-/* ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c */
/*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * Copyright 2005-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
-#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
long ii; \
- OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
is_complete = 1; \
if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] =
{ 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f };
-static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len);
-static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
-static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
- unsigned long len,
+static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t frag_off,
+ size_t frag_len);
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ unsigned char *p);
+static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char mt,
+ size_t len,
unsigned short seq_num,
- unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len);
-static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len);
+ size_t frag_off,
+ size_t frag_len);
+static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *errtype,
+ size_t *len);
-static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len,
- int reassembly)
+static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(size_t frag_len, int reassembly)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
- frag = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*frag));
- if (frag == NULL)
+ if ((frag = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*frag))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (frag_len) {
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
- if (buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(frag);
return NULL;
}
if (!frag)
return;
if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.
- saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.
- saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
+ /*
+ * If we're freeing the CCS then we're done with the old wrl and it
+ * can bee freed
+ */
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrlmethod != NULL)
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrlmethod->free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrl);
}
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
* SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
*/
-int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type)
{
int ret;
- unsigned int curr_mtu;
+ size_t written;
+ size_t curr_mtu;
int retry = 1;
- unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
+ size_t len, frag_off, overhead, used_len;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
return -1;
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something
- * reasonable now */
-
- if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
- (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
+ /* should have something reasonable now */
+ return -1;
- if (s->write_hash) {
- if (s->enc_write_ctx
- && ((EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) ||
- (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)))
- mac_size = 0;
- else
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- } else
- mac_size = 0;
+ if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->init_num ==
+ s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ return -1;
+ }
- if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
- (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
- blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
- else
- blocksize = 0;
+ overhead = s->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_max_record_overhead(s->rlayer.wrl);
frag_off = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
/* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
while (s->init_num > 0) {
- used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
- + mac_size + blocksize;
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) {
+ /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */
+
+ if (frag_off > 0) {
+ /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */
+
+ if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /*
+ * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have
+ * contained the message header plus one other byte.
+ * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least
+ * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went
+ * wrong.
+ */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new
+ * message header for this fragment.
+ */
+ s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We must have been called again after a retry so use the
+ * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need
+ * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because
+ * that should already have been done before the retry.
+ */
+ frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ }
+ }
+
+ used_len = BIO_wpending(s->wbio) + overhead;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
else
/*
* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
*/
- ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret <= 0)
+ ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
return ret;
- used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
- if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+ }
+ if (s->d1->mtu > overhead + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - overhead;
} else {
/* Shouldn't happen */
return -1;
else
len = s->init_num;
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- if (len > INT_MAX)
- len = INT_MAX;
+ if (len > ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s))
+ len = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
/*
* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- if (s->init_off != 0) {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- /*
- * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should
- * be safe
- */
- if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
- len = curr_mtu;
- else
- len = s->init_num;
- }
-
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- if (len > INT_MAX)
- len = INT_MAX;
-
if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
*/
return -1;
}
- dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
- len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
dtls1_write_message_header(s,
(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
data[s->init_off]);
}
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- len);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len,
+ &written);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
/*
* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
* previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
* retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and
* wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
*/
- if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) {
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
return -1;
/* Have one more go */
} else
return -1;
} else {
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
} else {
* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
* got sent. but why would this happen?
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
+ if (!ossl_assert(len == written))
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * We should not exceed the MTU size. If compression is in use
+ * then the max record overhead calculation is unreliable so we do
+ * not check in that case. We use assert rather than ossl_assert
+ * because in a production build, if this assert were ever to fail,
+ * then the best thing to do is probably carry on regardless.
+ */
+ assert(s->s3.tmp.new_compression != NULL
+ || BIO_wpending(s->wbio) <= (int)s->d1->mtu);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
/*
unsigned char *p =
(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
- int xlen;
+ size_t xlen;
if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/*
l2n3(0, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- xlen = ret;
+ xlen = written;
} else {
p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ xlen = written - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
+ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen))
+ return -1;
}
- if (ret == s->init_num) {
+ if (written == s->init_num) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
- (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+ (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
s->init_num = 0;
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
- s->init_off += ret;
- s->init_num -= ret;
- frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ s->init_off += written;
+ s->init_num -= written;
+ written -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ frag_off += written;
+
+ /*
+ * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it
+ * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the
+ * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be
+ * updated again later.
+ */
+ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0);
}
}
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
-int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len)
+int dtls_get_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
unsigned char *p;
- unsigned long msg_len;
- int ok;
- long tmplen;
+ size_t msg_len;
+ size_t tmplen;
+ int errtype;
msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
again:
- ok = dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &tmplen);
- if (tmplen == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT
- || tmplen == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
- /* bad fragment received */
- goto again;
- } else if (tmplen <= 0 && !ok) {
+ if (!dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &errtype, &tmplen)) {
+ if (errtype == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT
+ || errtype == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
+ /* bad fragment received */
+ goto again;
+ }
return 0;
}
- *mt = s->s3->tmp.message_type;
+ *mt = s->s3.tmp.message_type;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (*mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
if (s->msg_callback) {
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- p, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ p, 1, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
}
/*
* This isn't a real handshake message so skip the processing below.
*/
- *len = (unsigned long)tmplen;
return 1;
}
s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
l2n3(0, p);
l2n3(msg_len, p);
- if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- }
-
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- *len = s->init_num;
return 1;
}
-static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
+/*
+ * Actually we already have the message body - but this is an opportunity for
+ * DTLS to do any further processing it wants at the same point that TLS would
+ * be asked for the message body.
+ */
+int dtls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
+{
+ unsigned char *msg = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ size_t msg_len = s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ /* Nothing to be done */
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
+ * Finished verification.
+ */
+ if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ msg += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ msg_len -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msg, msg_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ end:
+ *len = s->init_num;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but
+ * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it.
+ */
+static size_t dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ size_t max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+ if (max_len < s->max_cert_list)
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+ return max_len;
+}
+
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
{
size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len;
frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
/* sanity checking */
- if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len
+ || msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return 0;
}
if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */
/*
- * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against max
- * above
+ * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against
+ * dtls_max_handshake_message_len(s) above
*/
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
- (s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
+ s->s3.tmp.message_size = msg_len;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->s3.tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
} else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) {
* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit
* would open possibility for buffer overrun.
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return 0;
}
- return 0; /* no error */
+ return 1;
}
-static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok)
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if there is a buffered fragment available, 0 if not, or -1 on a
+ * fatal error.
+ */
+static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
{
/*-
* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* (2) update s->init_num
*/
pitem *item;
+ piterator iter;
hm_fragment *frag;
- int al;
+ int ret;
+ int chretran = 0;
- *ok = 0;
- item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
- if (item == NULL)
- return 0;
+ iter = pqueue_iterator(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ do {
+ item = pqueue_next(&iter);
+ if (item == NULL)
+ return 0;
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
+ pitem *next;
+ hm_fragment *nextfrag;
+
+ if (!s->server
+ || frag->msg_header.seq != 0
+ || s->d1->handshake_read_seq != 1
+ || s->statem.hand_state != DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ /*
+ * This is a stale message that has been buffered so clear it.
+ * It is safe to pop this message from the queue even though
+ * we have an active iterator
+ */
+ pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ item = NULL;
+ frag = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We have fragments for a ClientHello without a cookie,
+ * even though we have sent a HelloVerifyRequest. It is possible
+ * that the HelloVerifyRequest got lost and this is a
+ * retransmission of the original ClientHello
+ */
+ next = pqueue_next(&iter);
+ if (next != NULL) {
+ nextfrag = (hm_fragment *)next->data;
+ if (nextfrag->msg_header.seq == s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
+ /*
+ * We have fragments for both a ClientHello without
+ * cookie and one with. Ditch the one without.
+ */
+ pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ item = next;
+ frag = nextfrag;
+ } else {
+ chretran = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ chretran = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } while (item == NULL);
/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
return 0;
- if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) {
- unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+ if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq || chretran) {
+ size_t frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
- al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header);
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+ ret = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header);
- if (al == 0) { /* no alert */
+ if (ret && frag->msg_header.frag_len > 0) {
unsigned char *p =
(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
- if (al == 0) {
- *ok = 1;
- return frag_len;
+ if (ret) {
+ if (chretran) {
+ /*
+ * We got a new ClientHello with a message sequence of 0.
+ * Reset the read/write sequences back to the beginning.
+ * We process it like this is the first time we've seen a
+ * ClientHello from the client.
+ */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ }
+ *len = frag_len;
+ return 1;
}
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ /* Fatal error */
s->init_num = 0;
- *ok = 0;
return -1;
- } else
+ } else {
return 0;
+ }
}
-/*
- * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
- * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but
- * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it.
- */
-static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long max_len =
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
- if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
- return s->max_cert_list;
- return max_len;
-}
-
-static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
+static int dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+ size_t frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+ size_t readbytes;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
goto err;
- if (frag_len == 0)
+ if (frag_len == 0) {
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ }
/* Try to find item in queue */
memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
unsigned char devnull[256];
while (frag_len) {
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
- devnull,
- frag_len >
- sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
- frag_len, 0);
+ i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len >
+ sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
+ frag_len, 0, &readbytes);
if (i <= 0)
goto err;
- frag_len -= i;
+ frag_len -= readbytes;
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
}
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
- frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,
- frag_len, 0);
- if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
+ i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+ frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,
+ frag_len, 0, &readbytes);
+ if (i <= 0 || readbytes != frag_len)
i = -1;
if (i <= 0)
goto err;
RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
(long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
+ if (!ossl_assert(msg_hdr->msg_len > 0))
+ goto err;
RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
is_complete);
* would have returned it and control would never have reached this
* branch.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ if (!ossl_assert(item != NULL))
+ goto err;
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
if (item == NULL)
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
+ return -1;
}
-static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
- int *ok)
+static int dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
{
int i = -1;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+ size_t frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+ size_t readbytes;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
goto err;
*/
if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
- (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
- {
+ (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
unsigned char devnull[256];
while (frag_len) {
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
- devnull,
- frag_len >
- sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
- frag_len, 0);
+ i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len >
+ sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
+ frag_len, 0, &readbytes);
if (i <= 0)
goto err;
- frag_len -= i;
+ frag_len -= readbytes;
}
} else {
- if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
- return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+ if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr);
+ }
if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
goto err;
/*
* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read
*/
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
- frag->fragment, frag_len, 0);
- if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
+ i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+ frag->fragment, frag_len, 0,
+ &readbytes);
+ if (i<=0 || readbytes != frag_len)
i = -1;
if (i <= 0)
goto err;
* have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or
* the record will have been discarded.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ if (!ossl_assert(item != NULL))
+ goto err;
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
if (item == NULL)
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
+ return 0;
}
-static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len)
+static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *errtype,
+ size_t *len)
{
unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
- unsigned long mlen, frag_off, frag_len;
- int i, al, recvd_type;
+ size_t mlen, frag_off, frag_len;
+ int i, ret, recvd_type;
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
- int ok;
+ size_t readbytes;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+ int chretran = 0;
+
+ *errtype = 0;
redo:
/* see if we have the required fragment already */
- if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &ok)) || ok) {
- if (ok)
- s->init_num = frag_len;
+ ret = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &frag_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ s->init_num = frag_len;
*len = frag_len;
- return ok;
+ return 1;
}
/* read handshake message header */
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, wire,
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
+ i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, wire,
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0, &readbytes);
if (i <= 0) { /* nbio, or an error */
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- *len = i;
+ *len = 0;
return 0;
}
- if(recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
if (wire[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
- memcpy(s->init_buf->data, wire, i);
- s->init_num = i - 1;
+ memcpy(s->init_buf->data, wire, readbytes);
+ s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 1;
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = i - 1;
- *len = i - 1;
+ s->s3.tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+ s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes - 1;
+ *len = readbytes - 1;
return 1;
}
/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
- if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ if (readbytes != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
* We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
* Fragments must not span records.
*/
- if (frag_len > RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)) {
- al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ if (frag_len > s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec].length) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
* although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
*/
if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
- *len = dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, &ok);
- return ok;
+ if (!s->server
+ || msg_hdr.seq != 0
+ || s->d1->handshake_read_seq != 1
+ || wire[0] != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
+ || s->statem.hand_state != DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ *errtype = dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We received a ClientHello and sent back a HelloVerifyRequest. We
+ * now seem to have received a retransmitted initial ClientHello. That
+ * is allowed (possibly our HelloVerifyRequest got lost).
+ */
+ chretran = 1;
}
if (frag_len && frag_len < mlen) {
- *len = dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, &ok);
- return ok;
+ *errtype = dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr);
+ return 0;
}
- if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
- wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
+ if (!s->server
+ && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0
+ && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
+ && wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
/*
* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are
* doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is
if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+ wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_num = 0;
goto redo;
- } else { /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ } else { /* Incorrectly formatted Hello request */
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
- if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr)))
+ if (!dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto f_err;
+ }
if (frag_len > 0) {
unsigned char *p =
(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
- &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0);
+ i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
+ &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0, &readbytes);
/*
* This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
*/
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- *len = i;
+ *len = 0;
return 0;
}
- } else
- i = 0;
+ } else {
+ readbytes = 0;
+ }
/*
* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake
* to fail
*/
- if (i != (int)frag_len) {
- al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ if (readbytes != frag_len) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ if (chretran) {
+ /*
+ * We got a new ClientHello with a message sequence of 0.
+ * Reset the read/write sequences back to the beginning.
+ * We process it like this is the first time we've seen a ClientHello
+ * from the client.
+ */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ }
+
/*
* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
* s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' lengths: as
return 1;
f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
s->init_num = 0;
- *len = -1;
+ *len = 0;
return 0;
}
/*-
* for these 2 messages, we need to
- * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
- * ssl->rlayer.read_sequence zero
- * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
* ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
* ssl->session->read_compression assign
* ssl->session->read_hash assign
*/
-int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
{
- unsigned char *p;
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS;
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
- s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
- s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p);
- s->init_num += 2;
- }
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->d1->handshake_write_seq)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
}
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s)
+/*
+ * Wait for a dry event. Should only be called at a point in the handshake
+ * where we are not expecting any data from the peer except an alert.
+ */
+WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret, errtype;
+ size_t len;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
/* read app data until dry event */
- ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret < 0)
+ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(ssl));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
if (ret == 0) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ /*
+ * We're not expecting any more messages from the peer at this point -
+ * but we could get an alert. If an alert is waiting then we will never
+ * return successfully. Therefore we attempt to read a message. This
+ * should never succeed but will process any waiting alerts.
+ */
+ if (dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &errtype, &len)) {
+ /* The call succeeded! This should never happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(ssl));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(ssl));
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
#endif
-int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int code)
{
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
if (code > 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
- return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
+ if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s) || ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
/*
* not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle
* this. in fact it's probably an error
*/
return code;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* done, no need to send a retransmit */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-#else
- /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s))
-#endif
+ if (!SSL_in_init(ssl))
{
- BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
+ BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
return code;
}
return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
}
-int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
- pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
+ pqueue *sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
piterator iter;
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short)
dtls1_get_queue_priority
(frag->msg_header.seq,
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs), 0,
- &found) <= 0 && found) {
- fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs), &found) <= 0)
return -1;
- }
}
return 1;
}
-int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
+int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int is_ccs)
{
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
* this function is called immediately after a message has been
* serialized
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->init_off == 0))
+ return 0;
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
- if (!frag)
+ if (frag == NULL)
return 0;
memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
if (is_ccs) {
/* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- ((s->version==DTLS1_BAD_VER)?3:DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH)
- == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ ((s->version ==
+ DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ == (unsigned int)s->init_num)) {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ return 0;
+ }
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num)) {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
/* save current state */
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch =
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer);
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrlmethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrl = s->rlayer.wrl;
+
memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] =
return 1;
}
-int
-dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
- int *found)
+int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned short seq, int *found)
{
int ret;
/* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
unsigned char seq64be[8];
struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
- /*-
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
- */
-
/* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8);
item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
if (item == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*found = 0;
return 0;
}
frag->msg_header.frag_len);
/* save current state */
- saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
- saved_state.compress = s->compress;
- saved_state.session = s->session;
- saved_state.epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer);
+ saved_state.wrlmethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
+ saved_state.wrl = s->rlayer.wrl;
s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
/* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
- s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
- s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
- s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(&s->rlayer,
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch);
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrlmethod;
+ s->rlayer.wrl = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrl;
+
+ /*
+ * The old wrl may be still pointing at an old BIO. Update it to what we're
+ * using now.
+ */
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set1_bio(s->rlayer.wrl, s->wbio);
ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
/* restore current state */
- s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
- s->compress = saved_state.compress;
- s->session = saved_state.session;
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(&s->rlayer, saved_state.epoch);
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod = saved_state.wrlmethod;
+ s->rlayer.wrl = saved_state.wrl;
s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
- (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
return ret;
}
-/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
-void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
-{
- pitem *item;
-
- for (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
- item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) {
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
-}
-
-void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
- unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
- unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len)
+void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ unsigned char mt, size_t len,
+ size_t frag_off, size_t frag_len)
{
if (frag_off == 0) {
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
static void
-dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
- unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num,
- unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
+dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char mt,
+ size_t len, unsigned short seq_num,
+ size_t frag_off, size_t frag_len)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
}
static void
-dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len)
+dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t frag_off, size_t frag_len)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
}
-static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ unsigned char *p)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
return p;
}
-void
-dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
+void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
{
memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
}
+int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
+{
+ unsigned char *header;
+ if (htype == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, 0, 0, 0);
+ /*
+ * We allocate space at the start for the message header. This gets
+ * filled in later
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, &header)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet(pkt))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
+{
+ size_t msglen;
+
+ if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
+ || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
+ || msglen > INT_MAX)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+ s->init_num = (int)msglen;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ if (htype != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, htype == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ ? 1 : 0))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff