/*
- * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
-
static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
/* Structure to define a built-in extension */
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
init_status_request, tls_parse_ctos_status_request,
tls_parse_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_stoc_status_request,
tls_construct_ctos_status_request, NULL
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
NULL,
/*
* No server side support for this, but can be provided by a custom
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
- SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
- | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY,
NULL,
/* Processed inline as part of version selection */
NULL, tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions,
{
/*
* Special unsolicited ServerHello extension only used when
- * SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set
+ * SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set. We allow it in a ClientHello but
+ * ignore it.
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data,
tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data,
final_early_data
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
+ /*
+ * Note that SSL_IS_TLS13() means "TLS 1.3 has been negotiated",
+ * which is never true when generating the ClientHello.
+ * However, version negotiation *has* occurred by the time the
+ * ClientHello extensions are being parsed.
+ * Be careful to allow TLS 1.3-only extensions when generating
+ * the ClientHello.
+ */
|| (is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
- || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
+ || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
+ && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0)
+ || (s->server && !is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->hit && (extctx & SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION) != 0))
return 0;
-
return 1;
}
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
- && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) {
+ && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ && !((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
+ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug)
+#endif
+ ) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION);
goto err;
return 0;
/* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
- if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
- || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
- && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0)
+ if (!extension_is_relevant(s, extctx, thisctx)
|| ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
&& (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
&& (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)))
}
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
- reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
reason);
static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- if (s->server)
+ if (s->server) {
s->servername_done = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
+ s->ext.hostname = NULL;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, discard;
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0;
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->ctx->ext.servername_arg);
- else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
- && s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
+ else if (s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
- if (!sent) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
- s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
+ /*
+ * For servers, propagate the SNI hostname from the temporary
+ * storage in the SSL to the persistent SSL_SESSION, now that we
+ * know we accepted it.
+ * Clients make this copy when parsing the server's response to
+ * the extension, which is when they find out that the negotiation
+ * was successful.
+ */
+ if (s->server) {
+ /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) revisit !sent case */
+ if (sent && ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
+ /* Only store the hostname in the session if we accepted it. */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
+ s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
+ if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL && s->ext.hostname != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
}
/*
* exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context.
*/
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) {
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &discard,
- s->ctx->lock);
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, -1, &discard,
- s->session_ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+ tsan_decr(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
}
/*
return 0;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
+ /* TLSv1.3 doesn't have warning alerts so we suppress this */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
return 1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
- const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = get_ca_names(s);
if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, ca_sk, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char tmppsk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *early_secret, *psk;
- const char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
- const char external_label[] = "ext binder";
- const char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
- const char *label;
- size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ unsigned char *early_secret;
+ static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
+ static const unsigned char external_label[] = "ext binder";
+ const unsigned char *label;
+ size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize;
+ int hashsizei = EVP_MD_size(md);
int ret = -1;
int usepskfored = 0;
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashsizei >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashsize = (size_t)hashsizei;
+
if (external
&& s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1;
}
- if (sess->master_key_length != hashsize) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
- SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (external) {
- psk = sess->master_key;
- } else {
- psk = tmppsk;
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, sess->master_key,
- (const unsigned char *)nonce_label,
- sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, sess->ext.tick_nonce,
- sess->ext.tick_nonce_len, psk, hashsize)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
/*
* Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to
* resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client
early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret;
else
early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret;
- if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, psk, hashsize, early_secret)) {
+
+ if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
+ sess->master_key_length, early_secret)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
/* Generate the binder key */
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, (unsigned char *)label,
- labelsize, hash, hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, label, labelsize, hash,
+ hashsize, binderkey, hashsize, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
*/
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
size_t hdatalen;
+ long hdatalen_l;
void *hdata;
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ hdatalen = hdatalen_l =
+ BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen_l <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
goto err;
}
- mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize);
+ mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey,
+ hashsize);
if (mackey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|| s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
|| s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
|| !s->ext.early_data_ok
- || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
+ || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
+ || (s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb != NULL
+ && !s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb(s,
+ s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data))) {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
} else {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;