*/
#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
-static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al);
+static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al);
+static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al);
+static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#endif
static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx,
- int *al);
+ size_t chainidx);
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
-static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
-static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
+static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
+static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
/* Structure to define a built-in extension */
typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
int (*init)(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
/* Parse extension sent from client to server */
int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ size_t chainidx);
/* Parse extension send from server to client */
int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ size_t chainidx);
/* Construct extension sent from server to client */
EXT_RETURN (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
/* Construct extension sent from client to server */
EXT_RETURN (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
/*
* Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was
* initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if
* the extension was seen, or 0 otherwise.
*/
- int (*final)(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+ int (*final)(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
} EXTENSION_DEFINITION;
/*
* extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version.
*
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we have a test to check the consistency of these
+ *
+ * NOTE: WebSphere Application Server 7+ cannot handle empty extensions at
+ * the end, keep these extensions before signature_algorithm.
*/
#define INVALID_EXTENSION { 0x10000, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
tls_construct_stoc_server_name, tls_construct_ctos_server_name,
final_server_name
},
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ NULL, tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen, tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen,
+ tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen, tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen,
+ final_maxfragmentlen
+ },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,
tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket,
tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket, NULL
},
- {
- TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
- SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
- tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
- tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
- },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems,
tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems
},
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
+ tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
+ tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
+ },
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
*/
int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx)
{
+ int is_tls13;
+
+ /*
+ * For HRR we haven't selected the version yet but we know it will be
+ * TLSv1.3
+ */
+ if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0)
+ is_tls13 = 1;
+ else
+ is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
+
if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
+ || (is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
+ || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->hit && (extctx & SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION) != 0))
return 0;
* extensions that we know about. We ignore others.
*/
int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context,
- RAW_EXTENSION **res, int *al, size_t *len,
- int init)
+ RAW_EXTENSION **res, size_t *len, int init)
{
PACKET extensions = *packet;
size_t i = 0;
num_exts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0);
raw_extensions = OPENSSL_zalloc(num_exts * sizeof(*raw_extensions));
if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
/*
|| (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
&& (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
&& PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
idx = thisex - raw_extensions;
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
&& (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION);
- *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
+ SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
if (thisex != NULL) {
thisex->present = 1;
thisex->type = type;
thisex->received_order = i++;
+ if (s->ext.debug_cb)
+ s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, thisex->type,
+ PACKET_data(&thisex->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&thisex->data),
+ s->ext.debug_arg);
}
}
if (thisexd->init != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
&& extension_is_relevant(s, thisexd->context, context)
&& !thisexd->init(s, context)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
* this counted as success.
*/
int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context,
- RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &exts[idx];
int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al) = NULL;
+ size_t chainidx) = NULL;
/* Skip if the extension is not present */
if (!currext->present)
return 1;
- if (s->ext.debug_cb)
- s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, currext->type,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
- s->ext.debug_arg);
-
/* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */
if (currext->parsed)
return 1;
parser = s->server ? extdef->parse_ctos : extdef->parse_stoc;
if (parser != NULL)
- return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx, al);
+ return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx);
/*
* If the parser is NULL we fall through to the custom extension
}
/* Parse custom extensions */
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, context, currext->type,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
- x, chainidx, al) <= 0)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
+ return custom_ext_parse(s, context, currext->type,
+ PACKET_data(&currext->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
+ x, chainidx);
}
/*
* failure, |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
*/
int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al, int fin)
+ size_t chainidx, int fin)
{
size_t i, numexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
/* Parse each extension in turn */
for (i = 0; i < numexts; i++) {
- if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx, al))
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
+ }
}
if (fin) {
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
i++, thisexd++) {
if (thisexd->final != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
- && !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present, al))
+ && !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
+ }
}
}
* them to |pkt|. If this is an extension for a Certificate in a Certificate
* message, then |x| will be set to the Certificate we are handling, and
* |chainidx| will indicate the position in the chainidx we are processing (with
- * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If a
- * failure occurs then |al| is populated with a suitable alert code. On a
+ * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On a
* failure construction stops at the first extension to fail to construct.
*/
int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t i;
- int min_version, max_version = 0, reason, tmpal;
+ int min_version, max_version = 0, reason;
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
- /*
- * Normally if something goes wrong during construction it's an internal
- * error. We can always override this later.
- */
- tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/*
* If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
- * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello in SSLv3
+ * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello
+ * (for non-TLSv1.3).
*/
|| ((context &
(SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0
- && s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt,
WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
if (reason != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, reason);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
+ reason);
+ return 0;
}
}
/* Add custom extensions first */
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
- /* On the server side with initiase during ClientHello parsing */
+ /* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
}
- if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version, &tmpal)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
}
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) {
EXT_RETURN (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN ret;
/* Skip if not relevant for our context */
if (construct == NULL)
continue;
- ret = construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx, &tmpal);
- if (ret == EXT_RETURN_FAIL)
- goto err;
+ ret = construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx);
+ if (ret == EXT_RETURN_FAIL) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
if (ret == EXT_RETURN_SENT
&& (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
return 1;
-
- err:
- *al = tmpal;
- return 0;
}
/*
* of a failure then |*al| is populated with a suitable error code.
*/
-static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al)
+static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!s->server) {
/*
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
&& !sent) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
if (s->renegotiate
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
&& !sent) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al)
+static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, discard;
int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0;
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
+ if (!sent) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
+ s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we switched contexts (whether here or in the client_hello callback),
+ * move the sess_accept increment from the session_ctx to the new
+ * context, to avoid the confusing situation of having sess_accept_good
+ * exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) {
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &discard,
+ s->ctx->lock);
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, -1, &discard,
+ s->session_ctx->lock);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we're expecting to send a ticket, and tickets were previously enabled,
+ * and now tickets are disabled, then turn off expected ticket.
+ * Also, if this is not a resumption, create a new session ID
+ */
+ if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && s->ext.ticket_expected
+ && was_ticket && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0) {
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ SSL_SESSION* ss = SSL_get_session(s);
+
+ if (ss != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick);
+ ss->ext.tick = NULL;
+ ss->ext.ticklen = 0;
+ ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+ ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0;
+ ss->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+ if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- *al = altmp;
+ SSLfatal(s, altmp, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
return 0;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- *al = altmp;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
return 1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al)
+static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
break;
}
if (i == s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
- SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
+ SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
-static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
- const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
- unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+ if (!s->server && !sent && s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
- if (!s->server)
+ if (!s->server || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
- if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
- int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
- s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
-
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
-#endif
- } else if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
- /* Behave as if no callback was present. */
- return 1;
- } else {
- *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
+ /*
+ * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
+ * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
+ * we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data.
+ * In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now.
+ * For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation.
+ *
+ * On failure SSLfatal() already called.
+ */
+ return tls_handle_alpn(s);
}
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
return 1;
}
-static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!s->server && s->hit) {
/*
*/
if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
!(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_EMS, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
return 0;
}
}
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !construct_ca_names(s, pkt)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
- if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, al))
+ if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
-static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit) {
- *al = TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
+ SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
- *al = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/*
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
!= 0)) {
- const unsigned char *pcurves, *pcurvestmp, *clntcurves;
- size_t num_curves, clnt_num_curves, i;
+ const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups;
+ size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i;
unsigned int group_id = 0;
/* Check if a shared group exists */
/* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Get our list of available groups */
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
+ tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
/* Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list */
- for (i = 0, pcurvestmp = pcurves; i < num_curves;
- i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
- group_id = bytestogroup(pcurvestmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+ group_id = pgroups[i];
- if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 1))
+ if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 1))
break;
}
- if (i < num_curves) {
+ if (i < num_groups) {
/* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
s->hello_retry_request = 1;
if (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
- if (!sent)
- *al = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
- else
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ SSLfatal(s,
+ sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
+ SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
}
* processing).
*/
if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *early_secret;
+ unsigned char tmppsk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *early_secret, *psk;
const char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
const char external_label[] = "ext binder";
+ const char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
const char *label;
size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
int ret = -1;
+ int usepskfored = 0;
+
+ if (external
+ && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
+ && sess->ext.max_early_data > 0)
+ usepskfored = 1;
if (external) {
label = external_label;
labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1;
}
+ if (sess->master_key_length != hashsize) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (external) {
+ psk = sess->master_key;
+ } else {
+ psk = tmppsk;
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, sess->master_key,
+ (const unsigned char *)nonce_label,
+ sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, sess->ext.tick_nonce,
+ sess->ext.tick_nonce_len, psk, hashsize)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to
* resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client
- * side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK so that it
- * is in place for sending early data. For client side external PSK we
+ * side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK or external PSK
+ * that will be used for early_data so that it is in place for sending early
+ * data. For client side external PSK not being used for early_data we
* generate it but store it away for later use.
*/
- if (s->server || !external)
+ if (s->server || !external || usepskfored)
early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret;
else
early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret;
- if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
- sess->master_key_length, early_secret)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, psk, hashsize, early_secret)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (mctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Generate the binder key */
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, (unsigned char *)label,
labelsize, hash, hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Generate the finished key */
if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)
|| !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
hdatalen -= PACKET_remaining(&hashprefix);
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize);
if (mackey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0
|| bindersize != hashsize) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */
ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0);
+ if (!ret)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ SSL_R_BINDER_DOES_NOT_VERIFY);
}
err:
return ret;
}
-static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
- if (!s->server || !sent)
+ if (!sent)
return 1;
+ if (!s->server) {
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ && sent
+ && !s->ext.early_data_ok) {
+ /*
+ * If we get here then the server accepted our early_data but we
+ * later realised that it shouldn't have done (e.g. inconsistent
+ * ALPN)
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EARLY_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (s->max_early_data == 0
|| !s->hit
|| s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
|| s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
|| !s->ext.early_data_ok
- || s->hello_retry_request
- || s->s3->alpn_selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
- || (s->s3->alpn_selected_len > 0
- && memcmp(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len) != 0)) {
+ || s->hello_retry_request) {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
} else {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
+
+static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
+{
+ /*
+ * Session resumption on server-side with MFL extension active
+ * BUT MFL extension packet was not resent (i.e. sent == 0)
+ */
+ if (s->server && s->hit && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
+ && !sent ) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Current SSL buffer is lower than requested MFL */
+ if (s->session && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
+ && s->max_send_fragment < GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session))
+ /* trigger a larger buffer reallocation */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}