/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
-static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al);
+static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al);
+static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al);
+static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#endif
static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx);
+static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
-static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
+static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
+static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
/* Structure to define a built-in extension */
typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
int (*init)(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
/* Parse extension sent from client to server */
int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ size_t chainidx);
/* Parse extension send from server to client */
int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ size_t chainidx);
/* Construct extension sent from server to client */
- int (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ EXT_RETURN (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
/* Construct extension sent from client to server */
- int (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ EXT_RETURN (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
/*
* Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was
* initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if
* the extension was seen, or 0 otherwise.
*/
- int (*final)(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+ int (*final)(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
} EXTENSION_DEFINITION;
/*
* Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order
- * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
+ * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
* indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_locl.h.
* Each extension has an initialiser, a client and
* server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the
* extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version.
*
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we have a test to check the consistency of these
+ *
+ * NOTE: WebSphere Application Server 7+ cannot handle empty extensions at
+ * the end, keep these extensions before signature_algorithm.
*/
#define INVALID_EXTENSION { 0x10000, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED
- | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate, tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate,
tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate, tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate,
final_renegotiate
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
init_server_name,
tls_parse_ctos_server_name, tls_parse_stoc_server_name,
tls_construct_stoc_server_name, tls_construct_ctos_server_name,
final_server_name
},
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ NULL, tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen, tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen,
+ tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen, tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen,
+ final_maxfragmentlen
+ },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_srp, tls_parse_ctos_srp, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_srp, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
- {
- TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data_info,
- EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- NULL, NULL, tls_parse_stoc_early_data_info,
- tls_construct_stoc_early_data_info, NULL, NULL
- },
- {
- TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data,
- tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data, NULL
- },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
final_ec_pt_formats
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups, NULL,
- NULL /* TODO(TLS1.3): Need to add this */,
+ tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups,
tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups, NULL
},
#else
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_session_ticket, tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket,
tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket,
tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket, NULL
},
- {
- TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, NULL, NULL,
- tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
- },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
init_status_request, tls_parse_ctos_status_request,
tls_parse_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_stoc_status_request,
tls_construct_ctos_status_request, NULL
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_npn, tls_parse_ctos_npn, tls_parse_stoc_npn,
tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg, tls_construct_ctos_npn, NULL
},
* happens after server_name callbacks
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
init_alpn, tls_parse_ctos_alpn, tls_parse_stoc_alpn,
tls_construct_stoc_alpn, tls_construct_ctos_alpn, final_alpn
},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | EXT_DTLS_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY,
init_srtp, tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp, tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp,
tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp, tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp, NULL
},
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY | EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_etm, tls_parse_ctos_etm, tls_parse_stoc_etm,
tls_construct_stoc_etm, tls_construct_ctos_etm, NULL
},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
NULL,
/*
* No server side support for this, but can be provided by a custom
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems,
tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems
},
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
+ tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
+ tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
+ },
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY,
NULL,
/* Processed inline as part of version selection */
- NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL
+ NULL, tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions,
+ tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions,
+ tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
init_psk_kex_modes, tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL, NULL,
tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL
},
* been parsed before we do this one.
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_key_share, tls_parse_stoc_key_share,
tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share,
final_key_share
},
#endif
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ NULL, NULL, tls_parse_stoc_cookie, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_cookie,
+ NULL
+ },
{
/*
* Special unsolicited ServerHello extension only used when
* SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug,
- EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL
},
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data,
+ tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data,
+ final_early_data
+ },
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ init_certificate_authorities,
+ tls_parse_certificate_authorities, tls_parse_certificate_authorities,
+ tls_construct_certificate_authorities,
+ tls_construct_certificate_authorities, NULL,
+ },
{
/* Must be immediately before pre_shared_key */
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Fix me */
TLSEXT_TYPE_padding,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
NULL,
/* We send this, but don't read it */
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_padding, NULL
{
/* Required by the TLSv1.3 spec to always be the last extension */
TLSEXT_TYPE_psk,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_psk, tls_parse_stoc_psk, tls_construct_stoc_psk,
tls_construct_ctos_psk, NULL
}
};
+/* Check whether an extension's context matches the current context */
+static int validate_context(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx)
+{
+ /* Check we're allowed to use this extension in this context */
+ if ((thisctx & extctx) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_ONLY) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_validate_all_contexts(SSL *s, unsigned int thisctx, RAW_EXTENSION *exts)
+{
+ size_t i, num_exts, builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs), offset;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *thisext;
+ unsigned int context;
+ ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH;
+
+ if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
+ role = ENDPOINT_SERVER;
+ else if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0)
+ role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
+
+ /* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */
+ num_exts = builtin_num + s->cert->custext.meths_count;
+
+ for (thisext = exts, i = 0; i < num_exts; i++, thisext++) {
+ if (!thisext->present)
+ continue;
+
+ if (i < builtin_num) {
+ context = ext_defs[i].context;
+ } else {
+ custom_ext_method *meth = NULL;
+
+ meth = custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, thisext->type,
+ &offset);
+ if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL))
+ return 0;
+ context = meth->context;
+ }
+
+ if (!validate_context(s, context, thisctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Verify whether we are allowed to use the extension |type| in the current
* |context|. Returns 1 to indicate the extension is allowed or unknown or 0 to
* indicate the extension is not allowed. If returning 1 then |*found| is set to
- * 1 if we found a definition for the extension, and |*idx| is set to its index
+ * the definition for the extension we found.
*/
static int verify_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int type,
custom_ext_methods *meths, RAW_EXTENSION *rawexlist,
for (i = 0, thisext = ext_defs; i < builtin_num; i++, thisext++) {
if (type == thisext->type) {
- /* Check we're allowed to use this extension in this context */
- if ((context & thisext->context) == 0)
+ if (!validate_context(s, thisext->context, context))
return 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if ((thisext->context & EXT_TLS_ONLY) != 0)
- return 0;
- } else if ((thisext->context & EXT_DTLS_ONLY) != 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
*found = &rawexlist[i];
return 1;
}
}
- if ((context & (EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) == 0) {
- /*
- * Custom extensions only apply to <=TLS1.2. This extension is unknown
- * in this context - we allow it
- */
- *found = NULL;
- return 1;
- }
-
/* Check the custom extensions */
if (meths != NULL) {
- for (i = builtin_num; i < builtin_num + meths->meths_count; i++) {
- if (meths->meths[i - builtin_num].ext_type == type) {
- *found = &rawexlist[i];
- return 1;
- }
+ size_t offset = 0;
+ ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH;
+ custom_ext_method *meth = NULL;
+
+ if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
+ role = ENDPOINT_SERVER;
+ else if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0)
+ role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
+
+ meth = custom_ext_find(meths, role, type, &offset);
+ if (meth != NULL) {
+ if (!validate_context(s, meth->context, context))
+ return 0;
+ *found = &rawexlist[offset + builtin_num];
+ return 1;
}
}
* the extension is relevant for the current context |thisctx| or not. Returns
* 1 if the extension is relevant for this context, and 0 otherwise
*/
-static int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx,
- unsigned int thisctx)
+int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx)
{
+ int is_tls13;
+
+ /*
+ * For HRR we haven't selected the version yet but we know it will be
+ * TLSv1.3
+ */
+ if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0)
+ is_tls13 = 1;
+ else
+ is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
+
if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
- && (extctx & EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
+ && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && (extctx & EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (extctx & EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (extctx & EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0))
+ && (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
+ || (is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
+ || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
+ || (s->hit && (extctx & SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION) != 0))
return 0;
return 1;
/*
* Gather a list of all the extensions from the data in |packet]. |context|
* tells us which message this extension is for. The raw extension data is
- * stored in |*res| on success. In the event of an error the alert type to use
- * is stored in |*al|. We don't actually process the content of the extensions
- * yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the initialiser
- * functions for all known extensions (whether we have collected them or not).
- * If successful the caller is responsible for freeing the contents of |*res|.
+ * stored in |*res| on success. We don't actually process the content of the
+ * extensions yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the
+ * initialiser functions for all known extensions if |init| is nonzero (whether
+ * we have collected them or not). If successful the caller is responsible for
+ * freeing the contents of |*res|.
*
* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
* more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
* extensions that we know about. We ignore others.
*/
int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context,
- RAW_EXTENSION **res, int *al, size_t *len)
+ RAW_EXTENSION **res, size_t *len, int init)
{
PACKET extensions = *packet;
size_t i = 0;
size_t num_exts;
- custom_ext_methods *exts = NULL;
+ custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext;
RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
* Initialise server side custom extensions. Client side is done during
* construction of extensions for the ClientHello.
*/
- if ((context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
- exts = &s->cert->srv_ext;
- custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
- } else if ((context & EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) {
- exts = &s->cert->cli_ext;
- }
+ if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
+ custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
num_exts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0);
raw_extensions = OPENSSL_zalloc(num_exts * sizeof(*raw_extensions));
if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
+ i = 0;
while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
- unsigned int type;
+ unsigned int type, idx;
PACKET extension;
RAW_EXTENSION *thisex;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
/*
* Verify this extension is allowed. We only check duplicates for
- * extensions that we recognise.
+ * extensions that we recognise. We also have a special case for the
+ * PSK extension, which must be the last one in the ClientHello.
*/
if (!verify_extension(s, context, type, exts, raw_extensions, &thisex)
- || (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ || (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1)
+ || (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
+ && (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
+ && PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ idx = thisex - raw_extensions;
+ /*-
+ * Check that we requested this extension (if appropriate). Requests can
+ * be sent in the ClientHello and CertificateRequest. Unsolicited
+ * extensions can be sent in the NewSessionTicket. We only do this for
+ * the built-in extensions. Custom extensions have a different but
+ * similar check elsewhere.
+ * Special cases:
+ * - The HRR cookie extension is unsolicited
+ * - The renegotiate extension is unsolicited (the client signals
+ * support via an SCSV)
+ * - The signed_certificate_timestamp extension can be provided by a
+ * custom extension or by the built-in version. We let the extension
+ * itself handle unsolicited response checks.
+ */
+ if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs)
+ && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) == 0
+ && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
+ && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
+ && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
+ && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
+ SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
if (thisex != NULL) {
thisex->data = extension;
thisex->present = 1;
thisex->type = type;
+ thisex->received_order = i++;
+ if (s->ext.debug_cb)
+ s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, thisex->type,
+ PACKET_data(&thisex->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&thisex->data),
+ s->ext.debug_arg);
}
}
- /*
- * Initialise all known extensions relevant to this context, whether we have
- * found them or not
- */
- for (thisexd = ext_defs, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) {
- if(thisexd->init != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
+ if (init) {
+ /*
+ * Initialise all known extensions relevant to this context,
+ * whether we have found them or not
+ */
+ for (thisexd = ext_defs, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
+ i++, thisexd++) {
+ if (thisexd->init != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
&& extension_is_relevant(s, thisexd->context, context)
&& !thisexd->init(s, context)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
}
}
* given |context| and the parser has not already been run. If this is for a
* Certificate message, then we also provide the parser with the relevant
* Certificate |x| and its position in the |chainidx| with 0 being the first
- * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. In the event of a failure
- * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code. If an extension is not present
- * this counted as success.
+ * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If an extension is not
+ * present this counted as success.
*/
int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context,
- RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &exts[idx];
int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al) = NULL;
+ size_t chainidx) = NULL;
/* Skip if the extension is not present */
if (!currext->present)
return 1;
- if (s->ext.debug_cb)
- s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, currext->type,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
- s->ext.debug_arg);
-
/* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */
if (currext->parsed)
return 1;
parser = s->server ? extdef->parse_ctos : extdef->parse_stoc;
if (parser != NULL)
- return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx, al);
+ return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx);
/*
* If the parser is NULL we fall through to the custom extension
*/
}
- /*
- * This is a custom extension. We only allow this if it is a non
- * resumed session on the server side.
- *chain
- * TODO(TLS1.3): We only allow old style <=TLS1.2 custom extensions.
- * We're going to need a new mechanism for TLS1.3 to specify which
- * messages to add the custom extensions to.
- */
- if ((!s->hit || !s->server)
- && (context
- & (EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0
- && custom_ext_parse(s, s->server, currext->type,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
- al) <= 0)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
+ /* Parse custom extensions */
+ return custom_ext_parse(s, context, currext->type,
+ PACKET_data(&currext->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
+ x, chainidx);
}
/*
* Parse all remaining extensions that have not yet been parsed. Also calls the
- * finalisation for all extensions at the end, whether we collected them or not.
- * Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are working on a Certificate
- * message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and its position in the
- * |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate. On failure, |*al| is
- * populated with a suitable alert code.
+ * finalisation for all extensions at the end if |fin| is nonzero, whether we
+ * collected them or not. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are
+ * working on a Certificate message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and
+ * its position in the |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate.
*/
int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx, int fin)
{
size_t i, numexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
/* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */
- if ((context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
- numexts += s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count;
- } else if ((context & EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) {
- numexts += s->cert->cli_ext.meths_count;
- }
+ numexts += s->cert->custext.meths_count;
/* Parse each extension in turn */
for (i = 0; i < numexts; i++) {
- if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx, al))
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
+ }
}
- /*
- * Finalise all known extensions relevant to this context, whether we have
- * found them or not
- */
- for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) {
- if(thisexd->final != NULL
- && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
- && !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present, al))
- return 0;
+ if (fin) {
+ /*
+ * Finalise all known extensions relevant to this context,
+ * whether we have found them or not
+ */
+ for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
+ i++, thisexd++) {
+ if (thisexd->final != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
+ && !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
}
return 1;
}
+int should_add_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx,
+ int max_version)
+{
+ /* Skip if not relevant for our context */
+ if ((extctx & thisctx) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
+ if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
+ || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
+ && (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
+ || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
+ && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0)
+ || ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
+ && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
+ && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Construct all the extensions relevant to the current |context| and write
* them to |pkt|. If this is an extension for a Certificate in a Certificate
* message, then |x| will be set to the Certificate we are handling, and
* |chainidx| will indicate the position in the chainidx we are processing (with
- * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If a
- * failure occurs then |al| is populated with a suitable alert code. On a
+ * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On a
* failure construction stops at the first extension to fail to construct.
*/
int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t i;
- int addcustom = 0, min_version, max_version = 0, reason, tmpal;
+ int min_version, max_version = 0, reason;
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
- /*
- * Normally if something goes wrong during construction it's an internal
- * error. We can always override this later.
- */
- tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/*
* If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
- * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello in SSLv3
+ * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello
+ * (for non-TLSv1.3).
*/
- || ((context & (EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0
- && s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt,
+ || ((context &
+ (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0
+ && !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt,
WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- if ((context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
- reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
+ if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
if (reason != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, reason);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
+ reason);
+ return 0;
}
}
/* Add custom extensions first */
- if ((context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
- custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
- addcustom = 1;
- } else if ((context & EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) {
- /*
- * We already initialised the custom extensions during ClientHello
- * parsing.
- *
- * TODO(TLS1.3): We're going to need a new custom extension mechanism
- * for TLS1.3, so that custom extensions can specify which of the
- * multiple message they wish to add themselves to.
- */
- addcustom = 1;
+ if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
+ /* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */
+ custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
}
-
- if (addcustom && !custom_ext_add(s, s->server, pkt, &tmpal)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
}
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) {
- int (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ EXT_RETURN (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
+ EXT_RETURN ret;
/* Skip if not relevant for our context */
- if ((thisexd->context & context) == 0)
+ if (!should_add_extension(s, thisexd->context, context, max_version))
continue;
construct = s->server ? thisexd->construct_stoc
: thisexd->construct_ctos;
- /* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
- if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
- && (thisexd->context & EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY)
- != 0)
- || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && (thisexd->context & EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (thisexd->context & EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY)
- != 0)
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (thisexd->context & EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
- && (context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0)
- || ((thisexd->context & EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
- && (context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
- && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION))
- || construct == NULL)
+ if (construct == NULL)
continue;
- if (!construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx, &tmpal))
- goto err;
+ ret = construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx);
+ if (ret == EXT_RETURN_FAIL) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret == EXT_RETURN_SENT
+ && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) != 0)
+ s->ext.extflags[i] |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
return 1;
-
- err:
- *al = tmpal;
- return 0;
}
/*
* Built in extension finalisation and initialisation functions. All initialise
* or finalise the associated extension type for the given |context|. For
* finalisers |sent| is set to 1 if we saw the extension during parsing, and 0
- * otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure. In the event
- * of a failure then |*al| is populated with a suitable error code.
+ * otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
-static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al)
+static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!s->server) {
/*
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
&& !sent) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
if (s->renegotiate
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
&& !sent) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al)
+static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, discard;
int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0;
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
+ if (!sent) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
+ s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we switched contexts (whether here or in the client_hello callback),
+ * move the sess_accept increment from the session_ctx to the new
+ * context, to avoid the confusing situation of having sess_accept_good
+ * exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) {
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &discard,
+ s->ctx->lock);
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, -1, &discard,
+ s->session_ctx->lock);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we're expecting to send a ticket, and tickets were previously enabled,
+ * and now tickets are disabled, then turn off expected ticket.
+ * Also, if this is not a resumption, create a new session ID
+ */
+ if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && s->ext.ticket_expected
+ && was_ticket && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0) {
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ SSL_SESSION* ss = SSL_get_session(s);
+
+ if (ss != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick);
+ ss->ext.tick = NULL;
+ ss->ext.ticklen = 0;
+ ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+ ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0;
+ ss->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+ if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- *al = altmp;
+ SSLfatal(s, altmp, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
return 0;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- *al = altmp;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
return 1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al)
+static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
break;
}
if (i == s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
- SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
+ SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
return 0;
}
}
{
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
if (s->server) {
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
return 1;
}
-static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
- const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
- unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+ if (!s->server && !sent && s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
- if (!s->server)
+ if (!s->server || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
- if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
- int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
- s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
-
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
-#endif
- } else {
- *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
+ /*
+ * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
+ * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
+ * we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data.
+ * In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now.
+ * For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation.
+ *
+ * On failure SSLfatal() already called.
+ */
+ return tls_handle_alpn(s);
}
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
return 1;
}
-static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!s->server && s->hit) {
/*
*/
if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
!(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_EMS, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
+static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+{
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+
+ if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt))
+ return 0;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
}
#endif
-static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
- if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- *al = TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
+ if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit) {
+ SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
+ /* Nothing to do for key_share in an HRR */
+ if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0)
+ return 1;
+
/*
* If
* we are a client
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/*
*/
if (s->server && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
/* No suitable share */
- if (s->hello_retry_request == 0 && sent
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && sent
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
!= 0)) {
- const unsigned char *pcurves, *pcurvestmp, *clntcurves;
- size_t num_curves, clnt_num_curves, i;
+ const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups;
+ size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i;
unsigned int group_id = 0;
/* Check if a shared group exists */
/* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Get our list of available groups */
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
+ tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
/* Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list */
- for (i = 0, pcurvestmp = pcurves; i < num_curves;
- i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
- group_id = bytestogroup(pcurvestmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+ group_id = pgroups[i];
- if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 1))
+ if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 1))
break;
}
- if (i < num_curves) {
+ if (i < num_groups) {
/* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
- s->hello_retry_request = 1;
+ s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
return 1;
}
}
if (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ SSLfatal(s,
+ sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
+ SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
}
/* We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest messages */
- if (s->server)
- s->hello_retry_request = 0;
+ if (s->server && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_COMPLETE;
/*
* For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
* processing).
*/
if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
- unsigned char *binderout,
- SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign)
+ unsigned char *binderout, SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign,
+ int external)
{
EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- const char resumption_label[] = "resumption psk binder key";
- size_t bindersize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ unsigned char tmppsk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *early_secret, *psk;
+ const char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
+ const char external_label[] = "ext binder";
+ const char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+ const char *label;
+ size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
int ret = -1;
+ int usepskfored = 0;
+
+ if (external
+ && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
+ && sess->ext.max_early_data > 0)
+ usepskfored = 1;
- /* Generate the early_secret */
- if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
- sess->master_key_length,
- (unsigned char *)&s->early_secret)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (external) {
+ label = external_label;
+ labelsize = sizeof(external_label) - 1;
+ } else {
+ label = resumption_label;
+ labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1;
+ }
+
+ if (sess->master_key_length != hashsize) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (external) {
+ psk = sess->master_key;
+ } else {
+ psk = tmppsk;
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, sess->master_key,
+ (const unsigned char *)nonce_label,
+ sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, sess->ext.tick_nonce,
+ sess->ext.tick_nonce_len, psk, hashsize)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to
+ * resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client
+ * side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK or external PSK
+ * that will be used for early_data so that it is in place for sending early
+ * data. For client side external PSK not being used for early_data we
+ * generate it but store it away for later use.
+ */
+ if (s->server || !external || usepskfored)
+ early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret;
+ else
+ early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret;
+ if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, psk, hashsize, early_secret)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (mctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Generate the binder key */
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_secret,
- (unsigned char *)resumption_label,
- sizeof(resumption_label) - 1, hash, binderkey,
- hashsize)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, (unsigned char *)label,
+ labelsize, hash, hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Generate the finished key */
if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
* following a HelloRetryRequest then this includes the hash of the first
* ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest itself.
*/
- if (s->hello_retry_request) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
size_t hdatalen;
void *hdata;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
* ClientHello - which we don't want - so we need to take that bit off.
*/
if (s->server) {
- if (hdatalen < s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ PACKET hashprefix, msg;
+
+ /* Find how many bytes are left after the first two messages */
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&hashprefix, hdata, hdatalen)
+ || !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)
+ || !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- hdatalen -= s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ hdatalen -= PACKET_remaining(&hashprefix);
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize);
if (mackey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0
|| bindersize != hashsize) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */
ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0);
+ if (!ret)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ SSL_R_BINDER_DOES_NOT_VERIFY);
}
err:
return ret;
}
+
+static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
+{
+ if (!sent)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!s->server) {
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ && sent
+ && !s->ext.early_data_ok) {
+ /*
+ * If we get here then the server accepted our early_data but we
+ * later realised that it shouldn't have done (e.g. inconsistent
+ * ALPN)
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EARLY_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->max_early_data == 0
+ || !s->hit
+ || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
+ || s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
+ || !s->ext.early_data_ok
+ || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+ } else {
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
+
+ if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
+{
+ /*
+ * Session resumption on server-side with MFL extension active
+ * BUT MFL extension packet was not resent (i.e. sent == 0)
+ */
+ if (s->server && s->hit && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
+ && !sent ) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Current SSL buffer is lower than requested MFL */
+ if (s->session && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
+ && s->max_send_fragment < GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session))
+ /* trigger a larger buffer reallocation */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff