/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
+#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "rand.h"
-#include "objects.h"
-#include "evp.h"
-#include "x509.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#define BREAK break
-/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- */
-
-#ifndef NOPROTO
+static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
+static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
-#else
-
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello();
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello();
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange();
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request();
-static int ssl3_send_server_done();
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify();
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange();
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate();
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request();
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method();
-
-#endif
-
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(ver)
-int ver;
+static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
- if (ver == 3)
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
-SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method()
+SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
{
static int init=1;
static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
if (init)
{
- init=0;
memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
+ init=0;
}
return(&SSLv3_server_data);
}
-int ssl3_accept(s)
-SSL *s;
+int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
long num1;
int ret= -1;
- CERT *ct;
- BIO *bbio,*under;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
- RAND_seed((unsigned char *)&Time,sizeof(Time));
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
- errno=0;
+ clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-#ifdef undef
- /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
- /* we don't actually need a cert, we just need a cert or a DH_tmp */
- if (((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->cert == NULL)) &&
- (s->cert == NULL))
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
+ return(-1);
}
-#endif
for (;;)
{
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
- s->version=3;
+ if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
goto end;
}
- /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
- * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
- */
- if (s->bbio == NULL)
- {
- bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- if (bbio == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_LIB_BUF);
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->bbio=bbio;
- }
- else
- bbio=s->bbio;
- BIO_reset(bbio);
- if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_LIB_BUF);
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
-
- s->ctx->sess_accept++;
s->init_num=0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
+ * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+ */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else
{
+ /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
+ * we will just send a HelloRequest */
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
- /* remove buffering on output */
- under=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
- if (under != NULL)
- s->wbio=under;
- else
- abort(); /* ok */
- BIO_free(s->bbio);
- s->bbio=NULL;
-
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
- ret=1;
- goto end;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->new_session = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
- if (s->session->cert == NULL)
- {
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- {
- CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
- s->session->cert=s->cert;
- }
- else
- {
- CRYPTO_add(&s->ctx->default_cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
- s->session->cert=s->ctx->default_cert;
- }
- }
- ct=s->session->cert;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
- if (s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ )
+ /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+ * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+ * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+ * be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
- if ( s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp ||
- (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA)) ||
- ((l & SSL_kRSA) &&
- ((ct->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL)||
- ((l & SSL_EXPORT) &&
- (EVP_PKEY_size(ct->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > 512)
- )
- )
+ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
+ || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ )
+ )
+ )
)
- )
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
- if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+ * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)))
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+ * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+ * and in RFC 2246): */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+ * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
}
else
{
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
- /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
- * have not asked for it :-) */
- ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->init_num=0;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ else {
+ /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
+ * have not asked for it :-) */
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified */
- ssl3_final_finish_mac(s,&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- NULL,&(s->s3->tmp.finish_md1[0]));
- ssl3_final_finish_mac(s,&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- NULL,&(s->s3->tmp.finish_md2[0]));
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B,
- &(ssl3_client_finished_const[0]));
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!ssl3_setup_key_block(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ { ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
- if (!ssl3_change_cipher_state(s,
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
- &(ssl3_server_finished_const[0]));
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
s->init_buf=NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
- under=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
- if (under != NULL)
- s->wbio=under;
- else
- abort(); /* ok */
- BIO_free(s->bbio);
- s->bbio=NULL;
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- s->new_session=0;
s->init_num=0;
- ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- s->ctx->sess_accept_good++;
- /* s->server=1; */
- s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
- ret=1;
-
- if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-
+ if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+ {
+ /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
goto end;
- break;
+ /* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
- break;
+ /* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
- if (s->debug) BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (s->debug)
+ {
+ if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+ s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
- s->in_handshake--;
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_REQUEST;
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+
+ /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
+ * so permit appropriate message length */
+ n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
+ {
+ /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
+ * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
+ * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
+ * when a handshake is not completed ... */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 2;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
long n;
unsigned long id;
- unsigned char *p,*d;
+ unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK *ciphers=NULL;
-
+ SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
+
+ /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
+ * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
+ * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
+ * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
+ * TLSv1.
+ */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
s->first_packet=1;
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
+ * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
+ s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
+ p+=2;
- if (p[0] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ if (s->client_version < s->version)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- goto err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ {
+ /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
}
- p+=2;
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
j= *(p++);
s->hit=0;
- if (j == 0)
+ /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
+ * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
+ * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
+ * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
+ * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
+ * an earlier library version)
+ */
+ if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
else
{
- i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,j,p);
+ i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
if (i == 1)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
}
- else
+ else if (i == -1)
+ goto err;
+ else /* i == 0 */
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
{
/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((i+p) > (d+n))
+ if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
{
/* not enough data */
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
j=0;
id=s->session->cipher->id;
- for (i=0; i<sk_num(ciphers); i++)
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
+#endif
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
{
- c=(SSL_CIPHER *)sk_value(ciphers,i);
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+#endif
if (c->id == id)
{
j=1;
}
if (j == 0)
{
- if ((s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_num(ciphers) == 1))
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
{
/* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
- s->session->cipher=
- (SSL_CIPHER *)sk_value(ciphers,0);
+ s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
+ 0);
}
else
{
/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
* list if we are asked to reuse it */
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
/* compression */
i= *(p++);
+ if ((p+i) > (d+n))
+ {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ q=p;
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
+ {
if (p[j] == 0) break;
+ }
p+=i;
if (j >= i)
{
/* no compress */
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
- if (p > (d+n))
- {
- /* wrong number of bytes,
- * there could be more to follow */
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
+ * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
+ * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+ if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
+ { /* See if we have a match */
+ int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
+
+ nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
+ v=comp->id;
+ for (o=0; o<i; o++)
+ {
+ if (v == q[o])
+ {
+ done=1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (done) break;
+ }
+ if (done)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+ else
+ comp=NULL;
}
- /* do nothing with compression */
+ /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (p < (d+n))
+ {
+ /* wrong number of bytes,
+ * there could be more to follow */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
- /* Given s->session->ciphers and ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s), we must
+ /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
* pick a cipher */
if (!s->hit)
{
+ s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
- sk_free(s->session->ciphers);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers=NULL;
c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
- ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s));
+ SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
{
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
- STACK *sk;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
- if (s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
{
sk=s->session->ciphers;
- for (i=0; i<sk_num(sk); i++)
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
- c=(SSL_CIPHER *)sk_value(sk,i);
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
nc=c;
- if (c->algorithms & SSL_EXP)
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec=c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
- * s->hit - sesson reuse flag
+ * s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
- if (ciphers != NULL) sk_free(ciphers);
+ if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
p=s->s3->server_random;
Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
- *(p++)=SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
- *(p++)=SSL3_VERSION_MINOR;
+ *(p++)=s->version>>8;
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
* back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
+ * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
*/
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+ s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++)=sl;
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
- *(p++)=0;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ *(p++)=0;
+ else
+ *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j,num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int u;
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
- DH *dh,*dhp;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *p,*d;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
- cert=s->session->cert;
+ cert=s->cert;
buf=s->init_buf;
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
n=0;
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
{
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
- if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->ctx->default_cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
- rsa=s->ctx->default_cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms|
- SSL_NOT_EXP)?0:1);
- CRYPTO_add(&rsa->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ if(rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kEDH)
{
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
- if ((dhp == NULL) && (cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
- dhp=cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms|
- SSL_NOT_EXP)?0:1);
+ if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
}
s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
- if (((dhp->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (dhp->priv_key == NULL) ||
- (s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) &&
- (!DH_generate_key(dh)))
+ if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+ dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
+ if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
else
{
else
#endif
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
== NULL)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
{
/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
* and p points to the space at the end. */
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
q=md_buf;
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
- EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx,(num == 2)?EVP_md5():EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+ ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx,q,
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
- i=RSA_private_encrypt(j,md_buf,&(p[2]),
- pkey->pkey.rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
goto err;
}
- s2n(i,p);
- n+=i+2;
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n+=u+2;
}
else
#endif
-#if !defined(NO_DSA)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
- EVP_SignInit(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1());
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
#endif
{
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
s->init_off=0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
- STACK *sk=NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
nl=0;
if (sk != NULL)
{
- for (i=0; i<sk_num(sk); i++)
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
- name=(X509_NAME *)sk_value(sk,i);
+ name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,4+n+j+2))
{
goto err;
}
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
- if (!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
s->init_num=n+4;
s->init_off=0;
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
+#endif
+
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i,al,ok;
long n;
unsigned long l;
unsigned char *p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
- BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
DH *dh_srvr;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- 400, /* ???? */
+ 2048, /* ??? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (l & SSL_kRSA)
{
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
{
- if ((s->session->cert != NULL) &&
- (s->session->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
- rsa=s->session->cert->rsa_tmp;
- else if ((s->ctx->default_cert != NULL) &&
- (s->ctx->default_cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
- rsa=s->ctx->default_cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
+ rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
/* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
* be sent already */
if (rsa == NULL)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
goto f_err;
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
- i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-#if 1
- /* If a bad decrypt, use a dud master key */
- if ((i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) ||
- (p[0] != 3) ||
- (p[1] != 0))
+ /* TLS */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
- p[0]=3;
- p[1]=0;
- RAND_bytes(&(p[2]),SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH-2);
- i=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (n != i+2)
+ {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ p-=2;
+ }
+ else
+ n=i;
}
-#else
+
+ i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+ al = -1;
+
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- goto f_err;
}
- if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff)))
+ if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+ * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+ * protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+ if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
+ (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
-#endif
+ if (al != -1)
+ {
+#if 0
+ goto f_err;
+#else
+ /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+ * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+ * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
+ * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
+ * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+ * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+#endif
+ }
+
s->session->master_key_length=
- ssl3_generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p,i);
memset(p,0,i);
}
else
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
-
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
{
- if (!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
{
if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+
i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0)
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=
- ssl3_generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,i);
+ memset(p,0,i);
}
else
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ krb5_data enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator;
+ krb5_data enc_pms;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 1];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(pms);
+ krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
+ krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ enc_ticket.length = i;
+ enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=enc_ticket.length;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ authenticator.length = i;
+ authenticator.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=authenticator.length;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ enc_pms.length = i;
+ enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=enc_pms.length;
+
+ if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ &kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
+ ** but will return authtime == 0.
+ */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+ &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
+ (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
+ {
+ int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
+ {
+ s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+ memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ ** but it caused problems for apache.
+ ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ */
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
{
- al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
err:
+#endif
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
unsigned char *p;
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
- al=SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
ret=1;
if (peer == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
- al=SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- al=SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
if (i > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
- i=RSA_public_decrypt(i,p,p,pkey->pkey.rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((i != (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) ||
- memcmp(&(s->s3->tmp.finish_md1[0]),
- p,MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) ||
- memcmp(&(s->s3->tmp.finish_md2[0]),
- &(p[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (i == 0)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
- j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,s->s3->tmp.finish_md2,
+ j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
if (j <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
else
#endif
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al=SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
goto f_err;
}
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
end:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(s)
-SSL *s;
+static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
X509 *x=NULL;
unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
- STACK *sk=NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
-#if defined(MSDOS) && !defined(WIN32)
- 1024*30, /* 30k max cert list :-) */
-#else
- 1024*100, /* 100k max cert list :-) */
-#endif
+ s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al=SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE;
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
+ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- if ((sk=sk_new_null()) == NULL)
+ if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
n2l3(p,llen);
if (llen+3 != n)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
n2l3(p,l);
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (p != (q+l))
{
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!sk_push(sk,(char *)x))
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
nc+=l+3;
}
- if (sk_num(sk) <= 0)
+ if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
{
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_PASSED);
- goto f_err;
+ /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
- i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if (!i)
+ else
{
- al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
+ i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
+ if (!i)
+ {
+ al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
- /* This should not be needed */
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
X509_free(s->session->peer);
-
- s->session->peer=(X509 *)sk_shift(sk);
+ s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
+ * when we arrive here. */
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
+ /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
+ * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
+
+ sk=NULL;
ret=1;
if (0)
}
err:
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
- if (sk != NULL) sk_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
+ if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
-int ssl3_send_server_certificate(s)
-SSL *s;
+int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long l;
X509 *x;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
{
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
- if (x == NULL)
+ if (x == NULL &&
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
+ & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff