_MORE_A;
             break;
         }
-        /*
-         * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
-         * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
-         * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
-         * something clever in the record layer for this.
-         */
+
         if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
             if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
                 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
@@ -868,6 +879,12 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
                 /* SSLfatal() already called */
                 return WORK_ERROR;
             }
+            /*
+             * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
+             * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
+             * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
+             */
+            s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
             break;
         }
 
@@ -938,8 +955,23 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
         break;
 
     case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
-        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+        clear_sys_error();
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
+            if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+                    && conn_is_closed()) {
+                /*
+                 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
+                 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
+                 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
+                 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
+                 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
+                 */
+                s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+                break;
+            }
+
             return WORK_MORE_A;
+        }
         break;
     }
 
@@ -2370,15 +2402,19 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
 
     if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
             || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
-            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
-            || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
-                                         s->hello_retry_request
-                                            == SSL_HRR_PENDING
-                                            ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
-                                            : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
-                                                ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
-                                                : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
-                                         NULL, 0)) {
+            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+                                  s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+                                      ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+                                      : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+                                          ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+                                          : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
+                                  NULL, 0)) {
         /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return 0;
     }
@@ -3519,6 +3555,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
     size_t chainidx;
     SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
 
+    /*
+     * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
+     * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
+     * TLSv1.3
+     */
+    s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
+
     if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
                  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);