/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
*hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
} else {
size_t retlen;
+ long retlen_l;
- retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
- if (retlen <= 0) {
+ retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
+ if (retlen_l <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
+ md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
+ md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
}
}
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
+ * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
+ * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
+ * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
+ * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
+ * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
+ */
+ if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ else
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
{
unsigned int updatetype;
- s->key_update_count++;
- if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
- SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
-
/*
* A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
* be on a record boundary.
WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
if (clearbufs) {
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
* Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
* post handshake exchange
*/
- if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
+ if (cleanuphand) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
/* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
- /*
- * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going
- * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
- * required.
- */
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- }
} else {
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
- /*
- * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going
- * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
- * required.
- */
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- }
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ if (cleanuphand
+ || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ }
if (!stop) {
/* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
{
int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int curve;
+ EC_KEY *eckey;
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
default:
break;
}
- if (ssl_has_cert(s, i))
+ if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
+ continue;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
return 1;
+ /*
+ * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
+ * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
+ * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
+ */
+ eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
+ if (eckey == NULL)
+ continue;
+ curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+ if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
+ return 1;
+#else
+ return 1;
+#endif
}
return 0;
return 0;
}
-int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
{
- const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
+
+ if (s->server) {
+ ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
+ ca_sk = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ca_sk == NULL)
+ ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+
+ return ca_sk;
+}
+
+int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
/* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
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