-/* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
-static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p);
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
-static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
{
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
return 1;
}
- /*
- * Export ciphersuites may have temporary RSA keys if the public key in the
- * server certificate is longer than the maximum export strength
- */
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (pkey == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- /*
- * If the public key in the certificate is shorter than or equal to the
- * maximum export strength then a temporary RSA key is not allowed
- */
- if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey)
- <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
- return 0;
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- return 1;
- }
-
return 0;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
+ } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
+ && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
+ && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ /*
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
+ * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
+ * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
+ * the server is resuming.
+ */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
} else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
+ * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
+ return 1;
}
/* Fall through */
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
- return 1;
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return 1;
+ }
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
}
break;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
-#endif
- /*
- * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
- */
- if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- }
-#endif
+
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
s->first_packet = 1;
return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
+ * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
+ * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
+ */
+ return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
return WORK_ERROR;
}
-/*
- * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
- * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
- * Returns 1 on success
- * Returns 0 on error
- */
-static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
-
- if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /*
- * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
- * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
- * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
- * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
- * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
- * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
- */
- mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
- | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
-#endif
- ;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
- if ((options & mask) != mask) {
- s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- }
-#else
- if ((options & mask) == mask) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
- return 0;
- }
- s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
-#endif
-
- mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
- if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
- s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
- mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
- if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
- s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
-#endif
-
- if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
- SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
- /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
- if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
- */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
- */
- s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- } else {
- /*
- * We only support one version: update method
- */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- }
- }
-
- s->client_version = s->version;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i;
+ int protverr;
unsigned long l;
int al = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
- if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
+ protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
+ if (protverr != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
goto err;
+ }
- if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+ if ((sess == NULL) ||
+ !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
/*
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
* "ticket" without a session ID.
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
- * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
PACKET session_id;
size_t session_id_len;
- unsigned char *cipherchars;
+ const unsigned char *cipherchars;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
unsigned int compression;
+ unsigned int sversion;
+ int protverr;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
- if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- unsigned int sversion;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
-#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
-#error Code needs updating for new TLS version
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
- if (FIPS_mode()) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
- } else
-#endif
- if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
- s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
- } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
- s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
- } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
- s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
-
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
- unsigned int hversion;
- int options;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- options = s->options;
- if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
- else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- s->version = hversion;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
- s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
- else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- s->version = hversion;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
- } else {
- unsigned char *vers;
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8))
- || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1];
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
+ if (protverr != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
+ goto f_err;
}
/* load the server hello data */
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
s->session->tlsext_tick) {
- SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
}
}
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
/* session_id_len could be 0 */
memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
session_id_len);
}
+ /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
+ if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
- /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
- if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
- s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
/*
- * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
- * return an error.
+ * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
+ * version.
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
+ s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
+ /*
+ * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
+ * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
*/
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
- /*
- * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
- * authentication.
- */
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
- goto f_err;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
+ const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
- * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
+ * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
}
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
+ if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
+ && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
+ (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
+ && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
-#endif
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- int al, j, verify_ret;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
+ int al, j;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh = NULL;
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- int curve_nid = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
#endif
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
save_param_start = *pkt;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA_free(s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp);
- s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp);
- s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp);
- s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
#endif
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
goto f_err;
}
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ /*
+ * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
+ * options
+ */
+ if (0) {
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- PACKET mod, exp;
- /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
- if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &mod)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exp)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&mod), PACKET_remaining(&mod),
- rsa->n)) == NULL
- || (rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&exp), PACKET_remaining(&exp),
- rsa->e)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
- rsa = NULL;
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
}
-#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
- if (0) ;
-#endif
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
+
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
goto f_err;
}
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
+ peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ dh = DH_new();
+
+ if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto dherr;
}
- if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
- PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
- || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
- PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
- || (dh->pub_key =
- BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
- PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) {
+ p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
+ g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator),
+ NULL);
+ bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
+ NULL);
+ if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
+ goto dherr;
}
- if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
+ if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
- goto f_err;
+ goto dherr;
+ }
+
+ if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto dherr;
+ }
+
+ if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto dherr;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- goto f_err;
+ goto dherr;
}
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto dherr;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
+
+ goto dhend;
+ dherr:
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(bnpub_key);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
+ goto f_err;
+ dhend:
+ /*
+ * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
+ * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
+ */
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
-
- s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
- dh = NULL;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- EC_GROUP *ngroup;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
PACKET encoded_pt;
- unsigned char *ecparams;
-
- if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ const unsigned char *ecparams;
+ int curve_nid;
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
goto f_err;
}
- if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2))) == 0) {
+ curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
+ if (curve_nid == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
- ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
- if (ngroup == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
- al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL
+ || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
-
- /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
- if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
- ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = NULL;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
- PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), bn_ctx) == 0) {
+ if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
+ PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
if (0) ;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
# endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
- EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
- s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
- ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- unsigned char *sigalgs;
+ const unsigned char *sigalgs;
int rv;
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ md = EVP_md5_sha1();
} else {
md = EVP_sha1();
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int num;
- unsigned int size;
-
- j = 0;
- q = md_buf;
- for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
- ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
- PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
- q += size;
- j += size;
- }
- verify_ret =
- RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, PACKET_data(&signature),
- PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa);
- if (verify_ret < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (verify_ret == 0) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#endif
- {
- EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
- PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
- PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
+ PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
+ PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
}
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
goto f_err;
}
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH_free(dh);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
#endif
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- unsigned char *data;
- unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+ const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ } else {
+ ssl_set_default_md(s);
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ xn = NULL;
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return ret;
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int ret;
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- if (ret == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (ret < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
+ /*
+ * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
+ * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
+ * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
+ int ret;
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
+ if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only applies to renegotiation */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
- const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
-
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
}
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
-
identitylen = strlen(identity);
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
goto psk_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
goto memerr;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
- RSA *rsa;
+ size_t enclen;
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL)
goto err;
}
- if (s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
- rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
- else {
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- goto err;
- }
- rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p += 2;
- n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n = enclen;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = NULL;
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
- goto err;
- }
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
- DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
- if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
- dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
- else {
- /* we get them from the cert */
- EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
- dh_srvr = NULL;
- spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (spkey) {
- dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
- }
- if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
- /* Use client certificate key */
- EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
- dh_clnt = NULL;
- if (clkey)
- dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
- if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- /* generate a new random key */
- if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- goto err;
- }
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
+ dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
- pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
- if (pms == NULL)
- goto memerr;
-
- /*
- * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
- * clear it out afterwards
- */
-
- n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
- if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
- DH_free(dh_srvr);
-
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- pmslen = n;
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
- n = 0;
- else {
- /* send off the data */
- n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
- n += 2;
- }
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ /* send off the data */
+ DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
+ n = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, p);
+ n += 2;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ ckey = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
- EC_KEY *tkey;
- int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
- int field_size = 0;
- /*
- * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
- * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
- * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
- */
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
- /*-
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client
- * authentication using ECDH certificates.
- * To add such support, one needs to add
- * code that checks for appropriate
- * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
- * For example, the cert have an ECC
- * key on the same curve as the server's
- * and the key should be authorized for
- * key agreement.
- *
- * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
- * to skip sending the certificate verify
- * message.
- *
- * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
- * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
- * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
- * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
- */
- }
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
- tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp;
- } else {
- /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
- srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
- || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
- || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ if ((skey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ goto err;
}
- tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
- }
-
- srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
- if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ /* Generate encoding of client key */
+ encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &encodedPoint, NULL);
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
+ if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
- /*
- * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
- * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
- */
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
- tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
- if (priv_key == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
- if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
- * clear it out afterwards
- */
-
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
- if (field_size <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
- if (pms == NULL)
- goto memerr;
- n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
- if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
- /* Send empty client key exch message */
- n = 0;
- } else {
- /*
- * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
- * accordingly.
- */
- encoded_pt_len =
- EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ ckey = NULL;
- /* Encode the public key */
- n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+ n = encoded_pt_len;
- *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
- /* Encoded point will be copied here */
- p += 1;
- /* copy the point */
- memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
- /* increment n to account for length field */
- n += 1;
- }
+ *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
+ /* increment n to account for length field */
+ n += 1;
/* Free allocated memory */
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
unsigned int md_len;
unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
- EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
+ int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
+ dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
+
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
goto err;
}
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
- X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
}
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
- *
- * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+ * parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
- EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
- /* Generate session key */
- if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+ /* Generate session key */
+ || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
* data
*/
- ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
- EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
+ EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
shared_ukm) < 0) {
*/
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
- s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+ if (pms != NULL) {
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+ }
return 1;
memerr:
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
+ pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
+ pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Check for SRP */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
return 1;
}
#endif
- pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
- pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
+ pms = NULL;
+ pmslen = 0;
goto err;
}
+ pms = NULL;
+ pmslen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
- unsigned long n;
- int j;
+ unsigned long n = 0;
+ long hdatalen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+ mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
- /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (pctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- NID_sha1,
- &(data
- [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
- } else {
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- /*
- * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
- * digest and cached handshake records.
- */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
- const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+ if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
+ n = 2;
+ }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
- EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
- || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n = u + 4;
- /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
- goto err;
- } else
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n = u + 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else
-#endif
- if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- unsigned char signbuf[64];
- int i;
- size_t sigsize = 64;
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
- if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
- p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
+ || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key))
+ || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ {
+ int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
+ BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n += u + 2;
+ /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+ goto err;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 1;
err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 0;
}
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned long alg_k;
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
- int i = s->session->peer_type;
- EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
- clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
- /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
- return 1;
- if (i >= 0)
- spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (spkey) {
- /* Compare server and client parameters */
- i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
- if (i != 1)
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
- }
return 1;
}
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
- int i, idx;
+ int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int idx;
+#endif
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int pkey_bits;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rsa;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh;
-#endif
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return (1);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
-#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
- idx = s->session->peer_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ idx = s->session->peer_type;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
- } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
- goto f_err;
}
#endif
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
- if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (rsa != NULL) {
- /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- }
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) {
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
- } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
- !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
- goto f_err;
}
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
- !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-# endif
#endif
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- } else if (RSA_bits(rsa) >
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
- al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
- if (DH_bits(dh) >
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
- al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
- /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
- al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
unsigned char *p)
{
int i, j = 0;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
continue;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
- if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
- continue;
- else
- empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
- }
-#endif
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
p += j;
}
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,
- "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
-#endif
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff