* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <assert.h>
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
-#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
{
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
+ && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
+ || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
return 0;
return 1;
*/
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
{
- long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
return 1;
}
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
-#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
#endif
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
s->hit = 1;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
- } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
+ } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected
- || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+ || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
- if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
- /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ /*
+ * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
+ * we already sent close_notify
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
&& s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
else
- st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
+ st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
: TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
+ st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
: TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
/* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
- st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
+ st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
: TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
- if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
-
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+ if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#else
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WORK_ERROR;
break;
}
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
else
- s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+ s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
}
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
unsigned char *session_id;
- if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- /* Should not happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
if (protverr != 0) {
}
if (sess == NULL
- || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
+ || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
|| !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
&& !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
- p = s->s3->client_random;
+ p = s->s3.client_random;
/*
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
size_t idx;
i = 1;
- for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
+ for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
if (p[idx]) {
i = 0;
break;
i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
}
- if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
+ if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
* supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
- && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
+ && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
+ sess_id_len) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
&& s->ctx->comp_methods
- && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
return 0;
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
- && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
/* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
* In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
* ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
*/
- if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
- != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
+ if (ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2)
+ != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
return 0;
}
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
return 1;
}
unsigned int compression;
unsigned int sversion;
unsigned int context;
- int discard;
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
goto err;
}
} else {
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
- if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && s->session->ext.tick_identity
- != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
- s->session_ctx->lock);
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
* Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
* version.
*/
- s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
- s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
+ s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
+ s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
} else {
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
}
#endif
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
+ && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL
#endif
) {
/*
* type.
*/
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
+ if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
x = NULL;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
return 1;
}
bnpub_key = NULL;
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- goto err;
- }
-
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
+ 0, dh)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
+ SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
/*
* FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
* public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
return 0;
}
- if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
+ if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
return 0;
}
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
+ else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
save_param_start = *pkt;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
- s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
+ s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
#endif
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
PACKET params;
- int maxsig;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned char *tbs;
size_t tbslen;
goto err;
}
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
+ OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
+ md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
- maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if (maxsig < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check signature length
- */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
- /* wrong packet length */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
md_ctx = NULL;
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+ if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
&& !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
/* Clear certificate validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+ s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
PACKET reqctx, extensions;
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
+ * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
+ * we just ignore it
+ */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
+
/* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
- s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
+ s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
s->pha_context = NULL;
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
+ * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
+ * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
+ * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
+ * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
+ * client_cert_cb.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
&& (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
+ : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+
/*
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
* one
goto err;
}
+ if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
+ && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
+ * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
+ * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
PACKET extpkt;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
- || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- &exts, NULL, 1)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
+ NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
goto err;
}
s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
+ s->session->not_resumable = 0;
/* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
PACKET_data(&nonce),
PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
s->session->master_key,
- hashlen)) {
+ hashlen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
goto err;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
- s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
+ s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
tmppsk = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
- s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+ s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
- skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
if (ckey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
- skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
if (ckey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
+ if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
/*
* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
peer_cert = s->session->peer;
- if (!peer_cert) {
+ if (peer_cert == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
return 0;
}
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
+ X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
+ s->ctx->propq);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
/* Generate session key
* TODO(size_t): Convert this function
*/
- || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
+ || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ukm_hash == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
- s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+ s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
err:
{
unsigned long alg_k;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
return 1;
err:
- OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
- s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
+ s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
return 0;
}
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
- pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
- pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
+ pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
+ pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Check for SRP */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
#endif
- if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
- s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
return 0;
}
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
- if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
+ if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
i = 0;
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
- (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
+ (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
: s->cert->key)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
size_t idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
/* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
if (!maxverok) {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
- && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
+ && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
maxverok = 1;
} else {
- if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
- && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+ if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
+ && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
maxverok = 1;
}
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff