Always build library object files with shared library cflags
[openssl.git] / ssl / ssl_sess.c
index 5dfc4c8..97f3ce2 100644 (file)
@@ -1,25 +1,24 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +62,7 @@
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  *
  */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-#define session_ctx initial_ctx
-#else
-#define session_ctx ctx
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
 static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
 
 SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
 /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
-       {
-       return(ssl->session);
-       }
+{
+    return (ssl->session);
+}
 
 SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
 /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
-       {
-       SSL_SESSION *sess;
-       /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
-        * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
-        * non-null and when we up the reference count. */
-       CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-       sess = ssl->session;
-       if(sess)
-               sess->references++;
-       CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-       return(sess);
-       }
-
-int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
-            CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-       {
-       return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
-                       new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-       }
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    /*
+     * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+     * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
+     * and when we up the reference count.
+     */
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+    sess = ssl->session;
+    if (sess)
+        sess->references++;
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+    return (sess);
+}
 
 int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
-       {
-       return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
-       }
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
 
 void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
-       {
-       return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
-       }
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
 
 SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
-       {
-       SSL_SESSION *ss;
-
-       ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-       if (ss == NULL)
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-               return(0);
-               }
-       memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-
-       ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
-       ss->references=1;
-       ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
-       ss->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-       ss->prev=NULL;
-       ss->next=NULL;
-       ss->compress_meth=0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-       ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *ss;
+
+    ss = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ss));
+    if (ss == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    ss->verify_result = 1;      /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
+    ss->references = 1;
+    ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4;   /* 5 minute timeout by default */
+    ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+    return (ss);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *dest;
+
+    dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
+    if (dest == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
+
+    /*
+     * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
+     * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    dest->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+    dest->ciphers = NULL;
+    dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+    dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+#endif
+    dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    dest->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+    memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
+
+    /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
+    dest->prev = NULL;
+    dest->next = NULL;
+
+    dest->references = 1;
+
+    if (src->peer != NULL)
+        X509_up_ref(src->peer);
+
+    if (src->peer_chain != NULL) {
+        dest->peer_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(src->peer_chain);
+        if (dest->peer_chain == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
+        dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
+        if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (src->psk_identity) {
+        dest->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity);
+        if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
 #endif
-       CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
-       return(ss);
-       }
-
-const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
-       {
-       if(len)
-               *len = s->session_id_length;
-       return s->session_id;
-       }
-
-/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
- * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
- * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
- * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
- * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
- * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
- * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
- * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
+
+    if(src->ciphers != NULL) {
+        dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
+        if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+                                            &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (src->tlsext_hostname) {
+        dest->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
+        if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+        dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+            OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                       src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+        if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+        dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+            OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                       src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+        if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (ticket != 0) {
+        dest->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
+        if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+        dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (src->srp_username) {
+        dest->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(src->srp_username);
+        if (dest->srp_username == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return dest;
+err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+                                        unsigned int *len)
+{
+    if (len)
+        *len = s->session_id_length;
+    return s->session_id;
+}
+
+unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->compress_meth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling
+ * the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to
+ * complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw:
+ * understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid
+ * a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the
+ * RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to
+ * 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions
+ * is perhaps a more interesting question ...
+ */
 
 #define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
 static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
-                               unsigned int *id_len)
-{
-       unsigned int retry = 0;
-       do
-               if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
-                       return 0;
-       while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
-               (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
-       if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
-               return 1;
-       /* else - woops a session_id match */
-       /* XXX We should also check the external cache --
-        * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
-        * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
-        * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
-        * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
-        * and make a reservation for it if it does not
-        * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
-        */
-       return 0;
+                                   unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+    unsigned int retry = 0;
+    do
+        if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+           (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
+    if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+        return 1;
+    /* else - woops a session_id match */
+    /*
+     * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
+     * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
+     * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
+     * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
+     * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
+     * internal cache as well).
+     */
+    return 0;
 }
 
 int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
-       {
-       /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
-
-       unsigned int tmp;
-       SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
-       GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
-
-       if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
-
-       /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
-       if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
-               ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
-       else
-               ss->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
-
-       if (s->session != NULL)
-               {
-               SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-               s->session=NULL;
-               }
-
-       if (session)
-               {
-               if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
-                       {
-                       ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION;
-                       ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-                       }
-               else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-                       {
-                       ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION;
-                       ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-                       }
-               else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-                       {
-                       ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
-                       ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-                       }
-               else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
-                       {
-                       ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION;
-                       ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-                       }
-               else
-                       {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
-                       SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-                       return(0);
-                       }
-               /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
-               CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-               if(s->generate_session_id)
-                       cb = s->generate_session_id;
-               else if(s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
-                       cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
-               CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-               /* Choose a session ID */
-               tmp = ss->session_id_length;
-               if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
-                       {
-                       /* The callback failed */
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
-                               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
-                       SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-                       return(0);
-                       }
-               /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
-                * nor set it higher than it was. */
-               if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
-                       {
-                       /* The callback set an illegal length */
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
-                               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
-                       SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-                       return(0);
-                       }
-               /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
-               if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
-                       memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
-               else
-                       ss->session_id_length = tmp;
-               /* Finally, check for a conflict */
-               if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
-                                               ss->session_id_length))
-                       {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
-                               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
-                       SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-                       return(0);
-                       }
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               ss->session_id_length=0;
-               }
-
-       if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx)
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-               SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-               return 0;
-               }
-       memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
-       ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
-       s->session=ss;
-       ss->ssl_version=s->version;
-       ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-
-       return(1);
-       }
-
-int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len)
-       {
-       /* This is used only by servers. */
-
-       SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data;
-       int fatal = 0;
-
-       data.ssl_version=s->version;
-       data.session_id_length=len;
-       if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
-               goto err;
-       memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
-
-       if (!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
-               {
-               CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-               ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions,&data);
-               if (ret != NULL)
-                   /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
-                   CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-               CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-               }
-
-       if (ret == NULL)
-               {
-               int copy=1;
-       
-               s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
-               ret=NULL;
-               if (s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL
-                   && (ret=s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,&copy))
-                      != NULL)
-                       {
-                       s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
-
-                       /* Increment reference count now if the session callback
-                        * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
-                        * returned by the callback are shared between threads,
-                        * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
-                        * or things won't be thread-safe). */
-                       if (copy)
-                               CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-
-                       /* Add the externally cached session to the internal
-                        * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
-                       if(!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
-                               /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
-                                * things are very strange */
-                               SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
-                       }
-               if (ret == NULL)
-                       goto err;
-               }
-
-       /* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
-
-       if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
-          && (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
-              || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)))
-           {
-               /* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
-                * want to use it in this context. */
-               
-               if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
-                       {
-                       /* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context
-                        * -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard
-                        * of this session, but then applications could effectively
-                        * disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */
-
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
-                       fatal = 1;
-                       goto err;
-                       }
-               else
-                       {
-#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
-          * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
-
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
-#endif
-                       goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
-                       }
-               }
-
-       if (ret->cipher == NULL)
-               {
-               unsigned char buf[5],*p;
-               unsigned long l;
-
-               p=buf;
-               l=ret->cipher_id;
-               l2n(l,p);
-               if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-                       ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
-               else 
-                       ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
-               if (ret->cipher == NULL)
-                       goto err;
-               }
-
-
-#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
-
-       /* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
-        * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could
-        * be in trouble.  So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
-        * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
-       CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-#endif
+{
+    /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+    unsigned int tmp;
+    SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
+    GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
+
+    if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
+    if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+        ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+    else
+        ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+
+    SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    s->session = NULL;
+
+    if (session) {
+        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+            ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+            ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+            return (0);
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+         * Note that:
+         * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+         *     ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+         *     When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
+         *     ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+         *     At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+         *     however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+         *     whether a ticket is expected or not.
+         *
+         * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+         *     ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+         *     ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+         */
+        if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+            ss->session_id_length = 0;
+            goto sess_id_done;
+        }
+
+        /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        if (s->generate_session_id)
+            cb = s->generate_session_id;
+        else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
+            cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
+        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        /* Choose a session ID */
+        tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+        if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
+            /* The callback failed */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                   SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        /*
+         * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
+         * set it higher than it was.
+         */
+        if (tmp == 0 || tmp > ss->session_id_length) {
+            /* The callback set an illegal length */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                   SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+            return (0);
+        }
+        ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+        /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+        if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+                                        ss->session_id_length)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+            return (0);
+        }
+
+ sess_id_done:
+        if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+            ss->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+            if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        ss->session_id_length = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+    ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
+    s->session = ss;
+    ss->ssl_version = s->version;
+    ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+    /* If client supports extended master secret set it in session */
+    if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)
+        ss->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
+
+    return (1);
+}
 
-       if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */
-               {
-               s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
-               /* remove it from the cache */
-               SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
-               goto err;
-               }
-
-       s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
-       /* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */
-       /* again, just leave the session 
-        * if it is the same session, we have just incremented and
-        * then decremented the reference count :-) */
-       if (s->session != NULL)
-               SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-       s->session=ret;
-       s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
-       return(1);
+/*-
+ * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+ * connection. It is only called by servers.
+ *
+ *   ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
+ *   session_id: ClientHello session ID.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: error
+ *    0: a session may have been found.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ *   - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
+ *     existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
+ *   - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
+ *     if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
+ */
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id)
+{
+    /* This is used only by servers. */
+
+    SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
+    int fatal = 0;
+    int try_session_cache = 1;
+    int r;
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(session_id) == 0)
+        try_session_cache = 0;
+
+    /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected and extended master secret flag */
+    r = tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(s, ext, session_id, &ret);
+    switch (r) {
+    case -1:                   /* Error during processing */
+        fatal = 1;
+        goto err;
+    case 0:                    /* No ticket found */
+    case 1:                    /* Zero length ticket found */
+        break;                  /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
+    case 2:                    /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
+    case 3:                    /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
+        try_session_cache = 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        abort();
+    }
+
+    if (try_session_cache &&
+        ret == NULL &&
+        !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+          SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+        SSL_SESSION data;
+        size_t local_len;
+        data.ssl_version = s->version;
+        if (!PACKET_copy_all(session_id, data.session_id,
+                             sizeof(data.session_id),
+                             &local_len)) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+        data.session_id_length = local_len;
+        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
+        if (ret != NULL) {
+            /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+            CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+        }
+        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+    }
+
+    if (try_session_cache &&
+        ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+        int copy = 1;
+        ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(session_id),
+                                             PACKET_remaining(session_id),
+                                             &copy);
+
+        if (ret != NULL) {
+            s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
+
+            /*
+             * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
+             * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
+             * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
+             * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
+             * thread-safe).
+             */
+            if (copy)
+                CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
+            /*
+             * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
+             * well if and only if we are supposed to.
+             */
+            if (!
+                (s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+                 SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
+                /*
+                 * The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
+                 * very strange
+                 */
+                if (SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret))
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
+    if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
+        || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
+        /*
+         * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
+         * use it in this context.
+         */
+        goto err;               /* treat like cache miss */
+    }
+
+    if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
+        /*
+         * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
+         * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
+         * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
+         * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
+         * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
+         * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
+         * noticing).
+         */
+
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
+               SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+        fatal = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
+        unsigned char buf[5], *p;
+        unsigned long l;
+
+        p = buf;
+        l = ret->cipher_id;
+        l2n(l, p);
+        if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+            ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
+        else
+            ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
+        if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
+        s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
+        if (try_session_cache) {
+            /* session was from the cache, so remove it */
+            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+        }
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Check extended master secret extension consistency */
+    if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+        /* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */
+        if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            fatal = 1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
+        /* If new session includes extms, but old does not: do not resume */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+    SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    s->session = ret;
+    s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+    return 1;
 
  err:
-       if (ret != NULL)
-               SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
-       if (fatal)
-               return -1;
-       else
-               return 0;
-       }
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+
+        if (!try_session_cache) {
+            /*
+             * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
+             * the new session
+             */
+            s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (fatal)
+        return -1;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
 
 int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
-       {
-       int ret=0;
-       SSL_SESSION *s;
-
-       /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
-        * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
-        * doubly linked list and an lhash */
-       CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-       /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
-
-       CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-       s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
-       
-       /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
-        * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
-        * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
-       if (s != NULL && s != c)
-               {
-               /* We *are* in trouble ... */
-               SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
-               SSL_SESSION_free(s);
-               /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
-                * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
-                * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
-                * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
-                * cache) */
-               s = NULL;
-               }
-
-       /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
-       if (s == NULL)
-               SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
-
-       if (s != NULL)
-               {
-               /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
-                * count because it already takes into account the cache */
-
-               SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
-               ret=0;
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
-               
-               ret=1;
-
-               if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
-                       {
-                       while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
-                               SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
-                               {
-                               if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
-                                       ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
-                                       break;
-                               else
-                                       ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
-                               }
-                       }
-               }
-       CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-       return(ret);
-       }
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    SSL_SESSION *s;
+
+    /*
+     * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
+     * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
+     * an lhash
+     */
+    CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+    /*
+     * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
+     */
+
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
+
+    /*
+     * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
+     * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+     * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
+     */
+    if (s != NULL && s != c) {
+        /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+        SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+        /*
+         * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
+         * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
+         * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
+         * obtain the same session from an external cache)
+         */
+        s = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+    if (s == NULL)
+        SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
+
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+         * count because it already takes into account the cache
+         */
+
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s);    /* s == c */
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
+         */
+
+        ret = 1;
+
+        if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+            while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
+                   SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+                if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+                    break;
+                else
+                    ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    return (ret);
+}
 
 int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
 {
-       return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+    return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
 }
 
 static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
-       {
-       SSL_SESSION *r;
-       int ret=0;
-
-       if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
-               {
-               if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-               if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
-                       {
-                       ret=1;
-                       r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
-                       SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
-                       }
-
-               if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
-               if (ret)
-                       {
-                       r->not_resumable=1;
-                       if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
-                               ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r);
-                       SSL_SESSION_free(r);
-                       }
-               }
-       else
-               ret=0;
-       return(ret);
-       }
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *r;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
+        if (lck)
+            CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
+            ret = 1;
+            r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
+            SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
+        }
+
+        if (lck)
+            CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+        if (ret) {
+            r->not_resumable = 1;
+            if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+                ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
+            SSL_SESSION_free(r);
+        }
+    } else
+        ret = 0;
+    return (ret);
+}
 
 void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
-       {
-       int i;
-
-       if(ss == NULL)
-           return;
-
-       i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
-       REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss);
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (ss == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    i = CRYPTO_add(&ss->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
+    X509_free(ss->peer);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ss->peer_chain, X509_free);
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+    ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
 #endif
-       if (i > 0) return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-       if (i < 0)
-               {
-               fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
-               abort(); /* ok */
-               }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
 #endif
-
-       CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
-
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg);
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key);
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id);
-       if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
-       if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
-       if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-       if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
-#endif
-       OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss));
-       OPENSSL_free(ss);
-       }
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss));
+}
 
 int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
-       {
-       int ret=0;
-       const SSL_METHOD *meth;
-
-       if (session != NULL)
-               {
-               meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
-               if (meth == NULL)
-                       meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
-               if (meth == NULL)
-                       {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
-                       return(0);
-                       }
-
-               if (meth != s->method)
-                       {
-                       if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
-                               return(0);
-                       if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
-                               session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
-                       else
-                               session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
-                       }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-                if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
-                    session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
-                {
-                    s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
-                    memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
-                            session->krb5_client_princ_len);
-                    s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
-                }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-               /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
-               CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-               if (s->session != NULL)
-                       SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-               s->session=session;
-               s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
-               /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
-               ret=1;
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               if (s->session != NULL)
-                       {
-                       SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-                       s->session=NULL;
-                       }
-
-               meth=s->ctx->method;
-               if (meth != s->method)
-                       {
-                       if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
-                               return(0);
-                       }
-               ret=1;
-               }
-       return(ret);
-       }
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const SSL_METHOD *meth;
+
+    if (session != NULL) {
+        meth = s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+        if (meth == NULL)
+            meth = s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+        if (meth == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
+            return (0);
+        }
+
+        if (meth != s->method) {
+            if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
+                return (0);
+        }
+
+        /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
+        CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = session;
+        s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+        /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
+        ret = 1;
+    } else {
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = NULL;
+        meth = s->ctx->method;
+        if (meth != s->method) {
+            if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
+                return (0);
+        }
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
 
 long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
-       {
-       if (s == NULL) return(0);
-       s->timeout=t;
-       return(1);
-       }
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    s->timeout = t;
+    return (1);
+}
 
 long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-       {
-       if (s == NULL) return(0);
-       return(s->timeout);
-       }
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (s->timeout);
+}
 
 long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-       {
-       if (s == NULL) return(0);
-       return(s->time);
-       }
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (s->time);
+}
 
 long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
-       {
-       if (s == NULL) return(0);
-       s->time=t;
-       return(t);
-       }
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    s->time = t;
+    return (t);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return (s->tlsext_ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned char **tick,
+                            size_t *len)
+{
+    *len = s->tlsext_ticklen;
+    if (tick != NULL)
+        *tick = s->tlsext_tick;
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+    return s->peer;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+    if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
+               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
 
 long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
-       {
-       long l;
-       if (s == NULL) return(0);
-       l=s->session_timeout;
-       s->session_timeout=t;
-       return(l);
-       }
+{
+    long l;
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    l = s->session_timeout;
+    s->session_timeout = t;
+    return (l);
+}
 
 long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
-       {
-       if (s == NULL) return(0);
-       return(s->session_timeout);
-       }
-
-typedef struct timeout_param_st
-       {
-       SSL_CTX *ctx;
-       long time;
-       LHASH *cache;
-       } TIMEOUT_PARAM;
-
-static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
-       {
-       if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */
-               {
-               /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
-                * save on locking overhead */
-               lh_delete(p->cache,s);
-               SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
-               s->not_resumable=1;
-               if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
-                       p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s);
-               SSL_SESSION_free(s);
-               }
-       }
-
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    return (s->session_timeout);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
+                              int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s,
+                                                            void *secret,
+                                                            int *secret_len,
+                                                            STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+                                                            *peer_ciphers,
+                                                            const SSL_CIPHER
+                                                            **cipher,
+                                                            void *arg),
+                              void *arg)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
+    s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
+                                  void *arg)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
+    s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
+{
+    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+        OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+        s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
+        s->tlsext_session_ticket =
+            OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
+        if (s->tlsext_session_ticket == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (ext_data) {
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
+            memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
+        } else {
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
+            s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
+        }
+
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st {
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    long time;
+    LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+static void timeout_cb(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
+{
+    if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */
+        /*
+         * The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on
+         * locking overhead
+         */
+        (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
+        SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s);
+        s->not_resumable = 1;
+        if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+            p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+    }
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM);
 
 void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
-       {
-       unsigned long i;
-       TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
-
-       tp.ctx=s;
-       tp.cache=s->sessions;
-       if (tp.cache == NULL) return;
-       tp.time=t;
-       CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-       i=tp.cache->down_load;
-       tp.cache->down_load=0;
-       lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp);
-       tp.cache->down_load=i;
-       CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-       }
+{
+    unsigned long i;
+    TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+    tp.ctx = s;
+    tp.cache = s->sessions;
+    if (tp.cache == NULL)
+        return;
+    tp.time = t;
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    i = CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
+    CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = 0;
+    lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_TIMEOUT_PARAM(tp.cache, timeout_cb, &tp);
+    CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = i;
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+}
 
 int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
-       {
-       if (    (s->session != NULL) &&
-               !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
-               !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)))
-               {
-               SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
-               return(1);
-               }
-       else
-               return(0);
-       }
+{
+    if ((s->session != NULL) &&
+        !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+        !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
+        SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+        return (1);
+    } else
+        return (0);
+}
 
 /* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
 static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
-       {
-       if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
-
-       if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
-               { /* last element in list */
-               if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
-                       { /* only one element in list */
-                       ctx->session_cache_head=NULL;
-                       ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL;
-                       }
-               else
-                       {
-                       ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev;
-                       s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
-                       }
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
-                       { /* first element in list */
-                       ctx->session_cache_head=s->next;
-                       s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
-                       }
-               else
-                       { /* middle of list */
-                       s->next->prev=s->prev;
-                       s->prev->next=s->next;
-                       }
-               }
-       s->prev=s->next=NULL;
-       }
+{
+    if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
+        return;
+
+    if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
+        /* last element in list */
+        if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+            /* only one element in list */
+            ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
+            ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+        } else {
+            ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
+            s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+            /* first element in list */
+            ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
+            s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+        } else {
+            /* middle of list */
+            s->next->prev = s->prev;
+            s->prev->next = s->next;
+        }
+    }
+    s->prev = s->next = NULL;
+}
 
 static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
-       {
-       if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
-               SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
-
-       if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL)
-               {
-               ctx->session_cache_head=s;
-               ctx->session_cache_tail=s;
-               s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
-               s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
-               }
-       else
-               {
-               s->next=ctx->session_cache_head;
-               s->next->prev=s;
-               s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
-               ctx->session_cache_head=s;
-               }
-       }
+{
+    if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
+        SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+
+    if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
+        ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+        ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
+        s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+        s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+    } else {
+        s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
+        s->next->prev = s;
+        s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+        ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+    }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                        SSL_SESSION *sess))
+{
+    ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+    return ctx->new_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess))
+{
+    ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                  SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+    return ctx->remove_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+                                                 const unsigned char *data,
+                                                 int len, int *copy))
+{
+    ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                       const unsigned char *data,
+                                                       int len, int *copy) {
+    return ctx->get_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                               void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
+{
+    ctx->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+                                                 int val) {
+    return ctx->info_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+                                           EVP_PKEY **pkey))
+{
+    ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+                                                 EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
+    return ctx->client_cert_cb;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
+{
+    if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
+               SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
+        ENGINE_finish(e);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                    int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                               unsigned char *cookie,
+                                               unsigned int *cookie_len))
+{
+    ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                  int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
+                                             unsigned int cookie_len))
+{
+    ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb;
+}
 
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,
+                 SSL_SESSION)