evp: prevent underflow in base64 decoding
[openssl.git] / ssl / ssl3.h
index 45fef15fb6bac157be22ba208b8ff24ec3829142..cb8b2492ec976704c89ecc32e8009f051398ead4 100644 (file)
@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL3_RT_ALERT                  21
 #define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE              22
 #define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA       23
+#define TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT              24
 
 #define SSL3_AL_WARNING                        1
 #define SSL3_AL_FATAL                  2
@@ -339,6 +340,9 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN    46
 #define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER      47      /* fatal */
 
+#define TLS1_HB_REQUEST                1
+#define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE       2
+       
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
 
 typedef struct ssl3_record_st
@@ -383,6 +387,18 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER                  0x0004
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG             0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY            0x0010
+#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE              0x0020
+/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+ * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+ * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
+ * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
+ * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS
+ * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to
+ * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be
+ * effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE            0x0040
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
 
@@ -518,6 +534,20 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
         unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
         unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
         int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+       /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */
+       int next_proto_neg_seen;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       /* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
+        * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari
+        * on 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */
+       char is_probably_safari;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
        } SSL3_STATE;
 
 #endif
@@ -526,6 +556,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 /*client */
 /* extra state */
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH               (0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK                    (0x310|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK                     (0x320|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#endif 
 /* write to server */
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A                (0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B                (0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
@@ -553,6 +587,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B         (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A            (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B            (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A                (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B                (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#endif
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A          (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B          (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 /* read from server */
@@ -568,13 +606,15 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 /* server */
 /* extra state */
 #define SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH               (0x100|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK                    (0x310|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK                     (0x320|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#endif 
 /* read from client */
 /* Do not change the number values, they do matter */
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A                (0x110|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B                (0x111|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C                (0x112|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-/* a new state to remember that we have already receive a ClientHello without srp username extension */
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME (0x1E2|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 /* write to client */
 #define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x113|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x114|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
@@ -600,6 +640,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B         (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A            (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B            (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A                (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B                (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#endif
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A          (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B          (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 /* write to client */
@@ -624,6 +668,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE            16
 #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED                       20
 #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS             22
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO                     67
+#endif
 #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST    3