static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
- unsigned char *p);
-
+ PACKETW *pkt);
/*
* Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
{
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
+ && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
return 0;
return 1;
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
- * -1: Error
*/
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ske_expected;
- switch(st->hand_state) {
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
} else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
- && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
- && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
- && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
+ && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
* from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
} else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
- & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
+ & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
} else {
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
- if (ske_expected < 0)
- return 0;
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected
- || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
- && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
- && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
+ && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+ return 1;
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
+ return 1;
}
}
}
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
- if (ske_expected < 0)
- return 0;
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
- if (ske_expected
- || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
- && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
/* Fall through */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
}
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
/* Fall through */
break;
}
+ err:
/* No valid transition found */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* Renegotiation - fall through */
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- /*
- * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
- * we will be sent
- */
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ /* Renegotiation - fall through */
+ case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ /*
+ * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
+ * we will be sent
+ */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
+ else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
- /*
- * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
- * sent, but no verify packet is sent
- */
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
- * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
- * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
- * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- }
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+ /*
+ * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
+ * sent, but no verify packet is sent
+ */
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
+ * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
+ * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
+ * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
+ } else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#else
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#endif
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#endif
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- }
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
}
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch(st->hand_state) {
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
}
break;
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
- return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
-
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->hit) {
s->init_num = 0;
- switch(st->hand_state) {
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch(st->hand_state) {
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
- return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- return s->max_cert_list;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ return s->max_cert_list;
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
- return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
- * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
- * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
- */
- return s->max_cert_list;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ /*
+ * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
+ * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
+ * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
+ */
+ return s->max_cert_list;
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return 3;
+ return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
}
return 0;
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
- return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
- return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+ return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch(st->hand_state) {
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
/* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned char *buf;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
+ unsigned char *p;
int i;
int protverr;
- unsigned long l;
- int al = 0;
+ int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+ PACKETW pkt, body, spkt;
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (!PACKETW_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
+ || !PACKETW_set_max_size(&pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ /* Should not happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
goto err;
}
- if ((sess == NULL) ||
- !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
+ if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
/*
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
* "ticket" without a session ID.
} else
i = 1;
- if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
- sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
+ if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
goto err;
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
- *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(&body, s->client_version, 2)
+ || !PACKETW_memcpy(&body, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i = 0;
else
i = s->session->session_id_length;
- *(p++) = i;
- if (i != 0) {
- if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
- p += i;
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)
+ || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&body, &spkt, 1)
+ || (i != 0 && !PACKETW_memcpy(&spkt, s->session->session_id, i))
+ || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+ if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
+ || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&body, &spkt, 1)
+ || !PACKETW_memcpy(&spkt, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)
+ || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
- memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
- p += s->d1->cookie_len;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
- i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ if (!PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&body, &spkt, 2)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
+ if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &spkt))
+ goto err;
+ if (!PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
- /*
- * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
- * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
- * use TLS v1.2
- */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
- && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
- i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
-#endif
- s2n(i, p);
- p += i;
/* COMPRESSION */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- *(p++) = 1;
-#else
-
- if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
- j = 0;
- else
- j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
- *(p++) = 1 + j;
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
- *(p++) = comp->id;
+ if (!PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&body, &spkt, 1)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
+ int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+ if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(&spkt, comp->id, 1)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
}
#endif
- *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
+ /* Add the NULL method */
+ if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(&spkt, 0, 1) || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
/* TLS extensions */
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
- if ((p =
- ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- &al)) == NULL) {
+ if (!PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&body, &spkt, 2)
+ /*
+ * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
+ * extensions length bytes
+ */
+ || !PACKETW_set_flags(&spkt,
+ OPENSSL_PACKETW_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)
+ || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, &spkt, &al)
+ || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- l = p - d;
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
+ if (!PACKETW_close(&body) || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
PACKET cookiepkt;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey),
- labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
- 0) <= 0)
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey),
+ labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
- && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
- (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
- && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
+ && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
+ (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
+ && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
return ret;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
- int al, j;
- long alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
-#endif
- PACKET save_param_start, signature;
-
- md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (md_ctx == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- save_param_start = *pkt;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
- s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
-#endif
-
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
- if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
- PACKET psk_identity_hint;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ PACKET psk_identity_hint;
- /*
- * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
- * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
- * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
- * identity.
- */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
- &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
}
- /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
/*
- * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
- * options
+ * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
+ * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
+ * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
+ * identity.
*/
- if (0) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
- BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
- PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
- || (s->srp_ctx.g =
- BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
- PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
- || (s->srp_ctx.s =
- BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
- PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
- || (s->srp_ctx.B =
- BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
- PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
+ &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
-/* We must check if there is a certificate */
- if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
- PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
- EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
- DH *dh = NULL;
- BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
+ PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.g =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
+ PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.s =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.B =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
+ PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ return 0;
+ }
- peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
- dh = DH_new();
+ /* We must check if there is a certificate */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto dherr;
- }
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
- p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
- g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator),
- NULL);
- bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
- NULL);
- if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto dherr;
- }
+static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
- if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
- goto dherr;
- }
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
- if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto dherr;
- }
- p = g = NULL;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto dherr;
- }
- bnpub_key = NULL;
+ peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ dh = DH_new();
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- goto dherr;
- }
+ if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto dherr;
- }
+ p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
+ g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL);
+ bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
+ NULL);
+ if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
+ if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- goto dhend;
- dherr:
- BN_free(p);
- BN_free(g);
- BN_free(bnpub_key);
- DH_free(dh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
- goto f_err;
- dhend:
- /*
- * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
- * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
- */
- if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ p = g = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- PACKET encoded_pt;
- const unsigned char *ecparams;
- int curve_nid;
+ if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ bnpub_key = NULL;
- /*
- * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
- * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
- * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /*
- * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
- * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
- */
- if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
- curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
- if (curve_nid == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
+ * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(bnpub_key);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
+
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ PACKET encoded_pt;
+ const unsigned char *ecparams;
+ int curve_nid;
+ unsigned int curve_flags;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
+ * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
+ * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
+ * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
+ */
+ if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
+
+ if (curve_nid == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
+ EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+ if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
+ } else {
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto f_err;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
+ }
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
- PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
- PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
+ PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ return 0;
+ }
- /*
- * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
- * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
- * and ECDSA.
- */
- if (0) ;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
-# endif
- /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ /*
+ * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
+ * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
+ * and ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al = -1;
+ long alg_k;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ PACKET save_param_start, signature;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ save_param_start = *pkt;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+ goto err;
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
PACKET params;
+ int maxsig;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
+
/*
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
* equals the length of the parameters.
PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const unsigned char *sigalgs;
int rv;
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
- if (rv == -1)
+ if (rv == -1) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ } else if (rv == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
- else if (rv == 0) {
- goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
- j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if (j < 0) {
+ maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (maxsig < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
/*
* Check signature length
*/
- if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
/* wrong packet length */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
}
+
+ md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
- PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
+ PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
- if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
- if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
+ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA_free(rsa);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-#endif
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ if (al != -1)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/* get the certificate types */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
goto done;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
/*
- * Remove the old session from the cache
+ * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
*/
- if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
- if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
- s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
- s->session);
- } else {
- /* We carry on if this fails */
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
- }
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
}
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
unsigned int type;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
- || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
/* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only applies to renegotiation */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
- && s->renegotiate != 0)
+ && s->renegotiate != 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
else
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
-int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al)
{
- unsigned char *p;
- int n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ /*
+ * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
+ * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
+ * strnlen.
+ */
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+ size_t identitylen = 0;
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
+ char *tmpidentity = NULL;
+ size_t psklen = 0;
+
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+
+ psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto err;
+ } else if (psklen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ identitylen = strlen(identity);
+ if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
+ if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
+ s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ tmppsk = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
+ tmpidentity = NULL;
+ s2n(identitylen, *p);
+ memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen);
+ *pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
+ *p += identitylen;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
+
+ return ret;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
#endif
- unsigned long alg_k;
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encoded_pt_len = 0;
-#endif
+ size_t enclen;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
- int psk_err = 1;
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
/*
- * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
- * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
- * strnlen.
+ * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
- char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
- size_t identitylen;
- unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
- size_t psklen;
-
- if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
-
- psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
- identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
- psk, sizeof(psk));
-
- if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- } else if (psklen == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
- goto memerr;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
- identitylen = strlen(identity);
- if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
- goto memerr;
- }
-
- s2n(identitylen, p);
- memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
- pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
- p += identitylen;
- psk_err = 0;
-psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
- if (psk_err != 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- n = 0;
- } else
-#endif
- /* Fool emacs indentation */
- if (0) {
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
- size_t enclen;
- pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
- if (pms == NULL)
- goto memerr;
-
- if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
- /*
- * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
+ pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
+ pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
- q = p;
- /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
- p += 2;
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
- goto err;
- }
- n = enclen;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- pctx = NULL;
+ q = *p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ *p += 2;
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *len = enclen;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = NULL;
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
- p[1]++;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
- tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
+ (*p)[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+ tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif
- /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- s2n(n, q);
- n += 2;
- }
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s2n(*len, q);
+ *len += 2;
}
+
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
- DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *pub_key;
- skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
- if (skey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
- dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
+}
- if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
+static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
+ skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+ dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
- /* send off the data */
- DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
- n = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(pub_key, p);
- n += 2;
+ if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
- ckey = NULL;
+ return 0;
}
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
+ *len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+ s2n(*len, *p);
+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);
+ *len += 2;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
#endif
+}
+static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
- skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
- if ((skey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
+ skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
- ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
- if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* Generate encoding of client key */
- encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- &encodedPoint, NULL);
+ /* Generate encoding of client key */
+ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
- if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
- ckey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ ckey = NULL;
- n = encoded_pt_len;
+ *len = encoded_pt_len;
- *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
- /* Encoded point will be copied here */
- p += 1;
- /* copy the point */
- memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
- /* increment n to account for length field */
- n += 1;
+ /* length of encoded point */
+ **p = *len;
+ *p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len);
+ /* increment len to account for length field */
+ *len += 1;
- /* Free allocated memory */
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
- /* GOST key exchange message creation */
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
- X509 *peer_cert;
- size_t msglen;
- unsigned int md_len;
- unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
- EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
- int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
- dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
-
-
- pmslen = 32;
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
- if (pms == NULL)
- goto memerr;
+ /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ size_t msglen;
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
+ int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
- /*
- * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
- */
- peer_cert = s->session->peer;
- if (!peer_cert) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
- goto err;
- }
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
+ dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
- if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
- * parameters match those of server certificate, use
- * certificate key for key exchange
- */
+ /*
+ * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
+ */
+ peer_cert = s->session->peer;
+ if (!peer_cert) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+ * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+ * certificate key for key exchange
+ */
- if (pkey_ctx == NULL
- || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
- /* Generate session key */
- || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- };
- /*
- * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
- (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
- /*
- * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
- * * would be used
- */
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
- /*
- * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
- * data
- */
- ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
- EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
- (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
- shared_ukm) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
- /*
- * Encapsulate it into sequence
- */
- *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
- msglen = 255;
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (msglen >= 0x80) {
- *(p++) = 0x81;
- *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
- n = msglen + 3;
- } else {
- *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
- n = msglen + 2;
- }
- memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
- /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
- (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
- /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+ pmslen = 32;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+ /* Generate session key */
+ || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ };
+ /*
+ * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
+ * * would be used
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
+ * data
+ */
+ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ukm_hash == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+ ukm_hash = NULL;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
}
+ /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+ /*
+ * Encapsulate it into sequence
+ */
+ *((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+ msglen = 255;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (msglen >= 0x80) {
+ *((*p)++) = 0x81;
+ *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
+ *len = msglen + 3;
+ } else {
+ *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
+ *len = msglen + 2;
+ }
+ memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen);
+ /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
+ NULL) > 0) {
+ /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
- /* send off the data */
- n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
- n += 2;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
+ /* send off the data */
+ *len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
+ s2n(*len, *p);
+ BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p);
+ *len += 2;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
#endif
- else {
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int len;
+ size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ int al = -1;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
+ && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ len = 0;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- n += pskhdrlen;
-#endif
+ len += pskhdrlen;
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (pms != NULL) {
- s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
- s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
- }
-
return 1;
- memerr:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
- OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ if (al != -1)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
return i;
}
-int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
- unsigned char *p)
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, PACKETW *pkt)
{
- int i, j = 0;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- unsigned char *q;
+ int i;
+ size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
- q = p;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
+# error Max cipher length too short
+# endif
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
+ * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
+ * use TLS v1.2
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+ else
+#endif
+ /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
+ maxlen = 0xfffe;
+
+ if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
+ maxlen -= 2;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+ maxlen -= 2;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
continue;
- j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
- p += j;
+
+ if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ totlen += len;
}
- /*
- * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
- * applicable SCSVs.
- */
- if (p != q) {
+
+ if (totlen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (totlen != 0) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
- j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
- p += j;
+ if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
- j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
- p += j;
+ if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
}
- return (p - q);
+ return 1;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff