Fix for CVE-2014-0224
[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
index 61ed0ad..fcc97f3 100644 (file)
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  *
  */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
 
 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
 
-
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#endif
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
+#endif
 
 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
        {
@@ -144,28 +156,16 @@ static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
                return(NULL);
        }
 
-SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
-       {
-       static int init=1;
-       static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
-
-       if (init)
-               {
-               memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
-                       sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
-               SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
-               SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
-               init=0;
-               }
-       return(&SSLv3_server_data);
-       }
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+                       ssl3_accept,
+                       ssl_undefined_function,
+                       ssl3_get_server_method)
 
 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
        {
        BUF_MEM *buf;
-       unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
+       unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
        void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-       long num1;
        int ret= -1;
        int new_state,state,skip=0;
 
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                }
 
                        s->init_num=0;
+                       s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
 
                        if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
                                {
@@ -247,6 +248,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
                                s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
                                }
+                       else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+                               !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+                               {
+                               /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
+                                * client that doesn't support secure
+                                * renegotiation.
+                                */
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+                               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                               ret = -1;
+                               goto end;
+                               }
                        else
                                {
                                /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
@@ -289,9 +302,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
                        ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                        if (s->hit)
-                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+                               {
+                               if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+                                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+                               else
+                                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+                               }
+#else
+                       if (s->hit)
+                                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
                        else
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
                        s->init_num=0;
@@ -299,15 +321,30 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
                case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
-                       /* Check if it is anon DH */
-                       if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+                       /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
+                       if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
+                               && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
                                {
                                ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
                                if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                               if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+                                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+                               else
+                                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+                               }
+                       else
+                               {
+                               skip = 1;
+                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+                               }
+#else
                                }
                        else
                                skip=1;
+
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
                        s->init_num=0;
                        break;
 
@@ -330,9 +367,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                        else
                                s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
+
                        /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
-                        * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
+                        * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
+                        *
+                        * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
+                        * message only if the cipher suite is either
+                        * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
+                        * server certificate contains the server's 
+                        * public key for key exchange.
+                        */
                        if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+                           || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
                            || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
                            || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
                                && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
@@ -401,15 +447,24 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                        break;
                
                case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-                       /* number of bytes to be flushed */
-                       num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
-                       if (num1 > 0)
+
+                       /* This code originally checked to see if
+                        * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
+                        * and then flushed. This caused problems
+                        * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
+                        * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+                        * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
+                        * still exist. So instead we just flush
+                        * unconditionally.
+                        */
+
+                       s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+                       if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
                                {
-                               s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-                               num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-                               if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-                               s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+                               ret= -1;
+                               goto end;
                                }
+                       s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 
                        s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
                        break;
@@ -423,10 +478,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                        if (ret == 2)
                                s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
                        else {
-                               /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
-                                * have not asked for it :-) */
-                               ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
-                               if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                               if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+                                       {
+                                       ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+                                       if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                                       }
                                s->init_num=0;
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
                        }
@@ -435,24 +491,39 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
                        ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
-                       if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
-                       s->init_num=0;
-
-                       /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
-                        * a client cert, it can be verified */ 
-                       s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-                               &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
-                               &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
-                       s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-                               &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
-                               &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+                       if (ret <= 0) 
+                               goto end;
+                       if (ret == 2)
+                               {
+                               /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+                                * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+                                * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+                                * message is not sent.
+                                */
+                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+                               s->init_num = 0;
+                               }
+                       else   
+                               {
+                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+                               s->init_num=0;
 
+                               /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+                                * a client cert, it can be verified
+                                */ 
+                               s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+                                   &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
+                                   &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
+                               s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+                                   &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
+                                   &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+                               }
                        break;
 
                case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
 
+                       s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
                        /* we should decide if we expected this one */
                        ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -463,16 +534,40 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
                case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+                       s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
                        ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
                                SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                        if (s->hit)
                                s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                       else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
                        else
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
                        s->init_num=0;
                        break;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+               case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+               case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+                       ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+                       if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+                       s->init_num=0;
+                       break;
+
+               case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+               case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+                       ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+                       if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+                       s->init_num=0;
+                       break;
+
+#endif
+
                case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
 
@@ -578,7 +673,7 @@ end:
        return(ret);
        }
 
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
        {
        unsigned char *p;
 
@@ -600,14 +695,14 @@ static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
        return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
        }
 
-static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
        {
        int ok;
        long n;
 
        /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
         * so permit appropriate message length */
-       n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+       n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
                -1,
@@ -617,10 +712,15 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
        if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
                {
+               /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+                * negotiation. */
+               if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+                       return -1;
+                       }
                /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
-                * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
-                * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
-                * when a handshake is not completed ... */
+                * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
                if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
                        {
@@ -628,19 +728,30 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
                        s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
                        }
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+               if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+                       {
+                       EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+                       s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+                       }
+#endif
+               s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
                return 2;
                }
        return 1;
 }
 
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
        {
        int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
+       unsigned int cookie_len;
        long n;
        unsigned long id;
        unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
        SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
        SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+#endif
        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
 
        /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
@@ -651,10 +762,10 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         */
        if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
                {
-               s->first_packet=1;
                s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
                }
-       n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+       s->first_packet=1;
+       n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
                SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
@@ -662,6 +773,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                &ok);
 
        if (!ok) return((int)n);
+       s->first_packet=0;
        d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 
        /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
@@ -669,7 +781,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
        s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
        p+=2;
 
-       if (s->client_version < s->version)
+       if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
+           (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
                {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
                if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 
@@ -681,6 +794,21 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                goto f_err;
                }
 
+       /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
+        * contain one, just return since we do not want to
+        * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
+        */
+       if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
+               {
+               unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
+               
+               session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+               cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
+
+               if (cookie_length == 0)
+                       return 1;
+               }
+
        /* load the client random */
        memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
        p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
@@ -697,14 +825,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
         * an earlier library version)
         */
-       if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
+       if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
                {
                if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
                        goto err;
                }
        else
                {
-               i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
+               i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
                if (i == 1)
                        { /* previous session */
                        s->hit=1;
@@ -719,6 +847,58 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                }
 
        p+=j;
+
+       if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+               {
+               /* cookie stuff */
+               cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+               /* 
+                * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+                * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+                * does not cause an overflow.
+                */
+               if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
+                       {
+                       /* too much data */
+                       al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+
+               /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+               if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+                       cookie_len > 0)
+                       {
+                       memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+                       if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
+                               {
+                               if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+                                       cookie_len) == 0)
+                                       {
+                                       al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 
+                                               SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+                                       goto f_err;
+                                       }
+                               /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+                               }
+                       else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 
+                                                 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
+                               {
+                                       al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 
+                                               SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+                                       goto f_err;
+                               }
+
+                       ret = 2;
+                       }
+
+               p += cookie_len;
+               }
+
        n2s(p,i);
        if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
                {
@@ -727,7 +907,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
                goto f_err;
                }
-       if ((i+p) > (d+n))
+       if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
                {
                /* not enough data */
                al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -763,27 +943,44 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                                break;
                                }
                        }
-               if (j == 0)
+/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
+#if 0
+               if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
                        {
-                       if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
-                               {
-                               /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
-                               s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
-                                                                      0);
-                               }
-                       else
+                       /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
+                        * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
+                        * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
+                        * preferences.  We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
+                        * enabled, though. */
+                       c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+                       if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
                                {
-                               /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
-                                * list if we are asked to reuse it */
-                               al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
-                               goto f_err;
+                               s->session->cipher = c;
+                               j = 1;
                                }
                        }
+#endif
+               if (j == 0)
+                       {
+                       /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
+                        * list if we are asked to reuse it */
+                       al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
                }
 
        /* compression */
        i= *(p++);
+       if ((p+i) > (d+n))
+               {
+               /* not enough data */
+               al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
        q=p;
        for (j=0; j<i; j++)
                {
@@ -799,10 +996,27 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                goto f_err;
                }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+       /* TLS extensions*/
+       if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+               {
+               if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+                       {
+                       /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+               }
+               if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+                       goto err;
+               }
+#endif
        /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
         * options, we will now look for them.  We have i-1 compression
         * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
        s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
        if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
                { /* See if we have a match */
                int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
@@ -827,11 +1041,15 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                else
                        comp=NULL;
                }
+#endif
 
        /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
+#if 0   /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
+         * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
+         * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
                {
-               if (p > (d+n))
+               if (p < (d+n))
                        {
                        /* wrong number of bytes,
                         * there could be more to follow */
@@ -840,13 +1058,18 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                }
+#endif
 
        /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
         * pick a cipher */
 
        if (!s->hit)
                {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+               s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
                s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
+#endif
                if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
                        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
                s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
@@ -910,7 +1133,19 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         * s->tmp.new_cipher    - the new cipher to use.
         */
 
-       ret=1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+       /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+       if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+               {
+               if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+               }
+#endif
+
+       if (ret < 0) ret=1;
        if (0)
                {
 f_err:
@@ -921,7 +1156,7 @@ err:
        return(ret);
        }
 
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
        {
        unsigned char *buf;
        unsigned char *p,*d;
@@ -932,9 +1167,10 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
                {
                buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
                p=s->s3->server_random;
-               Time=time(NULL);                        /* Time */
+               Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);                 /* Time */
                l2n(Time,p);
-               RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+               if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+                       return -1;
                /* Do the message type and length last */
                d=p= &(buf[4]);
 
@@ -952,11 +1188,24 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
                 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
                 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
                 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+                *
+                * We also have an additional case where stateless session
+                * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
+                * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
+                * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
+                * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
+                * is unaffected.
                 */
-               if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+               if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+                       && !s->hit)
                        s->session->session_id_length=0;
 
                sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+               if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                       return -1;
+                       }
                *(p++)=sl;
                memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
                p+=sl;
@@ -966,28 +1215,38 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
                p+=i;
 
                /* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+                       *(p++)=0;
+#else
                if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
                        *(p++)=0;
                else
                        *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+               if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                       return -1;
+                       }
+#endif
                /* do the header */
                l=(p-d);
                d=buf;
                *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
                l2n3(l,d);
 
-               s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
                /* number of bytes to write */
                s->init_num=p-buf;
                s->init_off=0;
                }
 
-       /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+       /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
        return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
        }
 
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
        {
        unsigned char *p;
 
@@ -1007,11 +1266,11 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
                s->init_off=0;
                }
 
-       /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+       /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
        return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
        }
 
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
        unsigned char *q;
@@ -1022,6 +1281,13 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
        DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+       EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+       unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+       int encodedlen = 0;
+       int curve_id = 0;
+       BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
 #endif
        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
        unsigned char *p,*d;
@@ -1091,7 +1357,6 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
                        if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
                                {
-                               DH_free(dh);
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                                goto err;
                                }
@@ -1131,6 +1396,132 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        }
                else 
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+                       if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
+                       {
+                       const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+                       ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+                       if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+                               {
+                               ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+                                     SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+                                     SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+                               }
+                       if (ecdhp == NULL)
+                               {
+                               al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
+
+                       if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                       /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+                       if (ecdhp == NULL)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                       if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                       s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+                       if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+                           (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+                           (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+                               {
+                               if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+                                   {
+                                   SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                                   goto err;
+                                   }
+                               }
+
+                       if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+                           (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
+                           (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                       if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+                           (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                       /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+                        * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
+                        * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+                        */
+                       if ((curve_id = 
+                           nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+                           == 0)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                       /* Encode the public key.
+                        * First check the size of encoding and
+                        * allocate memory accordingly.
+                        */
+                       encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
+                           EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+                           POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+                           NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+                       encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
+                           OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
+                       bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+                       if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+
+                       encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
+                           EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 
+                           POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+                           encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+                       if (encodedlen == 0) 
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                       BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+                       /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 
+                        * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+                        * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
+                        * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+                        * structure. 
+                        */
+                       n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+                       /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+                        * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+                        */
+                       r[0]=NULL;
+                       r[1]=NULL;
+                       r[2]=NULL;
+                       r[3]=NULL;
+                       }
+               else 
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
@@ -1158,7 +1549,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        kn=0;
                        }
 
-               if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,n+4+kn))
+               if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
                        goto err;
@@ -1173,6 +1564,32 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        p+=nr[i];
                        }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+               if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 
+                       {
+                       /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+                        * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+                        * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+                        * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+                        * the actual encoded point itself
+                        */
+                       *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+                       p += 1;
+                       *p = 0;
+                       p += 1;
+                       *p = curve_id;
+                       p += 1;
+                       *p = encodedlen;
+                       p += 1;
+                       memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
+                           (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
+                           encodedlen);
+                       OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+                       encodedPoint = NULL;
+                       p += encodedlen;
+                       }
+#endif
+
                /* not anonymous */
                if (pkey != NULL)
                        {
@@ -1185,6 +1602,8 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                j=0;
                                for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
                                        {
+                                       EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+                                               EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
                                        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
                                                ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
                                        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
@@ -1224,6 +1643,25 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                n+=i+2;
                                }
                        else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+                               if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+                               {
+                               /* let's do ECDSA */
+                               EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+                               EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+                               EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+                               EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+                               if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+                                       (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+                                       {
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+                                       goto err;
+                                       }
+                               s2n(i,p);
+                               n+=i+2;
+                               }
+                       else
 #endif
                                {
                                /* Is this error check actually needed? */
@@ -1248,11 +1686,15 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 f_err:
        ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
 err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+       if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+       BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
        return(-1);
        }
 
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
        {
        unsigned char *p,*d;
        int i,j,nl,off,n;
@@ -1285,7 +1727,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
                                {
                                name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
                                j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
-                               if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,4+n+j+2))
+                               if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
                                        {
                                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
                                        goto err;
@@ -1322,6 +1764,11 @@ static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
                s->init_num=n+4;
                s->init_off=0;
 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+               if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
                p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
 
                /* do the header */
@@ -1332,6 +1779,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
                s->init_num += 4;
 #endif
 
+               s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
                }
 
        /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
@@ -1340,7 +1788,7 @@ err:
        return(-1);
        }
 
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        {
        int i,al,ok;
        long n;
@@ -1358,7 +1806,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
-       n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+       EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+       EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+       EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+       BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
+#endif
+
+       n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
                SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
                SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
@@ -1402,8 +1857,9 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
                        }
 
-               /* TLS */
-               if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+               /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
+               if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
+                   s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                        {
                        n2s(p,i);
                        if (n != i+2)
@@ -1427,7 +1883,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+                       /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
                        }
 
                if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
@@ -1443,37 +1899,36 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
                                {
                                al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                               goto f_err;
+                               /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+
+                               /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+                                * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+                                * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
+                                * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
+                                * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
+                                * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
+                                * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
                                }
                        }
 
                if (al != -1)
                        {
-#if 0
-                       goto f_err;
-#else
                        /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
                         * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
-                        * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
-                        * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
-                        * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
-                        * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
-                        * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
-                        */
+                        * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
                        ERR_clear_error();
                        i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
                        p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
                        p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
-                       RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
-#endif
+                       if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+                               goto err;
                        }
        
                s->session->master_key_length=
                        s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                s->session->master_key,
                                p,i);
-               memset(p,0,i);
+               OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
                }
        else
 #endif
@@ -1525,6 +1980,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                if (i <= 0)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                       BN_clear_free(pub);
                        goto err;
                        }
 
@@ -1536,7 +1992,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                s->session->master_key_length=
                        s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                s->session->master_key,p,i);
-               memset(p,0,i);
+               OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
                }
        else
 #endif
@@ -1552,20 +2008,38 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                EVP_CIPHER              *enc = NULL;
                unsigned char           iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
                unsigned char           pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
-                                               + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 1];
-               int                     padl, outl = sizeof(pms);
+                                               + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+               int                     padl, outl;
                krb5_timestamp          authtime = 0;
                krb5_ticket_times       ttimes;
 
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
                 if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
 
                n2s(p,i);
                enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+               if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                               SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
                enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
                p+=enc_ticket.length;
 
                n2s(p,i);
                authenticator.length = i;
+
+               if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                               SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
                authenticator.data = (char *)p;
                p+=authenticator.length;
 
@@ -1574,8 +2048,18 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
                p+=enc_pms.length;
 
-               if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
-                                               enc_pms.length + 6)
+               /* Note that the length is checked again below,
+               ** after decryption
+               */
+               if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                              SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+                                               enc_pms.length + 6))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
@@ -1591,7 +2075,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                         if (kssl_err.text)
                                 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                 kssl_err.reason);
                         goto err;
                         }
@@ -1608,14 +2092,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                         if (kssl_err.text)
                                 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                 kssl_err.reason);
                         goto err;
                        }
 
                if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
                        {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
                         goto err;
                        }
 
@@ -1627,7 +2111,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 if (enc == NULL)
                     goto err;
 
-               memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);       /* per RFC 1510 */
+               memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);       /* per RFC 1510 */
 
                if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
                        {
@@ -1661,6 +2145,24 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                        goto err;
                        }
+               if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+                   {
+                   /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+                    * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+                    * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+                    * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
+                    * the protocol version.
+                    * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
+                    * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
+                    */
+                   if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                              SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+                   }
+
                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
 
                 s->session->master_key_length=
@@ -1669,7 +2171,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
                 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
                         {
-                        int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+                        size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
                         if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
                                 {
                                 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
@@ -1686,6 +2188,162 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 }
        else
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+               if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+               {
+               int ret = 1;
+               int field_size = 0;
+               const EC_KEY   *tkey;
+               const EC_GROUP *group;
+               const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+                /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+               if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               /* Let's get server private key and group information */
+               if (l & SSL_kECDH) 
+                       { 
+                        /* use the certificate */
+                       tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
+                       }
+               else
+                       {
+                       /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
+                        * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
+                        */
+                       tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+                       }
+
+               group    = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+               priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+               if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+                   !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                              ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               /* Let's get client's public key */
+               if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+                if (n == 0L) 
+                        {
+                       /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+
+                        if (l & SSL_kECDHE) 
+                                {
+                                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+                                goto f_err;
+                                }
+                        if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+                           == NULL) || 
+                           (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
+                               {
+                               /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+                                * authentication using ECDH certificates
+                                * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
+                                * never executed. When that support is
+                                * added, we ought to ensure the key 
+                                * received in the certificate is 
+                                * authorized for key agreement.
+                                * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
+                                * the two ECDH shares are for the same
+                                * group.
+                                */
+                               al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                   SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
+
+                       if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+                           EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                       ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                        ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                       /* Get client's public key from encoded point
+                        * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
+                        */
+                       if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                        /* Get encoded point length */
+                        i = *p; 
+                       p += 1;
+                       if (n != 1 + i)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                   ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                        if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 
+                           clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                   ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                        /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+                         * currently, so set it to the start 
+                         */ 
+                        p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+                        }
+
+               /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+               field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+               if (field_size <= 0)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
+                              ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+               i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
+                if (i <= 0)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+
+               EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+               EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+               if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
+                       EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+               BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+
+               /* Compute the master secret */
+                s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
+                   generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
+               
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+                return (ret);
+               }
+       else
+#endif
                {
                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
@@ -1696,13 +2354,20 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        return(1);
 f_err:
        ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
 err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+       EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+       EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+       if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
+               EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+       BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 #endif
        return(-1);
        }
 
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
        {
        EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
        unsigned char *p;
@@ -1711,11 +2376,11 @@ static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
        int type=0,i,j;
        X509 *peer;
 
-       n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+       n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
                -1,
-               512, /* 512? */
+               514, /* 514? */
                &ok);
 
        if (!ok) return((int)n);
@@ -1821,6 +2486,23 @@ static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
                        }
                }
        else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+               if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+               {
+               j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+                       &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+                       SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
+               if (j <= 0)
+                       {
+                       /* bad signature */
+                       al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+                           SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+               }
+       else
 #endif
                {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1840,15 +2522,16 @@ end:
        return(ret);
        }
 
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
        {
        int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
        X509 *x=NULL;
        unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
-       unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+       const unsigned char *p,*q;
+       unsigned char *d;
        STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
 
-       n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+       n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
                -1,
@@ -1883,7 +2566,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
                goto f_err;
                }
-       d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+       p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 
        if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
                {
@@ -1951,7 +2634,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
        else
                {
                i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-               if (!i)
+               if (i <= 0)
                        {
                        al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
@@ -2022,3 +2705,210 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
        /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
        return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
        }
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
+static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
+{
+       /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
+        * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
+       switch (nid) {
+       case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
+               return 1;
+       case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
+               return 2;
+       case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
+               return 3;
+       case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
+               return 4;
+       case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
+               return 5;
+       case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
+               return 6;
+       case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
+               return 7;
+       case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
+               return 8;
+       case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
+               return 9;
+       case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+               return 10;
+       case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
+               return 11;
+       case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
+               return 12;
+       case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
+               return 13;
+       case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
+               return 14;
+       case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
+               return 15;
+       case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
+               return 16;
+       case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
+               return 17;
+       case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
+               return 18;
+       case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
+               return 19;
+       case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
+               return 20;
+       case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
+               return 21;
+       case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
+               return 22;
+       case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+               return 23;
+       case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
+               return 24;
+       case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */       
+               return 25;
+       default:
+               return 0;
+       }
+}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+       {
+       if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+               {
+               unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+               int len, slen;
+               unsigned int hlen;
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+               HMAC_CTX hctx;
+               SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+               unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+               unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+               /* get session encoding length */
+               slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+               /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+                * too long
+                */
+               if (slen > 0xFF00)
+                       return -1;
+               /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+                * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+                * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+                * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+                * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+                * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+                */
+               if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+                       26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+                       EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+                       return -1;
+               senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+               if (!senc)
+                       return -1;
+               p = senc;
+               i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+               p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+               /* do the header */
+               *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+               /* Skip message length for now */
+               p += 3;
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+               HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+               /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+                * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+                * from parent ctx.
+                */
+               if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+                       {
+                       if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+                                                        &hctx, 1) < 0)
+                               {
+                               OPENSSL_free(senc);
+                               return -1;
+                               }
+                       }
+               else
+                       {
+                       RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+                       EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+                                       tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+                       HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+                                       tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+                       memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+                       }
+               l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+               /* Skip ticket length for now */
+               p += 2;
+               /* Output key name */
+               macstart = p;
+               memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+               p += 16;
+               /* output IV */
+               memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+               p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+               /* Encrypt session data */
+               EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+               p += len;
+               EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+               p += len;
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+               HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+               HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+               HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+               p += hlen;
+               /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+               /* Total length */
+               len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+               p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
+               l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
+               p += 4;
+               s2n(len - 10, p);  /* Ticket length */
+
+               /* number of bytes to write */
+               s->init_num= len;
+               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+               s->init_off=0;
+               OPENSSL_free(senc);
+               }
+
+       /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+       return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+       }
+
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+       {
+       if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
+               {
+               unsigned char *p;
+               /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+                * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+                * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+                * + (ocsp response)
+                */
+               if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+                       return -1;
+
+               p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+               /* do the header */
+               *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+               /* message length */
+               l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+               /* status type */
+               *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
+               /* length of OCSP response */
+               l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+               /* actual response */
+               memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+               /* number of bytes to write */
+               s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+               s->init_off = 0;
+               }
+
+       /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+       return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+       }
+#endif