Revert "Keep the DTLS timer running after the end of the handshake if appropriate"
[openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_lib.c
index 32bcad4..2f78a3f 100644 (file)
@@ -1,28 +1,39 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
  *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
 #include "statem_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 
+/*
+ * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
+ */
+typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
+    int x509err;
+    int alert;
+} X509ERR2ALERT;
+
+/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
+const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
+    0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
+    0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
+    0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
+};
+
 /*
  * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
  * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
@@ -35,27 +46,30 @@ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
     ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
                            s->init_num, &written);
     if (ret < 0)
-        return (-1);
+        return -1;
     if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
         /*
          * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
          * ignore the result anyway
+         * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
          */
-        if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
-                             (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
-                             written))
-            return -1;
-
+        if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
+                                 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
+                                 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
+            if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
+                                 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+                                 written))
+                return -1;
     if (written == s->init_num) {
         if (s->msg_callback)
             s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
                             (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
                             s->msg_callback_arg);
-        return (1);
+        return 1;
     }
     s->init_off += written;
     s->init_num -= written;
-    return (0);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
@@ -74,33 +88,62 @@ int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
 
 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
 {
-    if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
+    if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Reset any extension flags */
+    memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
 
     if (s->server) {
-        if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
-            s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
-        } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
-                   !(s->options &
-                     SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
-            /*
-             * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
-             * support secure renegotiation.
-             */
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
-                   SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+        int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
+         * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
+         * ClientHello.
+         */
+        if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             return 0;
+        }
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+            const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
+                        DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
+                    ok = 1;
+            } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
+                ok = 1;
+            }
+            if (ok)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (!ok) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
+                     SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+            ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
+                                  "SSL/TLS version");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+            /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
+            tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
         } else {
-            s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+            /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
+            tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
 
             s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
         }
     } else {
         if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
-            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+            tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
         else
-            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+            tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
 
         /* mark client_random uninitialized */
         memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
@@ -152,6 +195,7 @@ static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
             hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
         } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
                                        EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
             return 0;
         }
 
@@ -159,10 +203,14 @@ static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
         *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
     } else {
         size_t retlen;
+        long retlen_l;
 
-        retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
-        if (retlen <= 0)
+        retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
+        if (retlen_l <= 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             return 0;
+        }
         *hdatalen = retlen;
     }
 
@@ -182,43 +230,47 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
     const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
 
     if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }
     pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
-    md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
 
-    if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }
 
     mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
     if (mctx == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;
     }
 
     /* Get the data to be signed */
     if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         goto err;
     }
 
     if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }
     siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
     sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
     if (sig == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;
     }
 
-    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
 
@@ -226,20 +278,25 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
         if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
             || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
                                                 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
-        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
-                             (int)s->session->master_key_length,
-                             s->session->master_key)) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                     ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
             goto err;
         }
     }
+    if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+        if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
+            || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+                                (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+                                s->session->master_key)
+            || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
 
-    if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                     ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
 
@@ -255,13 +312,16 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
 #endif
 
     if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }
 
     /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
-    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         goto err;
+    }
 
     OPENSSL_free(sig);
     EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
@@ -269,7 +329,6 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
  err:
     OPENSSL_free(sig);
     EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -280,8 +339,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
     unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
 #endif
-    int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
-    int type = 0, j, pktype;
+    MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    int j;
     unsigned int len;
     X509 *peer;
     const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
@@ -292,104 +351,113 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
 
     if (mctx == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
     }
 
     peer = s->session->peer;
     pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
     if (pkey == NULL) {
-        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
     }
 
-    pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
-    type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
+    if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        unsigned int sigalg;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                     SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+    }
 
-    if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
-               SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
-        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        goto f_err;
+    if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
     }
 
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+        fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
+                md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+
     /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
     /*
-     * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
-     * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
+     * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
+     * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
      */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
-    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
-        && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
-        len = 64;
+    if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
+        && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
+             && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+                 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
+            || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
+                && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
+        len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
     } else
 #endif
-    {
-        if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
-            int rv;
-            unsigned int sigalg;
-
-            if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
-                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                goto f_err;
-            }
-            rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
-            if (rv == -1) {
-                goto f_err;
-            } else if (rv == 0) {
-                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                goto f_err;
-            }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-            fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
-        } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
-                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                goto f_err;
-        }
-
-        md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
-
-        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-            goto f_err;
-        }
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
     }
+
     j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
     if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
         || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
-        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+        goto err;
     }
     if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
     }
 
     if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto f_err;
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
     }
 
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+    fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
+            md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
 #endif
-    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-        goto f_err;
+    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto err;
     }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
     {
+        int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
         if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
             || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
             || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
             if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto f_err;
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
             }
             BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
             data = gost_data;
@@ -401,32 +469,47 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
             || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
                                                 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-            goto f_err;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                     ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto err;
         }
-    } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
-        && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
-                            (int)s->session->master_key_length,
-                            s->session->master_key)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-        goto f_err;
     }
-
-    if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
-        al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-        goto f_err;
+    if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+        if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
+                || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+                                    (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+                                    s->session->master_key)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                     ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                     SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
+        if (j <= 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+                     SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
     }
 
-    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
-        ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
-    else
+    /*
+     * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
+     * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
+     * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
+     * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
+     * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
+     * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
+     */
+    if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
         ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
-    if (0) {
- f_err:
-        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-        ossl_statem_set_error(s);
-    }
+    else
+        ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ err:
     BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
     s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
     EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
@@ -443,7 +526,7 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
     size_t slen;
 
     /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
-    if (!s->server)
+    if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
         s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
 
     /*
@@ -454,9 +537,9 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
             && !s->server
             && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
             && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
-                    SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
-        goto err;
+                    SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
     }
 
     if (s->server) {
@@ -471,15 +554,16 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
                                                           sender, slen,
                                                           s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
     if (finish_md_len == 0) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err;
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
     }
 
     s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
 
     if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
     }
 
     /*
@@ -488,102 +572,111 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
      */
     if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
                                             s->session->master_key,
-                                            s->session->master_key_length))
+                                            s->session->master_key_length)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return 0;
+    }
 
     /*
      * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
      */
+    if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
     if (!s->server) {
-        OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
         memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
                finish_md_len);
         s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
     } else {
-        OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
         memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
                finish_md_len);
         s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
     }
 
     return 1;
- err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
 }
 
 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
 {
     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
     }
 
     s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
     return 1;
-
- err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
 }
 
 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 {
-    int al;
     unsigned int updatetype;
 
     s->key_update_count++;
     if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
-        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
-        goto err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
+                 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
+     * be on a record boundary.
+     */
+    if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
+                 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }
 
     if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
-            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
-            || (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
-                && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) {
-        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
-        goto err;
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
+                 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
+     * didn't recognise.
+     */
+    if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
+            && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
+                 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }
 
     /*
      * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
      * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
-     * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
+     * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We
+     * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already
+     * sent close_notify.
      */
-    if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
+    if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
+            && (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0)
         s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
 
     if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
-        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err;
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }
 
     return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
- err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
-    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
 }
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 /*
  * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
  * to far.
  */
-static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
 {
     const char *sender;
     size_t slen;
-    /*
-     * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
-     * the appropriate error.
-     */
-    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
-        return;
+
     if (!s->server) {
         sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
         slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
@@ -592,16 +685,20 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
         slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
     }
 
-    s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-                                                                          sender,
-                                                                          slen,
-                                                                          s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+    s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
+        s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
+                                              s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
 }
-#endif
 
 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 {
-    int al;
     size_t remain;
 
     remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
@@ -615,32 +712,32 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
              && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
             || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
                 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
-            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
-                   SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
-            goto f_err;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                    SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+            return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
         }
     } else {
         if (remain != 0) {
-            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
-                   SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
-            goto f_err;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                     SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+            return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
         }
     }
 
     /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
     if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
-        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }
 
     s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
     if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
-        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }
 
     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
@@ -660,55 +757,75 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
     }
 
     return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- f_err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
-    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
 }
 
 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 {
-    int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     size_t md_len;
 
 
     /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
-    if (s->server)
-        s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+    if (s->server) {
+        /*
+        * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
+        * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
+        * than TLSv1.3
+        */
+        s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
+        if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+            s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
+     * message must be on a record boundary.
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+                 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
 
     /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
     if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
-        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+                 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }
     s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 
     md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
 
     if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
-        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+                 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }
 
     if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
                       md_len) != 0) {
-        al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
-        goto f_err;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+                 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }
 
     /*
      * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
      */
+    if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
     if (s->server) {
-        OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
         memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
                md_len);
         s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
     } else {
-        OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
         memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
                md_len);
         s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
@@ -720,40 +837,39 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
      */
     if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
         if (s->server) {
-            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+            if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
+                    !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
                     SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
-                goto f_err;
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
             }
         } else {
             if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                     s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
                     &s->session->master_key_length)) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
-                goto f_err;
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
             }
             if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
                     SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
-                goto f_err;
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+            }
+            if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
             }
-            if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
-                goto f_err;
         }
     }
 
     return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
- f_err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-    ossl_statem_set_error(s);
-    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
 }
 
 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
 {
     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -761,42 +877,42 @@ int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
 }
 
 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
-static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
-                                   int *al)
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
 {
     int len;
     unsigned char *outbytes;
 
     len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
     if (len < 0) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
+                 ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
         return 0;
     }
     if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
             || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         return 0;
     }
 
     if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
-            && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
-                                         chain, al))
+            && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
+                                         chain)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return 0;
+    }
 
     return 1;
 }
 
 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
-static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
+static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
 {
     int i, chain_count;
     X509 *x;
     STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
     STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
     X509_STORE *chain_store;
-    int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
     if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
         return 1;
@@ -822,13 +938,15 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
         X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
 
         if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto err;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
+                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
         }
         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
             X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-            goto err;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
+                     ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+            return 0;
         }
         /*
          * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
@@ -849,52 +967,58 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
 #endif
             X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
-            goto err;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+            return 0;
         }
         chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
         for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
             x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
 
-            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
+            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
                 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
-                goto err;
+                return 0;
             }
         }
         X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
     } else {
         i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
         if (i != 1) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
-            goto err;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
         }
-        if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
-            goto err;
         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
             x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
-            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
-                goto err;
+            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return 0;
+            }
         }
     }
     return 1;
-
- err:
-    *al = tmpal;
-    return 0;
 }
 
-unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
-                                     int *al)
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
 {
-    int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
+        return 0;
 
-    if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
-            || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
-            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        *al = tmpal;
+    if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         return 0;
     }
+
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -903,19 +1027,10 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
  * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
  * freed up as well.
  */
-WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
+WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
 {
     void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
-        WORK_STATE ret;
-        ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
-        if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
-            return ret;
-    }
-#endif
-
     if (clearbufs) {
         if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
             /*
@@ -925,40 +1040,65 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
             BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
             s->init_buf = NULL;
         }
-        ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+        if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
         s->init_num = 0;
     }
 
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
+            && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+        s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
+
+    /*
+     * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
+     * post handshake exchange
+     */
     if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
         /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
         s->renegotiate = 0;
         s->new_session = 0;
         s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
+        s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
 
         ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
 
         if (s->server) {
-            ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+            /*
+             * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
+             * NewSessionTicket
+             */
+            if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+                ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
 
-            s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+            /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
+            tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
             s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
         } else {
-            ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+            if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+                /*
+                 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
+                 * so we remove this one from the cache.
+                 */
+                if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
+                     & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
+                    SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
+                 * NewSessionTicket
+                 */
+                ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+            }
             if (s->hit)
-                s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+                tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
 
             s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
-            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+            tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
         }
 
-        if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-            cb = s->info_callback;
-        else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-            cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-        if (cb != NULL)
-            cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-
         if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
             /* done with handshaking */
             s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
@@ -966,24 +1106,32 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
             s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
             dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
         }
-        s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE;
     }
 
-    /*
-     * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
-     * so continue.
-     */
-    if (!clearbufs)
-        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+        cb = s->info_callback;
+    else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+        cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
 
+    /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
     ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+
+    if (!stop) {
+        /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
+        ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+    }
+
     return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
 }
 
 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
 {
     /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
-    int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
+    int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
     unsigned char *p;
     size_t l, readbytes;
 
@@ -1005,10 +1153,21 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
                  * in the middle of a handshake message.
                  */
                 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
-                    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
-                           SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
-                    goto f_err;
+                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                             SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
+                             SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
+                        && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
+                    /*
+                     * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
+                     * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
+                     * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
+                     * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
+                     * with a valid cookie.
+                     */
+                    return 0;
                 }
                 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
                 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
@@ -1016,9 +1175,10 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
                 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
                 return 1;
             } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
-                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
-                goto f_err;
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
+                         SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+                return 0;
             }
             s->init_num += readbytes;
         }
@@ -1066,9 +1226,9 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
         n2l3(p, l);
         /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
         if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
-            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-            goto f_err;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
+                     SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+            return 0;
         }
         s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
 
@@ -1077,9 +1237,6 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
     }
 
     return 1;
- f_err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-    return 0;
 }
 
 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
@@ -1108,21 +1265,21 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
         n -= readbytes;
     }
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
     /*
      * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
      * Finished verification.
      */
-    if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-        ssl3_take_mac(s);
-#endif
+    if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        *len = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
     if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
         if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
                              s->init_num)) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
             *len = 0;
             return 0;
         }
@@ -1130,12 +1287,28 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
             s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
                             (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
     } else {
-        if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
-                             s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            *len = 0;
-            return 0;
+        /*
+         * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
+         * processing the message
+         * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
+         * message.
+         */
+#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET  (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
+        /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
+        if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
+                                 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
+            if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
+                    || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+                    || memcmp(hrrrandom,
+                              s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
+                              SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
+                if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+                                     s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+                    /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                    *len = 0;
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
         }
         if (s->msg_callback)
             s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
@@ -1147,100 +1320,59 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
     return 1;
 }
 
-int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
-{
-    if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
-        return -1;
-
-    switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
-    default:
-        return -1;
-    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
-        return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
-    case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
-        return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
-        return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
-    case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
-        return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
-    case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
-        return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
-    case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
-        return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
-#endif
-    }
-}
+static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
+    {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
+    {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+    {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+    {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+    {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+
+    /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
+    {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
+};
 
-int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
+int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
 {
-    int al;
+    const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
 
-    switch (type) {
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
-        al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
-        break;
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
-    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
-    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
-    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
-    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
-    case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
-    case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
-    case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
-    case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
-    case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
-        al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-        break;
-    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
-        al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-        break;
-    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
-        al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
-        break;
-    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
-        al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
-        break;
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
-    case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
-    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
-    case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
-        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        break;
-    case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
-    case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
-    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
-    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
-    case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
-    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
-        al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
-        break;
-    case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
-        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-        break;
-    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
-        al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
-        break;
-    default:
-        al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
-        break;
-    }
-    return (al);
+    for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
+        if (tp->x509err == x509err)
+            break;
+    return tp->alert;
 }
 
 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
@@ -1267,10 +1399,11 @@ typedef struct {
     const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
 } version_info;
 
-#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
 #endif
 
+/* Must be in order high to low */
 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
     {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
@@ -1300,10 +1433,11 @@ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
     {0, NULL, NULL},
 };
 
-#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
 #endif
 
+/* Must be in order high to low */
 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
     {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
@@ -1349,6 +1483,62 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
     return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
+ * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
+{
+    int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    int curve;
+    EC_KEY *eckey;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
+        return 1;
+#endif
+
+    if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
+        switch (i) {
+        case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+        case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
+        case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
+        case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
+            continue;
+        default:
+            break;
+        }
+        if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
+            continue;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
+            return 1;
+        /*
+         * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
+         * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
+         * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
+         */
+        eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
+        if (eckey == NULL)
+            continue;
+        curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+        if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
+            return 1;
+#else
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
  * `SSL *` instance
@@ -1358,7 +1548,7 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
  *
  * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
  */
-int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
+int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
 {
     const version_info *vent;
     const version_info *table;
@@ -1378,9 +1568,14 @@ int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
     for (vent = table;
          vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
          ++vent) {
-        if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
-            version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
-            ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
+        if (vent->cmeth != NULL
+                && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
+                && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
+                && (!s->server
+                    || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
+                    || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
+            if (meth != NULL)
+                *meth = vent->cmeth();
             return 1;
         }
     }
@@ -1471,12 +1666,12 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
         return 0;
 
     case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
-        if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
+        if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL)
             return 0;
         break;
 
     case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
-        if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
+        if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) ||
             DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
             return 0;
         break;
@@ -1486,6 +1681,27 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
     return 1;
 }
 
+static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
+{
+    if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
+            && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
+        *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
+    } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+            && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
+               /*
+                * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
+                * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
+                * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
+                * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
+                * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
+                */
+            && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
+        *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
+    } else {
+        *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version.  Called when the
  * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
@@ -1495,13 +1711,13 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
  */
-int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
+int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
 {
     /*-
      * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
      *
      *   s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
-     *   s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
+     *   s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
      *
      * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
      * handle version.
@@ -1520,6 +1736,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
         if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
             if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
                 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+            *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
             /*
              * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
              * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints.  Hope
@@ -1533,6 +1750,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
          * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
          * a HelloRetryRequest
          */
+        /* fall thru */
     case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
         table = tls_version_table;
         break;
@@ -1543,6 +1761,10 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
 
     suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
 
+    /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
+    if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
+        return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+
     if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
         unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
         unsigned int best_vers = 0;
@@ -1556,30 +1778,23 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
             return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
         }
 
+        /*
+         * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
+         * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
+         * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
+         * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
+         * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
+         * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
+         * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
+         */
+        if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
+            return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
+
         while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
-            /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
-            if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
-                candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
-            /*
-             * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
-             * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
-             * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
-             */
             if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
                 continue;
-            for (vent = table;
-                 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
-                 ++vent)
-                continue;
-            if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
-                const SSL_METHOD *method;
-
-                method = vent->smeth();
-                if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
-                    best_vers = candidate_vers;
-                    best_method = method;
-                }
-            }
+            if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
+                best_vers = candidate_vers;
         }
         if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
             /* Trailing data? */
@@ -1587,15 +1802,16 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
         }
 
         if (best_vers > 0) {
-            if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+            if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
                 /*
-                 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
-                 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
+                 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
+                 * negotiated TLSv1.3
                  */
                 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
                     return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
                 return 0;
             }
+            check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
             s->version = best_vers;
             s->method = best_method;
             return 0;
@@ -1622,6 +1838,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
             continue;
         method = vent->smeth();
         if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
+            check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
             s->version = vent->version;
             s->method = method;
             return 0;
@@ -1638,22 +1855,45 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
  *
  * @s: client SSL handle.
  * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
+ * @extensions: The extensions received
  *
- * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
  */
-int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
+int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
 {
     const version_info *vent;
     const version_info *table;
+    int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
+
+    origv = s->version;
+    s->version = version;
+
+    /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
+    if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
+                             SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+                             | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
+                             NULL, 0)) {
+        s->version = origv;
+        return 0;
+    }
 
-    /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
-    if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
-        version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+    if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
+            && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+        s->version = origv;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+                 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     switch (s->method->version) {
     default:
-        if (version != s->version)
-            return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+        if (s->version != s->method->version) {
+            s->version = origv;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                     SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+                     SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+            return 0;
+        }
         /*
          * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
          * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints.  Hope
@@ -1661,7 +1901,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
          * versions they don't want.  If not, then easy to fix, just return
          * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
          */
-        return 0;
+        return 1;
     case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
         table = tls_version_table;
         break;
@@ -1670,34 +1910,79 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
         break;
     }
 
-    for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
-        const SSL_METHOD *method;
-        int err;
+    ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        s->version = origv;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
+                       : s->version < ver_min) {
+        s->version = origv;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+        return 0;
+    } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
+                              : s->version > ver_max) {
+        s->version = origv;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
+        real_max = ver_max;
 
-        if (version != vent->version)
+    /* Check for downgrades */
+    if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
+        if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
+                   s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+                                        - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
+                   sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
+            s->version = origv;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                     SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+                     SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+               && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
+               && real_max > s->version) {
+        if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
+                   s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+                                        - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
+                   sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
+            s->version = origv;
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                     SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+                     SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
+        if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
             continue;
-        if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
-            break;
-        if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION)
-            return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
 
-        method = vent->cmeth();
-        err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
-        if (err != 0)
-            return err;
-        s->method = method;
-        s->version = version;
-        return 0;
+        s->method = vent->cmeth();
+        return 1;
     }
 
-    return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+    s->version = origv;
+    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+             SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
+ * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
  * @s: The SSL connection
  * @min_version: The minimum supported version
  * @max_version: The maximum supported version
+ * @real_max:    The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
+ *               where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
+ *               protocol.
  *
  * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
  * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.  We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
@@ -1712,10 +1997,10 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
  * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.  On failure
  * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
  */
-int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
-                                   int *max_version)
+int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version,
+                            int *real_max)
 {
-    int version;
+    int version, tmp_real_max;
     int hole;
     const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
     const SSL_METHOD *method;
@@ -1732,6 +2017,12 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
          * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
          */
         *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
+        /*
+         * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
+         * flexible method.
+         */
+        if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
+            return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
         return 0;
     case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
         table = tls_version_table;
@@ -1764,6 +2055,9 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
      */
     *min_version = version = 0;
     hole = 1;
+    if (real_max != NULL)
+        *real_max = 0;
+    tmp_real_max = 0;
     for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
         /*
          * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
@@ -1771,15 +2065,22 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
          */
         if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
             hole = 1;
+            tmp_real_max = 0;
             continue;
         }
         method = vent->cmeth();
+
+        if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
+            tmp_real_max = vent->version;
+
         if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
             hole = 1;
         } else if (!hole) {
             single = NULL;
             *min_version = method->version;
         } else {
+            if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
+                *real_max = tmp_real_max;
             version = (single = method)->version;
             *min_version = version;
             hole = 0;
@@ -1807,7 +2108,14 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
 {
     int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
 
-    ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
+    /*
+     * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
+     * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
+     */
+    if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+        return 0;
+
+    ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
 
     if (ret != 0)
         return ret;
@@ -1829,7 +2137,7 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
  * 1) or 0 otherwise.
  */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups,
+int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
                   size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
 {
     size_t i;
@@ -1837,17 +2145,261 @@ int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups,
     if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
         return 0;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
-        unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
+    for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+        uint16_t group = groups[i];
 
-        if (group_id == share_id
+        if (group_id == group
                 && (!checkallow
-                    || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
-            break;
+                    || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
+            return 1;
         }
     }
 
-    /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
-    return i < num_groups;
+    return 0;
 }
 #endif
+
+/* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
+int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
+                                  size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
+                                  size_t hrrlen)
+{
+    unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+
+    memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
+
+    if (hashval == NULL) {
+        hashval = hashvaltmp;
+        hashlen = 0;
+        /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
+                || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
+                                       &hashlen)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
+    if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
+    msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
+    msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
+    if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+            || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
+     * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
+     * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
+     */
+    if (hrr != NULL
+            && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
+                || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+                                    s->s3->tmp.message_size
+                                    + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+    return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
+    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+    PACKET cadns;
+
+    if (ca_sk == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* get the CA RDNs */
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
+        const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
+        unsigned int name_len;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        namestart = namebytes;
+        if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+                     ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+                     SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        xn = NULL;
+    }
+
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+    s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
+    X509_NAME_free(xn);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
+{
+    const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
+
+    if (s->server) {
+        ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+        if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
+            ca_sk = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (ca_sk == NULL)
+        ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+
+    return ca_sk;
+}
+
+int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
+    if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ca_sk != NULL) {
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
+            unsigned char *namebytes;
+            X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
+            int namelen;
+
+            if (name == NULL
+                    || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
+                    || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
+                                                       &namebytes)
+                    || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
+size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
+                                  const void *param, size_t paramlen)
+{
+    size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
+    unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
+
+    if (tbs == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+    memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
+
+    *ptbs = tbs;
+    return tbslen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
+ * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
+ */
+int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+
+        s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
+                                s->s3->handshake_dgst)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
+ * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
+ */
+int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst,
+                            s->pha_dgst)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}