* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
-
-static STACK *ssl_meth=NULL;
-static STACK *ssl_ctx_meth=NULL;
-static int ssl_meth_num=0;
-static int ssl_ctx_meth_num=0;
+const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
+ /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
+ (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function
};
int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
{
- int state;
if (s->method == NULL)
{
return(0);
}
+ if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session=NULL;
+ }
+
s->error=0;
s->hit=0;
s->shutdown=0;
-#if 0
+#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
+ * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
if (s->new_session) return(1);
+#else
+ if (s->new_session)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
#endif
- state=s->state; /* Keep to check if we throw away the session-id */
s->type=0;
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
s->client_version=s->version;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+#if 0
s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
+#endif
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
{
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
- {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=NULL;
- }
-
s->first_packet=0;
#if 1
/* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
* so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
- if ((s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
+ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
{
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method=s->ctx->method;
return(NULL);
}
- s=(SSL *)Malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+ s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
if (s == NULL) goto err;
memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ s->options=ctx->options;
+ s->mode=ctx->mode;
+ s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
+
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
{
/* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
}
else
s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
- s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
- memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+
+ s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
+ s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
+ s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
+ s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
+ s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
s->trust = ctx->trust;
+ s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s->ctx=ctx;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
goto err;
- s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
s->references=1;
s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
- s->options=ctx->options;
- s->mode=ctx->mode;
+
SSL_clear(s);
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_meth,(char *)s,&s->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
return(s);
err:
ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
if (s->ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
- Free(s);
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
return 1;
}
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int id_len)
+ {
+ /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
+ * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
+ * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
+ * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
+ * use by this SSL. */
+ SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+ r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+ r.session_id_length = id_len;
+ memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
+ /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
+ * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
+ * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
+ * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
+ if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
+ (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
+ {
+ memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
+ SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
+ r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return (p != NULL);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
+ {
+ return X509_PURPOSE_set(&s->purpose, purpose);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
+ {
+ return X509_PURPOSE_set(&s->purpose, purpose);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
+ {
+ return X509_TRUST_set(&s->trust, trust);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
+ {
+ return X509_TRUST_set(&s->trust, trust);
+ }
+
void SSL_free(SSL *s)
{
int i;
}
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_meth,(char *)s,&s->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
if (s->bbio != NULL)
{
if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
- Free((char *)s);
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
}
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
{ return(s->wbio); }
int SSL_get_fd(SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(SSL *s)
{
int ret= -1;
BIO *b,*r;
return(ret);
}
-#ifndef NO_SOCK
+int SSL_get_wfd(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret= -1;
+ BIO *b,*r;
+
+ b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
{
int ret=0;
}
#endif
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+ {
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
+ if (count > ret)
+ count = ret;
+ memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+ {
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+ if (count > ret)
+ count = ret;
+ memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+
int SSL_get_verify_mode(SSL *s)
{
return(s->verify_mode);
int SSL_pending(SSL *s)
{
+ /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
+ * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
+ * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
+ * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
+ * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
+ * so we'd better not return -1.)
+ */
return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
}
else
r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
+ /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
+ * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
+
return(r);
}
return(s->method->get_timeout());
}
-int SSL_read(SSL *s,char *buf,int num)
+int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
{
return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
}
-int SSL_peek(SSL *s,char *buf,int num)
+int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
{
return(0);
return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
}
-int SSL_write(SSL *s,const char *buf,int num)
+int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
{
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
- s->new_session=1;
+ if (s->new_session == 0)
+ {
+ s->new_session=1;
+ }
return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
}
-long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,char *parg)
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
+ * false again once a handshake has finished */
+ return (s->new_session != 0);
+ }
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
{
long l;
l=s->read_ahead;
s->read_ahead=larg;
return(l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
return(s->options|=larg);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return(s->mode|=larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return(s->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l=s->max_cert_list;
+ s->max_cert_list=larg;
+ return(l);
default:
return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
}
}
-long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,char *parg)
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)())
+ {
+ switch(cmd)
+ {
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
+ }
+ }
+
+struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->sessions;
+ }
+
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
{
long l;
l=ctx->read_ahead;
ctx->read_ahead=larg;
return(l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return(ctx->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l=ctx->max_cert_list;
+ ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
+ return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
l=ctx->session_cache_size;
}
}
-int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(SSL_CIPHER *a,SSL_CIPHER *b)
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)())
+ {
+ switch(cmd)
+ {
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
{
long l;
return((l > 0)?1:-1);
}
-int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(SSL_CIPHER **ap,SSL_CIPHER **bp)
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
+ const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp)
{
long l;
return(c->name);
}
-/** specify the ciphers to be used by defaut by the SSL_CTX */
-int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *str)
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
-int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,char *str)
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
int i,j=0;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (sk == NULL) return(0);
q=p;
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if ((c->algorithms & SSL_KRB5) && nokrb5)
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
j=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
p+=j;
}
return(NULL);
}
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
- sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new(NULL); /* change perhaps later */
+ sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
else
{
sk= *skp;
return(l);
}
+/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+ * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+ * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
+ * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
+ * with a matching session ID. */
int SSL_SESSION_cmp(SSL_SESSION *a,SSL_SESSION *b)
{
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
}
+/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
+ * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
+ * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
+ * ssl.h. */
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *)
+
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
goto err;
}
- ret=(SSL_CTX *)Malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+ ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
/* We take the system default */
ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
- ret->new_session_cb=NULL;
- ret->remove_session_cb=NULL;
- ret->get_session_cb=NULL;
+ ret->new_session_cb=0;
+ ret->remove_session_cb=0;
+ ret->get_session_cb=0;
+ ret->generate_session_id=0;
memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
ret->info_callback=NULL;
- ret->app_verify_callback=NULL;
+ ret->app_verify_callback=0;
ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
+ ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
ret->read_ahead=0;
+ ret->msg_callback=0;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
+ ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
- ret->default_passwd_callback=NULL;
+ ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
- ret->client_cert_cb=NULL;
+ ret->client_cert_cb=0;
- ret->sessions=lh_new(SSL_SESSION_hash,SSL_SESSION_cmp);
+ ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash),
+ LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp));
if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_ctx_meth,(char *)ret,&ret->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
ret->extra_certs=NULL;
ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
return(NULL);
}
+#if 0
static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
- { Free(comp); }
+ { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
+#endif
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
{
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_ctx_meth,(char *)a,&a->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
if (a->sessions != NULL)
{
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
+#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
- Free((char *)a);
+#else
+ a->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
}
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,int (*cb)(),char *arg)
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
{
- /* now
- * int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *),
- * but should be
- * int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *arg)
- */
ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
- ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; /* never used */
+ ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_mode=mode;
ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
- /* This needs cleaning up EAY EAY EAY */
- X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(ctx->cert_store,cb);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
(rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
#else
rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
(dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
emask|=SSL_aDSS;
}
-#ifdef SSL_ALLOW_ADH
mask|=SSL_aNULL;
emask|=SSL_aNULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5;
+ emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5;
#endif
c->mask=mask;
c=s->cert;
ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
- is_export=SSL_IS_EXPORT(alg);
+ is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
mask=is_export?c->export_mask:c->mask;
kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK);
else
i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
}
+ else if (kalg & SSL_aKRB5)
+ {
+ /* VRS something else here? */
+ return(NULL);
+ }
else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(NULL);
}
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
}
else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(NULL);
}
}
* and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
- if ((s->ctx->session_cache_mode & mode)
- && (!s->hit)
- && SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session)
+ i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+ && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)
+ || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session))
&& (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
{
CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
}
/* auto flush every 255 connections */
- i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode;
if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
((i & mode) == mode))
{
reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+ else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
else
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
}
reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+ else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
else
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
}
return(NULL);
}
-char *SSL_get_version(SSL *s)
+const char *SSL_get_version(SSL *s)
{
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
return("TLSv1");
if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
return(NULL);
-
+
+ ret->version = s->version;
+ ret->type = s->type;
+ ret->method = s->method;
+
if (s->session != NULL)
{
/* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
if (s->cert != NULL)
{
+ if (ret->cert != NULL)
+ {
+ ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
+ }
ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
if (ret->cert == NULL)
goto err;
s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
}
+ ret->options=s->options;
+ ret->mode=s->mode;
+ SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+ ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+ ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
ret->debug=s->debug;
- ret->options=s->options;
/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
- if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(ssl_meth,&ret->ex_data,&s->ex_data))
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
goto err;
/* setup rbio, and wbio */
else
ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
}
+ ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
+ ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
+ ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+ ret->server = s->server;
+ ret->new_session = s->new_session;
+ ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+ ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
+ ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
+ ret->rstate=s->rstate;
+ ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
+ ret->hit=s->hit;
+ ret->purpose=s->purpose;
+ ret->trust=s->trust;
/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
}
}
- ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
- ret->state=s->state;
- ret->handshake_func=s->handshake_func;
- ret->server=s->server;
-
if (0)
{
err:
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
- Free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
}
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
- Free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
}
if (s->expand != NULL)
void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
{
- BIO *under;
-
if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
{
/* remove buffering */
- under=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
- if (under != NULL)
- s->wbio=under;
- else
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
+ s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
+ assert(s->wbio != NULL);
+#endif
+ }
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio=NULL;
}
return(ssl->ctx);
}
-#ifndef NO_STDIO
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
}
#endif
-void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,void (*cb)())
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
{
ssl->info_callback=cb;
}
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(SSL *ssl))(void)
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)
{
- return((void (*)())ssl->info_callback);
+ return ssl->info_callback;
}
int SSL_state(SSL *ssl)
return(ssl->verify_result);
}
-int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,char *argp,int (*new_func)(),
- int (*dup_func)(),void (*free_func)())
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
- ssl_meth_num++;
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_meth_num-1,
- &ssl_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
}
-int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,char *argp,int (*new_func)(),
- int (*dup_func)(),void (*free_func)())
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
- ssl_ctx_meth_num++;
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_ctx_meth_num-1,
- &ssl_ctx_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
* \param cb the callback
*/
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
int is_export,
int keylength))
- { SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,0,(char *)cb); }
-#endif
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)())cb);
+ }
-#ifndef NO_RSA
-void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
- int keylength))
- { SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,0,(char *)cb); }
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+ int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)())cb);
+ }
#endif
#ifdef DOXYGEN
* \param dh the callback
*/
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
int keylength))
- { SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,0,(char *)dh); }
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh);
+ }
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
- int keylength))
- { SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,0,(char *)dh); }
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh);
+ }
#endif
-#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(WIN16)
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)())cb);
+ }
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)())cb);
+ }
+
+
+
+#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff