/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
*/
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
- /* Renegotiation - fall through */
+ /* Renegotiation */
+ /* fall thru */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
- SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
- return 0;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
+ * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
+ */
+ if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
+ != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
+ * ciphersuite.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/* TLS extensions */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
- } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
+ } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
: SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1))
goto f_err;
s->hit = 0;
}
#endif
- if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
+ if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
goto f_err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
goto f_err;
}
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
+ /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
+ || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
+ /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- &extensions, &al, NULL)
+ &extensions, &al, NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
+ extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
goto f_err;
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
+ extensions = NULL;
+
+ if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
+ * ClientHello will not change
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/*
* Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
|| context != 0
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
- &al, NULL)
- || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
+ &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
+ PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
goto f_err;
}
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
- && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
- (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
- && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
+ && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_ECC || i != SSL_PKEY_ED25519)
+ && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
+ (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
+ && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
}
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
/* test non-zero pubkey */
if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
p = g = NULL;
if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
PACKET params;
int maxsig;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ unsigned char *tbs;
+ size_t tbslen;
+ int rv;
/*
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
unsigned int sigalg;
- int rv;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
- md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
goto err;
}
}
- if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
- PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
+ tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
+ PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
+ if (tbslen == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
- PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
- /* bad signature */
+
+ rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
+ PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tbs);
+ if (rv <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- &rawexts, &al, NULL)
+ &rawexts, &al, NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- rawexts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
goto err;
}
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
unsigned int sess_len;
RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
+ PACKET nonce;
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&nonce) == 0
+ || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
+ &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
|| (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
|| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
if (ticklen == 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
+ * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
+ * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
+ * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
+ * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
+ * cache.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
/*
PACKET extpkt;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
|| !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- &exts, &al, NULL)
+ &exts, &al, NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto f_err;
}
identitylen = strlen(identity);
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
} else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
- goto err;
+ /*
+ * This is a fatal error, which leaves
+ * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
+ * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
+ */
+ return 0;
}
return 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
idx = s->session->peer_type;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC || idx == SSL_PKEY_ED25519) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
+
/*
* This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
* compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
PACKET extensions;
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
- &al, NULL)
+ &al, NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
+ rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff