/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+
+/*
+ * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
+ */
+typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
+ int x509err;
+ int alert;
+} X509ERR2ALERT;
+
+/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
+const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
+ 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
+ 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
+ 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
+};
/*
* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
/*
* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
* ignore the result anyway
+ * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
*/
- if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
- (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- written))
- return -1;
-
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
+ && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
+ && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
+ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
+ (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ written))
+ return -1;
if (written == s->init_num) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
* enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
* ClientHello.
*/
- if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
+ if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i,
- s->session_ctx->lock);
- } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- /* Renegotiation is disabled */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- return 0;
- } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- !(s->options &
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- /*
- * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
- * support secure renegotiation.
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
} else {
/* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i,
- s->ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
}
} else {
- int discard;
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard,
- s->session_ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
else
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate,
- 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
/* mark client_random uninitialized */
- memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+ memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
s->hit = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
s->statem.use_timer = 1;
*hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
} else {
size_t retlen;
+ long retlen_l;
- retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
- if (retlen <= 0) {
+ retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
+ if (retlen_l <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
void *hdata;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
- if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
+ if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
+ pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
}
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
- || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- (int)s->session->master_key_length,
- s->session->master_key)
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated
+ * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params()
+ */
+ || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
} else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
+ md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
+
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/*
* If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
goto err;
}
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
+ OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
+ md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
+
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
}
}
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated
+ * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params()
+ */
if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
- || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- (int)s->session->master_key_length,
- s->session->master_key)) {
+ || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
+ * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
+ * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
+ * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
+ * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
+ * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
+ */
+ if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ else
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
size_t slen;
/* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
- if (!s->server)
+ if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
/*
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& !s->server
- && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
+ && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
&& (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
/* SSLfatal() already called */
finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender, slen,
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
if (finish_md_len == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
+ s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
- if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
return 0;
}
if (!s->server) {
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
+ memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
finish_md_len);
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
+ s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
} else {
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
+ memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
finish_md_len);
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
+ s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
}
return 1;
{
unsigned int updatetype;
- s->key_update_count++;
- if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
- SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
-
/*
* A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
* be on a record boundary.
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
* to far.
*/
-static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
{
const char *sender;
size_t slen;
- /*
- * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
- * the appropriate error.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
- return;
+
if (!s->server) {
sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender,
- slen,
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
-#endif
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
}
/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
+ s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
/* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
- if (s->server)
- s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+ if (s->server) {
+ /*
+ * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
+ * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
+ * than TLSv1.3
+ */
+ s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
/*
* In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
}
/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
- if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+ s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
- md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+ md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
md_len) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (s->server) {
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+ memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
md_len);
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
+ s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
} else {
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+ memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
md_len);
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
+ s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
}
/*
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (s->server) {
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
+ !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
* in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
* freed up as well.
*/
-WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
+WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
{
- int discard;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- WORK_STATE ret;
- ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
- if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
- return ret;
- }
-#endif
+ int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
if (clearbufs) {
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
s->init_num = 0;
}
- if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
+ && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
+ * post handshake exchange
+ */
+ if (cleanuphand) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->server) {
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard,
- s->ctx->lock);
- s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
- } else {
/*
- * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
+ * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
* NewSessionTicket
*/
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
+ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
+ s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
+ } else {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
+ * so we remove this one from the cache.
+ */
+ if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
+ & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
+ * NewSessionTicket
+ */
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ }
if (s->hit)
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard,
- s->session_ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1,
- &discard, s->session_ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
}
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
}
}
- /*
- * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
- * so continue.
- */
- if (!clearbufs)
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+ /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ if (cleanuphand
+ || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (!stop) {
+ /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
}
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
+ && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
+ * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
+ * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
+ * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
+ * with a valid cookie.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
+ s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
return 1;
} else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
/* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
*mt = *p;
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
+ s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
/*
*/
l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
+ s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
+ s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num = 0;
unsigned char *p;
int i;
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/* We've already read everything in */
*len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
return 1;
}
p = s->init_msg;
- n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+ n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
while (n > 0) {
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
&p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
n -= readbytes;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
* Finished verification.
*/
- if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
- ssl3_take_mac(s);
-#endif
+ if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ *len = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
/*
* We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
* processing the message
+ * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
+ * message.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
- && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
- s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- *len = 0;
- return 0;
+#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
+ /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
+ && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
+ || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ || memcmp(hrrrandom,
+ s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
+ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+ s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ *len = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
return 1;
}
-int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
+static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
+ {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+
+ /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
+ {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
+};
+
+int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
{
- int al;
+ const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
- switch (type) {
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
- case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
- case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
- case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
- case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
- case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
- case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
- case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
- case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
- case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
- case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
- case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
- case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
- al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- default:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
- break;
- }
- return al;
+ for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
+ if (tp->x509err == x509err)
+ break;
+ return tp->alert;
}
int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
} version_info;
-#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
#endif
{0, NULL, NULL},
};
-#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
#endif
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
+ * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
+{
+ int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int curve;
+ EC_KEY *eckey;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
+ switch (i) {
+ case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
+ continue;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
+ * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
+ * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
+ */
+ eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
+ if (eckey == NULL)
+ continue;
+ curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+ if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
+ return 1;
+#else
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
* `SSL *` instance
*
* Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
*/
-int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
+int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
{
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
for (vent = table;
vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
++vent) {
- if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
- version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
- ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
+ if (vent->cmeth != NULL
+ && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
+ && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
+ && (!s->server
+ || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
+ || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
+ if (meth != NULL)
+ *meth = vent->cmeth();
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
- if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
+ if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL)
return 0;
break;
case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
- if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) ||
DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
return 0;
break;
static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
{
if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
- && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
- } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
- && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
- || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ /*
+ * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
+ * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
+ * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
+ * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
+ * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
+ */
+ && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
} else {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
* With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
*
* s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
- * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
+ * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
*
* So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
* handle version.
suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
+ /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
+ if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
+ return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+
if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
unsigned int best_vers = 0;
return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
}
+ /*
+ * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
+ * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
+ * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
+ * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
+ * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
+ * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
+ * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
+ */
+ if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
+ return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
+
while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
- if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
- candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
- * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
- * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
- */
if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
continue;
- for (vent = table;
- vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
- ++vent)
- continue;
- if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
- const SSL_METHOD *method;
-
- method = vent->smeth();
- if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
- best_vers = candidate_vers;
- best_method = method;
- }
- }
+ if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
+ best_vers = candidate_vers;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
/* Trailing data? */
}
if (best_vers > 0) {
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
/*
- * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
- * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
+ * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
+ * negotiated TLSv1.3
*/
if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
*
* @s: client SSL handle.
* @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
- * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
+ * @extensions: The extensions received
*
* Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
*/
-int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd)
+int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
{
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
- int highver = 0;
+ int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
- if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
- version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ origv = s->version;
+ s->version = version;
+
+ /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
+ NULL, 0)) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
+ && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
switch (s->method->version) {
default:
- if (version != s->version) {
+ if (s->version != s->method->version) {
+ s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
break;
}
- for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
- const SSL_METHOD *method;
- int err;
-
- if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
- continue;
-
- if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
- continue;
+ ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
+ : s->version < ver_min) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
+ : s->version > ver_max) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ return 0;
+ }
- method = vent->cmeth();
- err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
- if (err != 0) {
- if (version == vent->version) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err);
- return 0;
- }
+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
+ real_max = ver_max;
- continue;
+ /* Check for downgrades */
+ if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
+ if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
+ s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
+ sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ return 0;
}
- if (highver == 0)
- highver = vent->version;
+ } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && real_max > s->version) {
+ if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
+ s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
+ sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
- if (version != vent->version)
+ for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
+ if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
continue;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
- /* Check for downgrades */
- if (checkdgrd) {
- if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
- if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
- s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
- sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
- SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
- && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
- && highver > version) {
- if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
- s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
- sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
- SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- s->method = method;
- s->version = version;
+ s->method = vent->cmeth();
return 1;
}
+ s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
return 0;
* @s: The SSL connection
* @min_version: The minimum supported version
* @max_version: The maximum supported version
+ * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
+ * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
+ * protocol.
*
* Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
* version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
* Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
* min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
*/
-int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
+int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version,
+ int *real_max)
{
- int version;
+ int version, tmp_real_max;
int hole;
const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
const SSL_METHOD *method;
* ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
*/
*min_version = *max_version = s->version;
+ /*
+ * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
+ * flexible method.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
+ return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = tls_version_table;
*/
*min_version = version = 0;
hole = 1;
+ if (real_max != NULL)
+ *real_max = 0;
+ tmp_real_max = 0;
for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
/*
* A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
*/
if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
hole = 1;
+ tmp_real_max = 0;
continue;
}
method = vent->cmeth();
+
+ if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
+ tmp_real_max = vent->version;
+
if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
hole = 1;
} else if (!hole) {
single = NULL;
*min_version = method->version;
} else {
+ if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
+ *real_max = tmp_real_max;
version = (single = method)->version;
*min_version = version;
hole = 0;
{
int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
- ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
+ /*
+ * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
+ * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
#endif
/* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
-int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s)
+int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
+ size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
+ size_t hrrlen)
{
- unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t hashlen = 0;
+ unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
- /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
- || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
+ if (hashval == NULL) {
+ hashval = hashvaltmp;
+ hashlen = 0;
+ /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
+ || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
+ &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
+ * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
+ * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
+ */
+ if (hrr != NULL
+ && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
+ || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+ s->s3.tmp.message_size
+ + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
xn = NULL;
}
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
return 1;
return 0;
}
-int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
{
- const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
+
+ if (s->server) {
+ ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
+ ca_sk = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ca_sk == NULL)
+ ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+
+ return ca_sk;
+}
+
+int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
/* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
*ptbs = tbs;
return tbslen;
}
+
+/*
+ * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
+ * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
+ */
+int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+
+ s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
+ s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
+ * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
+ */
+int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
+ s->pha_dgst)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff