Fix access zero memory if SSL_DEBUG is enabled

[openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_clnt.c

diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index ff353842f941aeecd8f0bce8ec6aaa0fdd29a3a6..5a8f1163dfaf1363718ee13b4874eca0e18eb7b2 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -423,11 +423,19 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
             st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
             return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
         }
-        /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-                 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
-                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+        /*
+         * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
+         * we already sent close_notify
+         */
+        if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
+            /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+        }
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
 
     case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
         if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
@@ -1087,6 +1095,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
                  ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         return WORK_ERROR;
 
+    case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
     case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
         return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
     }
@@ -1119,7 +1128,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
     }
 
     if (sess == NULL
-            || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
+            || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
             || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
         if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
                 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
@@ -1409,7 +1418,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
     unsigned int compression;
     unsigned int sversion;
     unsigned int context;
-    int discard;
     RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
     SSL_COMP *comp;
@@ -1616,8 +1624,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
                 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
                     && s->session->ext.tick_identity
                        != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
-            CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
-                              s->session_ctx->lock);
+            tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
             if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
                 /* SSLfatal() already called */
                 goto err;
@@ -2346,7 +2353,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         }
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
         if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
-            fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+            fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
+                    md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
 #endif
 
         if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
@@ -2448,6 +2456,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         PACKET reqctx, extensions;
         RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
 
+        if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
+            /*
+             * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
+             * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
+             * we just ignore it
+             */
+            return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+        }
+
         /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
         OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
         s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
@@ -2548,6 +2565,17 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
     /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
     s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
 
+    /*
+     * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
+     * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
+     * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
+     * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
+     * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
+     * client_cert_cb.
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+        return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
     return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
 }
 
@@ -2591,6 +2619,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
      */
     if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
         SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+
         /*
          * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
          * one
@@ -2602,6 +2631,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
             goto err;
         }
 
+        if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
+                && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+            /*
+             * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
+             * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
+             * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
+             */
+            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+        }
+
         SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
         s->session = new_sess;
     }
@@ -2636,10 +2675,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         PACKET extpkt;
 
         if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
-                || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
-                || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
-                                           SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
-                                           &exts, NULL, 1)
+                || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+                                    SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
+                                    NULL, 1)
                 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
                                              SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
                                              exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
@@ -2671,6 +2716,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         goto err;
     }
     s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
+    s->session->not_resumable = 0;
 
     /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
     if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {