* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
+#endif
+
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
if (init)
{
- memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
- sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
- SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
- init=0;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
+
+ if (init)
+ {
+ memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
+ sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
+ SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
+ SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
+ init=0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
}
return(&SSLv3_server_data);
}
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
long num1;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
- abort();
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
goto end;
}
- /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
- * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
- */
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
s->init_num=0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
+ /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
+ * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+ */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else
{
+ /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
+ * we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
- ret=1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
+ break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->new_session = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH */
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ )
+ /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+ * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+ * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+ * be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
- * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
+ * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
+ *
+ * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
+ * message only if the cipher suite is either
+ * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
+ * server certificate contains the server's
+ * public key for key exchange.
+ */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
|| (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
|| ((l & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)))
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num=0;
-
- /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
- * a client cert, it can be verified */
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ {
+ /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+ * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+ * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+ * message is not sent.
+ */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+ * a client cert, it can be verified
+ */
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ }
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- s->new_session=0;
s->init_num=0;
- ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
- /* s->server=1; */
- s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
- ret=1;
-
- if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-
+ if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+ {
+ /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+ s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
- s->in_handshake--;
return(ret);
}
int ok;
long n;
+ /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
+ * so permit appropriate message length */
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+ s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
* which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
* I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
* when a handshake is not completed ... */
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
* (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
p+=2;
+ if (s->client_version < s->version)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ {
+ /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
j= *(p++);
s->hit=0;
- if (j == 0)
+ /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
+ * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
+ * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
+ * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
+ * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
+ * an earlier library version)
+ */
+ if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((i+p) > (d+n))
+ if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
{
/* not enough data */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
/* compression */
i= *(p++);
+ if ((p+i) > (d+n))
+ {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
q=p;
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
{
/* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
- if (p > (d+n))
+ if (p < (d+n))
{
/* wrong number of bytes,
* there could be more to follow */
}
}
- /* Given s->session->ciphers and ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s), we must
+ /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
* pick a cipher */
if (!s->hit)
}
ciphers=NULL;
c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
- ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s));
+ SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL)
{
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
*(p++)=sl;
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
p+=sl;
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j,num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int u;
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ int curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *p,*d;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
n=0;
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
{
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
- CRYPTO_add(&rsa->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if(rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL)
}
else
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kEDH)
{
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
- !SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
DH_free(dh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
else
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
+ {
+ ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ecdh = ecdhp;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+ if ((ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
+ (ecdh->priv_key == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+ {
+ if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ecdh->group == NULL) ||
+ (ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
+ (ecdh->priv_key == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+ * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
+ * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh->group)))
+ == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key.
+ * First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
+ ecdh->pub_key,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
+ ecdh->pub_key,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
+ * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+ * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
+ * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n = 3 + encodedlen;
+
+ /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+ * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0]=NULL;
+ r[1]=NULL;
+ r[2]=NULL;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
kn=0;
}
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,n+4+kn))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
p+=nr[i];
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+ * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+ * the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
+ (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
+ encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
+#endif
+
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
* and p points to the space at the end. */
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
q=md_buf;
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
- EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
- ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1);
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+ ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx,q,
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
else
#endif
-#if !defined(NO_DSA)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
- EVP_SignInit(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1());
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
n+=i+2;
}
else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ n+=i+2;
+ }
+ else
#endif
{
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,4+n+j+2))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
long n;
unsigned long l;
unsigned char *p;
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
DH *dh_srvr;
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- 400, /* ???? */
+ 2048, /* ??? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (l & SSL_kRSA)
{
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ al = -1;
+
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- goto f_err;
}
- if ((p[0] != (s->client_version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->client_version & 0xff)))
+ if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+ * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+ * protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+ if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
+ (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
-#endif
+ if (al != -1)
+ {
+#if 0
+ goto f_err;
+#else
+ /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+ * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+ * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
+ * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
+ * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+ * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+#endif
+ }
+
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
memset(p,0,i);
}
else
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
n2s(p,i);
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,i);
+ memset(p,0,i);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ krb5_data enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator;
+ krb5_data enc_pms;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
+ krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
+ krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ enc_ticket.length = i;
+ enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=enc_ticket.length;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ authenticator.length = i;
+ authenticator.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=authenticator.length;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ enc_pms.length = i;
+ enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=enc_pms.length;
+
+ /* Note that the length is checked again below,
+ ** after decryption
+ */
+ if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ &kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
+ ** but will return authtime == 0.
+ */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+ &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
+ (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
+ {
+ int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
+ {
+ s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+ memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ ** but it caused problems for apache.
+ ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ */
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get server private key and group information */
+ if (l & SSL_kECDH)
+ {
+ /* use the certificate */
+ srvr_ecdh->group = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
+ pkey.eckey->group;
+ srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
+ pkey.eckey->priv_key;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
+ * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
+ */
+ srvr_ecdh->group = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->group;
+ srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->priv_key;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get client's public key */
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh->group))
+ == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L)
+ {
+ /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+
+ if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+ == NULL) ||
+ (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates
+ * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
+ * never executed. When that support is
+ * added, we ought to ensure the key
+ * received in the certificate is
+ * authorized for key agreement.
+ * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
+ * the two ECDH shares are for the same
+ * group.
+ */
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key);
+ ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Get client's public key from encoded point
+ * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
+ */
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get encoded point length */
+ i = *p;
+ p += 1;
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh->group,
+ clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+ * currently, so set it to the start
+ */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
+ srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+
+ /* Compute the master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
+ generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
+
+ memset(p, 0, i);
+ return (ret);
}
else
#endif
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-#if !defined(NO_DH) || !defined(NO_RSA)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
+ srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
return(-1);
}
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
- 512, /* 512? */
+ 514, /* 514? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
}
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
if (i > n)
goto f_err;
}
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
}
else
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
}
else
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.eckey);
+ if (j <= 0)
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
goto f_err;
}
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
-#if defined(MSDOS) && !defined(WIN32)
- 1024*30, /* 30k max cert list :-) */
-#else
- 1024*100, /* 100k max cert list :-) */
-#endif
+ s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
+ /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
+ * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
sk=NULL;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
{
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
- if (x == NULL)
+ if (x == NULL &&
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
+ & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
+static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
+{
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ return 1;
+ case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ return 2;
+ case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ return 3;
+ case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ return 4;
+ case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ return 5;
+ case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ return 6;
+ case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ return 7;
+ case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ return 8;
+ case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ return 9;
+ case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ return 10;
+ case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ return 11;
+ case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ return 12;
+ case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ return 13;
+ case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ return 14;
+ case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ return 15;
+ case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ return 16;
+ case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ return 17;
+ case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ return 18;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ return 19;
+ case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ return 20;
+ case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ return 21;
+ case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ return 22;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ return 23;
+ case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ return 24;
+ case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ return 25;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff