}
#endif
+/*
+ * Comparison function used in a call to qsort (see tls_collect_extensions()
+ * below.)
+ * The two arguments |p1| and |p2| are expected to be pointers to RAW_EXTENSIONs
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 if the type for p1 is greater than p2
+ * 0 if the type for p1 and p2 are the same
+ * -1 if the type for p1 is less than p2
+ */
static int compare_extensions(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
const RAW_EXTENSION *e1 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p1;
const RAW_EXTENSION *e2 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p2;
+
if (e1->type < e2->type)
return -1;
else if (e1->type > e2->type)
return 1;
- else
- return 0;
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
* types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
* parsed, or an internal error occurred.
*/
-int tls_parse_raw_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res,
+/*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then
+ * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions()
+ */
+int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res,
size_t *numfound, int *ad)
{
PACKET extensions = *packet;
while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
unsigned int type;
PACKET extension;
+
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
*ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto done;
+ goto err;
}
num_extensions++;
}
if (num_extensions > 0) {
- raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RAW_EXTENSION) * num_extensions);
+ raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions)
+ * num_extensions);
if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
}
- /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
+ /* Second pass: collect the extensions. */
for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet, &raw_extensions[i].type) ||
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet,
&raw_extensions[i].data)) {
/* This should not happen. */
*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto done;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(packet) != 0) {
*ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto done;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
/* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
- qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(RAW_EXTENSION),
+ qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(*raw_extensions),
compare_extensions);
for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
if (raw_extensions[i - 1].type == raw_extensions[i].type) {
*ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto done;
+ goto err;
}
}
}
*numfound = num_extensions;
return 1;
- done:
+ err:
OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions);
return 0;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int al;
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t md_len;
/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
goto f_err;
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
}
+ /*
+ * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
+ * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (s->server) {
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
+ &s->session->master_key_length)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
* handle version.
*/
int server_version = s->method->version;
- int client_version = hello->version;
+ int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
int disabled = 0;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
s->client_version = client_version;
switch (server_version) {
default:
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
+ * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
+ * renegotiation for TLS1.3
+ */
if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
/*
break;
}
+ suppversions = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
+ hello->num_extensions,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
+
+ if (suppversions != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
+ unsigned int best_vers = 0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
+ PACKET versionslist;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
+ /* Trailing or invalid data? */
+ return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
+ if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+ candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
+ * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
+ * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
+ */
+ if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
+ continue;
+ for (vent = table;
+ vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
+ ++vent)
+ continue;
+ if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
+
+ method = vent->smeth();
+ if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
+ best_vers = candidate_vers;
+ best_method = method;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
+ /* Trailing data? */
+ return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ if (best_vers > 0) {
+ s->version = best_vers;
+ s->method = best_method;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
+ * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
+ */
+ if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
+ client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+
+ /*
+ * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
+ * the ClientHello.
+ */
for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
const SSL_METHOD *method;
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
+ if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+ version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+
switch (s->method->version) {
default:
if (version != s->version)
/*
* ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
- * the initial ClientHello.
+ * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
*
* @s: client SSL handle.
*
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
- s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;
+ s->version = ver_max;
+
+ /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+
+ s->client_version = ver_max;
return 0;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff