static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
+static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
- RAND_seed(&Time,sizeof(Time));
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
s->new_session=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_MS_SGC:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
+ if(s->state != SSL3_ST_SR_MS_SGC) ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else
|| (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
|| ((l & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
- || (SSL_IS_EXPORT(l)
- && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(l)
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
- if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+ * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)))
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+ * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+ * and in RFC 2246): */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+ * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
- /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
- * have not asked for it :-) */
- ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->init_num=0;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ /* Check for second client hello if MS SGC */
+ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+ if(ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if(ret == 2) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_MS_SGC;
+ else {
+ /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
+ * have not asked for it :-) */
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
* a client cert, it can be verified */
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- &(s->s3->tmp.finish_md[0]));
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- &(s->s3->tmp.finish_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_len);
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_REQUEST;
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
+static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+
+ n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+ -1,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+ &ok);
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ if(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) return 2;
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
if (!ok) return((int)n);
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- /* The version number has already been checked in ssl3_get_message.
- * I a native TLSv1/SSLv3 method, the match must be correct except
- * perhaps for the first message */
-/* s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; */
+ /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
+ * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
+ s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
p+=2;
/* load the client random */
p=s->s3->server_random;
Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
int j,num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
- DH *dh,*dhp;
+ DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *p,*d;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
- i=RSA_private_encrypt(j,md_buf,&(p[2]),
- pkey->pkey.rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
goto err;
}
- s2n(i,p);
- n+=i+2;
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n+=u+2;
}
else
#endif
s->init_off=0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-#if 1
+#if 0
/* If a bad decrypt, use a random master key */
if ((i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) ||
((p[0] != (s->client_version>>8)) ||
{
p[0]=(s->version>>8);
p[1]=(s->version & 0xff);
- RAND_bytes(&(p[2]),SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH-2);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(&(p[2]),SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH-2);
i=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
}
/* else, an SSLeay bug, ssl only server, tls client */
goto f_err;
}
- if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff)))
+ if ((p[0] != (s->client_version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->client_version & 0xff)))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
#ifndef NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
- i=RSA_public_decrypt(i,p,p,pkey->pkey.rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((i != (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) ||
- memcmp(&(s->s3->tmp.finish_md[0]),p,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (i == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
- &(s->s3->tmp.finish_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
if (j <= 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
- /* If tls asked for a client cert we must return a 0 list */
+ /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
* when we arrive here. */