#include <openssl/trace.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/param_build.h>
-#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
}
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
-# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
+ /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
+# error Internal DTLS version error
#endif
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ return (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
+ : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
&& RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
- sess_id_len) <= 0) {
+ sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
err:
X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
* (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
*/
- if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
+ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
- if (i > 1) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, i);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
return 0;
}
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
return 0;
}
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
NULL);
goto err;
}
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
+ EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
0, peer_tmp)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
err:
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
- OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
BN_free(p);
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
+ s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
return 1;
}
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
- md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
+ md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
}
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
- md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
+ md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey,
NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
s->session = new_sess;
}
- /*
- * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
- * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
- */
- s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
+ s->session->time = time(NULL);
+ ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
goto err;
}
/*
- * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
+ * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
* but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
*/
if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
/* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
- int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
size_t hashlen;
static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
return 0;
}
if (ret < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
* as the prime.
*/
- prime_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ckey);
+ prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
if (pad_len > 0) {
if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
/* Generate session key
- * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
*/
- || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
+ || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
goto err;
}
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 0;
}
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff