* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(NeXT) && !defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
-#include <dirent.h>
-#endif
-
-#if defined(WIN32)
-#include <windows.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef NeXT
-#include <sys/dir.h>
-#define dirent direct
-#endif
-
+#include "o_dir.h"
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
{
static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
{
- /* any write lock will do; usually this branch
- * will only be taken once anyway */
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
{
ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
}
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
+
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
+void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
+ {
+ /* Set digest values to defaults */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+ }
+
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
{
CERT *ret;
ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references=1;
-
+ ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
return(ret);
}
* if you find that more readable */
ret->valid = cert->valid;
- ret->mask = cert->mask;
- ret->export_mask = cert->export_mask;
+ ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+ ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+ ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+ ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
{
- /* DH parameters don't have a reference count */
ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
{
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
+ {
+ ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+ if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
+ ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
+#endif
+
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
- if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
+ CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL)
{
- ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
+ CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
- if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ if (cpk->privatekey != NULL)
{
- ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
+ rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
+ CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
switch(i)
case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
/* We have a DH key. */
break;
-
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+ /* We have an ECC key */
+ break;
+
default:
/* Can't happen. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
}
}
+
+ if (cpk->chain)
+ {
+ int j;
+ rpk->chain = sk_X509_dup(cpk->chain);
+ if (!rpk->chain)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(rpk->chain); j++)
+ {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(rpk->chain, j);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+ }
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].authz != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Just copy everything. */
+ ret->pkeys[i].authz_length =
+ cert->pkeys[i].authz_length;
+ ret->pkeys[i].authz =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(ret->pkeys[i].authz_length);
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].authz == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].authz,
+ cert->pkeys[i].authz,
+ cert->pkeys[i].authz_length);
+ }
}
- /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
- * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
-
ret->references=1;
+ /* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
+ * will be set during handshake.
+ */
+ ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+ /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
+ ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+ /* Configure sigalgs however we copy across */
+ if (cert->conf_sigalgs)
+ {
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen
+ * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+ if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs,
+ cert->conf_sigalgslen * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+ ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+ /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
+ ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
return(ret);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* avoid 'unreferenced label' warning if OPENSSL_NO_DH is defined */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
- if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
- }
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
return NULL;
}
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509)
+ {
+ X509_free(cpk->x509);
+ cpk->x509 = NULL;
+ }
+ if (cpk->privatekey)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+ cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+ }
+ if (cpk->chain)
+ {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ cpk->chain = NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (cpk->authz != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(cpk->authz);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
#endif
-
- for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
- if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#if 0
- if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
- }
+
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+ if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+ if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
return(1);
}
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+ if (!cpk)
+ return 0;
+ if (cpk->chain)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ cpk->chain = chain;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ if (!chain)
+ return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
+ dchain = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+ if (!dchain)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dchain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(dchain, i);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain))
+ {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+ if (!cpk)
+ return 0;
+ if (!cpk->chain)
+ cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x))
+ return 0;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ return 1;
+ }
SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
{
if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
OPENSSL_free(sc);
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
+#if 0
if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+#endif
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
- /* We need to set the verify purpose. The purpose can be determined by
+ /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
* the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
* or vice versa.
*/
- if (s->server)
- i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT;
- else
- i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER;
- X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(&ctx, i, s->purpose, s->trust);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
+ s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+ /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
+ * ctx.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+ i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+#else
i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+#endif
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
return(i);
}
-static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
if (*ca_list != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
- *ca_list=list;
+ *ca_list=name_list;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
return(ret);
}
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
- set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),list);
+ set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
}
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
- set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),list);
+ set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
}
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->client_CA);
}
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(SSL *s)
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{ /* we are in the client */
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret,*sk;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
- ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
- if ((ret == NULL) || (sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
{
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
/* check for duplicates */
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
return(ret);
}
#endif
sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
}
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
if (0)
{
err:
if(x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
+ (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
return ret;
}
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* XXXX This may be fixed in the future */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! */
-
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *dir)
{
- DIR *d;
- struct dirent *dstruct;
+ OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+ const char *filename;
int ret = 0;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
- d = opendir(dir);
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
- if(!d)
- {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- while((dstruct=readdir(d)))
+
+ while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
{
char buf[1024];
int r;
-
- if(strlen(dir)+strlen(dstruct->d_name)+2 > sizeof buf)
+
+ if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
-
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name);
- if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
+#else
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
+#endif
+ if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
goto err;
if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
goto err;
}
+
+ if (errno)
+ {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+ ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
ret = 1;
-err:
+err:
+ if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
return ret;
}
-#endif
-#endif
+/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
-#else
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int n;
+ unsigned char *p;
-int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
- const char *dir)
+ n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+ l2n3(n,p);
+ i2d_X509(x,&p);
+ *l+=n+3;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
{
- WIN32_FIND_DATA FindFileData;
- HANDLE hFind;
- int ret = 0;
+ BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
+ int no_chain;
+ int i;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
-
- hFind = FindFirstFile(dir, &FindFileData);
- /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
- if(hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ X509 *x;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+
+ if (cpk)
+ x = cpk->x509;
+ else
+ x = NULL;
+
+ /* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use
+ * parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (cpk && cpk->chain)
+ extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+ else
+ extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+
+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
+ no_chain = 1;
+ else
+ no_chain = 0;
+
+ /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
{
- SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
}
-
- do
+ if (x != NULL)
{
- char buf[1024];
- int r;
-
- if(strlen(dir)+strlen(FindFileData.cFileName)+2 > sizeof buf)
+ if (no_chain)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
}
-
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,FindFileData.cFileName);
- if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
- goto err;
- if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
- goto err;
}
- while (FindNextFile(hFind, &FindFileData) != FALSE);
- FindClose(hFind);
- ret = 1;
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++)
+ {
+ x=sk_X509_value(extra_certs,i);
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+ return 0;
+ }
-err:
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
- return ret;
+ return 1;
}
-#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff