* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
-
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
#ifdef REF_CHECK
# include <assert.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
-static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *ssl_meth=NULL;
-static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *ssl_ctx_meth=NULL;
-static int ssl_meth_num=0;
-static int ssl_ctx_meth_num=0;
-
OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
/* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
(int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
{
- int state;
if (s->method == NULL)
{
return(0);
}
+ if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session=NULL;
+ }
+
s->error=0;
s->hit=0;
s->shutdown=0;
}
#endif
- state=s->state; /* Keep to check if we throw away the session-id */
s->type=0;
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
- {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=NULL;
- }
-
s->first_packet=0;
#if 1
/* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
* so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
- if ((s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
+ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
{
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method=s->ctx->method;
s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ s->options=ctx->options;
+ s->mode=ctx->mode;
+ s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
+
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
{
/* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
}
else
s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
- s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
- memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+
+ s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
+ s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
+ s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
+#if 0
s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
+#endif
+ s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+ memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
+
+ s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!s->param)
+ goto err;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
+#if 0
s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
s->trust = ctx->trust;
+#endif
+ s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s->ctx=ctx;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
goto err;
- s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
s->references=1;
s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
- s->options=ctx->options;
- s->mode=ctx->mode;
- s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; /* used to happen in SSL_clear */
+
SSL_clear(s);
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_meth,s,&s->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
return(s);
err:
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
- if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
+ if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
* any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
* use by this SSL. */
SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+
+ if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
+ return 0;
+
r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
r.session_id_length = id_len;
memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
-{
- return X509_PURPOSE_set(&s->purpose, purpose);
-}
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+ }
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
-{
- return X509_PURPOSE_set(&s->purpose, purpose);
-}
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+ }
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
-{
- return X509_TRUST_set(&s->trust, trust);
-}
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+ }
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
-{
- return X509_TRUST_set(&s->trust, trust);
-}
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+ }
void SSL_free(SSL *s)
{
}
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_meth,(char *)s,&s->ex_data);
+ if (s->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
if (s->bbio != NULL)
{
if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
+ kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
int SSL_get_fd(SSL *s)
{
- return(SSL_get_rfc(s));
+ return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
}
int SSL_get_rfd(SSL *s)
int SSL_get_verify_depth(SSL *s)
{
- return(s->verify_depth);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
}
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- return(ctx->verify_depth);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
{
- s->verify_depth=depth;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
}
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
- s->new_session=1;
+ if (s->new_session == 0)
+ {
+ s->new_session=1;
+ }
return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
}
-long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,char *parg)
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
+ * false again once a handshake has finished */
+ return (s->new_session != 0);
+ }
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
{
long l;
l=s->read_ahead;
s->read_ahead=larg;
return(l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
return(s->options|=larg);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return(s->mode|=larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return(s->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l=s->max_cert_list;
+ s->max_cert_list=larg;
+ return(l);
default:
return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
}
{
switch(cmd)
{
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
default:
return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
}
return ctx->sessions;
}
-long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,char *parg)
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
{
long l;
l=ctx->read_ahead;
ctx->read_ahead=larg;
return(l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return(ctx->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l=ctx->max_cert_list;
+ ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
+ return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
l=ctx->session_cache_size;
{
switch(cmd)
{
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
default:
return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
}
* preference */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(SSL *s)
{
- if ((s != NULL) && (s->cipher_list != NULL))
- {
- return(s->cipher_list);
- }
- else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
- (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
+ if (s != NULL)
{
- return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+ {
+ return(s->cipher_list);
+ }
+ else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+ (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
+ {
+ return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
+ }
}
return(NULL);
}
* algorithm id */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
{
- if ((s != NULL) && (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
- {
- return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
- }
- else if ((s != NULL) && (s->ctx != NULL) &&
- (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
+ if (s != NULL)
{
- return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ {
+ return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+ }
+ else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+ (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
+ {
+ return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+ }
}
return(NULL);
}
/* We take the system default */
ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
- ret->new_session_cb=NULL;
- ret->remove_session_cb=NULL;
- ret->get_session_cb=NULL;
- ret->generate_session_id=NULL;
+ ret->new_session_cb=0;
+ ret->remove_session_cb=0;
+ ret->get_session_cb=0;
+ ret->generate_session_id=0;
memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
ret->info_callback=NULL;
- ret->app_verify_callback=NULL;
+ ret->app_verify_callback=0;
ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
+ ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
ret->read_ahead=0;
+ ret->msg_callback=0;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+#if 0
ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
+#endif
+ ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
- ret->default_passwd_callback=NULL;
+ ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
- ret->client_cert_cb=NULL;
+ ret->client_cert_cb=0;
ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash),
LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp));
goto err2;
}
+ ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!ret->param)
+ goto err;
+
if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_ctx_meth,(char *)ret,&ret->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
ret->extra_certs=NULL;
ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_ctx_meth,(char *)a,&a->ex_data);
+ if (a->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+
+ /*
+ * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
+ * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
+ * after the sessions were flushed.
+ * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
+ * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
+ * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
+ * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
+ */
if (a->sessions != NULL)
- {
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
+
+ if (a->sessions != NULL)
lh_free(a->sessions);
- }
+
if (a->cert_store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
}
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,int (*cb)(),char *arg)
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
{
- /* now
- * int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *),
- * but should be
- * int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *arg)
- */
ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
- ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; /* never used */
+ ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_mode=mode;
ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
- /* This needs cleaning up EAY EAY EAY */
- X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(ctx->cert_store,cb);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
{
- ctx->verify_depth=depth;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
unsigned long mask,emask;
+ int have_ecc_cert, have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
+ int signature_nid = 0;
if (c == NULL) return;
dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+#endif
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
-
+ cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
+ have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
mask=0;
emask=0;
emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5;
#endif
+ /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
+ * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
+ */
+ if (have_ecc_cert)
+ {
+ /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+ x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+ (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
+ ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+ (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
+ ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
+ EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
+ if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+ signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (ecdh_ok)
+ {
+ if ((signature_nid == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) ||
+ (signature_nid == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) ||
+ (signature_nid == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))
+ {
+ mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA;
+ if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
+ emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA;
+ }
+ if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
+ {
+ mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA;
+ if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
+ emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (ecdsa_ok)
+ {
+ mask|=SSL_aECDSA;
+ emask|=SSL_aECDSA;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (have_ecdh_tmp)
+ {
+ mask|=SSL_kECDHE;
+ emask|=SSL_kECDHE;
+ }
+#endif
c->mask=mask;
c->export_mask=emask;
c->valid=1;
}
+/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+
+int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs)
+ {
+ unsigned long alg = cs->algorithms;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int keysize = 0;
+ int signature_nid = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
+ {
+ /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
+ keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (keysize > 163) return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+ signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ if (alg & SSL_kECDH)
+ {
+ /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
+ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
+ {
+ /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
+ if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+ {
+ /* signature alg must be RSA */
+ if ((signature_nid != NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) &&
+ (signature_nid != NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) &&
+ (signature_nid != NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
+ {
+ /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
+ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1; /* all checks are ok */
+ }
+
/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
{
mask=is_export?c->export_mask:c->mask;
kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK);
- if (kalg & SSL_kDHr)
+ if (kalg & SSL_kECDH)
+ {
+ /* we don't need to look at SSL_kECDHE
+ * since no certificate is needed for
+ * anon ECDH and for authenticated
+ * ECDHE, the check for the auth
+ * algorithm will set i correctly
+ * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
+ * not an RSA cert but for ECDHE-RSA
+ * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
+ * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
+ * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
+ */
+ i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ }
+ else if (kalg & SSL_aECDSA)
+ {
+ i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ }
+ else if (kalg & SSL_kDHr)
i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
else if (kalg & SSL_kDHd)
i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
return(NULL);
}
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
+
return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
}
else
return(NULL);
}
+ else if ((alg & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+ (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
+ return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
* and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
- if ((s->ctx->session_cache_mode & mode)
- && (!s->hit)
- && SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session)
+ i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+ && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+ || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session))
&& (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
{
CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
}
/* auto flush every 255 connections */
- i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode;
if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
((i & mode) == mode))
{
if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
return(NULL);
-
+
+ ret->version = s->version;
+ ret->type = s->type;
+ ret->method = s->method;
+
if (s->session != NULL)
{
/* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
* they should not both point to the same object,
* and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */
+ ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
ret->method = s->method;
ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
}
+ ret->options=s->options;
+ ret->mode=s->mode;
+ SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+ ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+ ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
ret->debug=s->debug;
- ret->options=s->options;
/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
- if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(ssl_meth,&ret->ex_data,&s->ex_data))
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
goto err;
/* setup rbio, and wbio */
else
ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
}
+ ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
+ ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
+ ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+ ret->server = s->server;
+ ret->new_session = s->new_session;
+ ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+ ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
+ ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
+ ret->rstate=s->rstate;
+ ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
+ ret->hit=s->hit;
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
}
}
- ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
- ret->state=s->state;
- ret->handshake_func=s->handshake_func;
- ret->server=s->server;
-
if (0)
{
err:
return(NULL);
}
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ return(s->compress->meth);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ return(s->expand->meth);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
{
BIO *bbio;
}
#endif
-void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,void (*cb)())
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
{
ssl->info_callback=cb;
}
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(SSL *ssl))(void)
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)
{
- return((void (*)())ssl->info_callback);
+ return ssl->info_callback;
}
int SSL_state(SSL *ssl)
int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
- ssl_meth_num++;
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_meth_num-1,
- &ssl_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
- ssl_ctx_meth_num++;
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_ctx_meth_num-1,
- &ssl_ctx_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
int keylength))
- {
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh);
- }
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh);
+ }
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
int keylength))
- {
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh);
- }
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)())ecdh);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)())ecdh);
+ }
#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)())cb);
+ }
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)())cb);
+ }
+
+
+
#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff