Update ServerHello to new draft-22 format

[openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_clnt.c

diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index a7a5a1723b8a2e06b24a0b284dc8307f8d5d6ea6..3c628bdd99e42a29589fa668c56ba089efa605e1 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -1332,60 +1332,30 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         goto err;
     }
 
-    /*
-     * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
-     * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
-     * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
-     */
-    if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1)) {
-        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+    /* Get the session-id. */
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
         goto err;
     }
-
-    /*
-     * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
-     * message must be on a record boundary.
-     */
-    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
-                 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+    session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
+    if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
+        || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
         goto err;
     }
 
-    /* Get the session-id. */
-    if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
-        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
-            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
-                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
-        if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
-            || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
-            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
-                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
-                     SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    } else {
-        PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
-        session_id_len = 0;
-    }
-
     if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
                  SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
         goto err;
     }
 
-    if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
-        if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
-            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
-                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    } else {
-        compression = 0;
+    if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
     }
 
     /* TLS extensions */
@@ -1398,10 +1368,44 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         goto err;
     }
 
+    if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+                                SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+                                | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
+                                &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
+     * are appropriate for this version.
+     */
     context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
                               : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
-    if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
-        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+    if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
+     * message must be on a record boundary.
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && compression != 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
         goto err;
     }
 
@@ -1411,7 +1415,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
         if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
                                  SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
-                                 extensions, NULL, 0l)) {
+                                 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
             /* SSLfatal() already called */
             goto err;
         }