/*
- * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <string.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
-#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
+static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
+static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
/* Structure to define a built-in extension */
typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
/*
* Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order
* of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
- * indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_locl.h.
+ * indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_local.h.
* Each extension has an initialiser, a client and
* server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the
* extension is relevant to the given context) even if we did not see the
tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
final_ec_pt_formats
},
+#else
+ INVALID_EXTENSION,
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
{
+ /*
+ * "supported_groups" is spread across several specifications.
+ * It was originally specified as "elliptic_curves" in RFC 4492,
+ * and broadened to include named FFDH groups by RFC 7919.
+ * Both RFCs 4492 and 7919 do not include a provision for the server
+ * to indicate to the client the complete list of groups supported
+ * by the server, with the server instead just indicating the
+ * selected group for this connection in the ServerKeyExchange
+ * message. TLS 1.3 adds a scheme for the server to indicate
+ * to the client its list of supported groups in the
+ * EncryptedExtensions message, but none of the relevant
+ * specifications permit sending supported_groups in the ServerHello.
+ * Nonetheless (possibly due to the close proximity to the
+ * "ec_point_formats" extension, which is allowed in the ServerHello),
+ * there are several servers that send this extension in the
+ * ServerHello anyway. Up to and including the 1.1.0 release,
+ * we did not check for the presence of nonpermitted extensions,
+ * so to avoid a regression, we must permit this extension in the
+ * TLS 1.2 ServerHello as well.
+ *
+ * Note that there is no tls_parse_stoc_supported_groups function,
+ * so we do not perform any additional parsing, validation, or
+ * processing on the server's group list -- this is just a minimal
+ * change to preserve compatibility with these misbehaving servers.
+ */
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
- SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups, NULL,
tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups,
tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
- INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
init_status_request, tls_parse_ctos_status_request,
tls_parse_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_stoc_status_request,
tls_construct_ctos_status_request, NULL
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
NULL,
/*
* No server side support for this, but can be provided by a custom
init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems,
tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems
},
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms_cert,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ init_sig_algs_cert, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert,
+ tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert,
+ /* We do not generate signature_algorithms_cert at present. */
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ init_post_handshake_auth,
+ tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth, NULL,
+ NULL, tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth,
+ NULL,
+ },
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
- SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY,
NULL,
/* Processed inline as part of version selection */
- NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL
+ NULL, tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions,
+ tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions,
+ tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes,
init_psk_kex_modes, tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL, NULL,
tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL
},
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{
/*
* Must be in this list after supported_groups. We need that to have
tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share,
final_key_share
},
-#endif
{
+ /* Must be after key_share */
TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
| SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
- NULL, NULL, tls_parse_stoc_cookie, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_cookie,
- NULL
+ NULL, tls_parse_ctos_cookie, tls_parse_stoc_cookie,
+ tls_construct_stoc_cookie, tls_construct_ctos_cookie, NULL
},
{
/*
* Special unsolicited ServerHello extension only used when
- * SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set
+ * SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set. We allow it in a ClientHello but
+ * ignore it.
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
- | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data,
tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data,
final_early_data
return 1;
}
+int tls_validate_all_contexts(SSL *s, unsigned int thisctx, RAW_EXTENSION *exts)
+{
+ size_t i, num_exts, builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs), offset;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *thisext;
+ unsigned int context;
+ ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH;
+
+ if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
+ role = ENDPOINT_SERVER;
+ else if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0)
+ role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
+
+ /* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */
+ num_exts = builtin_num + s->cert->custext.meths_count;
+
+ for (thisext = exts, i = 0; i < num_exts; i++, thisext++) {
+ if (!thisext->present)
+ continue;
+
+ if (i < builtin_num) {
+ context = ext_defs[i].context;
+ } else {
+ custom_ext_method *meth = NULL;
+
+ meth = custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, thisext->type,
+ &offset);
+ if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL))
+ return 0;
+ context = meth->context;
+ }
+
+ if (!validate_context(s, context, thisctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Verify whether we are allowed to use the extension |type| in the current
* |context|. Returns 1 to indicate the extension is allowed or unknown or 0 to
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
+ /*
+ * Note that SSL_IS_TLS13() means "TLS 1.3 has been negotiated",
+ * which is never true when generating the ClientHello.
+ * However, version negotiation *has* occurred by the time the
+ * ClientHello extensions are being parsed.
+ * Be careful to allow TLS 1.3-only extensions when generating
+ * the ClientHello.
+ */
|| (is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
- || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
+ || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
+ && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0)
+ || (s->server && !is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->hit && (extctx & SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION) != 0))
return 0;
-
return 1;
}
/*
* Gather a list of all the extensions from the data in |packet]. |context|
* tells us which message this extension is for. The raw extension data is
- * stored in |*res| on success. In the event of an error the alert type to use
- * is stored in |*al|. We don't actually process the content of the extensions
- * yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the initialiser
- * functions for all known extensions if |init| is nonzero (whether we have
- * collected them or not). If successful the caller is responsible for freeing
- * the contents of |*res|.
+ * stored in |*res| on success. We don't actually process the content of the
+ * extensions yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the
+ * initialiser functions for all known extensions if |init| is nonzero (whether
+ * we have collected them or not). If successful the caller is responsible for
+ * freeing the contents of |*res|.
*
* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
* more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
- && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) {
+ && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ && !((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
+ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug)
+#endif
+ ) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION);
goto err;
* given |context| and the parser has not already been run. If this is for a
* Certificate message, then we also provide the parser with the relevant
* Certificate |x| and its position in the |chainidx| with 0 being the first
- * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. In the event of a failure
- * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code. If an extension is not present
- * this counted as success.
+ * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If an extension is not
+ * present this counted as success.
*/
int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context,
RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
* finalisation for all extensions at the end if |fin| is nonzero, whether we
* collected them or not. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are
* working on a Certificate message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and
- * its position in the |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate. On
- * failure, |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
+ * its position in the |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate.
*/
int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int fin)
return 0;
/* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
- if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
- || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
- && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0)
+ if (!extension_is_relevant(s, extctx, thisctx)
|| ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
&& (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
&& (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)))
}
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
- reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
reason);
* Built in extension finalisation and initialisation functions. All initialise
* or finalise the associated extension type for the given |context|. For
* finalisers |sent| is set to 1 if we saw the extension during parsing, and 0
- * otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure. In the event
- * of a failure then |*al| is populated with a suitable error code.
+ * otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- if (s->server)
+ if (s->server) {
s->servername_done = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
+ s->ext.hostname = NULL;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, discard;
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0;
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->ctx->ext.servername_arg);
- else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
- && s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
+ else if (s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
- if (!sent) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
- s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
+ /*
+ * For servers, propagate the SNI hostname from the temporary
+ * storage in the SSL to the persistent SSL_SESSION, now that we
+ * know we accepted it.
+ * Clients make this copy when parsing the server's response to
+ * the extension, which is when they find out that the negotiation
+ * was successful.
+ */
+ if (s->server) {
+ if (sent && ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && !s->hit) {
+ /* Only store the hostname in the session if we accepted it. */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
+ s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
+ if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL && s->ext.hostname != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
}
/*
* exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context.
*/
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) {
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &discard,
- s->ctx->lock);
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, -1, &discard,
- s->session_ctx->lock);
+ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+ tsan_decr(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
}
/*
ss->ext.ticklen = 0;
ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0;
- ss->ext.tick_identity = 0;
if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
+ /* TLSv1.3 doesn't have warning alerts so we suppress this */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
+ s->servername_done = 0;
return 1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
if (s->server)
return 1;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/*
* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
*/
if (s->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
&& s->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
- && s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
- && s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
+ && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL
+ && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len > 0
&& ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
size_t i;
- unsigned char *list = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
+ unsigned char *list = s->ext.peer_ecpointformats;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
if (*list++ == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
break;
}
- if (i == s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len) {
+ if (i == s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
return 1;
}
static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
+ s->s3.alpn_selected = NULL;
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
if (s->server) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
- s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
+ s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
+ s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
}
return 1;
}
* we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data.
* In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now.
* For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation.
- *
+ *
* On failure SSLfatal() already called.
*/
return tls_handle_alpn(s);
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs);
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+{
+ /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs);
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs = NULL;
return 1;
}
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- if (!s->server)
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+ s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
return 1;
}
* Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
* original session.
*/
- if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
+ if (!(s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
!(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = NULL;
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = NULL;
return 1;
}
X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
- const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = get_ca_names(s);
if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, ca_sk, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return 1;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3)
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
- * If
+ * IF
* we are a server
- * AND
- * we have no key_share
* THEN
- * If
- * we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest
- * AND
- * the client sent a key_share extension
- * AND
- * (we are not resuming
- * OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes)
- * AND
- * a shared group exists
+ * IF
+ * we have a suitable key_share
* THEN
- * send a HelloRetryRequest
- * ELSE If
- * we are not resuming
- * OR
- * the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes
- * THEN
- * fail;
+ * IF
+ * we are stateless AND we have no cookie
+ * THEN
+ * send a HelloRetryRequest
+ * ELSE
+ * IF
+ * we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest
+ * AND
+ * the client sent a key_share extension
+ * AND
+ * (we are not resuming
+ * OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes)
+ * AND
+ * a shared group exists
+ * THEN
+ * send a HelloRetryRequest
+ * ELSE IF
+ * we are not resuming
+ * OR
+ * the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes
+ * THEN
+ * fail
+ * ELSE IF
+ * we are stateless AND we have no cookie
+ * THEN
+ * send a HelloRetryRequest
*/
- if (s->server && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
- /* No suitable share */
- if (s->hello_retry_request == 0 && sent
- && (!s->hit
- || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
- != 0)) {
- const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups;
- size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i;
- unsigned int group_id = 0;
-
- /* Check if a shared group exists */
-
- /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
- tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
- tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
-
- /* Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list */
- for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
- group_id = pgroups[i];
-
- if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 1))
- break;
+ if (s->server) {
+ if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
+ /* We have a suitable key_share */
+ if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0
+ && !s->ext.cookieok) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) {
+ /*
+ * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any
+ * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other
+ * than 0?
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* No suitable key_share */
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && sent
+ && (!s->hit
+ || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
+ != 0)) {
+ const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups;
+ size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i;
+ unsigned int group_id = 0;
+
+ /* Check if a shared group exists */
+
+ /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
+ tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
+
+ /*
+ * Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+ group_id = pgroups[i];
+
+ if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups,
+ 1))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i < num_groups) {
+ /* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
+ s->s3.group_id = group_id;
+ s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!s->hit
+ || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
+ /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
+ SSLfatal(s, sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
+ : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
+ SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
}
- if (i < num_groups) {
- /* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
- s->s3->group_id = group_id;
- s->hello_retry_request = 1;
+ if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0
+ && !s->ext.cookieok) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) {
+ /*
+ * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any
+ * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other
+ * than 0?
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
return 1;
}
}
- if (!s->hit
- || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
- /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
- SSLfatal(s,
- sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
- SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+
+ /*
+ * We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest
+ * messages
+ */
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_COMPLETE;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
+ * the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
+ * processing).
+ */
+ if (!sent && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
-
- /* We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest messages */
- if (s->server)
- s->hello_retry_request = 0;
-
- /*
- * For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
- * the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
- * processing).
- */
- if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3) */
return 1;
}
-#endif
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char tmppsk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *early_secret, *psk;
- const char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
- const char external_label[] = "ext binder";
- const char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
- const char *label;
- size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ unsigned char *early_secret;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = { 0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 };
+ static const unsigned char external_label[] = { 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 };
+#else
+ static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
+ static const unsigned char external_label[] = "ext binder";
+#endif
+ const unsigned char *label;
+ size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize;
+ int hashsizei = EVP_MD_size(md);
int ret = -1;
int usepskfored = 0;
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashsizei >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashsize = (size_t)hashsizei;
+
if (external
&& s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1;
}
- if (sess->master_key_length != hashsize) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (external) {
- psk = sess->master_key;
- } else {
- psk = tmppsk;
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, sess->master_key,
- (const unsigned char *)nonce_label,
- sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, sess->ext.tick_nonce,
- sess->ext.tick_nonce_len, psk, hashsize)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
/*
* Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to
* resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client
early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret;
else
early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret;
- if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, psk, hashsize, early_secret)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
+ sess->master_key_length, early_secret)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (mctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Generate the binder key */
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, (unsigned char *)label,
- labelsize, hash, hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, label, labelsize, hash,
+ hashsize, binderkey, hashsize, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Generate the finished key */
if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
* following a HelloRetryRequest then this includes the hash of the first
* ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest itself.
*/
- if (s->hello_retry_request) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
size_t hdatalen;
+ long hdatalen_l;
void *hdata;
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ hdatalen = hdatalen_l =
+ BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen_l <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)
|| !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
hdatalen -= PACKET_remaining(&hashprefix);
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize);
+ mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey,
+ hashsize);
if (mackey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
binderout = tmpbinder;
bindersize = hashsize;
- if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, mackey) <= 0
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, NULL, EVP_MD_name(md), s->ctx->propq,
+ mackey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0
|| bindersize != hashsize) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */
ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0);
+ if (!ret)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
+ SSL_R_BINDER_DOES_NOT_VERIFY);
}
err:
if (s->max_early_data == 0
|| !s->hit
- || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
|| s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
|| !s->ext.early_data_ok
- || s->hello_retry_request) {
+ || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
+ || (s->allow_early_data_cb != NULL
+ && !s->allow_early_data_cb(s,
+ s->allow_early_data_cb_data))) {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
} else {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
return 1;
}
+
+static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+{
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_NONE;
+
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff