/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
+#include <assert.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
-static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
return 1;
}
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
+# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
+#endif
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
+ /*
+ * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
+ * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
+ * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
+ * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
+ */
+ if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
break;
}
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
}
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
- return 1;
- }
}
break;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
return 1;
}
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
- return 1;
- }
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
err:
/* No valid transition found */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ BIO *rbio;
+
+ /*
+ * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
+ * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
+ */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
+ return 0;
+ }
SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
+ * we already sent close_notify
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
- && !s->hello_retry_request)
+ && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
else
st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
*/
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ /*
+ * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
+ * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
+ * because we did early data.
+ */
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
} else {
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
+
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
- s->first_packet = 1;
- }
-
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
- && s->max_early_data > 0
- && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
+ && s->max_early_data > 0) {
/*
* We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
* cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
* we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
*/
- if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
+ if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
}
+ /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
+ } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
+ s->first_packet = 1;
}
break;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
break;
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
&& s->max_early_data > 0) {
return WORK_MORE_B;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
+ if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
}
break;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
-
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
-
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
}
}
if (sess == NULL
- || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
+ || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
|| !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
- if (!s->hello_retry_request && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
+ && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
}
} else {
- i = s->hello_retry_request == 0;
+ i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
}
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
- if (!s->hello_retry_request
- && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
- sess_id_len) <= 0) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
+ && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
sess_id_len = 0;
}
} else {
+ assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
}
}
- if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
sess_id_len))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
PACKET session_id, extpkt;
size_t session_id_len;
const unsigned char *cipherchars;
+ int hrr = 0;
unsigned int compression;
unsigned int sversion;
unsigned int context;
- int discard;
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
}
/* load the server random */
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
+ if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
+ && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
+ s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
+ hrr = 1;
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
/* Get the session-id. */
}
/* TLS extensions */
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
} else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
goto err;
}
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
- &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
+ if (!hrr) {
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
+ &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
}
- if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
+ if (compression != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
+ || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
+ session_id_len) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hrr) {
+ if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
}
/*
goto err;
}
- if (compression != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
- || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
- session_id_len) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
- goto err;
- }
-
/* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
|| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& s->session->ext.tick_identity
!= TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
- s->session_ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
-static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
+ PACKET *extpkt)
{
- unsigned int sversion;
- const unsigned char *cipherchars;
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
- PACKET extpkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT clause before release */
- if (sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION && sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->hello_retry_request = 1;
/*
* If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
- /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
- || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
- /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
&extensions, NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
* ClientHello will not change
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
goto err;
}
* Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
* a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
*/
- if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
+ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
*/
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
+ SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
* Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
* server has sent an invalid curve.
*/
- if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
+ if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
+ || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0;
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
} else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
PACKET reqctx, extensions;
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
+ * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
+ * we just ignore it
+ */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
+
/* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
+ s->pha_context = NULL;
- /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
+ !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
PACKET sigalgs;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
+ /*
+ * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
+ * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
+ */
+ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
+ * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
+ * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
+ * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
+ * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
+ * client_cert_cb.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
PACKET nonce;
+ PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
+
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
|| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
- || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
- &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
+ : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
* cache.
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
- int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+
/*
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
* one
goto err;
}
- if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+ if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
+ && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
- * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
+ * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
+ * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
+ * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
*/
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
}
PACKET extpkt;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
- || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- &exts, NULL, 1)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
+ NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
goto err;
}
s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
+ s->session->not_resumable = 0;
/* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ size_t hashlen;
+ static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
+ nonce_label,
+ sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
+ PACKET_data(&nonce),
+ PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
+ s->session->master_key,
+ hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
+
OPENSSL_free(exts);
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
/* Generate session key
* TODO(size_t): Convert this function
*/
- || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
+ || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
- if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
+ if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
+ }
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ }
/* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
}
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
- * later
- */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
+ /* no context available, add 0-length context */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
int i;
size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
- ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
+ if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (sk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff