#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef NOPROTO
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
-#else
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove();
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_add();
-#endif
-
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
static int ssl_session_num=0;
static STACK *ssl_session_meth=NULL;
+#if 1 /* traditional SSLeay behaviour */
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl)
{
return(ssl->session);
}
+#else /* suggested change: increase reference counter so that a session
+ * can later be set in a new SSL object.
+ * Objections:
+ * -- the modified function should have a new name (or old
+ * applications, including s_client, leak memory);
+ * -- the locking seems unnecessary given that SSL structures
+ * usually cannot be safely shared between threads anyway. */
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+ * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
+ * non-null and when we up the reference count. */
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ sess = ssl->session;
+ if(sess)
+ sess->references++;
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ return(sess);
+ }
+#endif
int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)())
- {
- ssl_session_num++;
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_session_num-1,
+ {
+ ssl_session_num++;
+ return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_session_num-1,
&ssl_session_meth,
- argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
- }
+ argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+ }
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
}
memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
ss->references=1;
ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
ss->time=time(NULL);
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
{
+ /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (r == NULL) break;
/* else - woops a session_id match */
+ /* XXX We should also check the external cache --
+ * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
+ * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
+ * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
+ * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
+ * and make a reservation for it if it does not
+ * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
+ */
}
}
else
ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
s->session=ss;
ss->ssl_version=s->version;
+ ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
return(1);
}
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len)
{
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
+
SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data;
- int copy=1;
+ int fatal = 0;
- /* conn_init();*/
data.ssl_version=s->version;
data.session_id_length=len;
if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
- return(0);
+ goto err;
memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
{
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,(char *)&data);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
if (ret == NULL)
{
+ int copy=1;
+
s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
ret=NULL;
if (s->ctx->get_session_cb != NULL
{
s->ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
+ /* Increment reference count now if the session callback
+ * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
+ * returned by the callback are shared between threads,
+ * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
+ * or things won't be thread-safe). */
+ if (copy)
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
/* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
* things are very strange */
SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret);
}
- if (ret == NULL) return(0);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
}
+ /* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
- return 0;
- }
+ /* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
+ * want to use it in this context. */
+
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
+ {
+ /* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context
+ * -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard
+ * of this session, but then applications could effectively
+ * disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
+ * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
- /* auto free it */
- if (!copy)
- SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+#endif
+ goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
+ }
+ }
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
{
else
ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
- return(0);
+ goto err;
}
+
+#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
+
/* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
* it and then due to a time-out decided to 'Free' it we could
* be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
* later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+#endif
if ((long)(ret->time+ret->timeout) < (long)time(NULL)) /* timeout */
{
s->ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
/* remove it from the cache */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,ret);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ret); /* again to actually Free it */
- return(0);
+ goto err;
}
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
if (s->session != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session=ret;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return(1);
+
+ err:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ if (fatal)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return 0;
}
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
int ret=0;
SSL_SESSION *s;
- /* conn_init(); */
+ /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
+ * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
+ * doubly linked list and an lhash */
CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,(char *)c);
- /* Put on the end of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+ /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
+ * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+ * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
+ if (s != NULL && s != c)
+ {
+ /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
+ * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
+ * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
+ * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
+ * cache) */
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
if (s == NULL)
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
- /* If the same session if is being 're-added', Free the old
- * one when the last person stops using it.
- * This will also work if it is alread in the cache.
- * The references will go up and then down :-) */
if (s != NULL)
{
- SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+ * count because it already takes into account the cache */
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
ret=0;
}
else
{
+ /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
+
ret=1;
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
{
- if (!SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx,
- ctx->session_cache_tail))
+ if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
+ ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
break;
else
ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
}
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+ return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
{
SSL_SESSION *r;
int ret=0;
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
{
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,(char *)c);
if (r != NULL)
{
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
}
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ret)
{
memset(ss->key_arg,0,SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
memset(ss->master_key,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
memset(ss->session_id,0,SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
- if (ss->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(ss->cert);
+ if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
memset(ss,0,sizeof(*ss));
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