/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
- /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ /*
+ * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
+ * we already sent close_notify
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
}
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
unsigned char *session_id;
- if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- /* Should not happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
if (protverr != 0) {
unsigned int compression;
unsigned int sversion;
unsigned int context;
- int discard;
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
|| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& s->session->ext.tick_identity
!= TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
- s->session_ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
+ md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
PACKET reqctx, extensions;
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
+ * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
+ * we just ignore it
+ */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
+
/* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
+ * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
+ * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
+ * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
+ * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
+ * client_cert_cb.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
PACKET extpkt;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
- || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- &exts, NULL, 1)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
+ NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
PACKET_data(&nonce),
PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
s->session->master_key,
- hashlen)) {
+ hashlen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff