{
int i;
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return;
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock);
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s);
if (i > 0)
/* We are a server writing to an unauthenticated client */
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING;
ret = SSL_write_ex(s, buf, num, written);
+ /* The buffering BIO is still in place */
+ if (ret)
+ (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
s->early_data_state = early_data_state;
return ret;
return 1;
}
-static int ciphersuite_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
-{
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphersuites = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)arg;
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
- /* Arbitrary sized temp buffer for the cipher name. Should be big enough */
- char name[80];
-
- if (len > (int)(sizeof(name) - 1)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- memcpy(name, elem, len);
- name[len] = '\0';
-
- cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(name);
- if (cipher == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphersuites, cipher)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str)
-{
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *newciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
-
- if (newciphers == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- /* Parse the list. We explicitly allow an empty list */
- if (*str != '\0'
- && !CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, ciphersuite_cb, newciphers)) {
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(newciphers);
- return 0;
- }
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*currciphers);
- *currciphers = newciphers;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int update_cipher_list(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites)
-{
- int i;
-
- /*
- * Delete any existing TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. These are always first in the
- * list.
- */
- while (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) > 0
- && sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list, 0)->min_tls == TLS1_3_VERSION)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(cipher_list, 0);
-
- /* Insert the new TLSv1.3 ciphersuites */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_insert(cipher_list,
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i), i);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
-{
- int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites), str);
-
- if (ret && ctx->cipher_list != NULL) {
- /* We already have a cipher_list, so we need to update it */
- return update_cipher_list(ctx->cipher_list, ctx->tls13_ciphersuites);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str)
-{
- int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(s->tls13_ciphersuites), str);
-
- if (ret && s->cipher_list != NULL) {
- /* We already have a cipher_list, so we need to update it */
- return update_cipher_list(s->cipher_list, s->tls13_ciphersuites);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size)
{
char *p;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clntsk, *srvrsk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
int i;
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
+ if (!s->server
+ || s->session == NULL
+ || s->session->ciphers == NULL
+ || size < 2)
return NULL;
p = buf;
- sk = s->session->ciphers;
+ clntsk = s->session->ciphers;
+ srvrsk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ if (clntsk == NULL || srvrsk == NULL)
+ return NULL;
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk) == 0 || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvrsk) == 0)
return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk); i++) {
int n;
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clntsk, i);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(srvrsk, c) < 0)
+ continue;
+
n = strlen(c->name);
- if (n + 1 > len) {
+ if (n + 1 > size) {
if (p != buf)
--p;
*p = '\0';
strcpy(p, c->name);
p += n;
*(p++) = ':';
- len -= n + 1;
+ size -= n + 1;
}
p[-1] = '\0';
return buf;
/* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */
if ((RAND_bytes(ret->ext.tick_key_name,
sizeof(ret->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0)
- || (RAND_bytes(ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ || (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key)) <= 0)
- || (RAND_bytes(ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
+ || (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
sizeof(ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key)) <= 0))
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
- if (RAND_bytes(ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
+ if (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
sizeof(ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key)) <= 0)
goto err;
/*
* If sid_ctx_length is 0 there is no specific application context
* associated with this session, so when we try to resume it and
- * SSL_VERIFY_PEER is requested, we have no indication that this is
- * actually a session for the proper application context, and the
- * *handshake* will fail, not just the resumption attempt.
- * Do not cache these sessions that are not resumable.
+ * SSL_VERIFY_PEER is requested to verify the client identity, we have no
+ * indication that this is actually a session for the proper application
+ * context, and the *handshake* will fail, not just the resumption attempt.
+ * Do not cache (on the server) these sessions that are not resumable
+ * (clients can set SSL_VERIFY_PEER without needing a sid_ctx set).
*/
- if (s->session->sid_ctx_length == 0
+ if (s->server && s->session->sid_ctx_length == 0
&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) != 0)
return;
return 1;
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
- if (!ossl_assert(s->wbio != NULL))
- return 0;
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio = NULL;
if (ext->present)
num++;
}
- present = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*present) * num);
- if (present == NULL)
+ if ((present = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*present) * num)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_GET1_EXTENSIONS_PRESENT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) {
ext = s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i;
if (ext->present) {
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff