-/* ssl/statem/statem.c */
/*
- * Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include <assert.h>
/*
* This file implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS state machines.
* | Message flow state machine | | |
* | | | |
* | -------------------- -------------------- | Transition | Handshake state |
- * | | MSG_FLOW_READING | | MSG_FLOW_WRITING | | Event | machine |
+ * | | MSG_FLOW_READING | | MSG_FLOW_WRITING | | Event | machine |
* | | sub-state | | sub-state | |----------->| |
* | | machine for | | machine for | | | |
* | | reading messages | | writing messages | | | |
*/
/* Sub state machine return values */
-enum SUB_STATE_RETURN {
+typedef enum {
/* Something bad happened or NBIO */
SUB_STATE_ERROR,
/* Sub state finished go to the next sub state */
SUB_STATE_FINISHED,
/* Sub state finished and handshake was completed */
SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE
-};
+} SUB_STATE_RETURN;
static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server);
static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s);
-static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s);
+static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s);
static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s);
-static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s);
-static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
-static inline int key_exchange_skip_allowed(SSL *s);
-static int client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
-static enum WRITE_TRAN client_write_transition(SSL *s);
-static enum WORK_STATE client_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static enum WORK_STATE client_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static int client_construct_message(SSL *s);
-static unsigned long client_max_message_size(SSL *s);
-static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
-static enum WORK_STATE client_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static int server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
-static inline int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static inline int send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-static enum WRITE_TRAN server_write_transition(SSL *s);
-static enum WORK_STATE server_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static enum WORK_STATE server_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-static int server_construct_message(SSL *s);
-static unsigned long server_max_message_size(SSL *s);
-static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
-static enum WORK_STATE server_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
-
-
-enum HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
-{
- return ssl->statem.hand_state;
-}
+static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s);
-void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, enum HANDSHAKE_STATE state)
+OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_get_state(const SSL *ssl)
{
- /*
- * This function seems like a really bad idea. Should we remove it
- * completely?
- */
- ssl->statem.hand_state = state;
+ return ssl->statem.hand_state;
}
int SSL_in_init(SSL *s)
/*
* Clear the state machine state and reset back to MSG_FLOW_UNINITED
*/
-void statem_clear(SSL *s)
+void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s)
{
s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
s->statem.in_init = 1;
+ s->statem.no_cert_verify = 0;
}
/*
* Set the state machine up ready for a renegotiation handshake
*/
-void statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
- s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE;
s->statem.in_init = 1;
+ s->statem.request_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
}
/*
- * Put the state machine into an error state. This is a permanent error for
- * the current connection.
+ * Put the state machine into an error state and send an alert if appropriate.
+ * This is a permanent error for the current connection.
*/
-void statem_set_error(SSL *s)
+void ossl_statem_fatal(SSL *s, int al, int func, int reason, const char *file,
+ int line)
{
+ /* We shouldn't call SSLfatal() twice. Once is enough */
+ assert(s->statem.state != MSG_FLOW_ERROR);
+ s->statem.in_init = 1;
s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_ERROR;
+ ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SSL, func, reason, file, line);
+ if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
+/*
+ * This macro should only be called if we are already expecting to be in
+ * a fatal error state. We verify that we are, and set it if not (this would
+ * indicate a bug).
+ */
+#define check_fatal(s, f) \
+ do { \
+ if (!ossl_assert((s)->statem.in_init \
+ && (s)->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)) \
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, (f), \
+ SSL_R_MISSING_FATAL); \
+ } while (0)
+
/*
* Discover whether the current connection is in the error state.
*
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
-int statem_in_error(const SSL *s)
+int ossl_statem_in_error(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)
return 1;
return 0;
}
-void statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init)
+void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init)
{
s->statem.in_init = init;
}
-int statem_connect(SSL *s) {
+int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s)
+{
+ return s->statem.in_handshake;
+}
+
+void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand)
+{
+ if (inhand)
+ s->statem.in_handshake++;
+ else
+ s->statem.in_handshake--;
+}
+
+/* Are we in a sensible state to skip over unreadable early data? */
+int ossl_statem_skip_early_data(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!s->server || s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when we are in SSL_read*(), SSL_write*(), or SSL_accept()
+ * /SSL_connect()/SSL_do_handshake(). Used to test whether we are in an early
+ * data state and whether we should attempt to move the handshake on if so.
+ * |sending| is 1 if we are attempting to send data (SSL_write*()), 0 if we are
+ * attempting to read data (SSL_read*()), or -1 if we are in SSL_do_handshake()
+ * or similar.
+ */
+void ossl_statem_check_finish_init(SSL *s, int sending)
+{
+ if (sending == -1) {
+ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
+ || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA) {
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
+ /*
+ * SSL_connect() or SSL_do_handshake() has been called directly.
+ * We don't allow any more writing of early data.
+ */
+ s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (!s->server) {
+ if ((sending && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
+ || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING)
+ || (!sending && s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+ /*
+ * SSL_write() has been called directly. We don't allow any more
+ * writing of early data.
+ */
+ if (sending && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY)
+ s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
+ && s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s)
+{
+ s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
+ s->statem.in_init = 1;
+ /*
+ * This will get reset (briefly) back to TLS_ST_BEFORE when we enter
+ * state_machine() because |state| is MSG_FLOW_UNINITED, but until then any
+ * calls to SSL_in_before() will return false. Also calls to
+ * SSL_state_string() and SSL_state_string_long() will return something
+ * sensible.
+ */
+ s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+}
+
+int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s)
+{
return state_machine(s, 0);
}
-int statem_accept(SSL *s)
+int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s)
{
return state_machine(s, 1);
}
+typedef void (*info_cb) (const SSL *, int, int);
+
+static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ return s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ return s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/*
* The main message flow state machine. We start in the MSG_FLOW_UNINITED or
- * MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and
+ * MSG_FLOW_FINISHED state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and
* transitions are as follows:
*
- * MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE
+ * MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_FINISHED
* | |
* +-----------------------+
* v
* 1: Success
* <=0: NBIO or error
*/
-static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) {
+static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server)
+{
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
- unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret = -1;
int ssret;
return -1;
}
- RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+ cb = get_callback(s);
- s->in_handshake++;
+ st->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
- if (!SSL_clear(s))
+ /*
+ * If we are stateless then we already called SSL_clear() - don't do
+ * it again and clear the STATELESS flag itself.
+ */
+ if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0 && !SSL_clear(s))
return -1;
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
/*
* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
- * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+ * identifier other than 0.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
- s->in_handshake, NULL);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /*
- * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
- * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
- * handshakes anyway.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ st->in_handshake, NULL);
}
#endif
/* Initialise state machine */
-
- if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- if (!server)
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
- }
-
- if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
+ if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED
+ || st->state == MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) {
if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
+ st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
}
s->server = server;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+ /*
+ * Fatal errors in this block don't send an alert because we have
+ * failed to even initialise properly. Sending an alert is probably
+ * doomed to failure.
+ */
+
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
- (server
- || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ (server || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
} else {
- if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
- && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
}
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION &&
- !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
- goto end;
- }
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto end;
}
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
s->init_num = 0;
*/
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- if (!server || st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
- /*
- * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with
- * SCTP
- */
+ /*
+ * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with
+ * SCTP
+ */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
#endif
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, server ? 1 : 0)) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- }
-
- if (server) {
- if (st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
- } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- !(s->options &
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- /*
- * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
- * support secure renegotiation.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
- } else {
- /*
- * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
- * HelloRequest
- */
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
}
- } else {
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
-
- /* mark client_random uninitialized */
- memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
- s->hit = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- st->use_timer = 1;
+ if ((SSL_in_before(s))
+ || s->renegotiate) {
+ if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto end;
}
+
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ st->read_state_first_init = 1;
}
st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING;
init_write_state_machine(s);
- st->read_state_first_init = 1;
}
- while(st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) {
- if(st->state == MSG_FLOW_READING) {
+ while (st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) {
+ if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_READING) {
ssret = read_state_machine(s);
if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) {
st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING;
}
} else {
/* Error */
- statem_set_error(s);
+ check_fatal(s, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
goto end;
}
}
- st->state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
ret = 1;
end:
- s->in_handshake--;
+ st->in_handshake--;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
/*
* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream
- * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+ * identifier other than 0.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
- s->in_handshake, NULL);
+ st->in_handshake, NULL);
}
#endif
*/
static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
}
+static int grow_init_buf(SSL *s, size_t size) {
+
+ size_t msg_offset = (char *)s->init_msg - s->init_buf->data;
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)size))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (size < msg_offset)
+ return 0;
+
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + msg_offset;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in
* MSG_FLOW_READING. The valid sub-states and transitions are:
* READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS is an optional step that may occur if some post
* processing activity performed on the message may block.
*
- * Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occuring in which case
+ * Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occurring in which case
* control returns to the calling application. When this function is recalled we
* will resume in the same state where we left off.
*/
-static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) {
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret, mt;
- unsigned long len;
- int (*transition)(SSL *s, int mt);
+ size_t len = 0;
+ int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt);
PACKET pkt;
- enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN (*process_message)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
- enum WORK_STATE (*post_process_message)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
- unsigned long (*max_message_size)(SSL *s);
+ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
+ WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+ size_t (*max_message_size) (SSL *s);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+ cb = get_callback(s);
- if(s->server) {
- transition = server_read_transition;
- process_message = server_process_message;
- max_message_size = server_max_message_size;
- post_process_message = server_post_process_message;
+ if (s->server) {
+ transition = ossl_statem_server_read_transition;
+ process_message = ossl_statem_server_process_message;
+ max_message_size = ossl_statem_server_max_message_size;
+ post_process_message = ossl_statem_server_post_process_message;
} else {
- transition = client_read_transition;
- process_message = client_process_message;
- max_message_size = client_max_message_size;
- post_process_message = client_post_process_message;
+ transition = ossl_statem_client_read_transition;
+ process_message = ossl_statem_client_process_message;
+ max_message_size = ossl_statem_client_max_message_size;
+ post_process_message = ossl_statem_client_post_process_message;
}
if (st->read_state_first_init) {
st->read_state_first_init = 0;
}
- while(1) {
- switch(st->read_state) {
+ while (1) {
+ switch (st->read_state) {
case READ_STATE_HEADER:
- s->init_num = 0;
/* Get the state the peer wants to move to */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move
* to that state if so
*/
- if(!transition(s, mt)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ if (!transition(s, mt)) {
+ check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
+ SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* dtls_get_message already did this */
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && s->s3->tmp.message_size > 0
+ && !grow_init_buf(s, s->s3->tmp.message_size
+ + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
s->first_packet = 0;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
ret = process_message(s, &pkt);
- if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_ERROR) {
+
+ /* Discard the packet data */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR:
+ check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
- }
- if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING) {
+ case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
- }
- if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING) {
+ case MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS;
st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
- } else {
+ break;
+
+ default:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
+ break;
}
break;
case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS:
st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work);
- switch(st->read_state_work) {
- default:
+ switch (st->read_state_work) {
+ case WORK_ERROR:
+ check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE);
+ /* Fall through */
+ case WORK_MORE_A:
+ case WORK_MORE_B:
+ case WORK_MORE_C:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- statem_set_error(s);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
*/
static int statem_do_write(SSL *s)
{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
- || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) {
+ || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
else
*/
static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION;
}
* WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION transitions the state of the handshake state machine
* WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK performs any work necessary to prepare the later
- * sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occuring in
+ * sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occurring in
* which case control returns to the calling application. When this function
* is recalled we will resume in the same state where we left off.
*
* message has been completed. As for WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK this could also
* result in an NBIO event.
*/
-static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s)
+static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret;
- enum WRITE_TRAN (*transition)(SSL *s);
- enum WORK_STATE (*pre_work)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
- enum WORK_STATE (*post_work)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
- int (*construct_message)(SSL *s);
+ WRITE_TRAN(*transition) (SSL *s);
+ WORK_STATE(*pre_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+ WORK_STATE(*post_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
+ int (*get_construct_message_f) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ int (**confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt),
+ int *mt);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int (*confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
+ int mt;
+ WPACKET pkt;
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+ cb = get_callback(s);
- if(s->server) {
- transition = server_write_transition;
- pre_work = server_pre_work;
- post_work = server_post_work;
- construct_message = server_construct_message;
+ if (s->server) {
+ transition = ossl_statem_server_write_transition;
+ pre_work = ossl_statem_server_pre_work;
+ post_work = ossl_statem_server_post_work;
+ get_construct_message_f = ossl_statem_server_construct_message;
} else {
- transition = client_write_transition;
- pre_work = client_pre_work;
- post_work = client_post_work;
- construct_message = client_construct_message;
+ transition = ossl_statem_client_write_transition;
+ pre_work = ossl_statem_client_pre_work;
+ post_work = ossl_statem_client_post_work;
+ get_construct_message_f = ossl_statem_client_construct_message;
}
- while(1) {
- switch(st->write_state) {
+ while (1) {
+ switch (st->write_state) {
case WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION:
if (cb != NULL) {
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
else
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
}
- switch(transition(s)) {
+ switch (transition(s)) {
case WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE:
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK;
st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
break;
- default:
+ case WRITE_TRAN_ERROR:
+ check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
break;
case WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK:
- switch(st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
- default:
+ switch (st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
+ case WORK_ERROR:
+ check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE);
+ /* Fall through */
+ case WORK_MORE_A:
+ case WORK_MORE_B:
+ case WORK_MORE_C:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
}
- if(construct_message(s) == 0)
+ if (!get_construct_message_f(s, &pkt, &confunc, &mt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_DUMMY) {
+ /* Skip construction and sending. This isn't a "real" state */
+ st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK;
+ st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
+ || !ssl_set_handshake_header(s, &pkt, mt)) {
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (confunc != NULL && !confunc(s, &pkt)) {
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE);
+ return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt, mt)
+ || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
+ }
/* Fall through */
/* Fall through */
case WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK:
- switch(st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
- default:
+ switch (st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
+ case WORK_ERROR:
+ check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE);
+ /* Fall through */
+ case WORK_MORE_A:
+ case WORK_MORE_B:
+ case WORK_MORE_C:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
break;
default:
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
/*
* Flush the write BIO
*/
-static int statem_flush(SSL *s)
+int statem_flush(SSL *s)
{
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
/*
* Called by the record layer to determine whether application data is
- * allowed to be sent in the current handshake state or not.
+ * allowed to be received in the current handshake state or not.
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes (application data allowed)
* 0: No (application data not allowed)
*/
-int statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s)
+int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s)
{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE)
+ if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED)
return 0;
if (!s->s3->in_read_app_data || (s->s3->total_renegotiations == 0))
* ServerHello yet then we allow app data
*/
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
- || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO)
+ || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO)
return 1;
} else {
/*
return 0;
}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-/*
- * Set flag used by SCTP to determine whether we are in the read sock state
- */
-void statem_set_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s, int read_sock)
-{
- s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock = read_sock;
-}
-
-/*
- * Called by the record layer to determine whether we are in the read sock
- * state or not.
- *
- * Return values are:
- * 1: Yes (we are in the read sock state)
- * 0: No (we are not in the read sock state)
- */
-int statem_in_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s)
-{
- return s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock;
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
- *
- * Return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
-static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
-{
- /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Are we allowed to skip the ServerKeyExchange message?
- *
- * Return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
-static inline int key_exchange_skip_allowed(SSL *s)
-{
- long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /*
- * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
- * ciphersuite.
- */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
- * state transitions when the client is reading messages from the server. The
- * message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
- * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
- *
- * Return values are:
- * 1: Success (transition allowed)
- * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
- */
-static int client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
- st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
- return 1;
- }
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
- st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- return 1;
- } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
- & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- } else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
- && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- } else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- } else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
- return 1;
- } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /* No valid transition found */
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
- * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
- * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
+ * This function returns 1 if TLS exporter is ready to export keying
+ * material, or 0 if otherwise.
*/
-static enum WRITE_TRAN client_write_transition(SSL *s)
+int ossl_statem_export_allowed(SSL *s)
{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* Renegotiation - fall through */
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- /*
- * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
- * we will be sent
- */
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
-
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
- /*
- * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
- * sent, but no verify packet is sent
- */
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
- * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
- * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
- * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- }
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
-#else
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
-#endif
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-#endif
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- }
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
- * the client to the server.
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE client_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
- return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
- * messages unless we need to.
- */
- st->use_timer = 0;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
- return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
-#endif
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
-
- default:
- /* No pre work to be done */
- break;
- }
-
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
- * client to the server.
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE client_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
-#endif
- /*
- * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
- */
- if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- }
-#endif
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
- s->first_packet = 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
- if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
- return WORK_ERROR;
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
-#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
- else
- s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
- return WORK_ERROR;
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
- return WORK_ERROR;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
-
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_B;
-
- if (s->hit && tls_finish_handshake(s, WORK_MORE_A) != 1)
- return WORK_ERROR;
- break;
-
- default:
- /* No post work to be done */
- break;
- }
-
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Success
- * 0: Error
- */
-static int client_construct_message(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
- return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
- return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
- return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
- else
- return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
- return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
-#endif
- case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
- return tls_construct_finished(s,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* The spec allows for a longer length than this, but we limit it */
-#define HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 258
-#define SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 20000
-#define SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 102400
-#define SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH 0
-#define CCS_MAX_LENGTH 1
-/* Max should actually be 36 but we are generous */
-#define FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH 64
-
-/*
- * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
- * reading. Excludes the message header.
- */
-static unsigned long client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
- return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- return s->max_cert_list;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
- return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
- */
-static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
- return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
-
- case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
- return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
- return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
- return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
- * from the server
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE client_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
- /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
- if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- }
- statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
- return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
-#endif
-
- case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
- if (!s->hit)
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
- else
- return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return WORK_ERROR;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
- * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
- * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
- * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Success (transition allowed)
- * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
- */
-static int server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- /*
- * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
- * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
- * OR
- * 2) If we did request one then
- * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
- * AND
- * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
- * list if we requested a certificate)
- */
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
- && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
- || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- /*
- * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
- * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
- * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
- * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
- * the case of static DH). In that case |s->no_cert_verify| should be
- * set.
- */
- if (s->session->peer == NULL || s->no_cert_verify) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- /*
- * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
- * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
- * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
- * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
- */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
-#endif
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- }
-#endif
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /* No valid transition found */
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
-static inline int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /*
- * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH, fortezza or RSA but we have a
- * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
- * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
- * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
- * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
- * key exchange.
- */
- if ( (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
- || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
- || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
- [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
- 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- )
- )
- )
- /*
- * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
- * provided
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
- || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
- && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
- /* For other PSK always send SKE */
- || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
- || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-#endif
- ) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
-static inline int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-{
- if (
- /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
- s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
- /*
- * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
- * during re-negotiation:
- */
- && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
- /*
- * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
- * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
- * RFC 2246):
- */
- && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
- /*
- * ... except when the application insists on
- * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
- * this for SSL 3)
- */
- || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
- /*
- * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
- * are omitted
- */
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
- * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
- */
-static enum WRITE_TRAN server_write_transition(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
-
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
- st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- } else {
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
- /* normal PSK or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
- (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
- } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
- } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
- }
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
- if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
- if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- }
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
- * the server to the client.
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE server_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
- break;
-
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
- /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
- st->use_timer = 0;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
- * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
- */
- st->use_timer = 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
- return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
-#endif
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
- * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
- */
- st->use_timer = 0;
- }
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- statem_set_error(s);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
- * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
- * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
- * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
- */
- st->use_timer = 0;
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
-
- default:
- /* No pre work to be done */
- break;
- }
-
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
- * server to the client.
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE server_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- break;
-
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- /*
- * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
- * treat like it was the first packet
- */
- s->first_packet = 1;
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
- unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
- char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
-
- /*
- * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
- * SCTP used.
- */
- snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
- DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
- if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
- statem_set_error(s);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
-
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
- }
-#endif
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
- statem_set_error(s);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- break;
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
- break;
-
- default:
- /* No post work to be done */
- break;
- }
-
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Success
- * 0: Error
- */
-static int server_construct_message(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
- return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- return tls_construct_server_done(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
- return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
- else
- return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
-
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- return tls_construct_finished(s,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
-#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
-
-/*
- * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
- * reading. Excludes the message header.
- */
-static unsigned long server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
- return s->max_cert_list;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
- return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
-#endif
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
- return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
- return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
- */
-static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
- return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
- return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
-#endif
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
- return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
- return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
-
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- break;
- }
-
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
- * from the client
- */
-static enum WORK_STATE server_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
-{
- STATEM *st = &s->statem;
-
- switch(st->hand_state) {
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
- BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
- /* Are we renegotiating? */
- && s->renegotiate
- && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- } else {
- statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
- }
-#endif
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
-
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit)
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
- else
- return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return WORK_ERROR;
+ return s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0
+ && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff