static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
-static int ssl_session_num=0;
-static STACK *ssl_session_meth=NULL;
-#if 1 /* traditional SSLeay behaviour */
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl)
+/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
{
return(ssl->session);
}
-#else /* suggested change: increase reference counter so that a session
- * can later be set in a new SSL object.
- * Objections:
- * -- the modified function should have a new name (or old
- * applications, including s_client, leak memory);
- * -- the locking seems unnecessary given that SSL structures
- * usually cannot be safely shared between threads anyway. */
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl)
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
+/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
/* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
* non-null and when we up the reference count. */
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
sess = ssl->session;
if(sess)
sess->references++;
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
return(sess);
}
-#endif
-int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
- int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)())
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
- ssl_session_num++;
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_session_num-1,
- &ssl_session_meth,
- argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
SSL_SESSION *ss;
- ss=(SSL_SESSION *)Malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
if (ss == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ss->prev=NULL;
ss->next=NULL;
ss->compress_meth=0;
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_session_meth,(char *)ss,&ss->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
return(ss);
}
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
+ {
+ if(len)
+ *len = s->session_id_length;
+ return s->session_id;
+ }
+
+/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
+ * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
+ * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
+ * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
+ * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
+ * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
+ * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
+ * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
+
+#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+ unsigned int retry = 0;
+ do
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len);
+ while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+ if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+ return 1;
+ /* else - woops a session_id match */
+ /* XXX We should also check the external cache --
+ * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
+ * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
+ * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
+ * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
+ * and make a reservation for it if it does not
+ * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
{
/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+ unsigned int tmp;
SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
+ GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return(0);
}
-
- for (;;)
+ /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if(s->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->generate_session_id;
+ else if(s->ctx->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->ctx->generate_session_id;
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ /* Choose a session ID */
+ tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+ if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
+ {
+ /* The callback failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
+ * nor set it higher than it was. */
+ if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
+ {
+ /* The callback set an illegal length */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
+ if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
+ memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
+ else
+ ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+ /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+ if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+ ss->session_id_length))
{
- SSL_SESSION *r;
-
- RAND_bytes(ss->session_id,ss->session_id_length);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,
- (char *)ss);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if (r == NULL) break;
- /* else - woops a session_id match */
- /* XXX should also check external cache!
- * (But the probability of a collision is negligible, anyway...) */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return(0);
}
}
else
ss->session_id_length=0;
}
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
s->session=ss;
SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data;
int fatal = 0;
- /* conn_init();*/
data.ssl_version=s->version;
data.session_id_length=len;
if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
{
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,(char *)&data);
+ ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data);
if (ret != NULL)
/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (copy)
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
- * things are very strange */
- SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret);
+ /* Add the externally cached session to the internal
+ * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
+ if(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
+ /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
+ * things are very strange */
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret);
}
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
/* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
- * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'Free' it we could
+ * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could
* be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
* later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
int ret=0;
SSL_SESSION *s;
- /* conn_init(); */
+ /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
+ * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
+ * doubly linked list and an lhash */
CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,(char *)c);
+ s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
- /* Put on the end of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+ /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
+ * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+ * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
+ if (s != NULL && s != c)
+ {
+ /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
+ * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
+ * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
+ * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
+ * cache) */
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
if (s == NULL)
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
- /* If the same session if is being 're-added', Free the old
- * one when the last person stops using it.
- * This will also work if it is alread in the cache.
- * The references will go up and then down :-) */
if (s != NULL)
{
- SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+ * count because it already takes into account the cache */
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
ret=0;
}
else
{
+ /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
+
ret=1;
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
{
if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,(char *)c);
- if (r != NULL)
+ if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
{
ret=1;
+ r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
}
}
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_session_meth,(char *)ss,&ss->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
- memset(ss->key_arg,0,SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
- memset(ss->master_key,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
- memset(ss->session_id,0,SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id);
if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
- memset(ss,0,sizeof(*ss));
- Free(ss);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss));
+ OPENSSL_free(ss);
}
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
+ session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
+ {
+ s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
+ memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
+ session->krb5_client_princ_len);
+ s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (s->session != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session=session;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
/* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
ret=1;
}
{
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
* save on locking overhead */
- lh_delete(p->cache,(char *)s);
+ lh_delete(p->cache,s);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
s->not_resumable=1;
if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
}
}
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *)
+
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
unsigned long i;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
i=tp.cache->down_load;
tp.cache->down_load=0;
- lh_doall_arg(tp.cache,(void (*)())timeout,(char *)&tp);
+ lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp);
tp.cache->down_load=i;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff